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Introduction: Happiness, Utility  
and the Republic of Letters
Mark Philp and Georgios Varouxakis
‘Oh man! … can someone else know what pleases you better than 
you do?’ (Jeremy Bentham)1
‘It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; 
better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied. And if the 
fool, or the pig, is of a different opinion, it is because they only 
know their own side to the question.’ (John Stuart Mill)2
I.
Happiness was the ultimate end of life in the view of some of the most 
influential ancient Greek, Hellenistic and Roman philosophers. Happiness 
is also the end of life according to the modern utilitarian tradition – best 
exemplified in the works of Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill, but 
clearly based on deep and lasting influences from both classical philoso-
phy and early modern sources in the Scottish and French Enlightenments. 
This does not mean either that the view is uncontentious – few Christian 
sources, for example, between these periods thought of the ultimate ends 
of mankind as principally concerned with pleasure or happiness – or that 
it is a clear and uncomplicated idea. What constitutes happiness, how far 
it is identifiable with pleasure, whether pleasures are comparable and can 
be calculated or are distinct and in various ways incommensurable – such 
issues raise often deep philosophical questions about the nature of the 
good, the character of virtue, and the basis of value in human life. Even 
when we agree that we want to be happy, it is not clear that we are neces-
sarily envisaging that idea in the same way.3
2 HAPPINESS AND UTIL ITY
This collection of essays pays tribute to the work of our friend and 
colleague Fred Rosen, who spent the greater part of his academic life 
wrestling with the philosophy of happiness. Fred has had a distinguished 
and versatile career. He spent most of his years as an academic before he 
retired in 2003 at University College London (UCL), leading the editing 
of the impressive definitive UCL edition of The Collected Works of Jeremy 
Bentham, and being the Director of the Bentham Project, as well as the 
Chair of the History of Political Thought in the Department of History at 
UCL. But he had done quite different things before that. Fred was born in 
the State of New York and educated at Colgate University and Syracuse 
University in the US. He then moved to the UK where he completed his 
PhD under the supervision of the late Professor Maurice Cranston at the 
London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE). He had already 
begun his association with the Bentham Project at UCL by 1965, work-
ing for a year as a research assistant under the general editorship of 
Professor J. H. Burns, before being appointed lecturer at City University, 
in London. In 1971 he moved to a post in the Department of Government 
at the LSE. In 1983, Fred was seconded to the Bentham Project to take up 
what was initially a three-year appointment as General Editor, a post he 
held until his retirement 20 years later (in the last years as Joint General 
Editor along with Professor Philip Schofield). Though he was, until his 
retirement, best known for his penetrating analyses of Jeremy Bentham’s 
thought, Fred has always had wide interests in the broader canon of polit-
ical thought, in classics, and in the history of utilitarianism, exemplified 
in his Classical Utilitarianism from Hume to Mill (2003). After he retired, 
he dedicated himself to a major new study of John Stuart Mill, which was 
published in the Oxford University Press ‘Founders of Modern Political 
and Social Thought’ series in 2013. Much more work on the younger 
Mill accompanied that research in the form of various publications. He 
has also had a long-standing interest in ancient Greek political thought, 
which he taught at the LSE for many years. And besides teaching and 
publishing on the subject, he animated its study and promotion by run-
ning for many years the Society for Greek Political Thought and editing 
its journal, Polis: The Journal of Ancient Greek Political Thought (which 
continues to flourish under the editorship of Fred’s former student, 
Professor Kyriakos Demetriou). He was to continue as a journal editor by 
adding to his record the editorship of The Bentham Newsletter and then, 
when the latter merged with The Mill Newsletter, of Utilitas, founded in 
1989 – which is, happily, still thriving as one of the leading international 
journals on ethics. And as if Bentham, Mill and the ancient Greeks were 
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not enough, his first book was on William Godwin and his publications 
include work on the twentieth-century French philosopher Simone Weil.
Fred has played a crucial role in the establishment and running of 
the International Society for Utilitarian Studies (ISUS), which has for 
decades now been a major global network of scholarly cooperation and 
interaction and whose biannual international conferences are the high-
light of many academics’ professional lives. As Philip Schofield empha-
sizes in Chapter 3, Fred also encouraged and supported the founding of 
the Ibero-American Society for Utilitarian Studies, two of whose most 
active members are contributing chapters to this volume. In addition, 
Fred served for many years as one of the convenors of the Seminar in 
the History of Political Ideas at the Institute of Historical Research (IHR) 
of the University of London’s Institute of Advanced Studies. He success-
fully and generously supervised a great number of PhD students from all 
corners of the globe, several of whom have become academics in their 
respective countries teaching ‘the Utilitarian or Happiness theory’, as one 
of its main promoters called it.4
Utilitarianism has become a crowded philosophical field, but Fred’s 
core contribution to it has been to insist on the importance of taking 
an interpretative approach that focuses on the author’s intentions and 
way of framing the problem that they seek to answer. Although there is 
some affinity with the contextualist approach to the history of political 
thought developed by Quentin Skinner and John Dunn, Fred has also 
been especially concerned to ensure that we understand how enquiries in 
one dimension of a thinker’s oeuvre connect to other dimensions. Fred’s 
view of Mill’s political philosophy, for example, is deeply influenced by 
his understanding of Mill’s Logic. To understand his case in On Liberty, 
we need to grasp his commitments on secondary principles and his pro-
jected science of ‘ethology’. Similarly, he takes extremely seriously Mill’s 
engagement with continental thought, and perhaps especially his reac-
tion to Auguste Comte’s thinking. One result of this approach is that the 
Mill most undergraduates encounter in courses on political theory and 
philosophy is revealed to be a much richer and more complex thinker than 
the Mill captured in many of the present debates to which students are 
pointed – on types of utilitarianism, the nature of utility, the connection 
between liberty and utility, the role of the state in the pursuit of happiness, 
or the proper grounds for punishment. Moreover, Fred defends a similarly 
more complex view of Bentham, not least against some aspects of Mill’s 
own interpretation. In the course of his work, he has given us an account 
of the utilitarian tradition and of the thinking of its key figures, which is 
4 HAPPINESS AND UTIL ITY
an essential corrective to the ruthless appropriation of their work by the 
Anglo-American analytical tradition of political philosophy. He offers us 
a more human, complex and subtle appreciation of what Mill referred to 
as the ‘Art of Life’. His picture remains committed to the ultimate value 
of pleasure, but it is one in which a range of secondary principles are 
essential for the achievement of that end, and those principles necessi-
tate ensuring that there is a very wide area of liberty in which people can 
choose their path. This approach to Bentham and Mill is at once more 
careful and faithful to what they wrote, more illuminating about their 
different areas of interest and commitment, and more cautious in fitting 
them into  modern categories of thinking that are too often  anachronistic – 
Fred shows, for example, that Mill was not especially interested in moral 
philosophy, even if that is where most students encounter him! His  editing 
of Bentham and his interpretative work bringing back debates on the 
founders of this core philosophical tradition at the same time provides us 
with ways to rethink our own present and its priorities. At the heart of his 
approach has remained a commitment to helping us think better about 
the present, by thinking in more sophisticated ways thanks to working in 
conversation with some of the masters of the past.
In the papers that follow, a group of leading scholars in the wide 
field of utilitarian studies take up some of the knottiest, most recurrent 
problems in that field. They bring to it different methodological and dis-
ciplinary perspectives, and they are by no means in agreement with all 
aspects of Fred Rosen’s interpretation of the utilitarian canon. But their 
work is responding to the immense contribution he has made in reani-
mating debate on the character and legacy of utilitarianism and on the 
nature of happiness and utility.
II.
In Chapter 2, Emmanuelle de Champs argues that ‘[b]y the end of the 
eighteenth century, happiness was well established in political vocabu-
lary’. And she shows amply that the two thinkers she compares were at 
the forefront of attempts to make happiness the desirable aim in politics. 
Her essay uses the shared focus on the vocabulary of ‘happiness’ in the 
early thought of both Bentham and Condorcet to make a convincing his-
torical case for studying them ‘side by side’. She proceeds to analyse their 
respective positions on happiness through the lens of the context provided 
by the influential writings of Helvétius, whose work had a major impact 
on, and was commented on, by both thinkers. The essay then moves to 
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comparing the approaches of Bentham and Condorcet on a number of 
questions directly related to happiness in the early years of the French 
Revolution, up to 1791. The events of that year (triggered by the French 
king’s flight and arrest at Varennes) did mark a divide in the responses 
they evoked on the part of the two thinkers. For that reason, and to avoid 
projecting later positions onto earlier ones, her paper focuses on sources 
before 1791. She shows convincingly through focusing on a number of 
angles and by scrutinizing an impressive number of sources – many of 
them unpublished manuscript sources – as well as through sharp anal-
ysis of similarities and differences, that, in their political thinking, Con-
dorcet and Bentham shared more than has usually been acknowledged. 
Starting from comparable anthropological foundational premises, both 
Bentham and Condorcet recognized as the ultimate goal of politics, and 
as the measure of political success, the advancement of happiness. She 
also shows that Bentham was more flexible on the potential reconcila-
bility between utility and rights arguments than one would imagine 
on the basis of his later writings (starting from his notorious attack on 
rights-rhetoric in Nonsense upon Stilts from the mid-1790s). Neither their 
respective definitions of happiness nor the status each of them ascribed to 
the individual was very different, according to de Champs. She identifies 
striking similarities in their parallel moves towards democratic forms of 
government, in their emphasis on political equality, in their shared advo-
cacy of the state’s duty to secure the conditions conducive to the well-be-
ing of individuals, the need for a free public opinion and for enlightening 
the people through education. However, much was to change with the 
advent and course of the French Revolution. It was then that a polariza-
tion emerged between two types of arguments, one drawing on natural 
rights and another on utility. But the major contribution of de Champs’s 
essay is to show conclusively that the two respective types of liberalism 
that are routinely identified around these two different strategies for 
educating public opinion and legitimating reform were not hermetically 
distinct from each other but rather ‘developed historically together and 
in constant dialogue with one another’.
Those interconnections become still clearer in Manuel Escamilla-
Castillo’s examination in Chapter 8 of a crucial moment in modern 
American liberalism, F. D. Roosevelt’s 1941 ‘Four Freedoms’ speech. 
Using Bentham’s less florid language, Roosevelt pressed the question of 
the extent to which a set of concerns that were responding to a desper-
ate political and international moment might find a better formulation in 
Bentham’s legal positivism than in the human rights discourse to which 
they were subsequently seen as naturally aligned.
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Bentham’s stringent semantic hygiene with respect to natural rights 
is a matter of notoriety, but it is not clear (as de Champs also encour-
ages us to see) that the concerns of those thinking in terms of rights and 
those thinking in terms of happiness were drawing on very different 
sources of inspiration. As Escamilla-Castillo shows, there is much to be 
gained by insisting we restrict rights claims to those legally sanctioned 
and enforced. But to do so leaves open the question of which ends that 
law should pursue. For Bentham, those ends should be security, subsist-
ence, abundance and equality. It then becomes an empirical question of 
exactly what system of legally enforceable claims and guarantees will 
produce the optimal outcome in terms of those four ends – and while 
Bentham had strong views about the order of priority, this too must be a 
question of how far those priorities secure the greatest overall happiness. 
In making detailed legislative judgements, we must also consider what 
weight to give to which dimensions in respect to the possible outcomes 
we believe we can ensure. Moreover, while Bentham does not put it quite 
like this, we might well ask what forms and dimensions of freedom would 
best secure his ends. Like Roosevelt, then, we might well say that free-
dom in terms of conscience and the expression of belief is central, but so 
too is security and freedom from want (Bentham’s ‘abundance’). For both 
Bentham and Roosevelt, we cannot doubt the importance of such condi-
tions for happiness. But it is then a complex matter to work out how to 
secure these subordinate ends in practice (and exactly what role govern-
ment should play in doing so). In that process of reflection, it is difficult 
to see that one can exclude a priori much from the full range of liberal 
thought, from libertarianism through to social democracy, since each 
position in the whole range of perspectives offers insights, choices and 
political goals. The devil is in the detail, and while we probably ought to 
reject the overblown and distinctly casual rhetoric of much human rights 
discourse, its objectives do not look that different from Bentham’s utili-
tarian concerns.
In Chapter 4, in a wide-ranging essay on scepticism and Epicureanism 
from David Hume to J. S. Mill, James Moore follows the combination of 
scepticism and Epicureanism in the thought of David Hume as well as in 
the reception of Hume’s writings, most notably relating to A Treatise of 
Human Nature (1739–1740). That reception was not necessarily what 
Hume would have wished, with the early treatise dominating commen-
tary – rather than the later An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding 
and An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, as Hume would 
have much preferred. Moore follows the vicissitudes of commentary on 
Hume’s combination of Pyrrhonian scepticism and Epicureanism from 
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the time of the publication of the Treatise to the two Mills (James and 
John Stuart), via Jeremy Bentham and many others. The criticisms that 
Hume’s thought provoked and the debates it generated in Scotland, 
starting with Thomas Reid and on to Adam Ferguson, are also lucidly 
highlighted. Hume’s attachment to Cicero’s moral teachings comes out 
strongly in the essay. Professor Moore highlights some striking similari-
ties between Hume and the three leading classical utilitarians (Bentham 
and the two Mills), but also subtly brings out their differences, even where 
similarities of approach existed. Finally, we would like to draw attention 
to Moore’s observation that ‘It is remarkable that nowhere in a book of 
over 400 pages does [James] Mill ever challenge Mackintosh’s repeated 
characterization of Bentham and his school as Epicureans. “Epicurean”, 
it seems, was a term that did not present a problem for James Mill.’ This 
observation is important, as Antis Loizides agrees in a later chapter, 
although James Mill’s formal subscription to Epicureanism did not mean 
that his conception of happiness was less complicated than that subscrip-
tion might at first sight imply.
In ‘Shaftesbury, Hutcheson and Mill on Pleasure and Virtue’, Chapter 
6, Roger Crisp contributes a highly focused comparison of three philoso-
phers who grappled persistently with the relationship between happiness 
and virtue. Crisp explains that both of the eighteenth-century philoso-
phers he compares with J. S. Mill distinguished between higher and 
lower pleasures, placed virtue in the category of higher pleasures, and 
regarded it as an important constituent of happiness. Crisp begins with an 
analysis of the thought of Shaftesbury, which he stresses was extremely 
influential in the eighteenth century. Crisp shows that Shaftesbury was 
staunchly opposed to evaluative hedonism and insisted that consistency 
can be achieved only through aiming at virtue. Highlighting Shaftesbury’s 
Stoic views on desire, Crisp shows that he put a very high value on con-
tentment or tranquillity. He also shows that Shaftesbury’s main argu-
ment against unrestricted hedonism was ‘solidly Aristotelian’. That is, 
the pleasures really characteristic of the human being are the pleasures 
of virtuous action itself. Thus, Crisp establishes that Shaftesbury’s objec-
tion was not to hedonism per se, but to unrestricted hedonism. He reads 
Shaftesbury as ‘a substantive hedonist about well-being’, to the extent 
that he believed happiness consists ‘in pleasurable experiences arising 
from valuable objects, and in particular the state of mental contentment 
arising from virtue and virtuous activity’. Therefore ‘pleasure in worth-
less objects is itself worthless’. Crisp offers a detailed critical analysis of 
a series of interrelated arguments put forward by Shaftesbury to support 
his conclusion that the life of the virtuous person is the happiest. Crisp 
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then moves to analyse Hutcheson’s attempts to convince people that their 
individual greatest happiness lies in virtue. Crisp sees Hutcheson as an 
evaluative hedonist who held that the happiness of any individual is iden-
tical with ‘pleasant perceptions’, and saw public happiness as consisting 
merely in the aggregate of such perceptions. Crisp also argues that, like 
J.S. Mill, Hutcheson ‘did not sustain a clear distinction between happiness 
as pleasure, and happiness as the greatest balance of pleasure over pain 
within a life’. Crisp highlights the importance of ‘dignity’, in addition to 
intensity and duration, in Hutcheson’s assessment of degrees of pleasant-
ness or painfulness. He takes Hutcheson to be ‘a substantive but not an 
explanatory hedonist’ and scrutinizes Hutcheson’s own self-identification 
within the perfectionist Aristotelian tradition, according to which happi-
ness itself consists in the perfection of one’s nature. Crisp concludes by 
drawing briefly but explicitly the main parallels between the two eight-
eenth-century predecessors and J.S. Mill and offering a hypothesis as to 
what the differences of context may allow us to guess regarding Mill’s rhe-
torical strategies.
In Chapter 5, ‘Bentham on “Hume’s Virtues”’, José L. Tasset offers 
a concise and tightly argued analysis of the main criticisms that Jeremy 
Bentham levelled against David Hume’s theory of virtues. Tasset also 
highlights the high praise that Bentham had for Hume’s originality in 
many respects – from Bentham’s admiration for Hume’s distinction 
between impressions and ideas, through his demolition of the ‘fiction’ of 
the social contract, to the oft-quoted passage where Bentham acknowl-
edged that he ‘felt as if scales had fallen from my eyes’ when he read 
Hume’s attribution of the foundations of virtue in utility. But even in that 
famous text from his first published book, A Fragment on Government, 
Bentham was critical of the exceptions Hume had made to the attribu-
tion of (almost) all virtues to foundations of utility. Tasset highlights 
the main attractions of Hume’s work for Bentham from very early on, 
and then moves to analyse Bentham’s criticisms. One of Bentham’s main 
objections was that he thought Hume was misguided in conceiving vir-
tues as falling within the domain of intelligence. In contrast, Bentham 
thought that virtues were always related to the will (for Bentham, ‘there 
is no virtue where there is no struggle. Virtue implies a victory over some-
thing.’). But Tasset argues that Bentham misunderstood Hume’s use of 
the word ‘mind’, which – in Hume’s vocabulary – referred to the whole 
set of mental acts and is not limited to intelligence. It thus included the 
will. Tasset proposes an answer to Bentham’s first criticism in Humean 
terms by suggesting that an action’s voluntary character is not the key to 
evaluating it as a virtue but rather (he quotes Roger Crisp approvingly) 
 HAPPINESS,  UT IL ITY AND THE REPUBLIC OF LETTERS 9
‘[i]t is … the durability or the steadiness of moral qualities that leads to 
their being the primary concern of ethical judgements’. By moving the 
criterion from the voluntary (or otherwise) nature of acts to questions 
of the kind ‘What qualities should we possess?’ or ‘Into what kind of per-
son (from our qualities) should we develop?’, Tasset argues that moral 
qualities are justified ‘regardless of whether they are natural or artificial, 
voluntary or not’. That means, as he puts it, that ‘we can certainly establish 
that we must possess them, in so far as they promote utility’.
Even more serious for Bentham was what he saw as a contradiction 
in Hume’s overall thesis on virtues, to the extent that – as Tasset puts 
it – it first connected virtues with utility as their foundation and then sug-
gested that not all virtues derive their value and approval from utility. 
Tasset explains that Hume claimed utility was always a source of moral 
approval, but went on to also say that it was not the sole source of moral 
approval. However, Hume went on to argue, too, that utility is the sole 
source of moral approval with respect to some particular virtues such as 
justice. Bentham took exception to the exceptions and saw their evoca-
tion as contradictory to the role of utility in Hume’s theory. Tasset argues 
that in including the exceptions and qualifications, Hume avoided ‘falling 
into what might be called a utilitarian monism’. He also argues that in his 
refusal to proclaim utility as the foundation of all morality, Hume was 
‘applying his famous argument about the limited possibilities of reason 
in ethics and the predominant, non-exclusive and non-excluding role of 
passions within the domain of morality’.
Antis Loizides contributes an original and impressively docu-
mented analysis of James Mill’s conception of happiness in Chapter 9. 
Beginning with the premise that there was much more to James Mill 
than just the fact that he was the father of John Stuart Mill and the prop-
agandizing agent of Jeremy Bentham (important though those contribu-
tions were), Loizides sets out to scrutinize closely an astonishing array of 
writings of many different genres in which James Mill expressed himself 
on the meaning and content of happiness. He begins with a section that 
both elucidates the context and content of classical education in eight-
eenth-century Scotland, and highlights the extent to which James Mill 
was unusually deeply immersed in the classics. Besides the elder Mill’s 
compulsive interest in Plato, which Loizides had already analysed in an 
earlier work,5 he emphasizes here Mill’s sustained attention to Cicero, 
a classical thinker who also has an important place in other essays in 
this volume. Having established the major importance of grasping 
James Mill’s immersion in the classics in any attempt to understand his 
thought, Loizides then moves to focus on what can be gleaned of Mill’s 
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conception of happiness from a subtle reading of many arguments found 
in two sets of his writings, namely those on education and his essays 
advocating parliamentary reform. Loizides shows beyond doubt that 
from early on James Mill drew a distinction, which his son later made 
famous, between higher and lower pleasures – a theme that is also fruit-
fully discussed in other essays in this volume.6 But he goes on to argue 
that even more important with regard to happiness was the distinction 
between pursuing one’s own happiness or pleasures without concern for 
others’ happiness, on the one hand, and conceiving one’s happiness as 
deriving from one’s contribution to the happiness of others. The way 
Mill thought the latter conception could prevail, Loizides shows, was 
through education, designed so as to promote the right association of 
ideas. The passages from Mill’s works as well as the unpublished manu-
scripts that Loizides analyses are striking, and he uses them skilfully to 
highlight the subtlety of James Mill’s proposals for ways in which educa-
tion and political institutions could be combined to make the promotion 
of the happiness of the community constitutive of the individual’s per-
ception of his/her own happiness.
Political philosophers of happiness are not the natural allies of 
statesmen and -women in the modern world, but one of the striking fea-
tures of the work of Bentham and the two Mills is their willingness to 
attend to the details of constitutional design, so as to ensure that political 
systems could offer their subjects the best possible chance of securing 
happiness. Bentham certainly had a penchant for volunteering his advice 
to legislators. And he was impartial in the distribution of his advice. The 
French had received their fair share already by the early 1790s, during 
the turmoil of rapidly changing situations in their great Revolution. 
And in the early 1820s, the Spaniards were not alone in attracting 
Bentham’s attention and counsel. He also advised the Portuguese to 
adopt the main outlines of the Spanish Constitution of 1812, with the 
exception of four all-important amendments that he recommended to 
them.7 The Greeks got some of it as well not long afterwards.8 Philip 
Schofield’s essay, Chapter  3, focuses squarely on Bentham’s comments 
on the Spanish Constitution of 1812, basing his analysis on three differ-
ent sets of Bentham’s writings. First there was Bentham’s advice to the 
Spaniards once the Constitution of Cadiz (that had been promulgated 
in 1812) was restored by the Spanish king under revolutionary pressure 
from liberals in March 1820. This material began as the substantial essay 
‘Emancipation Spanish’ in the summer of 1820 and was eventually com-
pleted by April 1822 under the title ‘Rid Yourselves of Ultramaria’.9 The 
second set of commentary on the Spanish constitution comprised a series 
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of letters that Bentham began writing in late 1820 and that was eventu-
ally published as On the Liberty of the Press, and Public Discussion (July 
1821).10 The third essay was the letter addressed to the Portuguese men-
tioned above. Schofield analyses the main arguments Bentham used to 
warn the Spaniards (and then the Portuguese) of the shortcomings of a 
constitution of which he approved overall as a step in the direction of pro-
gress – recognizing that it established the felicity of the members of the 
nation as the ‘right and proper end of government’. Bentham used his sub-
stantial rhetorical skills to praise what was good about the constitution, 
but he did not mince his words about the serious dangers that he saw 
lurking behind some of its provisions. He thought that the type of mixed 
government envisaged was unstable and would sooner or later degener-
ate in the direction of either despotism or democracy. He castigated what 
he called the infallibility-assuming clause that forbade any amendments 
to the constitution for eight years. He poured scorn on the provision for 
the assembly to meet for only up to four months per year. And Bentham 
was unhappy about the constitution’s stipulation of biannual instead of 
annual elections to the representative assembly (Cortes).
This latter measure had been justified as necessary for the repre-
sentatives of the Spanish overseas colonies in Central and South America 
to be able to participate in the Cortes and travel to and from their con-
stituencies. That was only one of the many problems Bentham saw with 
the constitution’s (and the deputies’) clear desire to retain the colonial 
possessions of Spain. As Schofield’s analysis highlights, it was the issue 
of the colonies, the ‘ultramaria’, that Bentham was most exercised about. 
It is not accidental that the major essay commenting on the Constitution 
of 1812 was titled, in relation to that issue in particular, ‘Rid Yourselves 
of Ultramaria’. This was not the first time Bentham had become exer-
cised by the issues of colonial possessions and their impact on the hap-
piness of all those concerned. Already in 1793 he had used his recently 
bestowed status as honorary citizen of France to advise the French rev-
olutionaries to ‘Emancipate [their] Colonies’.11 As in ‘Emancipate Your 
Colonies’, Bentham could not resist using, repeatedly, lunar metaphors to 
emphasize the unrealistic and self-defeating results of the Spanish depu-
ties expecting to rule the distant overseas colonies in Latin America, the 
‘Ultramaria’ (a term he coined, as was his wont). The subtlety and power 
of the arguments against the possession of colonies and the remarka-
bly effective and witty way in which Bentham formulated those argu-
ments, both in the case of the French in the 1790s and in the case of the 
Spaniards in the 1820s, have attracted much amply deserved attention 
in recent years.12
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In Chapter 14, ‘The Failure of Planned Happiness: The Rise and Fall 
of British Home Colonies’, Barbara Arneil discusses the neglected topic 
of repeated attempts by a number of thinkers and activists to promote 
happiness through the establishment of colonies for marginalized groups 
within the territory of metropolitan Britain (as opposed to overseas 
colonization, which was of course on the agenda for others). As Arneil 
stresses, many of those who proposed such colonies in Britain argued that 
‘they would create happiness within these groups of fellow citizens who 
lived miserable lives on city streets’. As she maintains, the existence of the 
home colonies that she highlights challenges us ‘to rethink, in interest-
ing ways, the definition and scope of colonization as well as its relation-
ship to happiness within Britain in the nineteenth century’. Drawing also 
on her earlier classic work on John Locke’s theoretical justifications of 
the dispossession of indigenous land in seventeenth-century America,13 
Arneil summarizes the three principles that characterized colonialism 
as an ideology: ‘segregation, improvement and – above all – agrarian 
labour’. These same principles were used, she shows, by nineteenth- and 
twentieth-century domestic colonialists, ‘but often married to either a 
utilitarian or consequentialist understanding of happiness’. She notes 
that ‘it is striking how often justifications for nineteenth-century labour 
or home colonies for the idle poor used happiness to describe the goal of 
the colony juxtaposed against the misery of both their current state of 
unemployment, alcoholism, corruption or criminality as well as the life 
they would face in alternative institutions such as prisons, workhouses or 
emigration’. For example, she demonstrates that Robert Owen’s attempts 
to promote home colonies were striking in their emphasis on happiness 
as the end of such colonies – and as justifying the argument of another 
scholar quoted by Arneil that ‘Utility or the pursuit of happiness’ was the 
starting point of Owenite philanthropy. Happiness was also the explicit 
aim of the labour colony created in Lindfield, Sussex, by the Quaker 
William Allen in 1823. As Arneil explains, besides being initially closely 
allied to Robert Owen, Allen was also a close associate of James Mill 
and Jeremy Bentham. The imaginative parallel between the aspirations 
of internal colonization and those of colonization by European settlers 
overseas is made remarkably clear in the episodes Arneil discusses, with 
Allen’s Lindfield colony being persistently referred to as ‘America’ or ‘new 
America’. As she pointedly puts it, ‘Locke’s famous words “all the world 
was America” take on a new meaning here.’
The most influential domestic colonialist of the late nineteenth cen-
tury was the founder of the Salvation Army, William Booth. The urban-
based centres for which the Salvation Army is known today – revealingly 
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called ‘city colonies’ by their founder – were seen by him ‘as mere con-
duits to the central feature of his plan’: the domestic farm colony. The 
explicit association between domestic and overseas colonialism is again 
highlighted by Arneil’s analysis of Booth’s direct parallel between ‘dark-
est Africa’ and ‘the “submerged tenth” or idle poor of “darkest England”’ 
in his characteristically entitled book In Darkest England: The Way Out 
(1890). Booth emphasized the connection between domestic and over-
seas colonialism by presenting the domestic colonies and part of the 
preparation needed for the Salvation Army eventually to send colonists 
to an overseas colony owned by it. But, like the Jewish migrants who 
were to be sent to Palestine by the Zionist movement in the twentieth 
century, they needed to be prepared and experienced in cultivating the 
land before going to overseas colonies. As with Owen and Allen, ‘happi-
ness’ is also ubiquitous in Booth’s writings quoted here by Arneil.
In her conclusion, Arneil assesses the various explanations prof-
fered to account for the rapid and spectacular failure of the various pro-
jects discussed in her chapter and rejects them. Instead she argues that 
their failure rather lies ‘in the ideology of colonialism itself – namely, the 
central principle that it is possible to engineer the happiness of the poor 
through detailed plans based on the principles of segregation and engage-
ment in agrarian labour and spade husbandry’. Arneil’s essay establishes 
an important link between domestic settler colonialism and ideologies of 
imperialism in British political thought.14
The mention of Palestine and Zionism above leads us to Samuel 
Hollander’s Chapter 13, on ‘John Stuart Mill and the Jewish Question’. 
Hollander takes as his starting point the argument by Edward 
Alexander to the effect that ‘John Stuart Mill was neither anti-Sem-
ite nor  philo-Semite, but a tertium quid foreshadowing a political type’ 
that Alexander went on to describe as modern-day Israel’s ‘ideological 
enemies … [who] have long done battle with that straw man they call 
“Zionists who want to silence all criticism of Israel”, mythical creatures 
nobody has ever been able to identify … ’.15 Hollander takes issue with 
the implications of Alexander’s classification of Mill and the modern-day 
lineage implied for him by that classification. Hollander sets out to show 
that Mill was not prey to anti-Jewish prejudice and, instead, ‘that hon-
est critics [of Israeli policies] may rest assured that they are following 
in Mill’s footsteps’.16 Hollander first assesses the evidence on Mill’s his-
torical evaluation of the Old Testament and Jewish morals – which, he 
convincingly shows, evolved through his reading of particular works of 
biblical scholarship, especially Joseph Salvador’s Histoire des Institutions 
de Moïse et du People Hébreu (1828) some time around 1840. He shows 
that Mill’s overall assessment was far from negative, by drawing attention 
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to Mill’s evaluation of the contribution of Judaism to the rise of monothe-
ism and, not least, his extraordinarily high evaluation of the importance 
of the Jewish prophets as being conducive to progress not just for the 
Jews but in terms of universal history. That he put the Jews on the same 
league in terms of conduciveness to progress as his notoriously beloved 
Greeks speaks for itself.17 Hollander brilliantly captures the importance 
of this argument and in the end comes back to build his conclusion on its 
importance and contemporary implications.
Hollander then moves to contextualize Mill’s comments on the 
‘primitive’ nature of Old Testament ethics by focusing on some of Mill’s 
related comments on Christian ethics, showing that Mill’s ‘animus is 
directed not against Judaism but primarily against Christianity for its 
lack of social content, including “duty to the State”, thereby falling 
short of the morality even of “of the best Pagan nations” ’.18 That is fol-
lowed by an analysis of the concrete positions Mill took on a number of 
contemporary issues and policy debates involving the status of Jews in 
the United Kingdom – including Mill’s staunch support for the removal 
of Jewish political disabilities, neutrality in education and, most inter-
estingly, Mill’s support for Saturday as the day of rest for Jews on the 
grounds of their religious obligation, while he was against compulsory 
Christian observance of Sunday. On all of these issues Hollander shows 
Mill staunchly defending the principles of ‘civil equality and religious 
liberty’. And Hollander emphasizes the importance Mill attributed to 
insisting on principles for the promotion of a society’s happiness.
The papers in this collection include a group that focus in various 
ways on the issue of how we should understand the central idea of the 
utilitarian tradition – happiness. This is a complex matter that raises ques-
tions both about how to interpret the classical texts of the tradition, and 
how to understand the idea itself. Jonathan Riley, for example, focuses in 
Chapter 10 on Fred Rosen’s suggestion that J. S. Mill builds a degree of 
distance from Bentham’s position by engrafting elements of the Stoic trad-
ition into his understanding of happiness – enabling him to claim that it is 
better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied, which, on the face of 
it, puts happiness second to a story of the intrinsic merits of the virtuous 
life (which derives from the Stoic account). Riley’s argument involves two 
distinct moves, both of which merit further work: one dealing with the way 
in which we should read Bentham’s account of the variety and commen-
surability of the pleasures; and the other concerning whether or not it is 
necessary to include Stoic elements in the base of Epicureanism in utili-
tarianism in order to create a place for virtue. Mill clearly felt Bentham’s 
account was lacking in certain ways, in particular with reference to the 
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idea of higher pleasures and their commensurability, although it is moot 
as to whether his understanding of Bentham actually does justice to the 
now extensive published oeuvre of Bentham. But it is also contentious that 
Mill needs Stoicism for his own account – and that he sought to engraft it. 
Riley gives us good reasons to rethink what have been two long-standing 
traditions: one started by Mill in faulting Bentham over happiness and its 
relationship to virtue and the higher, more abstract, forms of motivation 
that go beyond the bare pursuit of pleasure; and the other thinking that 
Mill is in an important respect conditioning and modifying the central for-
mula of utilitarianism, the pursuit of happiness.
John Charvet raises a similarly vexed issue in Chapter 11 with 
regard to Mill’s utilitarianism, focusing on the question of whether the 
aim of maximizing total utility/pleasure/happiness comes with any nec-
essary commitment to equality in the distribution of that good. One prin-
cipal concern is whether, if we assume the validity of an ideal account 
of utility, it could be legitimate to sacrifice the many lower pleasures of 
the majority, so as to safeguard the few higher pleasures of the few. He 
demonstrates that at least some philosophers, such as Hastings Rashdall, 
have been prepared to advocate the legitimacy of that sacrifice. But the 
question in relation to Mill is whether the same holds true, and if it does 
not, does that involve appealing to something other than the perspective 
of someone trying to achieve the greatest overall utility? One possible 
alternative source of appeal is to the rules of justice, as discussed in Mill’s 
Utilitarianism. But Charvet shows that while this is a more attractive line 
than that of the direct maximizing perspective, it is not something that 
can be justified by that latter perspective. One plausible conclusion from 
this is that this maximizing perspective is one that we cannot plausibly 
adopt, and that we ought instead to take a stand on the equal interests 
of all members of the community. However, the fact that there remains 
an irresolvable tension between the two perspectives seems to point to a 
major challenge to utilitarianism.
The issue of the nature of virtue and its relationship to happiness 
in the development of an ideal utilitarianism is picked up and developed 
by David Weinstein in Chapter 15, in an essay that explores late nine-
teenth- and early twentieth-century discussions of the utilitarian legacy, 
focusing in particular on the attempt to vindicate a form of ideal utili-
tarianism from both the utilitarian writings of Henry Sidgwick and the 
idealism of T. H. Green. What Weinstein shows is that some of the attacks 
made on idealism and classical utilitarianism by G. E. Moore rely on very 
flawed interpretations of the texts he criticizes – particularly those of 
T. H. Green – so that the development of a form of ideal utilitarianism 
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(identified by Moore but only later named by Hastings Rashdall) is 
driven by an imperfect understanding of the doctrines against which 
he believed himself to be reacting. What we learn from this is that the 
contrast between ideal utilitarianism and idealism – which is drawn so 
strongly in standard accounts of the debates of the late nineteenth cen-
tury – actually obscures considerable affinities between these thinkers 
and the way they understand the good and the ideal in terms of their 
relationship to pleasure.
The importance of attending to what theorists of the past say is 
underlined also by Michael Quinn’s careful discussion of Bentham’s 
account of happiness in Chapter 7. His starting point is Amartya Sen’s 
development of the capabilities approach as a way of resisting utilitarian-
ism. Sen is hardly alone among modern political philosophers in thinking 
that neither a doctrine of rights, nor a version of welfare utilitarianism, 
can generate a sufficiently attractive account of how we should think 
about the appropriate metric for distribution in a modern society. What 
Quinn shows, however, is that there is little in the capabilities account 
to which Bentham did not in fact commit – and that Bentham’s think-
ing is poorly understood if we do not recognize his commitment to the 
importance of freedom, and his recognition of the significance of equality 
within a society. Quinn demonstrates, as do so many of the papers in this 
collection, the importance of attending with great care to the founders 
of the utilitarian tradition, whose thinking is often hugely more sophis-
ticated and subtler than either they acknowledged in their criticisms 
of each other, or than we recognize in the construction of the Western 
canon of political thought.
This is not to say that Bentham and Mill are uncriticizable. As Alan 
Ryan shows in Chapter 12, while there is much to admire in John Stuart 
Mill, there are also problems. As an early and enthusiastic reader of 
Tocqueville, Mill should have been keenly aware of the difference between 
the social dimension of democracy and its political dimension. Moreover, 
his enthusiasm for ancient Greek politics, which led him to anticipate a 
body of citizens devoted to the public good, also fuelled his dislike of pro-
fessional politicians and bureaucrats. But, according to Ryan, he failed 
to give serious attention to the problem of which social conditions could 
systematically generate the kind of enthusiasm for citizen politics neces-
sary to keep the government of a society out of the hands of experts, poli-
ticians and bureaucrats. When we look at the challenge faced by modern 
democracies, we seem to have little choice but to accept a political order 
we might hope to hold to account on some points, but which is not going 
to be dominated by an active citizen body. And we face this problem 
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because that kind of politics demands a kind of society that is unlikely 
to be attractive to the vast majority of its members. Tocqueville worried 
away at this problem in the course of his life; however, argues Ryan, Mill 
seems to have been curiously reticent about the problem, and curiously 
confident that active citizen involvement could provide an adequate form 
of political accountability for the elite. As Ryan shows, one of the things 
we can learn from this is the importance of asking what the conditions of 
feasibility are for particular conceptions of the political order, and how 
far the way in which modernity has developed simultaneously realizes 
elements of Mill’s vision in terms of a plurality of ways of life, while ren-
dering some of his other aspirations hopelessly impractical.
The papers in this collection draw on a variety of disciplinary 
perspectives and methodological approaches. Individually, they raise 
important questions on how to think about some of the core issues in 
the utilitarian tradition, and particularly in the work of its three seminal 
figures: Jeremy Bentham, James Mill and John Stuart Mill. They help us 
to appreciate some of the sources and debates from which the golden 
age of utilitarian thinking developed, and they demonstrate some of the 
complexities and subtleties of these writers’ thinking. They also help us 
see how the utilitarian tradition developed subsequently and raise issues 
about its continuing relevance. In doing so, for all their critical engage-
ment with his work, they necessarily pay homage to the work of Fred 
Rosen, who has spanned precisely this broad range of concerns in his 
long engagement with the political theory of utilitarianism, its ancient 
roots and its continuing significance.
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Happiness and Interests in Politics:  
A Late-Enlightenment Debate
Emmanuelle de Champs
In The Growth of Philosophic Radicalism (Le Radicalisme philosophique, 
1904), Élie Halévy presented Bentham’s principle of utility as the founding 
doctrine of the British industrial revolution in contrast to France, where the 
revolution had taken place not in economics but in politics and had been 
driven by the rhetoric of rights. In contrast, British classical utilitarianism 
had chosen interests over rights and freedom.1 A century later, John Rawls 
echoed and revised this seminal opposition when he contrasted two tradi-
tions within liberalism, one that used rights to secure liberties, and one that 
focused on promoting happiness:
The tradition of the liberalism of freedom started at least with the 
Reformation and gives special priority to certain basic liberties: lib-
erty of conscience and freedom of thought, liberties of persons and 
the free choice of vocation – liberty from slavery and serfdom – to 
mention several basic cases. Political liberalism is also a liberalism 
of freedom. Moreover, it assures all citizens adequate all-purpose 
means (primary goods) so that they can make intelligent use of the 
exercise of their freedom. Their happiness, though, is not guaran-
teed, for that is a matter for citizens themselves. The liberalism of 
the (classical) Utilitarians – Bentham, James Mill, and Sidgwick – is 
distinct from the liberalism of freedom. Its first principle is that of 
the greatest happiness summed over all individuals. If it confirms 
the liberal freedoms, it is a liberalism of happiness, yet if it doesn’t 
confirm these freedoms, it is not a liberalism at all. Since the basic 
ideal is that of maximizing happiness, it is a contingent matter 
whether doing this will secure the basic freedoms.2
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Rawls’s choice of Bentham as emblematic of the second option coincides 
with a long tradition that has classical utilitarianism seeing human beings 
exclusively as rational agents motivated primarily by self-interest. Histor-
ically, against the figure of Bentham, the names of Paine and Condorcet 
have been put forward to represent the defence of rights and the fight for 
freedom.3 In fact, in a recent contribution to the World Happiness Report, 
scholars called economists to move away from individualistic Benthamite 
utilitarianism and to reclaim a fuller tradition of ‘public happiness’, which 
they associated with Genovesi in Italy and Condorcet in France.4 Such a 
blunt characterization, which pits an aggregative view of ‘the greatest 
happiness of the greatest number’ against a concern for ‘public happiness’, 
freedom and rights does not do justice to the work of two influential 
authors of the late Enlightenment.
By studying the notions of ‘happiness’ and ‘rights’ in the writings 
of Condorcet and Bentham, this paper shows that it is necessary to 
move beyond the commonly accepted opposition between rights-based 
discourse and utilitarian reasoning to understand the specificity of late 
eighteenth-century political thought. Built around the vocabulary of 
‘happiness’ in the early thought of the two authors, the paper first makes 
a historical case for studying them ‘side by side’, echoing Fred Rosen’s 
approach to Hume and Smith.5 It then locates their respective positions 
on happiness in the wake of the writings of Claude Adrien Helvétius, 
who provided an influential framework for the political and moral dis-
cussion of happiness in politics in the second half of the eighteenth cen-
tury. Finally, it examines the positions of Bentham and Condorcet on 
a series of issues directly related to public happiness in the early years 
of the French Revolution, up until the end of 1791. In fact, the debate 
over the political means to happiness cannot be reduced to one that pits 
utility against rights or the well-being of the majority against that of the 
individual.
I. Two philosophers in politics
Bentham and Condorcet provide rare examples of established Enlight-
enment thinkers who embraced revolutionary ideas and became, with 
time, increasingly radical in national politics. Though they were near 
contemporaries (Condorcet being born five years earlier than Bentham), 
the two authors’ public positions in the 1770s and 1780s differed starkly. 
A protégé of d’Alembert and a correspondent of Voltaire from the 1770s, 
Condorcet was at the heart of Enlightenment circles and obtained an 
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institutional position at the French Academy of Sciences. From 1774 to 
1776, he also gained practical experience of politics during Turgot’s ten-
ure as Finance minister (1774–1776). In comparison, the first decades of 
Bentham’s life were spent in relative obscurity. His letter to d’Alembert 
received only a polite answer and Voltaire never knew that the English-
man had translated one of his philosophical tales.6 Only in 1781, when 
he obtained the patronage of Lord Shelburne, could Bentham access the 
kind of inside information on English and French politics that Condorcet 
had heard directly. Bentham, moreover, remained in the background 
during Shelburne’s eight months in office in 1782–1783.7
The 1780s was a formative decade for both men, as they both felt the 
need for reform in Europe. Bentham embarked on an ambitious scheme 
to present his ideas to a European audience by producing a work in 
French while Condorcet worked out the principles of social mathematics.8 
When over a decade of reforms and revolution began in France in 1788, 
the events aroused great interest in progressive British political circles 
such as Shelburne’s while in Paris Condorcet took part in the political 
agitation as a prominent pamphleteer. As early as 1789, in his draft of 
an open letter to Mirabeau, Bentham could write of Condorcet as one of 
the ablest political advisers in the country and asked his French friends 
to forward him a copy of Le Panoptique to him.9 Condorcet mentioned 
Bentham’s name in print only once, even though the Genevan Etienne 
Dumont, who was conveying Bentham’s ideas to France, frequented 
Condorcet and his wife during the same period.10 Their different institu-
tional positions during their formative years thus account for the unbal-
anced number of cross-references.
The year 1791 marked a divide for Bentham and Condorcet. After 
the arrest of the royal family at Varennes in June, the political climate 
changed markedly in France. Condorcet’s subsequent defiance towards 
the king led to his estrangement from the circles that still supported a 
constitutional monarchy.11 From that period, Bentham’s interest in 
French issues waned and he became more critical of the republican turn 
that Condorcet, among others, had embraced. By 1794, when Condorcet 
was found dead following his proscription under the Terror, Bentham no 
longer set his hopes on France. He was in fact at work on Nonsense upon 
Stilts, an extensive attack on ideas that Condorcet had done his utmost to 
defend: the existence of natural rights and the necessity to enshrine them 
in a Declaration.
Despite those differences, their writings of the 1770s and 1780s 
show that Bentham and Condorcet shared philosophical references and 
sought to intervene in the same debates in European reform politics.12 On 
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the place of happiness in politics, their writings of the pre-revolutionary 
and revolutionary period introduced themes that continue to shape our 
understanding of the issue.
II. Happiness, interests and politics – the legacy of 
Helvétius
By the end of the eighteenth century, happiness was well established in 
political vocabulary. Increasing public happiness should be the object of 
every philosopher and scientist, as Condorcet told the members of the 
Academy of Sciences: ‘Use the talents and energy Nature has bestowed 
on you to foster public happiness. Should you receive nothing for your 
pains but torments and even contempt, should your endeavours be use-
less, remain certain that you chose right.’13 As for Bentham, the phrase 
‘it is the greatest happiness of the greatest number that is the measure 
of right and wrong’ defined a political and philosophical programme 
that unfolded throughout his life.14 The phrase ‘the principle of utility’, 
which superseded that of ‘the greatest happiness of the greatest number’ 
until the 1810s, is not to be understood as a renunciation of happiness 
as a political programme, for Bentham consistently defined utility as ‘the 
property of an action to increase happiness’.15
To understand what was at stake in laying down happiness as a 
political programme in the 1770s and 1780s, it is useful to turn to the 
writings of Claude Adrien Helvétius. In De l’esprit and De l’homme, he 
repeatedly and interchangeably appealed to ‘utility’, ‘interest’ and ‘happi-
ness’ to describe the force that motivated human beings to act in private 
and public affairs. This force was the quest for pleasure and the avoid-
ance of pain. As an anthropological concept, ‘interest’ referred to how 
humans apprehended objects external to them, with reason taming the 
passions in an attempt to improve their condition.16 Interest was thus an 
operating principle in morals and in politics:
In this discourse, one sets out to demonstrate that the same interest 
which presides over the judgement we pass on actions and makes us 
consider them as virtuous, vicious, or allowed depending on whether 
they are useful, harmful or indifferent to the public, presides in the 
same way over the judgement we pass on ideas. Therefore, in morals 
as well as in understanding, interest alone dictates all our judgements. 
One can only perceive the extent of this truth by considering probity 
and understanding in relation to 1. an individual, 2. a small community, 
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3. a nation, 4. the different centuries and different countries, and 5. the 
universe.17
For Helvétius, who built on the core of Epicurean epistemology, inter-
est was not only an axiomatic principle describing the mechanisms of 
human action, it also laid the foundations for a critical approach that 
could be applied on different scales, from the individual to ‘the universe’.
The sensualist foundations of Helvétius’s philosophy were debated 
in philosophical circles. He had argued that ‘every time one bothers to 
break up the vague sentiment of the love of happiness into its parts, one 
will find physical pleasure at the bottom of the melting-pot’.18 In 1773, as 
De l’homme was starting to be read and discussed in French literary cir-
cles, Condorcet exchanged a series of letters on the subject with Turgot, 
who maintained that Helvétius’s insistence on the pleasures of the senses 
made a mockery of private virtue. In his reply, Condorcet did not ques-
tion the idea that self-interest was a powerful source of action, though he 
believed Helvétius had failed to recognize the role of sympathy in moral 
action.19 But the desire for reciprocal benevolence was stronger than ego-
tistical self-interest. Throughout his works, and like Sophie de Grouchy 
who became his wife in 1786 and later translated Smith’s Theory of Moral 
Sentiments into French, Condorcet was keen to distance himself from 
Helvétius’s focus on sensual pleasures and highlighted the force of moral 
sentiments such as sympathy and pity.
In contrast, Bentham fully accepted the sensualist implications of 
Helvétius’s writings: ‘the idea of considering happiness as resolvable into 
a number of individual pleasures, I took from Helvétius’, he maintained.20 
Contrary to Condorcet, Bentham banished the vocabulary of ‘moral sen-
timent’, for he believed that it only thinly concealed arbitrary preferences 
and personal interests.21 But Helvétius and Bentham both pointed out 
that the definition of self-interest as a source of motivation also encom-
passed actions usually presented as altruistic or disinterested. Helvétius 
recognized the joint forces of pity and sympathy as spurs for action: 
in acting to relieve another human being from pain, people obeyed an 
impulse that was necessary for their own pleasure and brought them, 
as a reward, the esteem of others.22 Similarly, in An Introduction to the 
Principles of Morals and Legislation, Bentham made a point of inserting 
‘the pleasures of sympathy’ and those ‘of a good name’ among the long 
list of self-regarding pleasures.23
Condorcet defended what he called a ‘proper sense of interest’, 
one that acknowledged our submission to pain and pleasure but incor-
porated sympathy for others, the love of virtue and the common good 
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and was wary of the power of passions. This did not entail a rejection of 
interests but a redefinition. ‘Is not a mistaken sense of interest the most 
common cause of actions contrary to the general welfare?’ he asked. ‘Is 
not the violence of our passions often the result of habits that we have 
adopted through miscalculation or of our ignorance of how to restrain 
them, tame them, deflect them, rule them?’24 Condorcet’s view of inter-
est differed from Bentham’s, though they both built on Locke. But both 
believed that a clear method for assessing and measuring interest could 
be worked out by reason, thereby allowing people to avoid being lured 
by false promises. They believed that the vocabulary of interest was an 
adequate way of understanding the interplay between the individual 
and political society. In so doing, both distinguished themselves from 
the position of Rousseau in the Social Contract, according to which, 
although individual interests played a role in explaining people’s wish 
to enter into a mutual contract, such interests ceased to operate in polit-
ical society.
For Helvétius, private and public interests could be reconciled 
and lead to increased happiness for all when a strong and benevolent 
legislator combined two means. The first was the establishment of good 
laws backed by sanctions that made obedience in everyone’s interest; 
the second was to promote a clear view of personal interest as coincid-
ing with, not opposed to, public interest, especially through education.25 
Condorcet embraced this programme in the preparatory manuscripts to 
his Historical Table of the Progress of the Human Mind. He asked: ‘does 
not the improvement of public laws which follows from the progress of 
moral and political sciences lead us to identify the common interest of 
each with the common interest of all? Is not the aim of the social art to 
destroy this apparent contradiction?’26 Likewise, Bentham put his faith 
into the work of a benevolent legislator: ‘the business of the government 
is to promote the happiness of the society, by punishing and rewarding’, 
while also devising ways to improve public debate, public education and 
morals.27
Like Helvétius, Bentham considered individual pains and pleasures 
as the building blocks of collective happiness:
The happiness of the community is made up of the several happi-
nesses (if one may say so) of the several individuals of which that 
body is composed – these happinesses are all reducible into such 
and such pains or evils averted – and such or such pleasures and 
advantages procured or secured.28
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To calculate whether a measure was good or bad, the legislator should 
first work out the impact on each individual (attempting to quantify the 
pleasures according to intensity, duration, proximity and certainty), and 
then multiply it by the number of persons affected (or its ‘extent’) – with 
each person counting as one.29 Therefore, in comparing the ‘lots of hap-
piness’ that some planned measures would create, the legislator should 
decide in favour of ‘the greatest which is partaken of by the greatest 
number of persons’.30 Bentham acknowledged that regarding the pre-
cise effects on individuals, the legislator often needed to resort to ‘guess-
work’, but ‘as bad as the chance may be which this method gives us of 
judging right, no other method is there that affords so good an one’.31 
There is ground for considering Bentham’s calculus as an argumentative 
strategy rather than primarily a mathematical one.32
Like Bentham, Condorcet believed that calculus was a valid tool in 
the hands of the legislator, both to assess specific situations and to evalu-
ate the quality of intended measures. When explaining how social math-
ematics were to be understood, he had in mind tools that would allow 
a precise population count and the construction of economic indicators 
that could serve for mathematical projections.33 Would these tools be 
applicable to the measure of happiness? No: ‘being, as a body, an abstract 
entity, a nation can neither be happy nor unhappy’.34 What, then, could 
the phrase ‘the happiness of a nation’ mean? While noting that the calcu-
lation of averages was a valid tool to be employed by the legislator arbi-
trating in matters of public policy,35 Condorcet excluded it when it came 
to measuring the happiness of a nation: this would mean ‘adopting the 
maxim … that the smaller number can legitimately be sacrificed to the 
greater’.36
In his early manuscripts, written before he could possibly have read 
Condorcet’s objections, Bentham had also examined the risks of  sacrificing 
the interests of some to maximize those of others when  aggregating 
 interests.37 Like Helvétius, who believed that forcing people to act against 
their interest was ‘impossible and unnatural’,38 Bentham understood 
aggregation as a way to rule out the possibility of private sacrifice:
The question lies not between the Public, on one part, & himself 
distinct from the public on the other: but between that part of the 
public which he is, on the one part, & the remainder of the persons 
of which the public is composed, on the other … . The Salus populi 
consists not in the sacrificing of private or Public interest, but in the 
union of both.39
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In this way, Bentham also distanced himself from reason-of-state argu-
ments, making it clear that public interest could not be disconnected 
from private interests, nor run against them.
If a calculation of averages was to be excluded, which indicators 
should then be used? Condorcet proposed a list of ‘the general means 
of happiness’, which included ‘the means of tranquillity and well-be-
ing which the land, the laws, industry, the relationships with foreign 
nations can offer the citizens in general’.40 Focusing not on quantities 
of happiness but on the conditions that made it possible was reminis-
cent of a similar solution Bentham proposed to bridge the gap between 
individual and collective happiness in his writings on the civil law of 
the 1780s:
For a political society to be happy, as much as the human condition 
allows, four things are needed: subsistence, abundance, equality, 
safety. The greater the enjoyment of these goods, the greater the 
sum of happiness, at least that happiness which depends on the 
laws. Is any of them missing? A proportional share of possible hap-
piness will be missing too.41
Condorcet expressed this shift towards indirect means of creating happi-
ness by moving, terminologically, from ‘happiness’ to ‘well-being’:
The well-being [of the people], bye the bye, is different from hap-
piness. This well-being consists in not being threatened by poverty, 
humiliation, oppression. It is this kind of well-being which the 
government owes the people. It is necessary to happiness but can 
also be insufficient for it. But it is nature’s role to complete it. In 
improving physics, morals and education, governments may, it is 
true, correct nature again; but this is not required by justice, only 
by benevolence.42
Likewise, and though Bentham refused to establish such a distinction 
between well-being and happiness (both being directly derived from the 
pleasures of the senses), he also distinguished between creating happi-
ness directly, which remained the individual’s own responsibility and 
creating the conditions for happiness, which belonged to the legislator. 
‘Oh man!’ he exclaimed, ‘can someone else know what pleases you better 
than you do?’43
In the 1770s and 1780s, in different ways, Condorcet and Bentham 
each developed a theoretical framework for the analysis of political 
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issues based on a broader understanding of human nature in political 
societies, both reinterpreting themes that had been central in the politi-
cal debates of the late Enlightenment. Who should be in charge of bring-
ing about increased happiness? In the 1770s and early 1780s, at a time 
when rulers throughout Europe seemed willing to embrace new ideas, 
both authors had seemed confident that good laws promoted by a mon-
arch could significantly improve the happiness of the people. When they 
addressed contemporary rulers, Condorcet and Bentham strove to make 
such a point. ‘The happiness of the people,’ Condorcet wrote, ‘depends 
more on the enlightenment of their governors than on the shape of politi-
cal constitutions.’44 Similar views were to be found in Bentham’s writings 
up until the mid-1780s: ‘Let all other laws be good, let the sovereign not 
oppose their execution, what does it matter in which hands sovereignty 
is placed?’45
III. Happiness vs rights? The early years of the French 
Revolution (1788–1791)
In the late 1780s, however, Condorcet gradually came to consider that 
beyond the authority of an enlightened sovereign, popular representation 
was a necessary condition to improve happiness in a nation. His experi-
ence under the Turgot ministry convinced him that representative assem-
blies had a central role to play in the consolidation of political reform. 
His increasing interest in the question can be traced from the Essai sur 
l’application de l’analyse à la probabilité des décisions rendues à la pluralité 
des voix (1785) through to the Essai sur la constitution et la fonction des 
assemblées provinciales published in 1788. Compared to this, Bentham’s 
work on political representation before the Revolution was rather lim-
ited: for him, the power of the people rested on their collective capacity 
to set limits to the exercise of sovereign power, not on the direct or even 
indirect exercise of this power.46 It is to be noted, however, that he devel-
oped simultaneously an analysis of political powers that made it possible 
to understand and legitimate various ways of exercising them, regardless 
of the actual persons, or bodies, that held them. He also addressed the 
issue of the limits applicable to the exercise of sovereign power.47 When 
the French Estates General were summoned, Bentham did not hesitate 
to confront the issue of popular representation. In England, he argued, 
the question could be postponed because public opinion acted as a true 
check on abuses. In France, on the contrary, the issue had imposed itself 
and had to be dealt with.48
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Condorcet, like Bentham, couched arguments in favour of political 
representation in the vocabulary of interests:
A representative assembly cannot be useful if it is not formed in 
such a way that the wish of the Assembly be in general conformable 
to the will and the opinion of those which it represents, if the mem-
bers who compose it do not know the true interest of the nation, 
and finally if they can be misled by other interests.49
However, Condorcet’s defiance of unenlightened interests explains 
why he presented them regularly alongside ‘corruption’, ‘passions’ and 
‘errors’, as opposed to the working out of a ‘general will’.50 He gave rep-
resentative assemblies two potentially conflicting missions: first, to cre-
ate the conditions for the expression of a variety of interests; second, to 
express a general will that included and transcended them. This would 
be achieved, first, by establishing ‘a good method for elections’,51 the 
details of which were laid out in mathematical terms in 1785 and worked 
out practically in 1788, through the ranking of candidates on lists.52 This 
went together with a reshaping of electoral districts according to popu-
lation: the division of the country would allow the equal weight of local 
interests.53 The second mission would be fulfilled by offering deputies a 
forum for ‘expressing their wills’ and ‘deliberating on their interests’.54 
Deliberation on the proposed legislation, for which Condorcet laid out a 
strict procedure, could counteract ‘the balance of opposing passions, of 
contrary interests, of fighting prejudices’.55 Condorcet’s search for ‘truth’ 
in political decisions did not entail the exclusion of interests from the 
realm of politics.56
Bentham’s views in the early years of the French Revolution also 
included an original attempt to associate the representation of individual 
interests with the working out of a general decision that expressed 
and transcended them. The role of an elected assembly was ‘to be 
 representative of the people, to try to consult its wills or its interests’. Like 
Condorcet, Bentham drew up electoral districts in relation to the popu-
lation. But his view of the role of an assembly was not simply to process 
individual interests into a national one through aggregation or majority 
vote. The aim was to ally ‘véracité’ (i.e. decisions conformable to truth, 
namely the general interest of the nation) with ‘fidélité’ (i.e. fidelity to the 
will and interests expressed by the people). To achieve this, he proposed 
an  original solution, placing individual deputies under the direct control 
of their electors (who could dismiss them at any time during their one-
year mandate) while asking them to swear ‘an oath to prefer the general 
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interest to the particular interest, real or imagined, of [their] constitu-
ents’.57 These seemingly contradictory commitments could be reconciled 
only by giving deliberation in the assembly a central role. In Political 
Tactics, Bentham devised strict rules for such deliberation, so that all opin-
ions could be heard and discussed before any vote.58 In their speeches, the 
deputies were bound by nothing but their desire to work out the general 
interest. After debates held in public and publicized through the press, the 
deputies were to go back to their constituencies to take the opinion of the 
people: Bentham hoped that, enlightened by the quality of the debates 
in the assembly, the deputies would then be ready to revise their original 
view of their own interest in the light of that of the nation taken together 
and modify their mandate accordingly.59
Condorcet’s and Bentham’s views on how to combine the expression 
of interests with the creation of a collective will led them to draw simi-
lar conclusions in two other respects: they both justified the inclusion of 
women among electors, and they refused a bicameral system.60 However, 
major differences of focus persisted, the main one being Condorcet’s belief 
that deputies to a National Assembly should be elected by a two-tiered sys-
tem (citizens would vote for electors, who would in turn vote for deputies), 
something that was absent in Bentham.61 Both were anxious to check the 
influence of an unenlightened electorate through a property qualification. 
But while Condorcet maintained this up until the end of 1791, Bentham 
changed his views earlier. Like Condorcet, he originally thought that only 
property owners could be said to have an interest in the security of prop-
erty, but in the autumn of 1789, he wanted a vote for ‘every French citizen, 
male or female, being of full age, of sound mind, and able to read’.62
These extended discussions of the interplay of interests in repre-
sentative assemblies were also connected to a changing understanding 
of the place of happiness in politics, especially of the connection between 
happiness and rights. The preamble to the French Declaration of the 
Rights of Man and of the Citizen, drafted and adopted in the summer of 
1789, stated that ‘the happiness of all’ was the final aim of a declaration 
based on ‘the natural, inalienable and sacred rights of man’.63 Happiness 
was the final aim of political association; it was within reach of individ-
uals and of nations when they followed the prescriptions of natural law 
and natural reason. These views were widely shared, including by mate-
rialists such as Helvétius. As Ann Thomson recently explained, they did 
not exclude appeals to natural law. As they strove ‘to reconcile individ-
ual happiness and social utility’, they held that ‘the pursuit of happiness 
was the basis of natural law and should also be the basis of civil laws’.64 
Bentham and Condorcet provide good examples of the modifications 
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undergone by the discourse on rights by the end of the eighteenth cen-
tury in enlightened circles.
For Bentham, alongside the rest of ‘the works of Grotius, Pufendorf 
and Burlamaqui’,65 a right to the pursuit of happiness was nonsensical. 
Commenting on the American Declaration of Independence in 1776, he 
had written: ‘If the right of pursuit of happiness is a right unalienable, 
why (how) are thieves restrained from pursuing it by theft, murderers by 
murder, and rebels by rebellion?’ In setting out this right, the Americans 
‘have out done the utmost extravagance of all former fanatics’.66 In the 
years 1789 to 1791, Bentham examined and commented on several pro-
jects for a Declaration of Rights drafted in France. No declaration could 
act as a substitute for the only test of the legitimacy of a law: the will of 
the legislator. Substituting vague ideas of ‘the people’s pleasure’ would 
only foster chaos. Methodologically speaking, starting from first princi-
ples was a mistake: only after individual laws had been assessed could 
one decide whether they were good or bad: ‘no law is good that does not 
add more to the general mass of felicity than it takes from it – No law 
ought to be made that does not add more to the general mass of felicity 
than it takes from it’.67 It was not by holding proposed legislation up to 
any superior and abstract legal standard that anyone could interpret as 
they wished that its desirability should be assessed, but by conducting a 
careful analysis of its expected consequences.
Condorcet never questioned the idea that happiness was the main 
object towards which legislators and individuals should strive. Indeed, 
the roots of this lay in the reasons for political association: ‘men have no 
other motives for their action than to avoid pain and look for happiness’.68 
Their decision to unite in political society derived from this objective and 
securing ‘the free enjoyment of natural rights’ was the first general con-
dition for happiness.69 Happiness and rights were therefore intrinsically 
linked because they derived from the nature of man and the genesis of 
political association. These natural rights were ‘1. personal security and 
liberty. 2. security and liberty for one’s properties. 3. equality’.70 This did 
not include any right to happiness.
Bentham and Condorcet both considered the rhetorical force of dec-
larations of rights and drew diverging conclusions. Condorcet believed 
that a declaration of rights would pacify public opinion and increase the 
people’s trust in legislators:
a Declaration of rights has a further advantage in that it ensures 
general tranquillity. Armed with such a shield, a nation ceases to 
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fret about every innovation, it has no pretext to take offence from 
those which are useful, it is not so easily misled by the defenders of 
abuses towards which the laws in question are directed, it does not 
confuse privileges that directly encroach on their rights with rights 
themselves, nor supports institutions which are directly opposed to 
its interests. … a declaration of rights is both the guardian of tran-
quillity and that of public liberty.71
In this, he followed an insight that his mentor Turgot had developed 
during their correspondence on Helvétius’s principles. Turgot had men-
tioned the effects of political principles on the behaviour of individuals 
and concluded, against the discourse of interest, that only appeals to 
rights were able to ensure public safety:
When one wants to attack intolerance and despotism, one must first 
ground one’s ideas upon exact ones, for inquisitors have an interest 
in being intolerant, and viziers and sub-viziers have an interest in 
preserving the abuses of government. Because they are the strong-
est, indiscriminately sounding the alarm bell against them means 
proving them right. I hate despotism as much as anyone else, but it 
will not be brought down by declamations, only by demonstrating 
the rights of man.72
Bentham also valued public order, but he believed that appeals to rights 
inflamed the passions, especially violent ones. Declarations of rights 
were, according to him, tools for manipulating crowds. Imposing utility 
meant placing the language of reason above that of passion. Much of his 
argument against rights-based discourse was therefore grounded in an 
analysis of their rhetorical appeal. Indeed, in 1789 and 1790, he was still 
willing to believe that rights and utility could be reconciled, if rhetorical 
forms were altered:
Change the language and instead of can not put ought no, the case is 
widely different. The moderate expression of opinion and will inti-
mated by this phrase leads naturally to the inquiry after a reason, 
and this reason, if there be any at bottom that deserves the name, is 
always a proposition of fact relative to the question of utility. Such 
a law ought not to be established, because it is not consistent with 
the general welfare: its tendency is not to add to the general stock 
of happiness.73
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Appealing to rights was no different from other types of arguments; it 
should also be weighed according to utility. In shifting the debate from 
the existence of natural rights to their efficiency, both Condorcet and 
Bentham can be seen as heirs to a protracted debate within eighteenth- 
century legal and political thought, one that cannot be summed up to an 
opposition between a priori rights and consequentialist reasoning.74
Conclusion
In many ways, the issues addressed by Condorcet and Bentham until 
1791 laid the foundations of recurring debates in early liberal circles. 
Both authors’ pre-revolutionary writings were indeed collected and 
printed again in the late 1790s and 1800s. Together, they were read by 
the Idéologues, Benjamin Constant, Madame de Staël, Tocqueville and 
Jean-Baptiste Say, in post-revolutionary France.75 In England, a young 
utilitarian such as John Stuart Mill presented Condorcet’s Life of Turgot 
as a sort of antidote to Benthamite sectarianism – his own brand of utili-
tarianism appearing therefore as a kind of synthesis of the two philoso-
phies.76 The following generation, both in France and in Britain, provided 
editions of their works simultaneously: Bentham’s Complete Works were 
published by John Bowring in Edinburgh up to 1843, while the final vol-
ume of Condorcet’s Œuvres, under the editorship of Arthur O’Connor – 
Condorcet’s son-in-law, who, Bentham boasted, had wished to become 
one of his own ‘disciple[s]’ – came out in Paris in 1847.77
Indeed, their political thought has more in common than has usually 
been acknowledged. Not only did they start from comparable anthropo-
logical foundations, they also recognized a common goal for individual 
and political achievement, that of happiness, understood as a secular 
pursuit. Where they differed was not, substantially, in their definition of 
happiness, nor in the status they ascribed to the individual. In the way 
they imagined the political and social structures giving rise to maximum 
happiness, the similarities between their proposals are striking – such are 
their parallel, if unsynchronized, moves towards democratic and republi-
can government. Many of their conclusions, including a belief in political 
equality, a view that the state’s duty is to secure the conditions for the 
security and the well-being of individuals, the necessity of fostering a free 
public opinion and of trusting in the gradual enlightenment of the people, 
were also similar and would not have surprised readers of Helvétius.
However, the French Revolution deeply polarized contempo-
rary political thought. After that, it is impossible to ignore the divide 
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between two types of arguments, one deriving from natural rights (after 
Condorcet) and the other from utility (after Bentham). As this paper has 
made clear, the choice of rights over utility (or the other way around) 
can be understood as a conscious strategy to educate public opinion and 
to set up a rationale that legitimates reform. There is no doubt that this 
element has indeed been central in ensuring the success of the rhetoric 
of rights. It is, however, insufficient to distinguish between two types of 
liberalism: the two approaches developed historically together and in 
constant dialogue with one another.
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Jeremy Bentham and the Spanish 
Constitution of 1812
Philip Schofield
I
An essay on Jeremy Bentham’s assessment of the Spanish Constitution 
of 1812 is particularly apt as a contribution to this volume in honour of 
Frederick Rosen. In his role as General Editor of the new authoritative 
edition of The Collected Works of Jeremy Bentham, Fred devoted a great 
deal of time and energy to encouraging the study of Bentham and John 
Stuart Mill in Spain and Portugal, and in particular in supporting the 
work of the late Professor Esperanza Guisán. The establishment of the 
Ibero-American Society for Utilitarian Studies was just one of the devel-
opments that Fred inspired. Such an essay also reflects Fred’s interest 
in Bentham’s constitutional theory and his influential rejection of the 
received view of Bentham as an authoritarian democrat, in favour of an 
interpretation that emphasized his credentials as a founder of modern 
liberalism. Indeed, our contemporary usage of the term ‘liberal’ emerged 
from the dispute between liberales and serviles that marked the period in 
Spanish history with which the present essay is concerned. I should add, 
moreover, that the work I undertook on some of the primary sources 
drawn on for this essay, and which appear in the volume entitled Colo-
nies, Commerce, and Constitutional Law,1 was undertaken under Fred’s 
general editorship and funded by an award from the Economic and 
Social Research Council under which Fred was Principal Investigator. 
Speaking on behalf of those of us – as yet far too few – who take a seri-
ous interest in Bentham’s constitutional theory, I take this opportunity 
to acknowledge our immense and profound debt to Fred’s pioneering 
scholarship.
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II
The Spanish Constitution promulgated by the Cortes of Cádiz on 19 
March 1812 had been drawn up while much of Spain was occupied by 
French forces, and while the legitimate Bourbon monarch, Ferdinand 
VII,2 lived in exile at Valençay, in the South of France. Having returned 
to Spain in March 1814 following the expulsion of the French, Ferdinand 
VII, by a decree of 4 May 1814, declared all acts of the Cortes null and 
void, abolished the Constitution, and thereby restored royal absolutism.3 
In December 1819, an expeditionary force destined for South America 
was assembled at La Isla de Leon, near Cádiz. On 1 January 1820, Rafael 
del Riego, an officer in this army, declared in favour of the Constitution 
of 1812. Such was the dissatisfaction with Ferdinand VII’s personal rule 
that the subsequent revolt met with little opposition. On 6 March 1820, 
the king was obliged to issue a decree calling the Cortes, and on the fol-
lowing day he consented to the restoration of the Constitution.4 On 26 
March 1820 he issued a further decree obliging the people to swear an 
oath of loyalty to the Constitution.5 The Constitution remained in force 
for three years, and this period was regarded at the time, and has been 
interpreted to be so since, as Spain’s liberal triennium.6
It was this decree of 26 March 1820 that elicited Bentham’s first 
response to the new liberal regime in Spain: a letter published in the 
Morning Chronicle on 18 April 1820. Four days later, prompted by a com-
ment in the Morning Chronicle criticizing the lack of a House of Lords in 
the Spanish Constitution, Bentham composed a second letter intended 
for the newspaper, expressing his opposition to aristocratic second cham-
bers, but which, in the event, he did not send. For much of the follow-
ing two years, Bentham’s life and work were dominated by the affairs 
of Spain, and to a lesser extent by those of Portugal, which adopted, for 
a brief period, a version of the Spanish Constitution. Bentham’s writ-
ings are now gathered in two volumes, the above-mentioned Colonies, 
Commerce, and Constitutional Law and On the Liberty of the Press, and 
Public Discussion.7 In the course of these works, and in particular in his 
most sustained essay, ‘Emancipation Spanish’, which he began to draft 
in the summer of 1820 and which he would virtually complete by April 
1822 under the revised title of ‘Rid Yourselves of Ultramaria’,8 he focused 
on the impact that the attempt of Spain’s rulers to retain the overseas 
Empire would have on the viability of the Constitution. He argued that 
the Constitution was essentially sound because it recognized the greatest 
happiness of the greatest number as the proper end of government, but 
that many of its detailed provisions, and especially those concerning the 
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colonies, were ill-conceived in that they opened the door for the return 
of royal despotism. The fundamental principles of the Constitution were 
announced in Articles 4 and 13, which recognized that ‘the felicity of all 
the individuals of which the nation or political society in question is con-
sidered as being composed’ was ‘the right and proper end of government: 
object of pursuit to all measures of government’.9 In contrast, Article 1, 
which proclaimed ‘The Spanish Nation consists of all Spaniards of both 
hemispheres’, was a source of great danger, since it enshrined the deter-
mination to maintain the Empire.10 Referring to those elements among 
Spain’s ruling classes who saw an advantage to themselves from main-
taining the claim over Ultramaria, Bentham remarked:
Spain is one! such will be their arithmetic. It has its Peninsular part 
and its Ultramarian part! such will be their geography. As well 
might it be said – Spain and the Moon are one! it has its earthly part: 
it has its lunar part. Such … is the language of your Constitutional 
Code. But, a body of human law, how well soever arranged in other 
respects, does not suffice for converting impossibilities into facts.11
Spain’s rulers recognized that the overseas possessions represented a 
major source of corruptive influence, which could be used to re-establish 
royal despotism. Bentham was worried that other parts of the Constitu-
tion tended in the same direction. He asked the Spanish people not to be 
angry with him for pointing out its flaws: ‘He who is angry with me, if it 
has ever happened to him to have received a wound, let him include in his 
anger the Surgeon by whom the probe, the knife or the needle have been 
applied to it.’ He asked them to accept that ‘in this instrument of prepon-
derant good, arrangements of the opposite character are not altogether 
wanting: arrangements by which a sacrifice is made of the universal 
interest to this or that particular and sinister interest’. The mixed govern-
ment established by the Constitution was unstable: it would dissolve into 
either a pure despotism or a pure representative democracy. Unless it was 
reformed, it was ‘doomed to perish, and to perish by means of corruptive 
influence’. His efforts, therefore, were directed towards persuading the 
Spanish people, and thereby the majority of the Cortes, to strengthen the 
democratic elements in the Constitution against the inevitable encroach-
ments of the king and his supporters.12
In Bentham’s view, the existence of the overseas colonies was the 
main threat to Spain’s liberal regime. Hence, Spain should grant inde-
pendence to her colonies, whereupon she would be financially stronger 
and militarily more secure, but, more importantly, a great deal of the 
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corruption that would otherwise impel the country towards royal des-
potism would be removed. There would be danger from corruptive influ-
ence even if Spain had no overseas colonies, but from the existence of 
the colonies, or even the claim to the colonies, the danger received ‘a 
boundless encrease’. The ‘rich compound of official power, and official 
emolument, and factitious dignity’ that the overseas possessions pro-
vided for the king and his supporters enormously increased the opportu-
nities for corruption.13
In material composed for ‘Emancipation Spanish’ in the summer 
of 1820, Bentham argued that the Constitution, at the same time that 
it asserted the claim over Ultramaria, made the maintenance of Spain’s 
dominion extremely problematic. The increased freedom, and hence the 
increased knowledge, under the new constitutional regime would under-
mine the ignorance that, under the old despotism, had encouraged ‘blind 
submission’. The Constitution, for instance, guaranteed the liberty of the 
press (Article 371) and the right to send a memorial to the king or the 
Cortes (Article 373). There were many causes of discontent in Spanish 
America, and the Constitution gave each Spanish American the opportu-
nity to tell every other Spanish American that he was discontented, and, 
if he thought it worth his while, to make representation of his discontent 
to the king and Cortes:
With such real, such ample, such universally-applying cause of dis-
content, pervading the whole of Spanish America, – with such cause 
of discontent, and at the same time such unprecedented and uncon-
troulable means of expressing and propagating it, think whether it 
could be long, ere, through the several stages of disaffection and 
disobedience, the discontent would have ripened into revolt.14
Moreover, the provision in the Constitution requiring all legislation ini-
tiated in Ultramaria to be approved by the Cortes would produce sig-
nificant problems and consequent suffering in Ultramaria. Without its 
own legislature, it was as impossible for any province in Ultramaria to 
be well-governed as it would be for Spain itself. On the part of the Ultra-
marians, the result would be ‘a state either of despondency or rage: of 
despondency if the abuse were regarded as not susceptible, of rage if it 
were regarded as susceptible, of remedy by insurrection’. The old des-
potism would be preferred to the new Constitution, since a despotism 
always had power to act, at least where it saw its interest in doing so, 
whereas under the new regime matters would stagnate.15
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There were other provisions in the Constitution that would aggra-
vate the discontent in Ultramaria. The right to elect deputies to the Cortes 
would be of no benefit to the Ultramarians, since the deputies would be 
corrupted by the rulers in Spain, and thereby induced to sacrifice the uni-
versal interests of both the Spanish and Ultramarian people to the sinis-
ter interest of Spain’s rulers. Moreover, there had been no census of the 
inhabitants of Ultramaria, and so it would be impossible to organize elec-
tions there according to the procedures laid down in the Constitution. 
Indeed, the Ultramarian members who had sat in the Cortes of 1812 
and that of 1820 had not been regularly elected by their alleged con-
stituents, but appointed by rulers in Spain.16 The infallibility- assuming 
clause (Article 375) meant that there would be no remedy for these 
problems until eight years had passed ‘subsequently to the time when the 
Constitution has been carried into practice in all its parts’. According to 
Bentham, the Constitution would not be carried into effect ‘in all its parts’ 
in two years, ‘nor in two hundred years – nor in two thousand years’. The 
argument in favour of the provision was that it was ‘a short method of 
disposing of all proposals tending to the restoration of the abolished des-
potism’. Bentham pointed out that if there were a majority in favour of 
the new order, then each such proposal could be rejected as and when it 
was brought forward. If there were a majority in favour of the old order, 
then the infallibility-assuming article would simply be ineffectual.17
Bentham expanded on these concerns in ‘Rid Yourselves of 
Ultramaria’, where he identified a series of ‘anti-constitutional evils’ that 
would arise from the retention of, or even the attempt to retain, the colo-
nies. The first evil was the addition of Ultramarian deputies to the Cortes. 
These deputies, who were neither chosen nor removable by the Spanish 
themselves, would in many matters – for instance, in the levying of tax-
ation – have an interest opposite to theirs. According to the Constitution 
(Art. 1), the Ultramarians and the Peninsular Spanish were all said to 
be ‘Spaniards’, yet, noted Bentham, they were in fact ‘strangers’ to each 
other. It was not ‘in the power of names to change and reverse the state 
of interests, the relations between interest and interest, or to destroy the 
influence of interest on conduct’.18 If the terms of the Constitution were 
put into effect, the Ultramarians would form a majority in the Cortes. The 
Constitution stipulated that there should be one deputy in the Cortes for 
every 70,000 ‘souls’ – it was unclear whether this meant women as well as 
men, though Bentham presumed not; it seemed to be generally accepted 
that there were more Ultramarians than Peninsulars (the population of 
Spain was around 12 million, and that of Ultramaria had been estimated 
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at over 15.5 million).19 In fact, no one would benefit from the Ultramarian 
representation in the Cortes. It would give no security against misrule 
to the Ultramarians themselves, and so was worthless to them, and yet 
would be seriously detrimental to the interests of Spain herself. In prac-
tice, the so-called Ultramarian representatives had not been elected by 
the people of Ultramaria, but consisted of 30 ‘substitutes’ who happened 
to be living in Madrid at the time of the elections, and attended the Cortes 
until the regularly elected representatives could arrive. Hence, laws were 
being imposed on the Spanish people that had been made not by genu-
ine, but by spurious, representatives of the Ultramarians.20 Bentham sus-
pected that the spurious representatives had been placed in the Cortes by 
those who had an interest in maintaining Spain’s claim over her colonies, 
whereas genuine representatives would be opposed to that claim.21
The second anti-constitutional evil was the addition that the colo-
nies made to the amount of corruptive influence that could be directed 
towards the members of the Cortes, whether from the Peninsula or from 
Ultramaria:
Of this corruptive influence the tendency, and to certainty sooner or 
later the effect, is to give to these representatives of the people on 
every occasion a particular interest opposite to the universal inter-
est, and to which, in consequence of the power attached to it, the 
universal interest will on every occasion of conflict be sure to be 
sacrificed: to produce, in a word, on their part the correspondent 
corrupt obsequiousness.
The king and his ministers had money and other ‘sweets of government’ 
to distribute to the representatives in the Cortes. In return, the repre-
sentatives were expected to promote the sinister interest of the king and 
his ministers. Unless the people intervened in some way, warned Ben-
tham, their representatives would be converted into the tools of ‘a virtual 
despotism – of a government in which, not less compleatly than under 
a despotism governing by force, the universal interest will be made a 
compleat sacrifice of to that knot of particular and sinister interests’. The 
people would be left with nothing beyond what was necessary for bare 
subsistence.22
The drafters of the Constitution, noted Bentham, had recognized 
the danger of corruptive influence, and had introduced arrangements 
to counteract it. These arrangements were, either through design or 
accident, completely inadequate. According to Article 129, deputies, 
during the period of their deputation, were not permitted to receive 
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for themselves, nor solicit for someone else, any employment from the 
king or promotion in rank. The value of an office, explained Bentham, 
was not destroyed by a delay, especially when the delay was at most 
two years, and might be as little as one day. The prohibition of solici-
tation was pointless, since a person did not have to solicit the king in 
order for the king to understand that he would be grateful if some office 
were given to a relative of his. ‘A female to whom service in that shape 
in which sexual desire is ministered to is a source of subsistence, does 
she never employ means of making it known, other than by making the 
tender of it in express terms?’ Rather than acting as a check to corrupt 
obsequiousness, this provision was a cover for it: ‘yielding to prostitu-
tion in this shape’ was not prohibited, but merely ‘the express offer of 
[the representative’s] services to the corruptor’s use’. Furthermore, if 
solicitation made an appointment to office void, then an enemy of a man 
about to be appointed to an office could simply solicit on his behalf in 
order to stop the appointment. According to Article 130, the deputies, 
during their deputation and for a year afterwards, were prohibited from 
obtaining for themselves or soliciting for another either a pension or 
dignity conferred by the king. This was in effect to give the deputy per-
mission to obtain or solicit such a pension or dignity a year after the 
period of his deputation had ended. This clause, like the previous one, 
pretended to be prohibitive, but in fact it gave licence. Hence, the dep-
uties of the Cortes, the only body that the Constitution had established 
in order to restrain the nation from ‘running full speed into the gulph 
of despotism’, could look forward to receiving in due course lucrative 
offices and pensions from the king. Once the retired deputy had been 
‘loaded with pensions and covered with ribbons’, he was then eligible to 
sit in the succeeding Cortes. Within a few years, predicted Bentham, the 
Cortes would have no deputies who were not king’s pensioners, appoint-
able and removable at his pleasure.23 Bentham recognized that it was 
impossible to remove completely the matter of corruptive influence from 
the executive for distribution among members of the legislature, but it 
was possible to reduce the number of ‘beneficial official situations’ to the 
minimum, and to reduce the pay attached to each to the minimum, ‘with 
the addition of punishment in case of legally proved corrupt obsequi-
ousness, and public reproach in case of corrupt obsequiousness believed 
though not legally proved’. A deputy might vote for an increase to the 
corruption fund, and then his son receive a lucrative office, but he could 
not be legally punished on this score. His constituents, at the next elec-
tion, could decide, however, ‘whether he is the fittest representative they 
can have’.24
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The third anti-constitutional evil produced by Ultramaria was 
 doubling the period between elections, and thereby adding to the time 
during which bad deputies were irremovable. Under the Constitution, the 
duration of the Cortes had been increased from the customary one year to 
two years, in order to give the Ultramarian deputies time to travel to and 
from Spain. One means of reducing corrupt obsequiousness was to limit 
the length of time for which an office could be held: ‘The shorter its dura-
tion, the less its magnitude: the less its magnitude, the less the marketable 
value of it in the event of its being on sale.’ The shorter the time that the 
corrupt service could continue, the less the corruptor would be prepared 
to give for it; and the shorter the time that the official was secured against 
removal, the less the quantity of evil he could perform before an end was 
put to it. The existence of Ultramaria, by occasioning biennial instead of 
annual elections, had, therefore, weakened ‘whatever security you had 
otherwise for the constitutional probity of [the] deputies’.25
The fourth anti-constitutional evil consisted in the demands that 
Ultramaria would place on the time of the Cortes. Were the Cortes to 
sit for the whole year, it would not have sufficient time to deal with 
the affairs of Spain. It was, however, expected to deal with the affairs 
of Ultramaria as well, and the demands of Ultramaria for the attention 
of the Cortes would exceed that of Spain itself. If this was not serious 
enough, the Cortes was not allowed to sit for more than four months each 
year. There would, predicted Bentham, be many complaints from the 
Ultramarians to the Cortes (as permitted by Art. 373), as well as disputes 
over the taxation levied by the Cortes on Ultramaria (Art. 131, clauses 
13 and 15; Art. 335, clause 1). Furthermore, since the Constitution had 
failed to establish any subordinate legislatures in the Ultramarian prov-
inces, all proposed legislation for Ultramaria would have to be dealt with 
by the Cortes. Under the terms of the Constitution, the smallest and most 
remote town council could not impose a tax upon its inhabitants with-
out the consent of the Cortes. Bentham lamented that the drafters of the 
Constitution had simply not been able to conceive of the effect that the 
change in Spain from a pure monarchy to a government that had within 
it a significant democratic element would have on Ultramaria – ‘and with 
all the aid they had from self-appointed Colleagues, the sham deputies 
from Ultramaria, [no] much clearer conception do they appear to have 
formed of themselves of the state of things in Ultramaria, in its thus pro-
jected condition, than if, instead of Ultramaria, they had had the moon 
to deal with’.26
The fifth anti-constitutional evil consisted in the introduction into 
Ultramaria, and from there into Spain, of a ‘latent despotism’. A major 
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problem for Spain would be extracting taxation from Ultramaria, since 
the Constitution had provided a variety of ‘facilities for evasion’. The 
Ultramarians would not pay taxes when the money would either be 
sent to Spain or used to pay the salaries of officials sent from Spain to 
Ultramaria in order ‘to fatten’ them. The Provincial Deputations (the 
ruling authorities in the colonies), of whose members the majority were 
Ultramarians, had the power to prevent the levying of any tax in the prov-
ince (Art. 335). Having said that, at the same time the Constitution had 
established a potential despotism in the powers given, somewhat sur-
reptitiously, to the governor or political chief of the province. Assuming 
that the Provincial Deputation proved awkward, the governor, who was 
appointed by the king, would make use of these powers. The governor 
was president of the Provincial Deputation, which was given authority ‘to 
promote the prosperity’ of the province. The executive authority, more-
over, which had been placed exclusively in the king, was pronounced to 
extend to whatever was ‘conducive to the preservation of public order 
in the interior and to the external security of the state, conformable to 
the Constitution and the laws’ (Art. 170). What all this meant in prac-
tice, claimed Bentham, was that the governor had a free hand to do as he 
pleased. All that he needed was sufficient military force at his disposal. 
In that case, there was nothing in the Constitution that could prevent the 
king and his ministers from granting unlimited power to the governor. 
Any judges who might be in a position to restrain the governor would 
have been sent from Madrid for the same purposes, and have the same 
interests, as the governor himself:
In case of any act done by him to the prejudice of the person, reputa-
tion, property or condition in life of this or that individual, to them 
[i.e. the judges sent from Madrid] it would belong to determine 
whether by such act, notwithstanding the private injury done, the 
general prosperity of the country were not promoted: the money, 
for example, necessary to the payment of their own salaries, raised.
In short, the judges would be ciphers. The power of the governor was, in 
effect, unlimited and, therefore, despotic.27
Why was the Constitution so incoherent? Bentham explained that 
its drafters had faced ‘a most perplexing’ task – to please the Spanish, 
the Ultramarians had to be placed under subjection, while to please 
the Ultramarians, they had to be exempt from subjection. ‘To the two 
opposite parties, the same set of arrangements was to present an object 
altogether opposite.’ The Ultramarians were all along to be ruled by the 
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rulers of Spain, but were to be given the appearance of a share in the rule 
over Spain: ‘But the subjection was real: the supposed power not effective 
power: nothing but a mere phantom of it.’ Bentham continued:
Without changing the nature of things, to reconcile such incompat-
ibilities was not in the power of omnipotence. What could not but 
happen has happened: in the endeavours to keep the Ultramarians 
in subjection and thence subject to taxation, the authors of your 
Constitutional Code … have compleatly failed. Requisitions, so they 
have ordered matters, will be made, but compliance will not follow: 
for compliance they have provided no motives: and for non-compli-
ance they have furnished not only adequate motives, but obvious 
and surely effectual means.
The only hope of effecting subjection was through the ‘inlets to despot-
ism’ that Bentham had identified in the powers given to the governor. 
In relation to Ultramaria, the Constitution was like the Frenchman’s 
account of the English drink of punch:
There was the brandy to make it strong: there was the water to 
make it weak: there was the lemon juice to make it sower: there 
was the sugar to make it sweet: in a word, it was the liquor of 
contradiction.28
III
In the late summer of 1820, Bentham became worried by two events in 
Spain. The first was the arrest of the Spanish liberal José Joaquín Mora 
on account of an article he had published in his journal El Constitucional, 
in which he had criticized the local government of Madrid. Bentham 
claimed that the successful prosecution of Mora would destroy the lib-
erty of the press. The second was a proposal put forward in the Cortes 
placing restrictions on public meetings. Bentham saw a translation of the 
proposed measure in The Traveller, 6 October 1820, and began to write 
the series of letters that was eventually published as On the Liberty of 
the Press, and Public Discussion in July 1821. His intention was that his 
essay should be translated into Spanish by Mora and published before the 
law was passed. By the time the text had reached Mora, however, it was 
too late: the measure had become law on 21 October 1820.29 Bentham, 
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nevertheless, went ahead with the publication of the original English ver-
sion of the Letters on the grounds that:
the more extensive object which they had in view … was neither at 
an end, nor in its nature capable of being put to an end. That object 
was – the rendering it manifest, how indispensable, at all times and 
every where, those two intimately-connected liberties – the liberty of 
the press, and the liberty of public discussion by word of mouth – are to 
every thing that can, with propriety, be termed good government … .30
Bentham contrasted the potential situation in Spain with the actual 
 situation in the United States of America, where no one could be pros-
ecuted for anything written against government, and where there were 
no restrictions on public meetings, and yet where, since independence, 
‘public tranquillity has not known what disturbance is’.31 Bentham rec-
ommended that, in relation to both liberty of speech and liberty of writ-
ing on political matters, Spain should follow the example of the United 
States. The Cortes should pass a declaration that the people should 
remain ‘at liberty … to meet, for the purpose of delivering their opinions, 
in the freest manner, on the conduct and character of their rulers’, or at 
least of their representatives and those subject to them.32
First, in relation to the liberty of the press, Bentham noted that crit-
icism of the form of government was inseparable from criticism of the 
persons exercising the powers of government, in that the form depended 
upon the persons. Rulers were prepared to punish both sorts of criticism. 
If the criticism suggested that a ruler had committed an act that was 
legally punishable, it was regarded as defamation; if the criticism was 
‘vague and general’, it was regarded as vituperation. Both acts were com-
monly treated as offences. Moreover, it was common to attach greater 
punishment to the offence as the rank of the person offended rose: the 
least punishment was attached where the person offended was a private 
individual, and the most where it was one of the leaders of the govern-
ment. In Bentham’s view, the more elevated the individual criticized, the 
less, rather than the more, protection should be afforded to that person 
by law. More powerful individuals had greater means to defend them-
selves against accusations of wrongdoing, while the greater rewards 
they enjoyed acted as compensation for any criticism they might receive. 
Hence, vituperation directed against a government official should not 
be made subject to punishment, while there should be no punishment 
for defamation ‘unless the imputation be false and groundless: nor even 
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then, unless the false assertion, or insinuation, be the result of wilful 
mendacity, accompanied with the consciousness of its falsity, or else with 
culpable rashness’. In short, the truth of the accusation should be a suffi-
cient defence. Bentham continued:
For these notions, speaking in general terms, my reason is – that 
to place, on any more advantageous footing, the official reputation 
of a public functionary, is, to destroy or proportionably to weaken, 
that liberty, which, under the name of the liberty of the press, oper-
ates as a check upon the conduct of the ruling few; and, in that 
character, constitutes a controuling power, indispensably necessary 
to the maintenance of good government.
Whatever evil could be produced by the exercise of this liberty to offended 
individuals was massively outweighed by the ‘infinite’ good it produced 
as a security for good government.33
Second, in relation to the liberty of public meetings, Bentham, hav-
ing seen the proposed measure regulating public meetings and the jus-
tifications put forward by the deputy Nicolás María Gareli in a debate 
in the Cortes, as reported in The Traveller, 21 September 1820, argued 
that it would have been better termed the ‘law for preventing public 
meetings’, and that its object was, in this respect, ‘to place the people of 
Spain exactly upon the same footing as the people of Morocco’. The law 
stated that public meetings were not to be held without the permission 
of the local authority. Only those meetings, remarked Bentham, that it 
suited the relevant official to allow would go ahead, while those he did 
not like would be banned. The measure constituted an attempt to estab-
lish a despotic government. Bentham would propose a test that would 
allow the Spanish people to distinguish a supporter of despotic govern-
ment from that of an undespotic one – in other words, to distinguish a 
hater from a lover of liberty – but before he could do this, some prelim-
inary explanations would be necessary. The characteristic feature of ‘an 
undespotic government’, he noted, consisted in ‘some eventual faculty of 
effectual resistance, and consequent change of government, … purposely 
left, or rather given, to the people’. To the objection that this was dan-
gerous, Bentham retorted that the subject many – his term for the peo-
ple in general – always had a ‘disposition to obsequiousness’, and that 
nothing ‘short of the extremity of misrule’ had ever produced revolution. 
Three ‘instruments’ were necessary to maintain a disposition to eventual 
resistance:
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instruction, excitation, correspondence. To the understanding applies 
instruction; to the will, excitation: both are necessary to appropri-
ate action and correspondent effect: instruction and excitation, in 
the case of each individual taken separately: correspondence, for 
the sake of concert amongst the number of individuals requisite and 
sufficient for the production of the ultimate effect.
All three elements contributed to maintaining ‘the national mind’ in ‘a 
state of preparation for eventual resistance’. Such a state of preparation 
both made possible a change in government, if necessary, and in the 
meantime prevented, or retarded, that necessity by constantly applying 
a check to misrule:
Necessary to instruction – to excitation – in a word to a state of 
preparation directed to this purpose, is – (who does not see it?) the 
perfectly unrestrained communication of ideas on every subject 
within the field of government: the communication, by vehicles of 
all sorts – by signs of all sorts: signs to the ear – signs to the eye – 
by spoken language – by written, including printed, language – by 
the liberty of the tongue, by the liberty of the writing desk, by the 
liberty of the post office – by the liberty of the press.
This was new neither in theory nor in practice. The principle was openly 
avowed in the United States Declaration of Independence, which thereby 
‘laid the foundation of eventual resistance to itself’. While disapproving 
of the ‘logic’ of the declaration, Bentham was prepared to admit that 
there was ‘thus much in it of good politics’.
Having explained the distinction between a despotic and undes-
potic government, Bentham announced his test: the question was 
whether a person would agree to arrange matters in relation to the 
liberty of the press and public discussion such that no one should have 
more to fear from speaking and writing against those exercising the 
powers of government than from speaking and writing in their favour. 
If the person answered yes, this was to declare in favour of an undes-
potic government; if no, in favour of a despotic one. If yes, the person’s 
principles were those of the United States and the Spanish Constitution; 
if no, they were those of the Emperor of Morocco. On this basis, those 
who supported the proposed measure to restrict public meetings were 
supporting the reintroduction of despotism. The Constitution itself pre-
vented political discussion at the parish elective meetings, the first stage 
of the four-stage electoral process. There was, therefore, no instruction, 
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excitation or correspondence among the electors. The proposed measure 
consummated the process by depriving people ‘of all other opportuni-
ties of learning the mental exercise; that instrument of independence by 
which alone man is distinguished from the puppet’.34
IV
A third short but insightful commentary on the Spanish Constitution 
appeared in an essay entitled ‘Letter to the Portugueze Nation, on Anti-
quated Constitutions; on the Spanish Constitution Considered as a 
Whole, and on Certain Defects Observable in It’, which was published in 
the summer of 1821 as the third of his Three Tracts on Spanish and Portu-
gueze Affairs.35 The Portuguese were in the process of adopting a new con-
stitution based on the Spanish model. Bentham’s aim was to warn them 
to avoid certain defects he had identified in the Spanish Constitution, 
while recommending its overall adoption, since it enshrined the demo-
cratic principles that he had himself advocated in Plan of Parliamentary 
Reform (1817), namely universality, secrecy, equality and annuality of 
suffrage – albeit elections in Spain would be biennial, and consist in four 
stages of election, as opposed to Bentham’s one. The Spanish Constitu-
tion represented a major improvement over Portugal’s ancient regime: 
‘The one thing needful is that by which the interest of the ruler is made 
the same with that of subject; of representative with that of constituent. 
This is what the Spanish constitution may be brought to do for you. This 
is what your old stale constitution never did, nor ever would be brought 
to do, for any body.’36
There were, however, four provisions within the Spanish Constitu-
tion that Bentham condemned. The first was ‘[t]he immutability-enacting, 
alias the infallibility-assuming clause’ (Art. 375). This clause prohibited 
any amendment to the Constitution for at least eight years. ‘Immutability 
in the work, assumes infallibility in the workman’: such an assumption 
was impossible to reconcile with sanity, since even if the legislator were 
infallible today, he would not remain so as time progressed. Bentham rec-
ognized that there was some reason for ‘this absurdity’, namely the fear of 
a return to despotism. The Portuguese, however, did not need to concern 
themselves in this regard, since the king was in Brazil.37
The second provision in the Spanish Constitution that Bentham 
encouraged the Portuguese to discard was non-re-eligibility (Arts 108, 
110) – that is, preventing the deputies of the first Cortes from sitting in 
the second. This was to jettison experience, even though, as the English 
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proverb maintained, experience was the mother of wisdom. To object 
that the deputies to the first Cortes might otherwise make their power 
perpetual was to ignore the fact that they could be removed every two 
years. If they proved themselves unfit, they would not be re-elected. The 
non-re-eligibility provision was undiscriminating in its application  – 
the most meritorious and the guiltiest representatives were removed 
together, without any opportunity for constituents to exercise their 
judgements in each individual case. The representative who had con-
ducted himself well was thereby denied ‘the correspondent and natural 
reward’, namely re-election. The fact that the representatives elected to 
the first Cortes could be elected to the third merely added to the compli-
cation. The author of the Constitution, in condemning the whole group 
of representatives together, assumed that he had greater knowledge of 
the men elected to the first Cortes, whom he did not know, than their 
electors did – he might as justifiably have excluded those who sat in the 
51st Cortes from the 50th.38
By prohibiting legal changes, one of the bad effects of an immuta-
bility-enacting clause was to produce ‘anti-legal changes’. By prohibiting 
regular amendment of the law, it encouraged the legislator himself to 
violate the law, and this in turn would encourage violation of the law 
throughout the community. An example of this was in relation to the 
non-re-eligibility clause. Despite the prohibition laid on representatives 
sitting in two successive Cortes, there were many members in the Cortes 
of 1820 who had also sat in the previous Cortes of 1812. Bentham asked: 
‘In the decree, by which the constitution was established, was any amend-
ment made as to this clause? If yes, then was the immutability clause 
violated: if no, then was the non-reeligibility clause violated’. Hence, the 
tendency of an immutability-enacting clause was ‘to plant anarchy, and 
to destroy confidence’.39
The third defect was the sleep-compelling clause (Arts 106–7), 
which limited the duration of the sitting of the Cortes to three months 
each year, with the possibility of an extension for a further month. ‘If 
there be one thing more impossible than another, surely it will be – the 
saying at any time of the year, upon any sure grounds, what time may 
be requisite and sufficient to the business: to the business that may, in 
the course of the remainder, happen to require to be done.’ If this was 
the case when everything had long been settled, it was still more so at 
a time when nearly everything still needed to be settled, and especially 
when the representatives themselves were new. ‘If such be the case, in 
a nation which (like the French), is more apt to go beyond the proper 
pace than fall short of it, in how much greater a degree must it not be 
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the case in a nation, which, if proverbs are not slanderers,40 is so much 
more apt to fall short of the mark, than to go beyond it?’ The supreme 
power in the state – the king and Cortes – was thereby doomed to impo-
tence for two-thirds of the year, without any reason assigned in justifica-
tion.41 In On the Liberty of the Press, and Public Discussion, Bentham had 
addressed the same theme: ‘By this strange article of the constitutional 
code, the Cortes, the only assembly in which, should misrule reassume 
its recent enormity, the voice of complaint can be heard, is laid asleep … 
for eight months.’ Meanwhile, the powers of government were lodged in 
the hands of ministers appointed by the king (Art. 171 (5)). At this time, 
he claimed that he was not so much concerned that the restoration of 
despotism would be the consequence of the eight months’ ‘sleep’ of the 
Cortes, since the new ministers had the same interest as the subject many 
in securing themselves from such an eventuality. However, as he went on, 
it seems that this was precisely his concern. He was afraid, he noted, that 
ministers ‘will do what all men would be disposed to do in their places: – 
that they will embrace every opportunity for sacrificing the interest of the 
whole community to their own particular interests’, and hence increase 
to the utmost the number of sinecure offices, increase to the utmost the 
amount of official pay, dispose of such offices for their own profit with-
out regard to the aptitude of the persons appointed to them, increase the 
expenditure of government as far as was practicable, and punish all per-
sons who had incurred their displeasure. In order to make this system 
permanent, they would enter into an alliance with the monarch and aris-
tocracy, and in particular the proprietors of large estates. The measures 
already taken in the Cortes by ministers ‘for the extinction of all power of 
control in the hands of the people, may, by means of such an alliance, be 
carried into full execution, and perfected and perpetuated’. Closing the 
Cortes for eight months was akin to locking up all the sheepdogs for eight 
months, ‘and the sheep committed during that time to the guardianship 
of the wolves’.42
The fourth amendment that Bentham recommended the Por-
tuguese to make to the Spanish Constitution was to replace biennial 
elections (Art. 108) with annual elections. The reason for the Span-
ish biennial clause was Ultramaria. If the duration of the Cortes had 
been but one year, the overseas representatives might have spent most 
of the year travelling to and from their constituencies. With the bien-
nial clause, only half the time would be wasted in this way. Bentham 
congratulated the Portuguese on the fact that they had been ‘eased of’ 
much of their Ultramaria by John VI’s removal to Brazil, and hoped 
that they would allow him to take the rest of the Portuguese colonies. 
56 HAPPINESS AND UTIL ITY
‘You will look down with an eye of sympathy on your neighbours the 
Spaniards, who are still incumbered and drained by the sort of nuisance 
of which you are rid.’ Being rid of their colonies, the Portuguese had 
removed one of the potential sources of dispute with the Spanish. Ben-
tham advised the Portuguese to ‘Unite yourselves to those same neigh-
bours by the closest bonds.’43
V
Having pointed out some of the ‘imperfections’ in the detail of the Consti-
tution, and stating that these were only a small part of those that he had 
identified, Bentham still referred to it as ‘this so extensively beneficent 
and wonder-working Code’ and as ‘this momentous work’. Its ‘excellence’, 
and hence his approval, was grounded on a small number of clauses: ‘the 
only legitimate end of government’ as recognized in Articles 4 and 13; 
and ‘the essential means: the choice of the ruling few placed in the hands 
of the subject many: to the exercise of a man’s share in this choice, no 
bar opposed but that which it is in a man’s own power to remove’ as rec-
ognized in Articles 34–5. Other nations were well advised to adopt the 
Spanish Constitution: ‘To each of these nations, what a treasure was this 
which their good fortune had thus placed in their hands!’ It was no good 
destroying an existing government unless there was some other to put in 
its place, and the Spanish Constitution was the best available.44
Bentham did his best to keep up with developments in Spain, and 
with organizing translations of his works. Despite his efforts, he always 
seemed to be overtaken by events. Just as he had identified the distance 
between Spain and her overseas colonies as a major impediment to effec-
tive governance, the relatively much shorter distance between Spain 
and England, and the difficulty of receiving accurate and reliable infor-
mation, meant that, even if there had been an audience for Bentham’s 
works, they were unlikely to have a significant impact. Yet having said 
that, what is striking is just how well grounded were Bentham’s fears 
concerning the re-establishment of royal despotism. He argued that a 
mixed constitution was essentially unstable and would inevitably move 
towards despotism or democracy. The tendency of measures passed by 
the Cortes, in Bentham’s view, was moving Spain back towards despot-
ism. His fears were realized: the Spanish liberals were either not able or 
not willing to introduce more robust measures of democratic reform into 
the Constitution and the political system, and thereby prevent the resto-
ration in 1823 of Ferdinand VII’s personal rule.
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Scepticism and Epicureanism:  
From David Hume to J. S. Mill
James Moore
I
It was a source of acute and persistent irritation to David Hume that his 
Scottish critics directed their criticisms of his philosophy against A Treatise 
of Human Nature, published in 1739–1740, when they should have focused 
their attention upon An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding and An 
Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, published in 1748 and 1751 
and reprinted together eight times, including the posthumously published 
edition of 1777. In an advertisement prefaced to the 1777 edition, Hume 
described the Treatise as a ‘juvenile work which the Author never acknowl-
edged … ’, which was ‘projected before he left College and which he wrote 
and published not long after’. He advised his readers that: ‘Henceforth, the 
Author desires, that the following pieces may alone be regarded as con-
taining his philosophical sentiments and principles.’1 Hume described his 
advertisement, in a letter to his publisher, William Strahan, as ‘a compleat 
Answer to Dr. Reid and to that bigoted silly Fellow, Beattie’.2
Hume’s advice to his readers was not followed by his Scottish 
critics, by Thomas Reid or by Hume’s friend, Adam Ferguson, or by 
Jeremy Bentham, James Mill and John Stuart Mill: all of them contin-
ued to focus their attention on the Treatise. They read the Treatise as 
a work that brought together extreme or Pyrrhonian scepticism and 
Epicureanism. This was an association that had been elaborated at 
length by Jean-Pierre de Crousaz, in his Examen du Pyrrhonisme, ancien 
et moderne, published in 1733, in a single double-columned volume of 
776 pages. Crousaz found this combination of Pyrrhonian scepticism and 
Epicureanism in the work of Pierre Bayle. As a Pyrrhonian sceptic, Bayle 
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ought to have been indifferent in his moral and political judgements; 
instead, he endorsed the moral principles of Epicureans, the principles 
of utility and agreeableness. He reproduced a character sketch in which 
Bayle was described as:
a genius capable of understanding anything, no matter how pro-
found, but he wrote sometimes in haste, and enjoyed making light 
of serious matters. Besides, one cannot justify the excess of love this 
author had for the desolate obscurity of Pyrrhonism.3
Crousaz was reproducing a description of Bayle’s intellectual charac-
ter written by the Chevalier Andrew Michael Ramsay, Hume’s host in 
France, where Hume wrote and refined the Treatise in Rheims and in 
La Flèche from 1734 to 1737. Hume advised a fellow Scot, also named 
Michael Ramsay, of what he should read to understand the argument of 
the Treatise: he should read the works of Malebranche, Berkeley, Bayle 
and Descartes. Hume was calling attention principally to Book I, Parts II 
and IV of the Treatise, on the ideas of space and time and on the sceptical 
and other systems of philosophy. Pyrrhonian scepticism is also evident 
in other parts of the Treatise, in Book II, on the passions, and Book III on 
justice and the natural virtues.
Crousaz had much to say on the subject of the passions in his 
Examen du Pyrrhonism. He had also outlined a review of the passions in 
his Logique translated in 1724 as A New Treatise on the Art of Thinking. 
He explained that it was entirely appropriate to discuss the passions in 
a work on logic, inasmuch as the passions, particularly the more violent 
passions, make it difficult to think logically and rationally. He considered 
the most violent passions to be self-love, love of sensual pleasure, love 
of fame and love of riches. It is remarkable that these were the passions 
that Hume considered indispensable for life in society. And love of fame 
and esteem for the rich and powerful prompted Hume to introduce the 
concept of ‘sympathy’ in the Treatise to reinforce his explanation of the 
passions by the association of ideas and impressions.
Hume declared, in An Abstract of a Treatise of Human Nature, pub-
lished in 1740, ‘if anything can intitle the author to so glorious a name as 
that of an inventor, ’tis the use he makes of the principle of the association 
of ideas’. The association of ideas, related in the imagination, judgement 
and reasoning by their resemblance contiguity and causation, enlivens 
ideas, imparting to those ideas the vivacity of impressions. In his appli-
cation of the association of ideas to the passions, and the reinforcement 
of those associations by sympathy, Hume was providing a defence of the 
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moral psychology identified by Crousaz, Chevalier Ramsay and others as 
Pyrrhonian scepticism.
In Book III, Parts II and III, Hume continued his defence of Pyrrhonian 
scepticism in opposition to the most distinguished natural rights theorist 
of the early eighteenth century, Jean Barbeyrac, who had aligned himself 
with Grotius, Pufendorf and Locke and the Stoic tradition of natural law 
against the Pyrrhonism of Bayle. Hume argued that property could not be 
considered a natural right, as Locke had argued, because one can always 
imagine that a man may be separated from his possessions. Property is a 
species of causation, and in any causal relation, the cause may be sepa-
rated from the effect. The imagination and the self-love of men must be 
regulated by an agreement of judgements or conventional restraints upon 
avarice and ambition. It is another association of ideas that provides the 
source of allegiance to government, which provides a remedy for the 
absence of proximity or contiguity as societies increase in size and in num-
bers. And, finally, Hume argued that rules of politeness provide a remedy 
for the resemblance of proud men who cannot fail to provoke one another 
by their vainglory and self-conceit. In all of these exercises of imagination 
and judgement, Hume was employing the association of ideas against 
the Stoic theories advocated by, among others, Barbeyrac and Crousaz.4 
This was the understanding of Hume’s philosophy, at once sceptical and 
Epicurean, that engaged the attention of Scottish and English readers from 
Reid and Ferguson to Bentham, James and John Stuart Mill.
II
In An Abstract of the Inquiry into the Human Mind on the Principles of 
 Common Sense, Thomas Reid wrote:
Ever since the Treatise of Human Nature was published, I respected 
Mr. Hume as the greatest metaphysician of the age, and have learned 
more from his writings in matters of that kind than from all others 
put together. I read that treatise over and over with great care, made 
an abstract of it and wrote my observations upon it. I perceived that 
his system is all founded upon one principle, from which his conclu-
sions, however extraordinary, are deduced with irresistible evidence. 
The principle I mean is, that all objects of human thought are either 
impressions or ideas; which I was very much disposed to believe until 
I read that treatise; but finding that if this is true I must be an absolute 
sceptic, I thought that it deserved a careful examination.5
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In Essays on the Active Powers of Man, Book V, Chapter V, Reid offered 
an appraisal of Hume’s theory of morals. He chose to bring together for 
the purposes of this exercise Book III of the Treatise and An Enquiry Con-
cerning the Principles of Morals: ‘In these two works on morals the sys-
tem is the same … in both systems, pleasure is the only end, the only 
thing that is good in itself, and desirable for its own sake.’6 In Hume’s 
systems, the proper object of moral approbation is not actions or any 
voluntary exertion but qualities of mind: natural affections or passions, 
which are involuntary and common to us and even to brute animals. 
In Reid’s judgement, Hume’s moral philosophy was clearly Epicurean. 
Hume’s system differed from Epicureans in one thing: it allowed for dis-
interested affections, such as benevolence and other natural virtues that 
are always agree able. There are other qualities of character that are not 
always agreeable, but they are useful to ourselves and to others. But, 
Reid declared: ‘Agree ableness and utility are not moral conceptions, nor 
have they any connection with morality.’7 Hume’s system, in short, was 
directly contrary to the account Reid had given of the active power of the 
human mind: ‘If God has given to man a power which we call conscience, 
the moral faculty, the sense of duty, then Hume’s theory must be false.’8
Reid also rejected Hume’s argument that there must be a motive to 
be virtuous, distinct from a love of virtue. Reid remarked:
This maxim of Mr. Hume, that no action can be morally good, unless 
there be some motive to produce it distinct from its morality, is so 
far from being undoubtedly true, that it must be undoubtedly false. 
It was never, so far as I know, maintained by any moralist, but by the 
Epicureans; and it savours of the very dregs of that sect.9
It was not only the Epicureans who thought that the Stoic virtue lacked 
a motive; this problem with Stoic virtue had also been remarked on by 
Cicero, as Hume had reminded Hutcheson. It was a problem for Hume 
that in Hutcheson’s moral sense theory, virtue (benevolence) should 
be sought for its own sake. Hume referred Hutcheson to Cicero, De Fin-
ibus Bonorum et Malorum, Book IV, where Cicero, writing as a sceptic, 
opposed the Stoics for failing to recognize that there must be a motive 
to be virtuous distinct from the love of virtue: ‘You [Cato], who have no 
other standard in view but abstract right and morality will not be able to 
find a source and starting point for duty and for conduct.’ Cicero charged 
the Stoics with inconsistency in proceeding first to ascertain the supreme 
good and only then searching the natural desires and instincts to discover 
a motive; they should have included these desires and motives from the 
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beginning of their reasoning, for ‘it is these things which excite desire 
and give motives to conduct’.10
As Hume read Cicero, he must have found a similar line of reason-
ing in De Officiis: that the way to the honestum, to that which would be 
worthy of praise and honour even if no one made it an object of praise 
or honour, must be through utilitas, which Cicero represented typically 
as love of fame. The fame must be deserved, it must be consistent with 
the honestum, which is the standard or foundation of morality, but in the 
absence of the passions, of the love of fame, of desire for esteem, of inter-
est, there would be no motive to be virtuous.
III
On 12 April 1759, Hume told Adam Smith of a manuscript he had received 
from Ferguson entitled A Treatise of Refinement. Hume liked what he read. 
He remarked on this manuscript that ‘with some amendment, it will make 
an admirable book and discovers an elegant and singular genius’.11 Some 
years later, he read what appears to have been a revised and expanded ver-
sion of this manuscript, now entitled An Essay on the History of Civil Society. 
Hume now disagreed with basically everything. He told Hugh Blair:
I have perus’d Ferguson’s papers more than once … I am sorry to 
say it … I do not think them fit to be given to the Public, neither on 
account of the Style nor the Reasoning: the Form nor the Matter … 
It is needless to enter into a Detail, where almost everything seems 
to me exceptionable.12
Hume’s disagreement with Ferguson’s An Essay on the History of Civil 
Society (1767) can be explained in part, perhaps, by the repeated chal-
lenges to Hume’s political ideas that appear in the Essay. I would suggest 
that the Essay can be read as a dialogue with Hume, that in this light, 
their disagreement may be considered an episode in the ongoing early 
modern debate between Stoics and Epicureans.13
Ferguson described the respective characters of Epicureans and 
Stoics in the Principles of Moral and Political Science:
The Epicurean was a deserter from the cause of his fellow-crea-
tures, and might justly be reckoned a traitor to the community of 
nature, of mankind, and even of his country, to which he owed his 
protection.
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The Stoic was a man of a different character:
The Stoic enlisted himself as a willing instrument in the hand of 
God, for the good of his fellow-creatures. For himself, the cares and 
attentions which their object required were his pleasures; and the 
continued exertion of a beneficent affection, his welfare and his 
posterity.14
The reader is left in no doubt where Ferguson stood in the debate between 
Epicureans and Stoics. Hume had caricatured the Epicurean philosophy 
in his essay ‘The Epicurean’, when he characterized the Epicurean as a 
man interested only in the pursuit of pleasure: this was the frivolous 
 philosophy of Aristippus and the Cyrenaics.15 In An Enquiry Concerning 
the Principles of Morals, Hume dissociated himself from philosophers who 
would reduce all passions to modifications of self-love: he included Hob-
bes and Locke in this company.16 But there were other themes in Hume’s 
moral and political writings, principally in the Treatise, that reflect the 
principles of modern Epicureans: Gassendi, Bayle, the Baron des Cous-
tures and St Evremond: (1) his depiction of the state of nature as a con-
dition of poverty, weakness and insecurity; (2) his insistence that justice 
and the institutions of society are artificial; (3) his argument that justice 
has its origin in a convention of abstaining from the possessions of oth-
ers; and (4) his conviction that the happiest societies are modern com-
mercial and polite societies.
Ferguson, in the Essay, challenged each of these propositions. (1) In 
Part I, Section I of the Essay, he replied to the question: ‘Where is the state 
of nature to be found?’ He answered this question (as Hutcheson did in 
his inaugural lecture) that the state of nature is found whenever men act 
in a manner consistent with their own nature: in Ferguson’s judgement, 
this happens whenever men exercise their minds as active, intelligent 
beings. ‘While this active being is in the train of employing his talents 
and of operating on the subjects around him, all situations are equally 
natural.’17 (2) Ferguson rejected the distinction between natural and arti-
ficial, as Hutcheson did, but in an idiom distinctively his own: ‘We speak 
of art as distinguished from nature; but art itself is natural to man … If 
the palace be unnatural, the cottage is so no less; and the highest refine-
ments of political and moral apprehension are not artificial in their kind, 
than the first operations of sentiment and reason.’18 (3) Whereas Hume 
had discovered the origin of justice in a convention of abstinence and 
thought that the rules of justice were mutually supporting, like stones 
in an arch, Ferguson discovered the origin of justice in the principle of 
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virtue that Montesquieu considered the animating spirit of the laws in 
republican governments: the love of equality.19 It is a principle, Ferguson 
remarked, that may be forgotten by those accustomed to unequal distri-
bution of goods and subordination of ranks. He considered the relations 
of men in society ‘not merely, like stones in a wall or an arch, that of rel-
ative position and place, but of activity and of co-operation in different 
functions, or of balance, counterpoise and mutual creation … ’20 (4) 
Ferguson was appreciative of the benefits that follow from commerce, as 
Hume described them: refinement of the arts, politeness, regular admin-
istration of the laws and of justice. But, Ferguson countered, unless one 
also cultivates the virtues of rude and barbarian societies, courage and 
fortitude, one may find that civil liberty has been lost. If one lacks the 
courage to protest when prisoners are held interminably without trial or 
are tortured to produce evidence that can be used against them, then 
governments, whether monarchical or republican, will lapse into despot-
ism. Here one may recognize Montesquieu’s analysis of the three forms 
of government transposed by Ferguson on a historical trajectory:
We must admire as the key-stone of civil liberty, the statute which 
forces the secrets of every prison to be revealed, the cause of every 
commitment to be declared, and the person of the accused to be 
produced, that he may claim his enlargement or his trial within 
a limited time. No wiser form was ever opposed to the abuses of 
power. But it requires a fabric no less than the whole constitution of 
Great Britain, a spirit no less than the refractory zeal of this fortu-
nate people to secure its effects.21
Hume was generally sceptical of the virtues of the active citizens of 
ancient Greece and Rome. His preference was for the polite societies of 
modern Great Britain and France. He had reason to be sceptical of the 
politics and manners of the ancient world, and was convinced that the 
most important virtue, the sentiment of humanity, the foundation of 
morality, was to be found more often in modern polite and commercial 
societies. In a section of the Essay, ‘Of the Corruption Incident to Polished 
Nations’, Ferguson expressed concern about the indifference to objects 
of a public nature in polished societies, that men were more inclined to 
value their private ease and tranquillity, that:
in this condition the mind becomes enfeebled and men generally 
flatter their own imbecility under the name of politeness. They are 
persuaded that the celebrated ardour, generosity and fortitude of 
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former ages, bordered on frenzy, or were the mere effects of neces-
sity … . They congratulate themselves on having escaped the storm 
which required the exercise of such arduous virtues; … .22
One may ask whether Hume ever responded to Ferguson’s sallies against 
his moral and political ideas. There is an account, written by John Home, 
a mutual friend of Ferguson and Hume, of a journey to Bath, taken in 
April or May 1776, the last year of Hume’s life:
Nothing occurred worthy the writing down, except Mr. David’s 
plan of managing his kingdom, in case Ferguson and I had been 
princes of the adjacent states. He knew very well, he said (having 
often disputed the point with us) the great opinion we had of mil-
itary virtues as essential to every state; that from those sentiments 
rooted in us, he was certain he would be attacked and interrupted 
in his projects of cultivating, improving and civilizing mankind by 
the arts of peace; that he comforted himself with reflecting, that 
from our want of economy and order in our affairs, we should be 
continually in want of money; whilst he would have his finances in 
excellent condition, his magazines well filled, and his naval stores 
in abundance; but that his final stroke of policy, upon which he 
depended, was to give one of us a large subsidy to fall upon the 
other, which would infallibly secure to him peace and quiet, and 
after a long war, would probably terminate in his being master of 
all three kingdoms.23
IV
In a lengthy note to A Fragment on Government, Jeremy Bentham recalled 
the delight he experienced upon reading Book III of A Treatise of Human 
Nature: ‘I felt as if scales had fallen from my eyes. I then, for the first time, 
learnt to call the cause of the people the cause of virtue.’ He discovered 
not only that the theory of the original contract, a staple of the early mod-
ern natural law tradition (endorsed by Hutcheson and by Reid), ‘had been 
effectually demolished by Mr. Hume’, he also found ‘that the foundations 
of all virtue are laid in utility is there demonstrated … ’24 Bentham meant 
by the principle of utility ‘that principle which approves or disapproves of 
every action whatsoever, according to the tendency which it appears to 
have to augment or diminish the happiness of the party whose interest is 
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in question’. He made it clear that the party whose interest is in question 
should always be understood to refer to an individual: ‘It is in vain to talk 
of the interest of the community without understanding what is in the 
interest of the individual … The community is a fictitious body, composed 
of the individual persons who are considered as constituting as it were its 
members.’25
Thus far, Bentham’s formulation of the principle of utility and its 
application to society is consistent with Hume’s understanding of society 
and the individuals who comprise it. Hume thought of society as an artifi-
cial institution that had its origin in an agreement of judgements made by 
individuals who understood that it was in their interest to live in society. 
This was ‘the natural obligation’, the original motive that restrained the 
avarice and ambition of individuals and prompted them to believe that 
life in society was in their interest.
In his celebration of the Treatise, Bentham confined his praise 
to Book III. He thought that Books I and II might be passed over, that 
Hume himself would not be ‘ill disposed, at present, to join with those 
who are of opinion that they might, without any great loss to the science 
of Human Nature, be dispensed with. The like might be said, perhaps, 
of a considerable part, even of this.’26 It should be said at once that the 
Treatise made a greater and more lasting impression on Bentham than 
any other work of Hume’s. But he may have been prepared to write dis-
missively of Books I and II because he had discovered in the writings of 
other  philosophers an understanding of experimental reasoning more 
congenial for his own project of censorial jurisprudence and reform. 
He had learned from Claude Adrien Helvétius that pains and pleas-
ures could be measured as units of sensation. And he had learned that 
Cesare Beccaria that the criteria for such calculations could be reduced 
to a formula or felicific calculus that considered the intensity, duration, 
propinquity and fecundity of pleasures and pains.27
These men were also the authors in whose writings Bentham found 
the phrase ‘the greatest happiness of the greatest number’; he sometimes 
also included Joseph Priestley in this list. He made no mention of Francis 
Hutcheson in this connection. Hutcheson had used the same phrase in 
An Inquiry into the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue (1725).28 
And it is possible that any one of Helvétius, Beccaria or Priestley may 
have taken over the ‘greatest happiness’ phrase from Hutcheson’s work; 
but, like Bentham, not one of them mentioned Hutcheson in this con-
nection. Two fine scholars, W. R. Scott, the biographer of Hutcheson, 
and Robert Shackleton, the biographer of Montesquieu, have attempted 
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to trace indirect connections between Hutcheson and the authors cited 
by Bentham,29 but a consideration that may prompt some scepticism of 
this scholarly enterprise is that Hutcheson did not have the interests of 
individuals in mind when he wrote about happiness. He maintained that 
happiness, true happiness, could be found only in virtue. And he had 
his own felicific calculus that allowed him to measure the momentum 
of virtue in any act or character. His formula was M (for momentum of 
virtue) = B (for benevolence) – (minus) I (for interest).30 He would sub-
tract motivation derived from interest from the benevolent motivation 
of the act or character to discover the virtue of the person or the deed. 
Hutcheson’s formula is not what Bentham or Helvétius or Beccaria had in 
mind when they wrote of the greatest happiness of the greatest number. 
They believed, as did Hume, that societies and governments must assume 
that individuals will pursue their own interests and take such interested 
behaviour into account in determining the laws and rights of individuals.
It may be instructive, in this context, to compare Hume and Bentham 
in their respective treatments of the right of property. Élie Halévy 
thought Bentham owed his theory of the right of property to Hume.31 
And Hume’s discussion of the origin of justice and property and the rules 
that determine property may have been Bentham’s point of departure. 
There are at least three aspects of Bentham’s theory of property that 
may be indebted to Hume. First, Bentham followed Hume in rejecting 
the justification of private ownership on the grounds of natural law or 
natural right. In A Fragment on Government, Bentham characterized all 
such approaches as absurd, on the basis that they ascribed legal relation-
ships to a condition, the state of nature, whose very meaning depended 
upon the assumption that law in such a state did not exist.32 In the most 
systematic of his discussions of property, in the ‘Principles of the Civil 
Code’, Bentham unequivocally insisted on the dependence of the institu-
tion of property upon positive or human law: ‘Property and law are born 
together and die together. Before laws were made there was no property; 
take away laws, and property ceases.’33 But if Bentham was indebted to 
Hume in this matter, the differences in the manner in which they worked 
out their theories are no less remarkable. For law, in Bentham’s thought, 
was never merely convention: in the absence of a command given by a 
superior person or persons (governors) to others (subjects) who are in 
the habit of obeying those commands, there was no law, and indeed no 
society, properly speaking.34 Thus, rights, including the right of property, 
were never understood by Bentham as merely the use and enjoyment of 
objects acknowledged as the property of individuals by the conventional 
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abstinence of others from those possessions. Rights, for Bentham, did not 
exist, until they were legislated into existence by the commands of gov-
ernments in the form of statute law, or by the quasi-commands of judges 
in courts of common law.
Second, the institution of property, for Bentham as for Hume, was 
the best means of providing security for individuals, and security in 
Bentham’s scheme of things, was ‘the principle object of law’, and ‘the dis-
tinctive index of civilization’.35 Without security, the condition of human 
beings would be like that of savages or animals, limited to the present, 
without anticipation of future experience, and therefore without expec-
tations. But, unlike Hume, for whom the insecurity and the uncertainty 
of the future could be remedied only by conventional or social behaviour, 
the anticipation of future consequences was for Bentham the very object 
of the human capacity for calculation. And the kind of pain that a legis-
lator would endeavour to avoid by providing security for rational or cal-
culating individuals was the pain of frustrated expectation, or the ‘pain 
of disappointment’.36 The best insurance against that ‘distinct and special 
evil’ was the institution of property.
Third, it is remarkable that in his guidance to legislators regarding 
the rules that should be followed in determining the rights of property 
ownership, Bentham once again followed the criteria set out by Hume. 
Both followed Roman private law in their specification of the rules 
of ownership: actual or present possession, which Bentham included 
with occupation, prescription, accession and succession. But each rule, 
in Bentham’s formulation, was based upon a calculation of the disap-
pointments that would be avoided by following a particular rule and 
the pleasures of satisfied expectation or pleasures of wealth, as he more 
directly refers to it on occasion,37 which would follow from applications 
of the rule. As such, he rejected Hume’s view that the rules of owner-
ship derived from nothing other than the principles of the imagination. 
Bentham’s campaign to rid the law of fictions made that kind of justi-
fication unacceptable. And his confidence in the capacity of legislators 
and judges to calculate the consequences of the applications of particular 
rules of laws made it possible for him to believe that a judge might weigh 
the pleasures and pains of two claimants to a certain property and award 
an appropriate amount to each:
Civil judges, who … are obliged to give a decisive sentence on some 
one side, are often at a loss how to determine, and are necessitated 
to proceed on the most frivolous reasons in the world.38
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Bentham’s view was that the principle of utility, as he understood it, 
 enabled a judge to weigh the pleasures and pains of both parties, and 
arrive at a more just distribution of goods:
the principle of caprice, without regard to the comparative amount 
of pains and pleasures, gives everything to one of the parties with-
out paying any attention to the other. The principle of utility, anx-
ious to reduce to the least term an inevitable inconvenience, weighs 
the two interests, seeks the means of reconciling them, and directs 
indemnities.39
In his endeavour to complement justice as security with another dimen-
sion of justice, in the form of equity, Bentham may have drawn attention 
to a facet of Hume’s theory that required amendment. But it must also 
be recognized that Hume’s insistence upon the obligation to adhere to 
a conventional or uniform manner of implementing rules of law derived 
from an understanding of the problem of contingency or unpredictability 
in human affairs, which Bentham tended to ignore. Ultimately, there was 
something paradoxical in Bentham’s insistence that although security 
was the end of law, the anguish of insecurity must be weighed by a leg-
islator or judge in any given case – against the claims of other sources of 
pain and pleasure. The assumption of that capacity to calculate, given the 
limits of human reason, and the unpredictability of human affairs, could 
have no other effect, Hume would have said, than to reintroduce through 
the judiciary, conditions of insecurity that could have been avoided by 
adherence to a conventional form of behaviour.
Bentham considered sympathy to be a misleading principle inas-
much as it substituted the internal and subjective feelings or sentiments 
of individuals for the external and objective standard of utility. The 
principles of sympathy and antipathy fuel resentment and lead to pun-
ishments of greater severity than is warranted, necessary or useful.40 
It is a question of whether this criticism of sympathy applies to Hume, 
for whom justice was an artificial not a natural virtue. Bentham’s case 
against sympathy may apply more directly to Adam Smith’s theory that 
justice has a natural origin in the resentment felt by the victim of injustice 
and in the sympathy felt by others that retaliation is appropriate.
Finally, Bentham, like Hume, was opposed to appeals to particu-
lar faculties of human nature to explain and justify human conduct. In 
An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, Chapter 2, 
 SCEPT IC ISM AND EPICUREANISM: FROM DAVID HUME TO J .  S.  MILL  71
‘of Principles Adverse to Utility’, Bentham compiled a list of turns of 
phrase that:
consist all of them in so many contrivances for avoiding the obliga-
tion of appealing to an external standard, and for prevailing upon 
the reader to accept the author’s sentiment or opinion as a reason 
and that a sufficient one for itself, the phrases different, but the 
principle the same.41
His list consisted of the following phrases: moral sense, common sense; 
understanding; rule of right; fitness of things; law of nature; law of rea-
son, right reason, natural justice, natural equity, good order; truth; doc-
trine of election; repugnancy of nature. Most of these phrases, if not all, 
designate faculties or powers of the mind of the sort that Hume had dis-
missed as ‘illusions’ characteristic of ‘the ancient philosophy’. Bentham’s 
dismissal of these phrases and the internal monitors signified by them 
was in this respect consistent with Hume’s treatment of the understand-
ing and the passions.
V
Unlike Jeremy Bentham, James Mill had read Books I and II of Hume’s 
Treatise with an appreciation for what he took to be Hume’s originality. 
In his article ‘Education’, published in 1819 as a supplement to the Ency-
clopaedia Britannica, Mill wrote:
Mr. Hume perceived, much more distinctly than any of the  philosophers 
who had gone before him, that to philosophize concerning the human 
mind was to trace the order of succession among the elementary 
feelings of man. He pointed out three great laws or comprehensive 
sequences, which he thought included the whole. Ideas followed one 
another, he said, according to resemblance, contiguity in time and place, 
and cause and effect.42
Mill also reserved for Hume the ‘great discovery’ that what are called our 
complex ideas are only a particular class of cases belonging to the same 
law – namely that of the succession of ideas; every complex idea being 
only a certain number of simple ideas that succeed each other so rapidly 
as not to be ‘distinguished’ without an effort of thought.
72 HAPPINESS AND UTIL ITY
Mill thought that Hume was much indebted to Hobbes’s work on 
human nature; that it was Hobbes who had theorized the correspond-
ence between ideas and impressions and the order in which they come 
to mind. Mill did not remark the distinctive character of Hume’s theory 
of belief in this connection that the credibility of ideas depends upon 
the manner in which ideas make an impression on the mind. He allowed 
that Hume had ‘made some brilliant developments in the philosophy of 
mind, but he did not advance very far in the general object’.43 The general 
object James Mill had in mind was education and how it could be made 
to contribute to human happiness. Fortunately, Hume was succeeded by 
Condillac and by Hartley, although Mill doubted either of them had read 
Hume’s Treatise.
Mill would work up his own theory of the association of ideas in 
his Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind (1829). His Analysis is 
notable for its reduction of mental phenomena to the simplest principles 
he could conceive. He reduced Hume’s principles of the association of 
ideas and impressions to one principle: contiguity in place and time.44 
Unlike Hartley, Mill had no theory of the ‘vibratiuncles’ or nerve end-
ings that connect sensations or feelings: Mill retained Hume’s theory that 
connections of ideas and impressions are marked by the vividness and 
frequency of the associations.
Later in the Analysis, Mill would explain: ‘The Phenomena which 
have been classed under the titles of Moral Sense, Moral Faculty, Sense 
of Right and Wrong, Moral Affection, Love of Virtue, and so on, which 
are all names of similar import.’45 As he explained these terms, they stand 
for nothing more than the pleasures or pains associated with acts of our 
own and of others. It is remarkable that what Mill described as acts – 
prudence, bravery, justice and beneficence – Hume would have called 
qualities of character, virtues useful and agreeable to ourselves and oth-
ers. Mill retained the categories of usefulness to ourselves and others: 
prudence and bravery are useful to ourselves, justice and benevolence 
are useful to others.
Mill was determined to reduce mental phenomena to the simplest 
explanations he could imagine: his reduction of virtues to acts useful 
to ourselves and others is a case in point. But one may recognize that 
he was employing categories of moral life that had been used by Hume. 
Opposite the title page of the Analysis, there are two epigraphs drawn 
from the writings of Dugald Stewart, which recommended the scientific 
study of human nature. Mill’s work, however, has little in common with 
the philosophy of Dugald Stewart or with Thomas Reid or the editor of 
the works of Stewart and Reid, Sir William Hamilton. James McCosh, in 
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The Scottish Philosophy, put it succinctly in his discussion of James Mill: 
‘Dugald Stewart’s teaching seems to have exercised little influence in his 
mind except to suggest the order in which he takes up his topics. I suspect 
he derived more from Hume than from Stewart.’46
Stewart had another pupil who remained much closer to him, per-
sonally and intellectually, than James Mill. Sir James Mackintosh (1765–
1832) was one of several students of Dugald Stewart who wrote for The 
Edinburgh Review.47 In 1816 and in 1821, Sir James Mackintosh wrote 
reviews of the first and second parts of Stewart’s Dissertation: Exhibiting 
the Progress of Metaphysical, Ethical and Political Philosophy. In Part II 
(1821), he reflected on the sceptical disposition of Hume:
the same character which disposes men to scepticism, may dispose 
them also to acquiesce in considerable abuses, … ; they hope for 
little from human wisdom and virtue, and are rather secretly prone 
to that indolence and indifference which forbade the Epicurean 
sage to hazard his quiet for the doubtful interests of a contemptible 
race … . The sceptical temper of Mr. Hume may have thus insensibly 
moulded his political opinions.48
In 1830, Mackintosh published a sequel to Stewart’s Dissertation, in 
which he considered the progress of ethical philosophy in the seven-
teenth and eighteenth centuries. He was not impressed by the progress 
made by moral philosophers in modern times; all, or almost all, had over-
looked an important distinction between the object of moral judgement 
and the subjective feelings that prompt us to approve or disapprove the 
conduct of others and ourselves. It is a distinction, he said, that:
has seldom been made by moral philosophers; the difference 
between the two problems has never been uniformly observed by 
any of them; and it will appear in the sequel, that they have been 
not rarely altogether confounded by very eminent men, to the 
destruction of all just conception and of all correct reasoning in this 
most important, and, perhaps most difficult of all sciences.49
One would not be wrong in supposing that this was a fairly rash asser-
tion on the part of Mackintosh; that a critic, predisposed to differ with 
him, might well fix upon it and produce citations from the writings of 
early modern moral philosophers where the distinction is very clearly 
and explicitly made. Such a critic would have a greater motive to do 
so if he found himself characterized as an unreflective follower of the 
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master of a school where this important distinction had been neglected or 
 suppressed. This confusion of the rightness or wrongness of actions with 
the feelings or motives that prompt us to approve or disapprove of those 
actions had its origins, Mackintosh believed, in the debates between Sto-
ics and Epicureans in ancient times. It was not the Stoics who were guilty 
of this confusion, as Hume had advised Hutcheson, citing Cicero’s scep-
tical reply to Cato in De Finibus, Book IV; in Mackintosh’s mind, it was 
the Epicureans, who thought that utility or the happiness of oneself and 
others was both the object and the motive of moral action:
It may be said, indeed, that the Epicurean doctrine has continued 
with little change to the present day; at least it is certain that no 
other ancient doctrine has proved so capable of being restored 
in the same form among the moderns: and it may be added, that 
Hobbes and Gassendi, as well as some of our own contemporaries 
are as confident in their opinions, and as intolerant of scepticism as 
the old Epicureans.50
The contemporaries to whom Mackintosh alluded were Jeremy Bentham 
and his school: ‘The disciples of Mr. Bentham are more like the hearers of 
an Athenian philosopher than the pupils of a modern professor … .’ He 
said, ‘They derive their opinions not so much from the cold perusal of his 
writings, as from familiar converse with a master from whose lips these 
opinions are recommended by simplicity, disinterestedness, originality 
and vivacity.’51 Mackintosh was describing conversations of which he had 
no direct acquaintance; this was not the way Bentham talked, as those 
who knew Bentham more intimately would be quick to point out.
James Mill’s A Fragment on Mackintosh: Being Strictures on Some 
Passages in the Dissertation by Sir James Mackintosh was published 
in 1835. It has been described as a work that is hypercritical and vitu-
perative. John Stuart Mill was embarrassed by it, but thought that the 
substance of his father’s arguments was basically sound.52 James Mill 
described his disposition as he wrote it in prefatory remarks to the reader. 
It was originally written, he said, in the form of letters to the author: ‘And 
they were written with that severity of reprehension which the first feel-
ings of indignation against an evil-doer inspire.’53
It is remarkable that nowhere in a book of over 400 pages does Mill 
ever challenge Mackintosh’s repeated characterization of Bentham and 
his school as Epicureans. ‘Epicurean’, it seems, was a term that did not 
present a problem for James Mill. He was more than ready to defend par-
ticular philosophers whom Mackintosh had described as Epicureans or 
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worse. Mill devoted a chapter of his work to a defence of Hobbes on human 
nature. He took offence at Sir James’s portrayal of Bernard Mandeville 
as ‘the buffoon and sophister of the ale-house’. For Mill, Mandeville was 
describing human nature with candour and the conditions of economic 
flourishing in a commercial society with accuracy and with penetration.54 
Helvétius was not as profound a philosopher as one might have wished, 
but he had made an important contribution to education.55 And James 
Mill thought that Hume was surely right when he wrote that:
Political writers have established it as a maxim, that in contriving 
any system of government, and fixing the several checks and con-
trols of the constitution, every man ought to be supposed a knave, 
and to have no other end, in all his actions, than private interest.56
This was an insight that the framers of the American constitution, Ham-
ilton and Madison, had very much in mind when they insisted upon an 
electoral college that would ensure presidents would be elected by those 
with some experience of government; unhappily, this arrangement has 
been modified over the centuries and decades in a manner that has pro-
duced a different, more controversial result.
VI
It must surely be the case that John Stuart Mill had Hume, among others, 
in mind, when he declared, memorably, that:
Those who know anything about the matter are aware that every 
writer, from Epicurus to Bentham, who maintained the theory of 
utility, meant by it, not something to be contradistinguished from 
pleasure, but pleasure itself, together with exemption from pain; 
and instead of opposing the useful to the agreeable or the ornamen-
tal, have always declared that the useful means these, among other 
things.57
Hume could not have enunciated what is meant by the principle of utility 
in morals more clearly or more persuasively: this is what utility meant for 
Hume in the Treatise, Book III, and in An Enquiry Concerning the Princi-
ples of Morals, Section V: ‘Why Utility Pleases’. And there are other con-
texts where, as Frederick Rosen has observed, J. S. Mill appears to have 
taken over arguments from Hume and Smith on the principles of political 
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economy; on the logic of the sciences, where ‘Mill uses some elements 
of Hume’s approach (emphasis on liberty, moderation and character)’, 
but with a different ‘emphasis on social science rather than political sci-
ence’ and on national character; and, more generally, on the formation of 
Mill’s conception of modern utilitarianism.58 But the differences in phil-
osophical outlook between Hume and J. S. Mill remained remarkable; 
those differences turn on the character and consequences of scepticism.
In what must have been one of his earliest publications, a review 
of George Brodie’s examination of Hume’s History of England in The 
Westminster Review (October 1824, Volume II, 346–402), Mill perceived 
Hume to have been a romantic, who attached more importance to the 
pains and pleasures of a particular individual, Charles I, than to the 
greatest happiness of the greatest number. In his speculative reasoning, 
Hume had attempted to demonstrate that truth was unattainable and 
that, accordingly, entertainment could be the only object of writing. 
Consequently, Hume adopted an approach calculated to excite the emo-
tions of his readers and, for this purpose, lingered over the misfortunes 
of a hero with whom the public could readily identify. And to this end, 
Hume falsified the historical evidence. He cultivated sympathy for the 
character of Charles I, while he denigrated the character of his parlia-
mentary opponents. A more sympathetic reader of Hume’s History might 
have answered that in the first edition of his History of Great Britain, 
under the House of Stuart, Hume was very critical of the arbitrary govern-
ment of Charles. It was only after he discovered the still more arbitrary 
exercise of power by the Tudor monarchs that Hume judged that Charles 
had not departed from the customary behaviour of his predecessors.
In the first version of Mill’s essay on Bentham in the Westminster 
Review (1838), Hume is described as ‘the prince of dilettanti’;59 his 
scepticism naturally led him into Toryism in practice. If truth is unat-
tainable, and thought is capable only of balancing one order of things 
against another, equally unsatisfactory, then the mind will prefer that 
order which has hitherto been compatible with private comfort. But in 
the reprint of the Bentham essay in Dissertations and Discussions (1859), 
this description of Hume is entirely deleted and, in its place, Hume is 
described as ‘the profoundest negative thinker on record’. Mill continues:
the peculiarities of whose mind qualified him to detect failure of 
proof, and want of logical consistency, at a depth which French 
sceptics, with their comparatively feeble power of analysis and dis-
traction stopt far short of, and which German subtlety alone could 
thoroughly appreciate, or hope to rival.60
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Mill’s appreciation of Hume’s scepticism may have been brought to mind 
as he exercised his own talent for scepticism upon the philosophy of Sir 
William Hamilton. His pejorative characterization of French scepticism 
may reflect his increasing disenchantment with the philosophy of August 
Comte.
It is also worth remarking that Mill, like Hume, celebrated the vir-
tue of humanity. But whereas Hume took the sentiment of humanity to be 
the foundation of morality in his An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of 
Morals, Mill took humanity to be the proper object of a religion. In his essay 
on ‘Theism’, Mill considered it highly appropriate that Christ had been cho-
sen as ‘a standard of excellence and a model of emulation … as the pattern 
of perfection for humanity’.61 Mill would place ‘the Prophet of Nazareth … 
in the very first rank of the men of whom our species can boast’. He thought 
that ‘religion cannot be said to have made a bad choice in pitching upon 
this man as the ideal representative and guide of humanity’.62
Hume never expressed himself in this way. If there was a model of 
human nature to which he aspired, it was exemplified by Cicero in his rela-
tions with friends with whom he disagreed. Hume wrote to a Scottish critic 
of An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, James Balfour: ‘Let us 
revive the happy times, when Atticus and Cassius the Epicureans, Cicero 
the Academic, and Brutus the Stoic, could all of them live in unreserved 
friendship together, and were insensible to all those distinctions, except 
so far as they furnished agreeable matter to discourse and conversation.’63 
Hume had composed, in the early 1750s, Dialogues Concerning Natural 
Religion.64 It was a work modelled on Cicero’s On the Nature of the Gods: 
Hume’s sceptic, Philo, was the teacher of Cotta, Cicero’s sceptic; Hume’s 
Stoic, Cleanthes, was the teacher of Balbus, Cicero’s Stoic. The allusions 
would have been evident to Hume’s readers. Hume withheld the book 
from publication in deference to the wishes of his friends, Adam Smith and 
Adam Ferguson, but he made provision to ensure its publication through 
his nephew, after Hume’s death. James Boswell suggested to Hume that 
he would surely be happy to continue conversations with his friends in the 
afterlife. Hume replied that there is nothing he would enjoy more. The dif-
ficulty was that they, like Hume, did not believe in an afterlife.
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Bentham on ‘Hume’s Virtues’
José L. Tasset
Introduction
Among scholars of utilitarianism, it is quite common to discuss Hume’s 
influence on Bentham. It is also often argued that the founder of classical 
utilitarianism’s admiration for the Scottish thinker diminished over time, 
mainly due to Bentham’s tendency to believe that Hume was not clearly 
or completely a utilitarian.
A detailed and comprehensive study of the relationship between 
the two thinkers has yet to be made. Nor has there been as an exhaus-
tive analysis of the possible role played by David Hume in what has been 
referred to as ‘The Invention of Utilitarianism’.1
This paper focuses on a specific aspect of the relationship between 
Hume and Bentham: the critical reading that Bentham carries out of 
the theory of virtues proposed by David Hume from Bentham’s classical 
 utilitarianism assumptions.
After providing an overview of the basic elements comprising David 
Hume’s theory of virtues, this paper analyses Bentham’s criticisms. In its 
conclusion, it defends the compatibility of Hume’s theory with some of 
the essential assumptions of classical utilitarianism – as well as the broad 
impact that Hume’s position might have had on the development of clas-
sical utilitarianism.
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I. A scheme of Hume’s theory of virtues
Aims of the theory
David Hume formulated his theory of the virtues both in his Treatise of 
Human Nature2 and in the Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals.3 
Further considerations are also found in some of his essays.4
I argue that the ultimate goal of this theory is to construct an 
 explanation of the way in which the social and political institutions that 
make human social life possible have emerged, been maintained and 
gradually developed. In Hume’s theory, the distinction between natural 
and artificial virtues occupies a crucial place.5 Moreover, I believe that 
the idea of the different role utility plays in the genesis and justification 
of both types of virtue is fundamental to his theory.
The definition of virtue
A virtue in Hume’s words is a character or action (object) that demands 
approval.
In Section 9 of the Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, 
under the general title of ‘personal merit’, Hume succinctly defines a vir-
tue as: ‘ … the possession of mental qualities, useful or agreeable to the 
person himself, or to others’.6
On the other hand, a key thesis of Hume's ethics is that morality is 
determined by sentiment. Later, in the same work, Hume adds a com-
plementary definition of virtue by insisting on its emotional aspects: ‘ … 
whatever mental action or quality gives a spectator the pleasing sentiment 
of approval … ’.7
Vice would simply be that which offers the opposite feeling.8
The description offered in the Treatise is consistent with this, although 
more developed in its link to feelings of pleasure and pain: ‘Every quality 
of the mind is denominated virtuous which gives pleasure by the mere sur-
vey, as every quality which produces pain, is called vicious.’9
According to this explanation by Hume, virtues or vices will be 
those qualities and tendencies (of action) that usually give rise to pleas-
ure or pain in the observer, without having a relationship between them 
that could alter objective judgement.
Together with this, Hume adds that there are a number of charac-
teristics or criteria that lead us to recognize something as a virtue. In par-
ticular, he speaks of ‘four different sources’ (or foundations)10 of virtue.11
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A trait of character or, indirectly, an action, can be considered virtu-
ous or vicious, by considering whether it is:
Qualities Agreeable To ourselves EPM: 3 & 5
To others EPM: 6
Useful To ourselves EPM: 8
To others EPM: 7
Throughout Hume’s work, we can find many and varied lists of these four 
kinds of virtues. For example, they are specified in the Treatise: (a) ‘useful 
to others’: generosity, humanity, bravery, beneficence; (b) ‘useful to one-
self’: good sense, prudence, temperance, frugality, industry, assiduity, 
enterprise, dexterity;12 (c) ‘agreeable to others’: scalability, wit, ingenu-
ity, cheerfulness; and (d) ‘agreeable to oneself’: courage, good humour 
and philosophical tranquillity. Some virtues fall into several categories. 
For example, ‘Benevolence’ is both ‘useful to others’ and ‘agreeable to 
oneself’. Others are both ‘useful’ and ‘agreeable to ourselves’: courage, 
intrepidity, ambition, love of glory;13 and constancy, fortitude and mag-
nanimity.14 Finally, there are virtues that are both ‘useful’ and ‘agreeable 
to others’: generosity, humanity, compassion, friendship, fidelity, zeal, 
disinterestedness and liberality.15
Scholars’ attention is usually focused on the qualities useful to 
others, since these would include artificial virtues – that is, justice and 
everything that Hume called ‘social virtues’.
It should be noted here that moral approval clearly takes into 
account actions and their practical consequences, but only to the extent 
that they reveal the motives that direct and lead to them, which will be 
the direct objects of evaluation in reality.16
And here, in the motives for action, is where natural and artificial 
virtues differ.
Natural or artificial virtues and utility
In the case of a natural virtue, there are in us (a) natural dispositions of 
behaviour towards them, and (b) natural tendencies towards the related 
approval of these same dispositions and their objective, the natural 
virtues.17
In contrast, artificial virtues do not possess natural motives, predis-
positions or tendencies, either towards their fulfilment or towards their 
approval.18
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The solution to the very complex problem of the motive for jus-
tice (as an artificial virtue) will require a special analysis of Hume. An 
evolutionary dimension must be introduced to explain the genesis and 
approval of this virtue.
Although this is perhaps the richest and most innovative element of 
Hume’s entire theory of virtues, we are not going to dwell specifically on 
it.19 We are more interested, at this moment, to show only that there are 
two types of virtues in Hume and that these originate from distinct passions 
as well as from a different perception of their utility, as we shall see from 
this point on.
Without going into detail, Hume’s conclusion about the process 
leading to the recognition of an object (of the mind) as a virtue (or vice) 
will be that a natural virtue comes from a natural motive, while an artifi-
cial virtue comes from an artificial motive. This is a conventional process 
that will generate, through education and above all through the experi-
ence of its beneficial consequences or its utility, a feeling and inclination 
(motive) favourable to its practice and approval.
In the case of natural virtues, utility is also present, but it is always 
direct, the product of a simple action. It can thus be the object of a natu-
ral, direct passion, produced by a pattern of simple behaviour.20
An example may serve to clarify the foundation of natural passions. 
We do not need conventions that generate in us favourable motives to 
help our direct relatives. And if we do not need or demonstrate them, we 
all immediately know – because the direct passion of love is lacking – that 
our behaviour reveals an evident vice of ‘ingratitude’ or ‘disloyalty’.21
On the other hand, the utility of an artificial virtue is always indirect. 
Furthermore, it usually entails accomplishing complex actions, generally 
of a collective nature. Thus, the motive for its realization and approval 
cannot come from a simple, and in that sense ‘natural’, provision. It will 
require a complex pattern of action, most likely of a collective, and not an 
individual, character. For the sake of simplicity, it will need an artificial 
pattern of behaviour.22
Thus, the natural virtues have a direct utility, and the artificial ones 
an indirect utility.
How must we interpret the Humean distinction between natural 
and artificial virtues?
Here we come to a central issue in interpreting Hume. Can it simply be 
held that this distinction between the two kinds of virtue and their dif-
ferent types of utility can correspond to the contemporary distinction 
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between act utilitarianism and rule utilitarianism? My general opinion 
on this crucial issue is that it is problematic to attribute to Hume a clear 
and conclusive form of twentieth-century ethics.
As Roger Crisp rightly points out, in order to understand Hume’s 
response, we have to ask the questions that he asked himself and in the 
terms in which he asked them.23 We must focus, therefore, on Hume’s 
problem, which is the slow and complex emergence of artificial struc-
tures and institutions (institutional evolution) based on natural motives 
that allow human beings, first of all, to survive and then to make pro-
gress. In that way, we will understand his theory and clarify his position 
in a more suitable way than if we try to make them correspond exactly to 
some contemporary form of utilitarianism.
Even so, this distinction between natural and artificial virtues comes 
not only from the fact that the utility of the former is direct, whereas that 
of the latter is indirect. It also comes from the way the former functions 
only in the immediate social sphere, while the latter establishes itself and 
is formed mainly in relation to the distant (and so not immediate) social 
context.
Because of the importance Hume gives to artificial virtues, he may 
at times seem to underestimate the importance of the natural virtues. He 
seems to forget his project of articulating the natural and artificial–con-
ventional form of virtue. In fact, this is not so, despite the dominant tone 
of Hume’s exposition. Hume does not really hold the view that there is 
no such thing as a ‘natural morality’. In his opinion, this kind of morality 
does exist. This morality would entail directly approving of certain qual-
ities or actions. The problem is that these qualities all refer to the ‘near 
dominion’. Outside of this, they lose all of their meaning; their strength 
and influence are greatly dissipated. Now, since a large part of a per-
son’s life develops outside of this immediate realm, the so-called ‘natural 
morality’ will explain only a small part of the ‘moral phenomenon’. It will 
need an extension of its limits that can no longer be as ‘natural’ as in its 
application to immediate behaviour.
In this respect, Hume’s conclusion, therefore, seems to be that, 
given the mental and passionate nature of the human constitution, the 
virtues will not be able to fulfil their role of establishing social order, once 
societies become more complex, if they do not transform their natural 
bases through an artificial process. They must be adjusted to new exigen-
cies and necessities.
In summary, it may be said that, according to Hume, the natural 
and artificial virtues are distinguished, first, by the different type of 
utility that forms the basis for their approval and practical realization. 
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Second, they will be distinguished by the different social environments 
in which they are exercised and in relation to which they have influence 
and validity. For the next level, we need no more than the natural virtues, 
and the extension of human life. Social policy must generate artificial vir-
tues, the main one being justice. Natural virtues form the basis for their 
artificial counterparts, which in turn develop these natural virtues in a 
progressive and complex way.24
II. Bentham’s criticism of the Humean theory of virtues
Bentham formulated the basis of his position on Hume’s theory of vir-
tues, and then dealt with the place of utility within it, in a well-known 
fragment of his first published work, A Fragment on Government (1776).
Bentham begins this text by pointing out the decisive character of 
the Humean critique of contractualism. This is crucial for understanding 
his reception of Hume’s thought:
As to the Original Contract … , a few pages, perhaps, may not be 
ill bestowed in endeavoring to come to a precise notion about its 
reality and use. The stress laid on it formerly, and still, perhaps, by 
some, is such as renders it an object not undeserving of attention. 
I was in hope, however …,  that this chimera had been effectually 
demolished by Mr HUME … I think we hear not so much of it now as 
formerly. The indestructible prerogatives of mankind have no need 
to be supported upon the sandy foundation of a fiction.25
Bentham then gives a detailed account of his views on the different 
aspects of Humean thought, making them correspond to the three books 
of the Treatise (knowledge, passions and morality). He shows himself as 
being very critical about Hume, especially with what he considers the 
radical sceptical implications of his epistemology, contained in Book I of 
the Treatise:26
Our Author [Bentham is criticizing the legal ideas by Sir William 
Blackstone, JLT], one would think, had never so much as opened 
that celebrated book: of which the criminality in the eyes of some, 
and the merits in the eyes of others, have since been almost effaced 
by the splendour of more recent productions of the same pen. The 
magnanimity of our Author scorned, perhaps, or his circumspection 
feared, to derive instruction from an enemy: or, what is still more 
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probable, he knew not that the subject had been so much as touched 
upon by that penetrating and acute metaphysician, whose works lie 
so much out of the beaten track of Academic reading. But here, as 
it happens, there is no matter for such fears. Those men, who are 
most alarmed at the dangers of a free enquiry; those who are most 
intimately convinced that the surest way to truth is by hearing noth-
ing but on one side, will, I dare answer almost, find nothing that 
which they deem poison in this third volume. I would not wish to 
send the Reader to any other than this, which, if I recollect alright, 
stands clear of the objections that have of late been urged, with so 
much vehemence, against the work in general. [By Dr BEATTIE, 
in his Essay on the Immutability of Truth. Note by Bentham.]. As to 
the two first [Books I and II from Treatise, JLT], the Author himself, 
I am inclined to think, is not ill disposed, at present, to join with 
those who are of opinion, that they might, without any great loss to 
the science of Human Nature, be dispensed with.27 The like might 
be said, perhaps, of a considerable part, even of this [Book III of 
Treatise, JLT]. But, after all retrenchments, there will still remain 
enough to have laid mankind under indelible obligations.28
Hume’s Benthamite evaluation ends with a critique of Hume from Helvé-
tius and the well–known quotation about the profound impact that 
Hume’s theory of justice had on Bentham:
That the foundations of all virtue are laid in utility, is there demon-
strated, after a few exceptions made, with the strongest force of 
evidence: but I see not, any more than Helvétius saw, what need 
there was for the exceptions.29 … For my own part, I well remem-
ber, no sooner had I read that part of the work which touches on 
this subject, than I felt as if scales had fallen from my eyes. I then, 
for the first time, learnt to call the cause of the people the cause of 
Virtue.30
Subsequently, this criticism is further developed in Appendix ‘C’ from 
Bentham’s Deontology, entitled ‘Hume's Virtues’31 as well as in his article 
‘Utilitarianism’.32
When he analyses Humean thought in all of these texts, Bentham's 
position is ambivalent. This is particularly clear in the extensive appendix 
of Deontology. Hume is harshly criticized, but at the same time, Bentham 
also expresses admiration for Hume’s distinction between impressions 
and ideas.33
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In the general version of his criticism, Bentham suggests that Hume 
is ambiguous about the concept of utility.34 He sometimes considered it to 
be synonymous with ‘conducive to happiness’35 and, on other occasions, 
as ‘conduciveness to the end or purpose proposed’,36 ‘whatsoever may hap-
pen to be that same end or purpose’.37
As a result of this overall discrepancy (Frederick Rosen has shown 
that this does not affect the clear utilitarian character of Hume’s ethic),38 
Bentham suggests the following major problems in Hume’s virtue theory.
First, Hume does not properly define what virtue is,39 so that it may 
not be distinguished from other, related mental contents:40
Pleasures, pains, desires, emotions, affections, passions, interests, 
virtues, vices, talents and other psychological entities are brought 
together … but the whole group in a state of the most perfect con-
fusion and without any attempt to show in what relationship they 
stand to one another.41
The second of Bentham’s criticisms of Hume has two parts, though they 
are interrelated: (a) by not properly defining virtue, Bentham accuses 
Hume of confusing natural talents with virtues; and (b) to the extent 
that Hume’s view assimilates virtues and natural talents, it tends to for-
get that virtues are not related to intelligence, but to will, thus failing this 
condition. In the case of natural virtues, Hume’s theory would collapse 
because of its starting point.42
Before evaluating this critique, it is necessary to have an overview 
of the technical terminology used by Hume. Bentham believes that Hume 
is incorrect in conceiving virtues as being related to intelligence, since, in 
his judgement, a virtue is always related to will. Bentham misunderstands 
Hume’s use of ‘mind’, which refers to the whole set of mental acts. It is not 
limited to intelligence. From a Humean point of view, the will forms part of 
the structure of our ‘mind’, just as much as any feeling or passion. 
Beyond this, the overall understanding of Hume’s purpose seems to 
be far too restricted. The general title that appears next to some pages of 
the original manuscript of this work by Bentham, ‘Hume’s Virtues and J. 
Bentham’s Intellectual Faculties’,43 offers us a clue about what concerned 
Bentham. This is clearly different from what concerned Hume. Bentham 
thought about the possible relationship, distinction and/or confusion 
between Hume’s virtues and what Bentham simply considered to be nat-
ural intellectual faculties.
This marginal note shows that Bentham does not perceive the 
central importance of Hume’s distinction between the natural and the 
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artificial, to the extent that, to face Hume and reveal his own original-
ity, for Bentham, virtue comes to oppose any kind of natural quality: 
‘“Virtue” … denotes a factitious quality [caused by the subject, produced, 
JLT], in contradiction to a natural one’;44 and ‘In so far as factitious, it is 
the result of will, an exercise of the attention fixed upon the subject, and 
having an end in view. In the first instance, requiring a sacrifice of present 
to future contingent good is required and is accompanied with self-de-
nial, which supposes more or less uneasiness.’45
Later, as if this were not sufficiently clear, he insists: ‘ … there 
is no virtue where there is no struggle. Virtue implies a victory over 
something.’46
Along with the denial of their possible natural character, Bentham 
also fully denies their potentially intellectual nature:
Every virtue is a moral quality in contradistinction to an intellec-
tual; i.e. a quality that belongs to the volitional, not to the intellec-
tual department of the human frame: a quality which is the result 
of the exercise given to the will, not of the state and condition of the 
understanding …47
Finally, and most importantly, since Hume does not ascribe a founda-
tional character to utility, Bentham considered his overall thesis on 
virtues to be contradictory. It first connected virtues with utility, and sub-
sequently suggested (‘a few exceptions made’) that not all virtues derive 
their value and approval from utility.48
III. Beyond Bentham: utility, virtue and morality
The criticism of Bentham from the previous section mainly focuses on the 
fact that utility is not the only basis in considering a quality of character 
(of the mind, remember what Hume says), or, through an extension of 
actions derived from it, as constituting a virtue or deserving the label 
‘virtuous’ (or vicious).49
Bentham also seems to reject the possible natural character of some 
virtues, and also their hypothetical and sometimes predominantly invol-
untary character. In a somewhat confused way, he indicates that they are 
not related to the intellect (apparently involuntary, for him a mere state), 
but rather, to the will itself (a process, an activity).50
We shall briefly discuss a possible answer to these two minor accu-
sations in Humean terms. Then, in a necessarily brief manner, we shall 
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confront the Humean arguments with the somewhat peculiar main accu-
sation that Hume is utilitarian in his theory of virtues, but not sufficiently 
rigorous or consistent.
Other critiques against attributing a utilitarian position to Hume 
are imaginable and have been formulated from contemporary ethics. 
However, the global question of whether Hume’s ethics and political phi-
losophy can be linked to or disassociated from classical utilitarianism is a 
different and broader question from the one I raise here: How weighty are 
the criticisms that Bentham directed to him? And, therefore, is it possible to 
read, or not, a utilitarian basis in Hume’s theory of virtues?
From the exposition we have made in the previous section, it seems 
correct to infer that, together with the crucial fact that utility in Hume is 
not the sole foundation of virtue, Bentham argues against Hume that a 
virtue can ever be natural or involuntary.
It is true that Hume does not establish a clear difference between 
natural capacities and moral virtues, which would be a logical conse-
quence of his definition of virtue. Moreover, Hume would refuse to dis-
tinguish between them based on whether his/her possessor holds them 
voluntarily or not.51
Against Bentham’s view, Hume might simply have argued, for 
example, in the first place, that many virtues, such as strength of mind, 
are involuntary.52
On the other hand, the Epicurean root thesis, which links virtue 
or vice with pleasure or pain, felt from ‘the general consideration of any 
quality or character’ (or its derived actions, I add), may cause many vir-
tues to be involuntary. These could cause pain or pleasure regardless of 
whether they are voluntary or not.
In view of this fact, it is necessary to ask what the key element is in 
evaluating something as a virtue, if it is not its voluntary character (which, 
on the other hand, as a freedom of absolute indeterminacy, Hume thought 
did not exist). Nor, of course, is it its natural character. As Roger Crisp 
rightly points out: ‘It is, then, the durability or the steadiness of moral qual-
ities that leads to their being the primary concern of ethical judgements.’53
Having established this, from Hume’s point of view we are already 
in a suitable position to answer the key question about any theory of vir-
tue: ‘What qualities should we possess?’ Or even ‘Into what kind of per-
son (from our qualities) should we develop?’ Here, we believe, Hume’s 
proposal is totally compatible with utilitarianism. Moral qualities are jus-
tified, regardless of whether they are natural or artificial, voluntary or 
not. That is, we can certainly establish that we must possess them, insofar 
as they promote utility.
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And this is what can be said in Humean terms concerning the first 
part of Bentham’s criticism – the one in which he stated emphatically that 
a virtue could only be artificial and voluntary.
More complex is the answer to the other Benthamite critique, 
namely, that utility does not have a foundational role in David Hume’s 
theory of virtues.
It might be appropriate, however, to point out that, even though 
Bentham had specific criticisms of certain ideas contained in Hume’s the-
ory of virtue, we could still say that Bentham would accept the thesis in 
which Hume turns utility into the foundation of virtue as social practice.54
Bentham could really only agree in a general way with Hume when 
he says in the Enquiry:
It appears to be matter of fact, that the circumstance of utility, in all 
subjects, is a source of praise and approbation: That it is constantly 
appealed to in all moral decisions concerning the merit and demerit 
of actions: That it is the sole source of that high regard paid to jus-
tice, fidelity, honour, allegiance, and chastity: That it is insepar-
able from all the other social virtues, humanity, generosity, charity, 
affability, lenity, mercy, and moderation: And, in a word, that it is 
a foundation of the chief part of morals, which has a reference to 
mankind and our fellow creatures.’55
Regardless of Hume’s specific meaning of utility, which Bentham consid-
ers, as we have seen, to be essentially ambiguous, we must analyse here the 
question of the role that Hume gives it in his foundation of virtue. That, it 
seems, is the central point of discrepancy between Hume and Bentham. If 
we go back to Hume’s text, we see two things clearly: (a) on the one hand, 
he asserts that utility is always a source of approval; and (b), on the other 
hand, he also asserts that not all approval comes from utility.
Let us analyse the first thesis, which, though it seems obvious, is of 
a deep transcendence. As Fred Rosen points out from the commentary on 
an anonymous review of Hume’s arguments – published in 1753, before 
Bentham’s criticism – Hume explained moral approval as a bond between 
utility and pleasure, that is, precisely in the same terms found in the basic 
thesis of classical utilitarianism.56
Now, as Bentham will do later, the anonymous 1753 reviewer draws 
attention to the fact that, although utility is the foundation for much of 
virtue, it does not embrace everything that Hume regards as virtue.
That is to say, on the one hand, Hume would be embracing, from his 
Epicurean roots (shared with Bentham), the basic thesis of what will later 
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be defined as classical utilitarianism (utility⇒approbation⇒­pleasure). 
Nevertheless, he would as well be proposing an implicit criticism of this 
same principle: there are also sources of approval connected with pleasure, 
which are different from utility.
Thus, Hume’s own fundamental text quoted at the beginning of this 
section serves to connect Hume to Jeremy Bentham. It also serves to sep-
arate them, since it clearly shows that Hume always avoids falling into 
what might be called a utilitarian monism.
In that text, we see that Hume says utility is ‘a source’ but not ‘the 
only source’ of moral approval. It is true that he goes on to say it is ‘the 
sole source … ’ with respect to virtues such as justice (and others). Not 
all virtues are included here, although justice occupies a central place in 
Hume’s theory of virtues. Consistent with its non-reductive or  pluralistic 
approach, the text also points out that it is ‘inseparable from all other 
social virtues’. However, it is not dominant or exclusive to other  possible 
factors of approval. Finally, while the text clearly states that ‘it is [a] 
foundation of most morals’, in no place does it say it is ‘the sole founda-
tion’. We must realize that he does not say ‘of all morals’, but, certainly, 
of most: those that are related to humanity, that is, to interaction with 
others.
In the end, the pertinent question is why Hume introduces all of 
these limiting considerations to utility’s role, if the novel approach 
in Inquiry comes precisely from the fact that he has first linked moral 
approval with pleasure, and then pleasure with utility. In my view, Hume 
is here applying his famous argument about the limited possibilities of 
reason in ethics and the predominant, non-exclusive and non-excluding 
role of passions within the domain of morality.
In this way, Hume would be refraining from asserting, I think con-
sciously, that utility (in his theory, in fact, reason or what is sometimes 
called ‘considerations of utility’) is the sole foundation of all morality; 
that morality can be a simple calculation of the utility of motives, of char-
acter and even, finally, and in a derivative way, of actions. This aspect of 
morality is crucial, necessary or fundamental, but it is not the only one, 
and should not be, at least from the point of view of Hume’s considera-
tion of the facts about morality.
I believe, therefore, that Jeremy Bentham’s rejection, though mod-
erated, of Hume’s theory of virtues (probably the origin of Bentham’s 
estrangement from Humean views) can be explained by how Bentham 
perceived Hume’s rejection of utility as the sole foundation of our sen-
timent of approval. However, I also feel that Bentham was mistaken in 
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confronting Hume’s position in a tangential way by insisting on the fact 
that its details were confused, or subject to criticism. At the same time, 
Bentham avoids entering into a direct discussion with Hume’s possible 
central assumption that there is a discrepancy with classical utilitarian-
ism. He asserted that morality is a complex phenomenon in which con-
siderations of utility are crucial. Nevertheless, other considerations, such 
as other sources of value, are not excluded. These can be as broad as the 
complex phenomenon of human morality.
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18. J. L. Mackie, Hume’s Moral Theory, International Library of Philosophy (London: Routledge 
and Kegan Paul, 1980) 76–7.
19. I have done this before, especially in José L. Tasset, La ética y las pasiones: un estudio de la filo-
sofía moral y política de David Hume (A Coruña: Universidade da Coruña, 1999), Chapter 6.
20. Based on the idea that virtue brings pleasure (and if it does not produce pleasure, it is not a 
virtue, although not all pleasure is associated with virtue, as is logical), Hume indicates that 
the natural virtues (e.g. an act of benevolent character) produce good from every particular 
individual or case, in every event connected with them (for example, all benevolent acts are 
virtuous and always produce good in a direct way). However, the artificial virtues (mainly 
justice) and the acts derived from them generate good as part of ‘a general scheme or system 
of action’ (T.3.3.1.12).
21. The appealing Humean discussion on the degree of stability–universality or modifiability (cul-
tural–relativity) of these motives cannot be addressed here, despite being one of the most in-
teresting aspects of Hume’s approach in terms of contemporary ethics. See on this point, José 
L. Tasset, ‘El relativismo ético: su naturaleza y sus problemas’, Direito–USF (Universidade Sâo 
Francisco, Brasil), 17/2 (2000): 63–85.
22. See Mackie, Hume’s Moral Theory, 81. Conversely, as we can deduct from Humean argument, 
there may be specific acts resulting from these artificial virtues that do not produce good di-
rectly. They may do so in an indirect, global or medium- to long-term way, in the context of the 
overall scheme. Hume develops this idea in a surprising and, in some sense, an unpredictable 
way at the end of the Enquiry through the so-called problem of the ‘Sensible Knave’; see on this 
subject, José L. Tasset, ‘De ladrones y reglas. (Una visión del problema del “Sensible Knave” 
desde un utilitarismo de la regla atemperado)’, Daimon. Revista Internacional de Filosofía 52 
(enero–abril 2011): 117–40.
23. Crisp, ‘Hume on Virtue, Utility, and Morality’, 159–60.
24. Merrill, Historical Dictionary of Hume’s Philosophy, 271, suggests that this distinction loses 
strength and importance in EPM: ‘ … he pretty much abandons the terminology of natural vs. 
artificial, but he continues to maintain that justice counts as a virtue only by reason of conven-
tion or artifice’. My view is that, in EPM, Hume clearly focuses on developing his theory of ar-
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tificial virtues, especially as it relates to justice. He does not abandon the distinction, on recog-
nizing that utility of natural virtues is direct, not requiring much proof or analysis. In general, 
I feel that there is a decreased value or importance of the ‘natural’ and ‘artificial’ terms and not 
of the distinction between justice and the other virtues. The theory is maintained as a whole, 
but Hume avoids that purely terminological discussion. He overly focuses on the themes of 
‘artificiality’ of justice and property, which had caused him so many problems. Thus, although 
the manner of developing this distinction between natural and artificial virtues changes from 
the Treatise to the Enquiry, that conceptual difference continued to be one of the most original 
points of Hume’s moral and political theory. It is precisely the clue to the crucial link between 
utilitarianism and naturalism.
25. Bentham, A Comment on the Commentaries and A Fragment on Government, 439.
26. This sceptical interpretation, derived from Hume’s reading made by the majority of his con-
temporaries, was first proposed as a standard by James Beattie and after by Hume’s works pub-
lished by Green & Grose. It was assumed, I think without criticism, by Jeremy Bentham and 
later also by John Stuart Mill, and even by Bertrand Russell. It is only after the decisive work by 
Norman Kemp Smith – The Philosophy of David Hume: A Critical Study of Its Origins and Central 
Doctrines ([s.l.]: Macmillan, 1941) – was published that this radically sceptical interpretation 
of Hume’s thought will begin to be revised in the twentieth century. My specific thesis is that 
a great part of the rejection that David Hume’s ethics and political philosophy arouses among 
classical utilitarians stems from the presumption of scepticism that they uncritically attributed 
to Hume’s thought. Even if this view is reconsidered and overcome, it obviously cannot be 
guaranteed that Hume’s relationship with utilitarianism would be less difficult to understand. 
Nevertheless, it can be viewed in a more objective way.
27. This text leaves no room for doubt about Bentham’s negative opinion of Humean epistemology 
and its implications; it is striking. However, in this judgement, Hume’s entire theory of pas-
sions is also included and is far from being interpreted as simply sceptical. In fact, the Slave Pas-
sage, in which reason is subdued to the non-tyrannical government of passions, recalls in many 
respects the beginning of Bentham’s Inquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals and Legislation. 
It describes the behaviour of human beings as being subjected to the domain of pleasure and 
pain, ‘passions’ in Hume’s terms.
28. Bentham, A Comment on the Commentaries and A Fragment on Government, 439–40.
29. This last sentence is the ultimate clue to Bentham’s dispute with Hume in regard to the concept 
of virtue and what makes him sceptical about the possible role of Humean ethical and political 
theory in how the utilitarian paradigm of rationality developed. I sincerely believe that Hume’s 
resistance to converting utility into the sole explanatory element or the one-and-only cause 
of morality (and what it can entail, a complete primacy of action over motives or character, 
as well as an excessive focus on rationality over feelings) is one of the greatest successes of 
Hume’s ethical theory. Utility and the consequent utilitarianism would explain to Hume a very 
important part of this moral experience, but they would not exhaust it.
30. Bentham, A Comment on the Commentaries and A Fragment on Government, 439–40.
31. Bentham’s text, included in his Deontology, comes from the manuscript UC xiv, 297–301 and 
303–5, June 1828; the first edition of this work was: Deontology: Or, the Science of Morality, two 
volumes, edited by John Bowring (London: Longman, Rees, Orme, Brown, Green & Longman, 
1834). A critical edition of this work is in Jeremy Bentham, Deontology; Together with A Table 
of the Springs of Action; and Article on Utilitarianism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983). Hereaf-
ter I will quote this volume from Bentham’s works in an abbreviated form as (CW [Collected 
Works], V [Volume V], plus the relevant page), for example, CW, V, 350.
32. The article by Bentham entitled ‘Utilitarianism’ was written for the editor of The Westminster 
Review in 1829, but it was never published. There is a long version and a shorter one. Both are 
included in Bentham, CW, V.
33. The services of Hume, in much of the field of moral and mental philosophy, were immense. 
He first drew a clear distinction between impressions and ideas. Without this distinction, it 
is hardly possible to grasp many topics of great importance. The distinction is obvious when 
pointed out: ‘—I see a man—it is a perception: I close my eyes, but imagine myself to see him 
still—it is an idea.’ Bentham, Deontology: Or, the Science of Morality (1834), 257 note. In the 
critical edition of Deontology, this note is much more extensive and even Bentham maintains 
that he does not understand how people could philosophize prior to this distinction: ‘I do not 
know what people did before this distinction. It was a great discovery.’ (CW, V, 350) Along 
with this, Jeremy Bentham cites this idea, the foundation of ‘empiricist criterion of meaning’ 
and its anti-metaphysical predominant use, as the basis of ‘physical phraseology’ (also CW, V, 
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350), central to his theory of ‘fictitious entities’. This is one of the great and profound influ-
ences of Hume’s thought in Bentham. Its importance is such that it requires study apart from 
the issue of virtues, in order to be addressed in depth and precisely. This point is argued at the 
beginning of the work in regard to Hume’s influence on Bentham.
34. This critique of Hume and others scattered throughout the vast work of Bentham have led 
Philip Schofield, in Bentham: A Guide for the Perplexed (London: Continuum, 2009), 3, for ex-
ample, to consider how Bentham’s opinion of Hume changed from his initial admiration in A 
Fragment on Government. Schofield refers to this shift in a discussion contained in Bentham, 
Deontology; Together with A Table of the Springs of Action; and Article on Utilitarianism, 289–90, 
322–84. Fred Rosen points out, rightly to my view, that if we read the famous Bentham text on 
Hume (see above) in its entirety, we find that Bentham was already very critical about Hume 
in that text and from that date on. However, this is not unusual in Bentham; he tended to intro-
duce highly censorious comments about all of the authors whom he also praises. Apparently, it 
was not clear that his position on Hume changed so considerably over time.
35. CW, V, 322.
36. CW, V, 323.
37. CW, V, 323. It is later repeated, almost in the same words, in Deontology (CW, V, 357).
38. This is not a suitable place to analyse the different meanings of utility employed by Hume, 
Smith, Bentham and Mill. Nevertheless, Fred Rosen points out how the Humean use is compat-
ible with classic utilitarianism. See Frederick Rosen, ‘Reading Hume Backwards (Utility as the 
Foundation of Morals)’, in Classical Utilitarianism from Hume to Mill (London; New York: Rou-
tledge, 2003), 29ff., in which the ‘strong’ thesis is not only (a) that utility is prime in Hume’s 
thought, but (b) that it influenced how Bentham formulated the principle of utility.
39. This particular criticism seems especially unfair because the most original element of Hume’s 
approach is the definition of virtue (see above), and not the resulting classification of virtues, 
on which Bentham concentrated.
40. In general terms, Bentham asserted that Hume’s theory of virtues is incorrect because his the-
ory of passions is also wrong.
41. CW, V, 323. In this respect, we may not fail to note that Bentham seems to focus on Book I of 
Treatise (which contains the theory of ideas that he so admires) and then on the third book (in 
which Hume is concerned with justice). However, the manner in which all concepts are linked 
with mental contents is found in Book II of Treatise, ‘Of the Passions’, later summarized in 
Dissertation on the Passions, which Bentham apparently overlooks; on the relevance of theory 
of passions for the correct understanding of Hume’s moral and political philosophy, see Tasset, 
La ética y las pasiones, and Tasset, Disertación sobre las pasiones.
42. Bentham further notes that no normative consequence or even a purely practical one is de-
rived from Hume’s approach (recently, this has been brilliantly refuted in Rachel Cohon, ‘Crit-
icizing Hume’s List of Virtues and Vices’, in Hume’s Morality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2008). Thus, according to Bentham, what Hume said, ‘consists of mere speculation; no part of 
it has been applied by him, or is capable of being applied, in such sort as to be of use to prac-
tice’ (CW, V, 324). This accusation of concealed conservatism runs parallel and is linked to the 
sceptical interpretation of Hume that was dominant at the time of Bentham and John Stuart 
Mill. It began to change only well into the twentieth century.
43. See UCL Benthamite Collection of Manuscripts, xiv, 300, 301 and 303–5 (written in June 
1828), bearing the marginal title ‘Hume’s Virtues and J. Bentham’s Intellectual Faculties’.
44. CW, V, 347.
45. CW, V, 347.
46. CW, V, 359.
47. CW, V, 347.
48. See note 36.
49. The criticism concerning the Humean indefiniteness of virtue runs counter to the fact that, 
probably, the most original feature of Humean theory is the definition of virtue. In fact, it 
obviously does not coincide with Bentham’s definition. In his explanation of the virtues, their 
potential natural dimension and their involuntary character or their possible relation to the 
intellect are completely excluded. All virtue seems to be, for Bentham, by exclusion, artificially 
and exclusively volitional.
50. See above, CW, V, 347. It is evident that a trait of the will can have a basis that is ‘natural’ and 
‘involuntary’ as well as ‘intelligent’.
51. See T.3.3.4.3–4.
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52. In fact, a significant number of the elements of character forming almost any virtue, or vice, 
are not completely voluntary. Any process of conception, deliberation and moral action has its 
basis, necessary but not sufficient, on certain cognitive–developmental structures (the ‘qual-
ities of the mind’ by Hume). They are not entirely ‘natural’ because they are developed, but 
are rooted in a minimum endowment of natural character. If this is absent, it precludes both 
feeling and moral reasoning and, therefore, also parallel ethical conduct. Once again, the evo-
lutionary and gradual perspective is decisive in understanding Humean views.
53. Crisp, ‘Hume on Virtue, Utility, and Morality’, 168.
54. Rosen,’Reading Hume Backwards’, 49.
55. EPM.5.44.
56. Rosen, ‘Reading Hume Backwards’, 33.
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6
Shaftesbury, Hutcheson and Mill 
on Pleasure and Virtue
Roger Crisp
John Stuart Mill’s hedonism – in particular, his arguments for a qualita-
tive distinction between pleasures and for virtue as a constituent of hap-
piness understood hedonistically – has been subjected to a huge amount 
of scrutiny, especially since the publication of the monumental Toronto 
edition of his works under the general editorship of John Robson.1 I have 
already contributed a few pebbles to this mountain of scholarly exegesis, 
and do not intend to add to it in this paper. Rather, I propose to focus 
on two British moral philosophers whose works in the eighteenth cen-
tury could be described as broadly hedonist and who, like Mill, engaged 
closely with the questions of the relation of virtue and pleasure, and the 
roles of each in human happiness or well-being. Especially significant, 
perhaps, is the fact that both distinguished between higher and lower 
pleasures, placed virtue in the former category, and saw it as an impor-
tant constituent of happiness.2
I. Shaftesbury
Anthony Ashley Cooper (1671–1713), 3rd Earl of Shaftesbury, was 
extremely influential on eighteenth-century thought, both philosophical 
and non-philosophical, in Britain and abroad. In philosophy, his impact 
on the sentimentalism of Hutcheson, Hume and others is often noted, 
though his own meta-ethics was a version of rationalist realism. That 
meta-ethics itself emerged from a broadly Platonic metaphysics, in which 
the potential for conflict between self and others was resolved through 
the postulation of a divinely created, ordered and governed universe, the 
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mind of each individual being seen as part of a general mind or nature, 
divinely construed (e.g. 21; R 14–17, 138–9).3
Shaftesbury’s early education was overseen by John Locke, who 
was a member of the 1st Earl’s household. Shaftesbury remained deeply 
attached to Locke, but was critical of many of his views, including some 
of those in ethics and political theory.4 Shaftesbury saw the attempt to 
understand society and social morality as developing out of a pre-social 
state of nature as deeply mistaken, since human beings are naturally 
social (e.g. 51). Shaftesbury also disliked the voluntarist and divine com-
mand elements in Locke’s thought and, in particular, the importance 
attributed to reward and punishment in the afterlife. In his earliest pub-
lication, a preface to an edition of sermons by the Cambridge Platonist 
Benjamin Whichcote, Shaftesbury allows that Christianity is the ‘greatest 
Blessing imaginable’, partly because of the excellence of its precepts and 
its enforcement of moral duties, and that without it morality would col-
lapse entirely (P iii–iv). But he believed that virtue was a good in itself for 
the agent and that virtuous motivation did not need to, indeed could not, 
depend on goods or bads external to virtue, so that reference to divine 
punishment is required only when the non-instrumental arguments for 
virtue have failed (269; NL 11–12). Shaftesbury’s theism is as rooted in 
ancient as in Christian thought, and his discomfort with the notion of 
a hell created by a benevolent and merciful God was clearly shared by 
Whichcote himself, who claims that, though God has indeed arranged 
matters so that vice leads to unhappiness, this punishment is inflicted 
internally and by the sinner himself, not by God (P xiii).5
Most of Shaftesbury’s works were written in the five or six years 
leading up to their being published together in his Characteristics of Men, 
Manners, Opinions, Times in 1711. Shaftesbury revised the work over the 
two remaining years of his life, and a new edition was published in 1714. 
This book, which went through eleven editions between 1711 and 1790, 
will be my main focus,6 but it is also important to consider other writings, 
in particular the highly personal and revealing Philosophical Regimen, a 
collection of Shaftesbury’s personal notebooks, apparently written only 
for himself and not published until 1900.7
Let us turn to pleasure. Shaftesbury frequently appears staunchly 
opposed to evaluative hedonism. He criticizes the philosophical and 
 theological orthodoxy of his day, according to which we should ‘rate life 
by the number and exquisiteness of the pleasing sensations’ and so ‘learn 
virtue by usury’, valuing it for the pleasure it can produce (and presuma-
bly the pain it can prevent) (57; also NL 19). Shaftesbury also finds prob-
lems internal to hedonism itself. First, pleasure cannot be the foundation 
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of a ‘rule of good’, since those who aim at unrestricted pleasure are con-
stantly changing their minds about what is and is not pleasurable (138; 
also 151–2, 252–3, R 50). Consistency can be found only through aim-
ing at virtue: ‘if honesty be my delight, I know no other consequence 
from indulging such a passion than that of growing better natured, and 
enjoying more and more the pleasures of society’ (138–9; also R 54–5). 
Second, and relatedly, any evaluative claim must be universally true 
(R 56–7). To be happy requires contentment, and one can be content 
without unrestricted pleasure, just as one can without fame or power. 
Further, pain cannot be said to be evil, since some people can tolerate it.
These arguments, it has to be admitted, are somewhat weak. If aim-
ing for unrestricted pleasure and avoidance of pain produces a lower bal-
ance of pleasure over pain than some other strategy, then an evaluative 
hedonist can recommend that alternative. Further, even though it is true 
that hedonic value can diminish marginally, there seems to be no rea-
son why an evaluative hedonist should not take this into account in his/
her calculations, shifting to a new source at the optimum level to max-
imize the overall balance of pleasure over the pains of disappointment 
and boredom. Nor need the hedonist reject the universality claim. S/he 
can insist that the greatest balance of unrestricted pleasure over pain is 
universally good, and note that, since contentment is a kind of pleasure, 
Shaftesbury’s own view can be understood as hedonist.8
As we might expect, given his Stoic views on desire, Shaftesbury 
puts a very high value on contentment or tranquillity: one moment of it 
is more valuable than a lifetime of the ‘tumultuous joy’ of friendship (R 
116). It is stable, does not lead to disgust, and is immune to the vicissi-
tudes of fortune (R 151–2, 208). It is ‘nothing else than the good order-
ing of the mind’,9 and Shaftesbury describes its absence, and indulgence 
in the passions, as ‘near to real madness’ (R 160).
Shaftesbury’s main argument against unrestricted hedonism is 
again solidly Aristotelian. According to Aristotle, since all animals, 
including the intelligent ones, aim at pleasure, it would be absurd to 
claim that it is not a good.10 But not all pleasures are worthy of choice, 
so unrestricted hedonism is mistaken.11 The pleasure of virtuous actions 
is good, while that of vicious ones is bad, and the virtuous person is the 
touchstone of which pleasures are and are not valuable.12 And these are 
primarily the pleasures really characteristic of a human being – that is, 
the pleasures of virtuous action itself.13 Shaftesbury is in broad agree-
ment with Aristotle. Just as a man of ‘breeding and politeness’ will take 
care to develop his taste by focusing on the best architecture and paint-
ings, so all of us should have ‘the same regard to a right taste in life and 
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manners’ (150–1; also e.g. 335). Shaftesbury’s objection, then, is not to 
hedonism, but to unrestricted hedonism (250–1).
This brings us to the question of how Shaftesbury views the value 
of virtue to the virtuous agent him/herself. In his earliest publication, 
Shaftesbury drew a distinction between a justification of virtue grounded 
on the intrinsic ‘Pleasure and Contentment in Works of Goodness and 
Bounty’ (which were also experienced by God)14 and one that appealed 
to ‘some Advantage of a different Sort from what attends the Actions 
themselves’ (P 10). Further, as one would expect, he accepts reasons of 
self-interest: ‘we should all agree – that happiness was to be pursued and 
in fact was always sought after’ (56; also 170).
Shaftesbury is most plausibly understood as a substantive hedonist 
about well-being, insofar as he believes that happiness consists in pleas-
urable experiences arising from valuable objects, and in particular the 
state of mental contentment arising from virtue and virtuous activity.15 
Again, this position is close to that of Aristotle, though Aristotle is most 
plausibly read as claiming that happiness consists only in (pleasurable) 
excellent or virtuous activity,16 and, as we shall see, Shaftesbury reverses 
Aristotle’s order of priority of intellectual activity over the exercise of the 
virtues of character.17 Shaftesbury is clearly not committed to explan-
atory hedonism, according to which the only good-making property is 
pleasantness. Pleasure in worthless objects is itself worthless. The fact 
that an experience is one of taking pleasure in a valuable object is itself 
good-making, but the explanatory account of goodness here is complex 
and must include reference to Shaftesbury’s views on God, nature and 
perfection.
Shaftesbury’s view on the content of morality is, in many respects, 
close to that of common sense. He is committed to many standard vir-
tues, and appears to accept certain standard deontological views on jus-
tice, promising and other issues. There is a strong welfarist element in 
Shaftesbury’s thinking – e.g. virtue aims at ‘the general good’ (230) and 
‘the good of mankind’ (244) – but his frequent mention of values such as 
justice alongside the promotion of overall good (e.g. R 71–2) suggests 
that we should not interpret him as any kind of utilitarian. When he says 
that making the most of life consists in doing the most good (R 346), 
he has in mind avoiding selfishness and living virtuously. Nevertheless, 
Shaftesbury’s insistence on impartiality and the promotion of the good of 
the whole does introduce a consequentialist element into his normative 
ethics. It seems that he believes, like many pure consequentialists, that 
following the partial principles of common-sense morality will in most 
cases promote the overall good, though he may well accept that there are 
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non-consequentialist reasons for so doing (e.g. 255–6). So the practical 
implications of his impartiality principle are relevant only in those prob-
ably rare cases in which one is required to sacrifice the interests of those 
close to one for the sake of the overall good (see e.g. 205–7; R 6, 97). 
Further, there is no hint in Shaftesbury of the idea that one should adopt 
anything like Sidgwick’s ‘point of view of the universe’, from which one’s 
own good matters, as far as one’s own practice is concerned, only as much 
as that of anyone else’s. Some degree of partiality towards oneself is nat-
ural, and hence good and required. But there is no tension between the 
promotion of my good and the promotion of the overall good, since my 
good itself consists in the promotion of the overall good, as Shaftesbury 
conceives it. That is to say, the overall good does not consist in an over-
all sum of individual utilities, themselves calculated independently of 
that overall good. The overall good consists in the world’s operating as it 
should, with each agent’s following common-sense morality modified by 
the principle of impartiality.
Shaftesbury puts forward a series of suggestive and interrelated 
arguments to the conclusion that the life of the virtuous person is the 
happiest:18
(i) Natural affections. To lack ‘honesty’, that is, virtue, would be to 
lack the natural social affections, a life without which is wretched (56). 
When we consider some creature void of such affections, we suppose 
it will feel little pleasure and be inclined to moroseness and distress 
(194–5, 215–16, 431–2). The reason for its state, though we tend not 
fully to recognize it, is disharmony. If we ‘strain’ some affection, or act 
on some wrong passion, this will upset the balance of our mind, causing 
deep and lasting distress. Our dependence on society is greater than that 
of any other animal, and we all strongly desire to be in friendly relations 
with others. Suppressing that desire will lead to disharmony, discontent 
and unhappiness.
Shaftesbury’s focus here, like that of Plato’s in the Republic, is on 
the life of the entirely vicious person. Confronted by, say, some gangster, 
who appears to have genuine love and concern for his family and friends, 
Shaftesbury can only doubt that genuineness, or insist that such partial 
concern anyway puts the individual into a position of conflict with the 
good of the whole, which itself will result in discontent (the gangster’s 
denial of that must again be taken to be disingenuous or the consequence 
of self-deceit) (194, 205–6; also Irwin, 360).19
(ii) Identity and character. In the Regimen, Shaftesbury appears to 
believe that continuity of correct moral opinion is required for identity 
over time. In the Characteristics, he makes the weaker claim that what a 
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person is – i.e. we must assume, what kind of person he is – depends on 
the person’s character and affections, so that if ‘he loses what is manly 
and worthy in these, he is as much lost to himself as when he loses his 
memory and understanding’ (56).
In both cases, Shaftesbury appears to be speaking of moral decline. 
It is not clear why someone whose opinions and character have been con-
tinuously villainous from the start should be denied the self of identity or 
of character required to ground any notion of self-interest.
(iii) Activity. It might be claimed that the highest pleasure is that of 
passive freedom from any kind of distress (142). But this life is equivalent 
to being asleep. True happiness consists in ‘action and employment’.
In following Aristotle here, who also stressed the importance of 
activity as opposed to the mere possession of virtuous dispositions,20 
Shaftesbury’s position is plausible enough. But he fails to address the 
position of those who advocate a life of wakeful disengagement and, of 
course, those who press the claims of the life of vice tend to be recom-
mending the life of vicious activity. Naturally, Shaftesbury will argue 
that luxury, like all vices, results in disharmony and hence discontent. 
But this is again an empirical claim, and it will be difficult for Shaftesbury 
plausibly to debunk apparent counterexamples. A more fruitful approach 
would be to accept the possibility of idle or vicious contentment but to 
question its value.
(iv) Perfectionism. Our own good or interest is itself the result of 
nature, and that good consists in fulfilling or perfecting our own nature 
(167, 205, 428; R 257). As we have seen, Shaftesbury sees each individ-
ual as having a role to play in the promotion of cosmic order. Our playing 
that role itself constitutes our good; if we do not, our relation to the cos-
mos is like that of an unhealthy part of the body that grows unnaturally 
to the detriment of the body as a whole (R 49; 193). Our social affec-
tions are to promote not our own interest, but that of our species (R 3). 
However:
for a creature whose natural end is society, to operate as is by nature 
appointed him towards the good of such his society or whole is in 
reality to pursue his own natural and proper good. (432)
This order is clearly the result of design by a ‘universal mind’ (276), and 
this provides Shaftesbury with the material for a second perfectionist 
argument, independent of the claim that the good of an individual con-
stituent consists in it fulfilling its natural role in promoting the good of 
the whole. For there to be a tension between the good of the part and 
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the good of the whole, or between the self-interest of the individual and 
virtue, would itself be ‘a blot and imperfection in the general constitution 
of things’ (190).
Like most perfectionist arguments, Shaftesbury’s can be accused of 
assuming what it is intended to prove. Shaftesbury himself accepts the 
naturalness of self-interest and the rationality of its pursuit, and so it is 
open to an egoist to argue that the perfection of any individual lies solely 
in promoting its own good. It is also possible to drive a wedge between the 
notions of perfection and well-being.21 An egoist may accept that my liv-
ing virtuously and so promoting the overall good will perfect my human 
nature, but deny that this will advance my own good. Now this will, of 
course, introduce the kind of tension into the cosmos that Shaftesbury’s 
second argument denies. But competition between individuals is fairly 
obviously part of the natural order, and the claim that the hierarchical 
order that results from competition is any less the result of divine inten-
tion than that which arises through cooperation is not well grounded.
(v) Higher pleasures. Shaftesbury claims that the pleasures (or per-
haps rather ‘enjoyments’, 252) of virtue are superior to bodily pleasures. 
His discussion, in part II of the Inquiry in particular (200–30), is sophisti-
cated and wide-ranging, and further subsections may be helpful.
(a) Mind versus body. Shaftesbury claims that most people will 
accept that the pleasures of the mind are greater than, and superior to, 
those of the body (200–2). As evidence, he cites the fact that those who 
have committed themselves to pursuing some mental pleasure cannot be 
diverted by bodily pleasures and pains. Even villains, on the basis of some 
principle of honour, will ‘embrace any manner of hardship and defy tor-
ments and death’. In contrast, someone currently experiencing pleasures 
of the senses can easily be distracted by internal pain or distress.
These claims are, at the very least, somewhat hard to believe. But 
Shaftesbury also offers a dependency argument (211–12). Bodily pleas-
ures depend on those of the mind – in particular, those of the natural 
affections. The pleasure of eating is insignificant without a table, com-
pany and so on; prostitutes know that their clients wish to believe that 
the pleasure the clients are feeling is mutual.
Besides again relying on dubious empirical premises, this argu-
ment brings out two further problems lying behind Shaftesbury’s overall 
 position. The first is an equivocation on the notion of ‘social affections’. 
On the one hand, it can refer to the pleasures of virtuous activity; on the 
other, to the pleasures of company. It is at least arguable that vicious peo-
ple can enjoy the company of others, even if they have no moral con-
cern for those others and treat them purely as a source of entertainment. 
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The second problem is with the very distinction between pleasures of 
the mind and those of the body. It could be that there is some important 
difference between, say, the pleasures of working through some elegant 
mathematical proof, and those resulting from a massage. Here we might 
have a real contrast between the intellectual and the sensual or physical. 
But the pleasure of refined eating may involve a good deal of reflective 
thought on the nature and origin of the foods in question; and the pleas-
ures taken in the company of others are sometimes sexual and, to that 
extent, bodily.
(b) The Informed Preference Test. As Mill was later to do,22 Shaftesbury 
revives one of Plato’s arguments for the superiority of mental over bodily 
pleasures in the Republic23 (202). To judge the relative value of two cate-
gories of pleasure adequately requires experience of each. The virtuous 
person understands sensual pleasure, while the vicious person cannot 
grasp social pleasure.
One worry here is again over whether there is empirical support for 
Shaftesbury’s claim. Consider the objection as raised by Alan Ryan against 
Mill’s argument in favour of mental over bodily pleasures: ‘The philoso-
pher who is a half-hearted sensualist cannot estimate the attractions of a 
debauched existence, any more than the sensualist flicking through the 
pages of Hume can estimate the pleasures of philosophy’.24 We might, 
however, allow Shaftesbury that at least some ordinarily virtuous people 
do seem capable of wholeheartedly enjoying sensual pleasures. A more 
serious problem is whether those virtuous people who, in certain circum-
stances, choose the pleasures of virtue over those of sensuality are doing 
so on the basis that the pleasures of virtue are more pleasant than those 
of the body. We might expect many of them to say that they prefer virtue, 
rather than the pleasures of virtue in particular, to bodily pleasure; that 
their own virtue would anyway decrease the amount of pleasure avail-
able to them from sensuality, if non-virtuous; and that their reasons for 
preferring virtue are moral rather than self-regarding. We can be sure 
that the judgements of some virtuous people would fit Shaftesbury’s 
description; but there would be many that did not.
(c) Virtuous activity versus contemplation. Earlier in this paper, I 
noted various ways in which Aristotle’s ethics appears to have influenced 
Shaftesbury, either directly or through the development of his ideas by 
Hellenistic philosophers. Notoriously, at the end of the Nicomachean 
Ethics, Aristotle ranks the intellectual activity of contemplation above 
that of practically virtuous activity. Here, Shaftesbury does not follow 
him (202–3). Shaftesbury is prepared to accept that intellectual pleas-
ures are superior to those of sense. Those who apply their understanding 
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of mathematical principles, for example, will experience an especially 
deep enjoyment resulting from ‘love of truth, proportion, order and sym-
metry’. But even this pleasure is ‘far surpassed by virtuous motion and 
the exercise of benignity and goodness … For where is there on earth a 
fairer matter of speculation, a goodlier view or contemplation, than that 
of a beautiful, proportioned and becoming action?’.
Shaftesbury’s ethical aestheticism again seems to involve reliance 
on empirically doubtful premises. Compare, for example, the pleasure 
Archimedes felt when he discovered the relation between volume and 
the displacement of water with that experienced by someone fulfilling a 
promise to a friend to post a letter for him/her on the way home.
(d) Consequences. Shaftesbury is prepared to identify the natural 
affections with mental enjoyments. But he also argues that certain men-
tal enjoyments flow from those affections, in two ways (204–5). First, 
one is able sympathetically to experience a second-order, sympathetic 
enjoyment in the pleasure of others. Second, one can enjoy the admira-
tion and esteem of others.
We have already seen the problems arising out of Shaftesbury’s 
equivocation concerning the natural or social affections. A benevolent 
person will indeed take vicarious pleasure in the happiness of others, 
and may well enjoy his/her reputation. But the same will be true of at 
least some vicious people. The most that Shaftesbury can offer is an 
enticement to virtue for someone already attracted to it and the particu-
lar reputation that it will bring with it. It also has to be admitted that 
there is a tension between the argument from esteem and Shaftesbury’s 
arguments elsewhere against attributing any great significance to 
reputation.
(e) Self-review. According to Shaftesbury, anyone who introspects 
will find that the pleasures he experiences alone or with others are ‘wholly 
founded in an easy temper, free of harshness, bitterness or distaste, and 
in a mind or reason well composed, quiet, easy within itself and such as 
can freely bear its own inspection and review’ (206, 208–10). By ‘anyone’ 
here, Shaftesbury must mean ‘anyone virtuous’, since he goes on to insist 
that the pleasures he has in mind are the result of the natural affections.
Some will wish to object that such self-review exemplifies a form 
of vanity or self-indulgence; but against this, it can plausibly be said that 
the absence of any kind of review is a sign of complacency. The problem 
is that many vicious people will also be able to bear or even enjoy this 
kind of self-review, in part because often the values against which they 
are assessing their own characters are themselves vicious (so while a vir-
tuous person may be tormented by a single, uncharacteristically ruthless 
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action, a vicious person may reflect on his/her ruthlessness with pride). 
Shaftesbury insists that all rational creatures will feel shame or regret at 
doing what is hateful (209). But unless he is building a capacity to feel 
such emotions into his account of rationality itself, Shaftesbury’s confi-
dent generalization again seems open to doubt. Many psychopaths seem 
perfectly rational, in the procedural sense, and yet they feel little or no 
shame. It is true, of course, that wrongdoers are often tormented by guilt; 
one way to avoid that is to refrain from action one knows is likely to cause 
guilt. But another is to adopt strategies to weaken one’s own proneness 
towards such negative emotions, as Nazis involved in the holocaust were 
encouraged to do.
(f) Excessive self-love and the unnatural affections. Shaftesbury anal-
yses several self-regarding affections, including love of life (which can 
lead to a miserable fear of death, for example), anger, luxury, sexual 
desire, love of wealth, pride, and love of ease, along with certain ‘unnat-
ural’ affections such as sadism (216–29). He argues plausibly enough 
that such affections, especially if excessive, can cause distress to their 
subject.
But the truth is significantly more complex than Shaftesbury 
allows, and depends on the existing nature and situation of the person 
in question. Some vicious people appear to enjoy excessive indulgence in 
luxury, pride or sadism, and even possibly intrinsically unpleasant emo-
tions, such as anger, may have instrumental benefits for the vicious agent 
who can use them, for example, to extort goods from others.
The upshot of the above is we cannot accept that Shaftesbury has 
shown ‘every vicious action must be self-injurious and ill’, on the ground 
that such actions encourage and strengthen vicious traits. In some cases, 
virtue will be more advantageous than vice in hedonistic terms; but in 
others it will not (for example, in the case of the person morally required 
to allow him/herself to be tortured). Further, Shaftesbury will face objec-
tions to his account of well-being from two opposed directions. On the 
one hand, unrestricted hedonists will insist that the contentment on 
which Shaftesbury places so much weight is only one kind of enjoyment 
among others, all of which should be brought into the discussion; on the 
other, non-hedonists may insist that Shaftesbury should have gone fur-
ther in the direction of the ancient view that virtue, or virtuous activ-
ity, matters independently of its hedonistic effects on the agent. Despite 
Aristotle’s influence on him, and his rejection of various Lockean views, 
and of course his own inventiveness, Shaftesbury seems unable to shake 
off the egoism and hedonism that dominated British moral philosophy 
after Hobbes.
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II. Hutcheson
Francis Hutcheson (1694–1746) was born in Northern Ireland and edu-
cated at the University of Glasgow, where he took up the chair of Moral 
Philosophy in 1729. His work played a significant role in the Scottish 
Enlightenment, influencing Hume, Smith and Reid, as well as many 
thinkers beyond Scotland.25 Hutcheson himself was modest about his 
own originality (S 1.xlvii: ‘All who have looked into such subjects know 
that the general doctrine and foundation of morals may be found in the 
antients … [Plato, Aristotle, Xenophon, Cicero], and in Dr. Cumberland, 
and in Lord Shaftesbury’ (SI 5).26 It is true that his views in general have a 
good deal in common with these predecessors, but also that the detailed 
and powerful statement of those views, including not only his theory of 
moral sense but also his position on morality and self-interest, is imag-
inative, historically significant, and highly suggestive. Given our focus 
on Hutcheson as a precursor to Mill, it is worth noting that Hutcheson 
sees more deeply than Cumberland into the true nature of broadly util-
itarian impartiality, while usually avoiding Shaftesbury’s equivocation 
between genuine impartiality and the pleasures of partial friendship. 
Further, although he is a devout Christian, and his ethics is theistic in cer-
tain important respects, unlike Shaftesbury he tends to maintain a clear 
distinction between religious and moral experience. Hutcheson is in this 
respect strongly committed to the idea of natural law, seeing the aim of 
moral philosophy as being to demonstrate to each person, with reference 
to nature rather than the supernatural, that their individual greatest hap-
piness lies in virtue (I 179; E 174–5; S 1.1).27
Hutcheson was, for most intents and purposes, an evaluative hedon-
ist, at least at the substantive level, and held also that pleasure is the sole 
object of the will (LM 126).28 The happiness of any individual is identical 
with ‘pleasant perceptions’, and public happiness is merely the aggregate 
of such perceptions (RL 42). These perceptions give us our first idea of 
natural goodness, and we attribute immediate goodness to those objects 
likely to produce such perceptions, such as drink or harmony, and medi-
ate goodness to objects instrumental to immediate goodness, such as 
wealth (I 86). The same relations, of course, hold between pain and bad-
ness, and lead to aversion rather than positive desire (e.g. S 1.4; I 26). 
Hutcheson’s definitions of happiness are less precise than those of his 
successors in the hedonist tradition. For example, he defines happiness 
as ‘a state wherein there is plenty of such things as excite these general 
sensations or one kind or another, and we are free from pain’, and misery 
as ‘frequent and lasting sensations of the painful and disagreeable sorts, 
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excluding all grateful sensations’. Further, like Mill,29 he did not sustain 
a clear distinction between happiness as pleasure, and happiness as the 
greatest balance of pleasure over pain within a life. But it is clear that he 
recognizes that pleasures and pains can be weighed against one another, 
and his advocacy of maximization at both the intra- and interpersonal 
levels suggests that he would have accepted a conception of well-being 
according to which it consists in the greatest balance of pleasure over 
pain. Degrees of pleasantness and painfulness depend entirely on their 
intensity and duration (e.g. E 37).
Often (e.g. E 9), Hutcheson appears to mean by ‘intensity’ degree of 
pleasurableness. At times he appears to distinguish between intensity and 
dignity. For example, the earlier statement of the seventh axiom of calm 
desire is: ‘In computing the Quantities of Good or Evil, which we pursue 
or shun, either for our selves or others, when the Durations are equal, the 
Moment is as the Intenseness’ (E 37). Hutcheson later added ‘or Dignity 
of the Enjoyment’ (E 210). Indeed, he allows that the dignity of certain 
individuals can justify choosing an outcome in which they benefit over 
another of equal hedonic value (E 39). At SI 9, he claims that we should 
compare enjoyments according to their dignity and duration, making no 
mention of intensity. And at SI 54, dignity appears to be equivalent to 
value at a time: the dignity of the sensual pleasures consists only in the 
‘intenseness of the pleasure in the sensation’; the superior pleasures have 
their own ‘excellence’. Hutcheson does believe that dignity – understood 
as something like ‘excellence’ – can increase pleasurableness, because 
of the pleasure taken in dignity, claiming: ‘These moral Pleasures do 
some way more nearly affect us than any other: They make us delight 
in our selves, and relish our very Nature. By these we perceive an inter-
nal Dignity and Worth; and seem to have a Pleasure like to that ascribed 
often to the Deity, by which we enjoy our own Perfection, and that of 
every other Being’ (E 107; also S 1.132). But it is tempting to think that, 
like Mill, Hutcheson at least comes close to allowing that non-hedonic 
properties of experiences can increase a person’s well-being directly, as 
well as  indirectly through increasing pleasurableness. In other words, 
Hutcheson is a substantive but not an explanatory hedonist. The moral 
pleasures are best for us, but not merely because of their greater pleasur-
ableness: their dignity also matters. Consider also S 1.117: ‘By this inti-
mate feeling of dignity, enjoyments and exercises of some kinds, tho’ not 
of the highest degree of those kinds, are incomparably more excellent 
and beatifick than the most intense and lasting enjoyments of the lower 
kinds’ (also I 4, 77; E 94–5; S 1.29, 117, 129, 2.380; SI 40, 56–7).30 And, 
of course, there is a corresponding indignity in vice, which makes it the 
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greatest evil (S 1.139–40). Nevertheless, it would certainly be fair to say 
that the dominant idea emerging from Hutcheson’s ethics is that the bal-
ance of pleasure over pain should be maximized at both individual and 
social levels, and that pleasantness and painfulness are the most signifi-
cant good- and bad-making properties respectively.
As is standard in philosophical discussions of pleasures and pains, 
Hutcheson divides each into various different categories (SI 55–62, 70; 
also S 1.116–39). The most basic are bodily or sensual pleasures, which 
are felt when we satisfy those appetites we share with non-human ani-
mals. They have ‘none of that dignity which is the object of praise’. Next 
are those pleasures that emerge from the ‘elegance and grandeur of life’, 
as well as those of the arts, sciences and intellectual activity in general. 
These pleasures are ‘purer … more honourable and joyful’, and yet not 
absolutely the highest. The next highest are those of sympathy, as we 
can see from the fact that we will not envy a person with profuse bodily 
and intellectual pleasures, but no social pleasures. Unlike Shaftesbury, 
Hutcheson distinguishes clearly between these pleasures and those of the 
conscience or moral sense, which arise through reflection on one’s own 
character and actions. And it is in the pleasures of virtue – in particu-
lar, acting virtuously – that we find the ‘highest happiness’. Hutcheson’s 
detailed arguments for this broadly hedonistic view are perhaps the most 
developed in the history of philosophy, though as with Shaftesbury some 
of them depend on dubious empirical claims.
Hutcheson takes care to reject those versions of Stoicism according 
to which what is central is making oneself immune to contingent harms 
(E 83). That would involve a failure of compassion for the suffering of 
others, an excessive focus on the self rather than others, and a move 
towards passive retreat from the world rather than active engagement 
with it (also S 1.132). Such a position is in effect inconsistent with true 
human nature, which reveals itself when the agent is calm – and hence 
impartially benevolent (I 164). Our benevolent nature is of course the 
result of benevolent design (RL 53; E 8; S 1.1.75; SI 23, 40), and so we 
should not be surprised to find that our moral sense is itself designed 
to give its possessors pleasure (I 100).31 Hutcheson also locates himself 
within the perfectionist Aristotelian tradition, according to which happi-
ness itself consists in the perfection of one’s nature (S 1.29). This general 
position resonates with his revival of the Shaftesburian argument that, 
since the self is independent of the body, the bodily pleasures are in that 
sense alien and inferior (E 107; S 1.147).
As we have seen, pleasures are of different kinds. How should we 
compare them? Referring appropriately to Plato and Shaftesbury, and 
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anticipating Mill,32 Hutcheson advocates reliance on the verdicts of a 
competent judge, rather than on each individual’s position (rather than a 
pig, Hutcheson imagines a fly or maggot judging its pleasures to be supe-
rior to all others) (E 88–9; also S 1.120–1; SI 57). According to such a 
judge, there is no doubt that the pleasures of virtue are the highest. These 
include the pleasures of benevolence (I 134; S 1.140–1, 147), but also 
those of piety, which Hutcheson tends to classify independently and as 
the very highest (S 1.222, 234; SI 87).
As far as benevolence is concerned, pleasantness increases with 
impartiality (S 1.132). As we might expect, this pleasantness is at least 
to some extent aesthetic: ‘in some extensive Principles of Action’, as in 
certain theorems, we perceive a beauty analogous to that in sensible 
objects (I 24).33 The approving awareness of one’s own virtue is a great joy 
(SI 40–1), while vice brings with it the pains of guilt, regret and remorse 
(SI 40, 66, 145, 147), and of reproach by others (SI 148). These pains are 
themselves distracting, making it impossible for the subject to focus on the 
sources of external, or bodily, pleasure (SI 63). Remorse also often arises 
after indulgence in the bodily or sensual pleasures (SI 56, 126), whereas 
reflection on past virtuous deeds is deeply pleasurable (RL 45; SI 61) 
and the development of a virtuous habit increases pleasure even further 
(S 1.133). Even in the absence of such remorse, reflection on past external 
pleasures is hedonically neutral, and such pleasures are brief and transient, 
producing nauseous satiety and languor (I 164; E 105–8; S 1.124, 132, 
SI 56, 88–9). Just as the pleasures of virtue have the greatest duration, the 
same is true of those of vice (E 108; SI 66): unlike Mill, Hutcheson allows 
for different qualities of pain as well as pleasure (SI 100, 139).
The pleasures of virtue, unlike even those of the imagination, are a 
support in difficult times (E 105–6), and the virtuous can even rise above 
physical pain (RL 46; S 1.151–2). Further, if pain is an obstacle to a vir-
tuous action, that of course only increases its value (I 165). The virtuous 
can enjoy the external pleasures, and do not need them in excess: a sim-
ple life is sufficient (I 1.106; S 1.127). In general, ‘external’ goods such as 
wealth are required for ‘complete’ happiness (SI 64, 222), but the virtu-
ous gain more from them (E 104). Their moderation increases pleasures 
from such sources (SI 58), while unmoderated indulgence itself causes 
vexation. Further the virtuous, because others will feel affection for 
them, are more likely to be beneficiaries as well as benefactors.
The emotions of the vicious – anger, malice, and so on – make 
them miserable even when opportunities for external pleasure are open 
to them (I 164). In response to the objection that the vicious clearly do 
experience some valuable external pleasures, Hutcheson can respond 
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that this is true only of the majority of the vicious who are in a way partly 
virtuous (S 1.153, 191–2). Virtue consists in benevolent affections, and 
most of the vicious have some social affections, which are valuable in 
themselves and may make it possible for the vicious to gain some value 
also from external pleasures (SI 57).
These points are part of the explanation of why virtue is necessary 
for other goods to be valuable (I 165–7; S 1.126). But there is another 
component to this explanation. Consider the Roman Regulus who, set 
free by the Carthaginians on condition that he would return, did so only 
to be tortured. We might wish that he had not been tortured; but none of 
us would wish, for his sake, that he had broken his promise. This is a very 
clear example of the work being done by dignity in Hutcheson’s account. 
Only pleasures are valuable, but their value depends not only on their 
being pleasant, but on their dignity. In this respect, then, Hutcheson, as 
Mill was tempted to do, moves away from a pure explanatory hedonism 
to allow in non-hedonic good-making properties. Many have wondered 
why Mill did not go the whole way, and move beyond substantive hedon-
ism altogether, perhaps even allowing happiness to consist in more than 
subjective states – in particular, in virtuous actions. The same question 
arises for Hutcheson, as does the question of whether the approval we 
feel for Regulus’s behaviour may be grounded in our view of the morality 
of his actions rather than whether he himself benefited from them.
We can now grasp the main outlines of Hutcheson’s conception of 
the role of virtue in happiness. In general, his view is that the pleasures 
of impartial benevolence, combined with piety, are discontinuously more 
valuable than others, and for that reason virtue guarantees the best out-
come for the agent, usually in terms of positive happiness but sometimes 
only in the diminution of misery (S 1.178; SI 78, 249). In certain pas-
sages, however, Hutcheson appears to accept weaker views. He allows 
that death may be preferable for a person ‘under grievous bodily pain’ 
(SI 65), implying that the exercise of courage in such circumstances is 
insufficient for happiness. At E 97–8, his argument for the superiority of 
virtue over the avoidance of bodily pain explicitly appeals to actions of 
great virtue, when his stated position elsewhere appears to be that all vir-
tuous pleasure is superior to the avoidance of bodily pain of any kind. At 
E 143, he claims that the reasonable person will examine the tendencies 
of the various types of action s/he considers doing, and that the pursuit 
of the public good is the most probable route to the greatest happiness. 
These and other passages, though in a minority, suggest a certain – quite 
justifiable – reluctance on Hutcheson’s part to accept the strong Stoic the-
sis that virtue guarantees the greatest happiness and hence immunity to 
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fortune. That reluctance may be explained partly by his commitment to 
substantive hedonism. It may be somewhat implausible to claim that the 
virtuous person who chooses to die in agony on the rack has lived the 
happiest or even the best life possible for him/her; but to claim that s/he 
has experienced the most pleasurable life is even harder to believe.
III. Shaftesbury, Hutcheson and Mill
There is no doubt that John Stuart Mill was familiar with the works 
of both Shaftesbury and Hutcheson. Although he does not explicitly 
mention either as direct influences, it is instructive to consider the par-
allels between their work and his, and to reflect upon the standard ques-
tions, and range of answers, constituting the philosophical background 
against which all three philosophers were working. All were substantive 
hedonists about well-being, believing human happiness to consist only 
in pleasures. Shaftesbury is not an explanatory hedonist, but the role 
Hutcheson placed on dignity, and Mill on nobility in his own account of 
higher pleasures, is evidence that at the very least they were tempted 
by an Aristotelian, non-hedonist position. Shaftesbury’s view is not a 
form of utilitarianism, but it is theoretically and practically close to it. 
All three philosophers distinguish between higher and lower pleasures, 
using, among others, the Socratic appeal to the experienced judge. All 
see virtue as a central component in happiness, though here we do see 
a contrast between Mill and his two predecessors. Mill’s attempt to close 
the apparent gap between self-interest consists in the very brief second 
stage of his famous proof in the fourth chapter of Utilitarianism, along 
with a somewhat vague and optimistic appeal to the potential of moral 
education in the third chapter. Unlike Shaftesbury and Hutcheson, Mill 
had to work hard to defend hedonism, and the opposition to utilitari-
anism was in Mill’s day a good deal more developed than that faced by 
Hutcheson. Given the weakness of any hedonist defence of a complete 
overlap between happiness and virtue, which he may well have noted in 
Shaftesbury and Hutcheson, Mill may have decided to focus on battles he 
had a better chance of winning.34
Notes
1. This paper uses material from chapters 7 and 9 of my book Sacrifice Regained: Morality and 
Self-Interest in British Moral Philosophy from Hobbes to Bentham (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
2019). I am grateful to Oxford University Press for permission.
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 2. The J. S. Mill library at Somerville College, Oxford, contains the 4th edition of Shaftesbury’s 
Characteristicks of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times (1727) and a 1st edition of Hutcheson’s Sys-
tem of Moral Philosophy (1755). Both contain annotations in Mill’s hand, along with textual 
side-markings. Some of these concern happiness and virtue. For example, at the very end of 
the second volume of the System, Mill includes the following notes (Mill, 2018): ‘25 Approba-
tion from others, excites pleasurable feelings; disapprobation painful. Again; why stop short? 
These feelings, not the idea of the good the man who approves may do us. True; but they are 
the train of pleasurable ideas (a much richer collection) of all the advantages which the favour 
of mankind yields to them who obtain it’; ‘42 Acts good for others done by us for the good they 
will do to us, not virtuous. True, in the sense you now use the phrase, “good to us”. But an act 
done by us, to produce a good to others which calls up all the train of pleasurable ideas which 
spring from the idea of good acts done mutually by men to one another is virtuous’; ‘100 The 
value of pains + pleasures measured, by intensity + durability’.
 3. All unattributed page references are to Shaftesbury, Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, 
Times, ed. L. Klein (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). Other Shaftesbury abbre-
viations used in the text are as follows: ‘Preface’ to Select Sermons of Dr Whichcot [P]; Several 
Letters Written by a Noble Lord to a Young Man at the University [NL]; The Life, Unpublished 
Letters, and Philosophical Regimen of Anthony, Earl of Shaftesbury [R]; Second Characters or the 
Language of Forms [SC].
 4. At SC 178, for example, Locke and Hobbes are classed together – apparently as ‘barbarians’ – 
for their denial of ethical aestheticism.
 5. Shaftesbury describes such punishment as ‘inherent’, which it insofar as the painfulness is a 
property of the vicious action itself. But it is not clear (pace M. Gill, The British Moralists on 
Human Nature and the Birth of Secular Ethics [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006], 
79) that this conception of inherent punishment (and reward) entitles Whichcote or Shaftes-
bury to the claim that we should care about virtue for its own sake, rather than for its inherent 
benefits.
 6. The Inquiry, included in the Characteristics, has usually been seen as Shaftesbury’s most sig-
nificant contribution to philosophical ethics. As noted by I. Rivers, Reason, Grace, and Senti-
ment: A Study of the Language of Religion and Ethics in England, 1660–1780, vol. 2: Shaftes-
bury to Hume (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 108, also 111, it is unwise to 
read the Inquiry independently of The Moralists (note especially her quotation from Leibniz at 
108n108).
 7. That edition itself is problematic: see R. Voitle, The Third Earl of Shaftesbury, 1671–1713 (Ba-
ton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1984), 354. An annotated version of the manu-
scripts is now available in Shaftesbury, Standard Edition II, 6: Askêmata, eds. W. Benda et al. 
(Stuttgart and Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog, 2011). Many themes are common be-
tween the Characteristics and the Regimen. The overlap is most noticeable in the Soliloquy and 
The Moralists, both of which are printed in the Characteristics (see J. Sellars, ‘Shaftesbury, Stoi-
cism, and Philosophy as a Way of Life’, Sophia, 2015, 7–8. DOI: 10.1007/s11841-015-0483-z).
 8. H. Sidgwick, Outlines of the History of Ethics, 5th edn (London: Macmillan, 1902), 185n1.
 9. Marcus Aurelius, Meditations, Books 1–6, tr. C. Gill (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 
20.
10. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans. R. Crisp, 2nd edn (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2014), 1172b35–1173a1.
11. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1174a8–11.
12. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1176a15–16.
13. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1176a22–9; see 1198a16–17.
14. Shaftesbury’s point here is reminiscent of Aristotle’s suggestion that we ought to ‘take on im-
mortality as much as possible, and do all that we can to live in accordance with the highest 
element within us’ (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1177b33-4).
15. Shaftesbury’s aim in Pt. 2 of the Inquiry is to show that having the natural affections is to have 
‘the chief means and power of self-enjoyment’, and that having excessive private affections, or 
having unnatural affections, leads to misery; he notes that happiness is ‘generally computed’ 
from ‘pleasures or satisfactions’ (200–1, 216). T. Irwin, The Development of Ethics, vol. 2: From 
Suarez to Rousseau (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2008), 358 – see S. Grean, Shaftesbury’s Philoso-
phy of Religion and Ethics: A Study in Enthusiasm (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1967), 
229–32 – referring to 250–1, claims that, according to Shaftesbury, the pleasant is merely 
what we think eligible. But Shaftesbury can be understood here to be objecting to a particular 
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version of unrestricted hedonism. Seeing will and pleasure as ‘synonymous’ is equivalent to 
calling everything that pleases us ‘pleasure’.
16. R. Crisp, ‘Aristotle’s Inclusivism’, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 12 (2004): 111–36.
17. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 10.7–8.
18. Gill, The British Moralists, Ch. 9, finds in Shaftesbury a separate teleological argument for vir-
tue, independent of the ‘mental enjoyment’ account, and argues for tensions between the two. 
I read Shaftesbury’s teleology as supporting the mental enjoyment account (if anything, Gill 
sees the relation running the other way: see Shaftesbury, Standard Edition, sect. 4, penult. 
para.; also E. Albee, ‘The Relation of Shaftesbury and Hutcheson to Utilitarianism’, Philosophi-
cal Review 5 (1896): 29). In outlining the teleological argument, Gill (120) quotes the question 
Shaftesbury suggests asking one of the ‘sportly gentlemen’ about a bitch who eats her puppies: 
‘whether he thinks the unnatural creature who acts thus, or the natural one who does other-
wise, is best in its kind and enjoys itself the most’ (430) [my italics].
19. Irwin, The Development of Ethics, 360.
20. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1095b30–1096a2; 1098b18–20.
21. P. Glassen, ‘A Fallacy in Aristotle’s Argument about the Good’, Philosophical Quarterly 7 
(1957): 319–22.
22. J. S. Mill, Utilitarianism, ed. R. Crisp (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 2.5.
23. Plato, Respublica, ed. S. R. Slings (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 581e–583a.
24. A. Ryan, J. S. Mill (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1974), 111.
25. See, for example, T. Campbell, ‘Francis Hutcheson: “Father” of the Scottish Enlightenment’, in 
The Origins and Nature of the Scottish Enlightenment, eds. R. Campbell and A. Skinner (Edin-
burgh: John Donald, 1982), 167–8.
26. Hutcheson abbreviations used in the text are as follows: Reflections upon Laughter and Remarks 
upon the Fable of the Bees [RL]; A System of Moral Philosophy [S]; An Essay on the Nature and 
Conduct of the Passions and Affections, with Illustrations on the Moral Sense [E]; Logic, Metaphys-
ics, and the Natural Sociability of Mankind [LM]; Philosophiae Moralis Institutio Compendiaria, 
with A Short Introduction to Moral Philosophy [SI]; and An Inquiry into the Original of Our Ideas 
of Beauty and Virtue [I].
27. Hutcheson’s central ethical texts fall into three broad groups. The fundamentals of his ethics 
were stated in the four influential treatises in I and E. Twenty or so years later, the Institutio 
appeared, to be translated into English as SI in 1747. In the meantime, Hutcheson had been 
working on S, which was published posthumously by his son. His views did change, but in 
general on the nature of morality and self-interest they remained largely consistent (see L. 
Stephen, History of English Thought in the Eighteenth Century, 2 vols (London: Smith, Elder, 
1876), 2.57). For helpful discussions of the development, or lack of it, in Hutcheson’s views, 
see W. R. Scott, Francis Hutcheson: His Life, Teaching and Position in the History of Philosophy 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1900), Chs 9, 10, 11 (1), 12; J. Moore, ‘The Two 
Systems of Francis Hutcheson: On the Origins of the Scottish Enlightenment’, in Studies in the 
Philosophy of the Scottish Enlightenment, ed. M. A. Stewart (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), 
37–59; S. Darwall, The British Moralists and the Internal ‘Ought’ (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1995), Ch. 8; J. Bishop, ‘Moral Motivation and the Development of Francis 
Hutcheson’s Philosophy’, Journal of the History of Ideas 57 (1996): 277–95. Note that the Lib-
erty Fund prints, in a revised edition, the second edition of I, but with complete textual notes 
of variations in the other three significant editions.
28. In his later writings (e.g. SI 48), Hutcheson spoke of the love of virtue itself, which may be 
taken as a source of non-hedonic motivation independent of both self-interest and morality: 
see Bishop, ‘Moral Motivation’, 289–91.
29. Mill, Utilitarianism, 2.2.
30. For an interpretation of Hutcheson as a purely ‘quantitative’ hedonist, see D. Dorsey, ‘Hutch-
eson’s Deceptive Hedonism’, Journal of the History of Philosophy 48 (2010): 445–67. By 
 quantitative hedonism, Dorsey means the view that the welfare value of a pleasure is simply 
a function of its pleasurableness (446). He later cites the link made by Hutcheson at S 100 
between ‘supreme happiness’ and ‘the most intense and durable pleasures’ as evidence for a 
quantitative interpretation (Dorsey, in fact, says ‘qualititative’, but he has confirmed to me that 
this is a typographical error). But if by ‘intensity’ Hutcheson means degree of pleasurable-
ness-at-a-time, the passage seems consistent with forms of qualitative hedonism according 
to which pleasurableness depends partly on dignity and/or welfare consists in the greatest 
pleasures, the welfare value of which depends at least partly on dignity as well as pleasura-
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bleness. M. Strasser, ‘Hutcheson on the Higher and Lower Pleasures’, Journal of the History of 
Philosophy 25 (1987): 521–2, suggests that Hutcheson is not open to Moore’s objection to Mill 
that allowing quality as well as quantity of pleasure to count commits Mill to a non-hedonist 
position, because ‘Hutcheson does not believe in the intrinsic moral worth of happiness or 
pleasure’. But, as Strasser himself notes, Hutcheson does believe in the intrinsic natural value 
of pleasure, and Moore’s argument – for what is it is worth – could be directed against that 
position.
31. This teleological element in Hutcheson’s thought is a problem for any account of the role of the 
moral sense in the origin of our moral distinctions that rules out teleology (e.g. Gill, The British 
Moralists, 177–8).
32. Mill, Utilitarianism, 2.5–8.
33. Hutcheson almost certainly has impartial benevolence in mind here; see e.g. the reference 
to ‘extensive affections’ at S 1.59–60. In a later edition, Hutcheson stated that the purpose of 
geometry is to show how what is true of one figure is also true of others; from the practical per-
spective, he may have in mind the extension of the scope of practical principles from egoism, 
through partial benevolence, to impartial benevolence.
34. This essay is dedicated to Fred Rosen, in admiration of his scholarship and in gratitude for his 
guidance, support and friendship over many years. I wish also to thank the editors for their 
invitation to present an earlier version at a symposium in honour of Fred, held at the Royal 
Historical Society in October 2017, and the audience for discussion and comments.
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‘The First Article to Look to is Power’: 
Bentham, Happiness and the 
Capability Approach
Michael Quinn
Since its inception by Amartya Sen, the capability approach has become 
a major perspective from which to discuss well-being, development and 
social justice, and thus an attractive alternative utilitarianism. Sen 
famously rejects utilitarianism, and devotes few words, mostly nega-
tive, to Jeremy Bentham.1 Several attempts have been made to rescue 
John Stuart Mill from Sen’s indictment,2 but little rehabilitative atten-
tion has been paid to Bentham. This discussion will argue first that Ben-
tham anticipated some of the insights of the capability approach, and 
that both his discussions of the necessary and sufficient conditions for 
voluntary action, and his proposal that public policy address ‘circum-
stances influencing sensibility’, reveal a sensitivity to the determinants 
of ‘effective liberty’ of which proponents of the capability approach 
might approve. For reasons of space, neither a detailed exposition nor 
a critique of the capability approach is attempted, beyond a thumbnail 
sketch of Sen’s initial presentation of functions and capabilities, and of 
his increasing focus on liberty. The paper attempts to respond to two 
criticisms levelled by Sen and Martha Nussbaum. First, that utilitar-
ianism’s exclusive focus on consequences in terms of utility overlooks 
the value of agency, and thereby overlooks both systematic violations 
of basic liberties and the demands of equality.3 Second, that evalua-
tion exclusively in terms of subjective reports of affective mental states 
overlooks the phenomenon of ‘adaptation’, that is the reining-in of aspi-
rations to avoid unhappiness, in background circumstances that them-
selves appear unjust.4
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I. Bentham and Sen on happiness and well-being
Bentham never deviated from the view that the end of human life was 
happiness,5 and that happiness consisted in a net balance of pleasures 
over pains.6 The positive elements of experience were pleasures, the neg-
ative elements pains:
In vain, indeed, would the appellation matter of happiness be 
denied to the word pleasure, for in the pursuit of pleasure, accompa-
nied all along with the avoidance of pain, will not man alone, but every 
sensitive being whatsoever, be at all times … occupied. … Such is the 
fact … : nor can any intelligible reason be assigned for so much as a 
wish that it were otherwise.7
Happiness or well-being – Bentham usually treats the expressions as syn-
onymous8 – was a property of the aggregate of sensations experienced by 
human beings, which sensations were the crucial variable in moral and 
political evaluation:
The feelings of individuals, sole elements of public happiness, 
these, and these only, are the considerations that have here been 
exclusively consulted, and their suggestions undeviatingly adhered 
to; human feelings, the only true standards of right and wrong in 
the business of legislation, not lawyers’ quibbles, nor reasons of 
other times, that have vanished with the times.9
Bentham thus equates well-being with happiness, and proposes an 
entirely hedonistic view of the elements of happiness: ‘Happiness is a 
vain word – a word void of meaning – to him to whose mind it does not 
explain itself by its reference to human feelings – feelings painful and 
pleasurable – pains and pleasures.’10 A happy human being experiences 
more valuable agreeable sensations (pleasures) than disagreeable ones 
(pains), so that the value of the sum of the person’s pleasures is greater 
than that of the sum of his/her pains. If the reverse is true, the person’s 
condition is one of unhappiness, or ill-being.11 Current sensations vary in 
degree (intensity) and duration, their value being the product of the two 
variables (allowance made for fecundity and purity, or their tendency to 
foster further pleasures or pains); while in evaluating future sensations, 
a rational agent discounts their value according to their uncertainty and 
temporal distance. Insofar as the agent is a utilitarian (and Bentham’s 
default perspective is that of the utilitarian legislator), s/he repeats the 
120 HAPPINESS AND UTIL ITY
calculation for all sentient beings affected by an action, which Bentham 
calls the dimension of extent.12 Rational decision-making – including 
moral or legal decision-making – depended upon calculation, on the 
determination of quantities:
According to the principle of utility, taking in its entirety the whole 
mass of pleasure in question – presence or, in case of absence, pro-
pinquity and certainty, i.e. probability, being given or out of the 
question – quantity is the sole measure of value:13
For Sen, this approach is altogether too reductionist.14 He does not assert 
that happiness is unimportant, but he rejects the claim that it is the only 
morally significant variable.15 According to Sen, utilitarianism asserts 
an identity between valuing and desiring, but there are more sources of 
value than the delivery of agreeable sensations or avoidance of disagree-
able ones. Faced with the assertion that the evaluation of human lives 
must look more broadly than at the level of happiness they contain, Ben-
tham might be left at a loss. What else could conceivably be relevant?
Sen’s first presentation of the capability approach was in answer 
to the question ‘Equality of What?’16 Capabilities and functionings were 
introduced as central variables in an effort to capture the strengths 
and avoid the weaknesses of ‘welfare’ and ‘resources’ respectively. 
Functionings are ‘parts of the state of a person – in particular the various 
things he or she manages to do or to be in leading a life’,17 while a person’s 
capability is constituted by ‘the alternative combinations of functionings 
the person can achieve, and from which she can choose one collection’.18 
The core assertion of the approach is that ‘the central feature of well-be-
ing is the ability to achieve valuable functionings’.19 Capability sets of 
possible ‘functionings’ were presented both as a more plausible criterion 
of ‘well-being’ than either utility or resources,20 and as the focus of inves-
tigation for egalitarian justice. More recently, Sen explicitly rejects both 
the characterization of the approach as a theory of justice, and the pur-
suit of ‘equality of opportunity for well-being’,21 describing his approach 
as ‘no more than a perspective in terms of which the advantages and 
disadvantages of a person can be reasonably assessed’.22 In Sen’s hands, 
the capability approach adopts a broadly consequentialist focus, but has 
self-consciously limited aspirations, and remains a partial moral theory.23 
Over time, Sen has increasingly emphasized the centrality of liberty, 
describing his perspective as ‘the freedom-based capability approach’.24 
The focus on freedom shifts the emphasis from achievement (function-
ings) to opportunity (capabilities): the issue is not ‘what I have been or 
done’, but ‘what I could reasonably have been or done’.25
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II.i. Capabilities and conditions for voluntary action
In discussing the difficulties facing the poor man seeking to save his sur-
plus income, Bentham commented ‘the first article to look to is power’.26 
The triad of knowledge, power and inclination, which Stark called Ben-
tham’s ‘subjective’ factors of production,27 constitute the necessary and 
sufficient conditions for voluntary action.28 To do something deliberately, 
I must want to do it, know how to do it, and be able – that is, have the 
power or capacity – to do it. Bentham’s poor man might know about the 
benefits of postponing pleasures so that temporally distant pains could 
be avoided, and might exhibit an appropriate inclination to accumulate 
surplus earnings against the exigencies of old age, but, in the absence of 
accessible banking services, he also knows that he cannot secure his nest 
egg, and might as well return to the pub.29
Since the capability approach focuses on effective freedom, on 
what people are able to do, it is worth translating Bentham’s conditions 
into the language of capability. The first condition for voluntary action is 
knowledge, which Bentham divides into knowledge of inducements and 
of means, or answers to the questions ‘Why should I do this?’ and ‘How 
do I do this’.30 Knowledge is a source of power, since I cannot voluntarily 
perform an action unless I know how to do it. Knowledge is also a nec-
essary condition for many of Sen’s ‘functionings’. In general, Bentham 
advocates the widest possible dissemination of knowledge. In ‘Indirect 
Legislation’, he dismisses the argument that such dissemination fosters 
criminality, countering that violent crimes of ignorance are more harm-
ful than deceptive crimes involving differential knowledge, and arguing 
that, for instance, maintaining the poor in contented illiteracy would 
lead to loss of pleasure:31 ‘in taking a fair estimate of the ballance of its 
[i.e. knowledge’s] effects, the former [abuse of knowledge] … is as much 
to be taken into account as the latter [use of knowledge]: but … the for-
mer is occasional and confined: the latter is boundless and continual.’32 
Ceteris paribus, happiness increases with knowledge.33
Broadly, knowledge for Bentham means true belief (i.e. belief in 
accordance with the actual state of things), the product of experience, 
observation and reflection.34 For Bentham, the attraction of utilitarian-
ism consisted in rendering moral discourse a matter of evidence, of inves-
tigation of facts.35 However, human beings are capable of believing in the 
existence of things that are not true (do not exist), and of disbelieving 
things that are true (do exist). He terms the former ‘false consciousness’ 
and the latter ‘unconsciousness’.36 An individual’s self-report of content-
ment with limited opportunities to exercise many functionings dependent 
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on education or good health may be partly explained by ‘lack of medical 
knowledge and by inadequate familiarity of comparative information’,37 
but such self-assessments are likely to be altered by gains in knowledge. 
Further, if self-assessment is underpinned by a misplaced conviction that 
prevailing arrangements are justified or immutable, false consciousness 
may contribute significantly to the phenomenon of adaptation.
Bentham divides the second condition, power, into power ab 
intra – the range of actions a person might undertake leaving aside the 
influence of factors outside his/her person – and power ab extra – deter-
mined by ‘the condition and situation of the persons and things he has 
to do with’.38 Power ab intra may be enhanced by knowledge, which is 
itself enhanced by education. In discussing the poor’s disinclination to 
save, Bentham draws a close connection between power and inclina-
tion: ‘Oftentimes where inclination appears wanting, and perhaps really 
is wanting, it is only because opportunity is wanting – that power, and 
consciousness of power, without which inclination can not so much as 
bring itself into life’.39
Power ab extra has several varieties, namely physical, legal and 
intellectual. Physical power is given by control over resources, in particu-
lar, the all-purpose resource of money or wealth. Legal power is given 
either by threatening punishment against those who interfere with the 
exercise of power ab intra, in which case ‘power is no more than liberty’,40 
or by ‘compelling [others] to afford assistance’ – that is, by threatening 
punishment against those who fail to do so.41 Legal powers thus confer 
increased capacity either by providing protection from interference, or 
by using law to add the powers of others to those of the power-holder. 
Since human beings inhabit contexts replete with other human beings, 
their ability to order the actions of others in accordance with their will 
is a significant determinant of their power. Wealth enhances power by 
allowing the purchase of others’ services or their obedience.
In one sense, Bentham’s power simply is capacity, is effective free-
dom: my power comprises the complete range of actions between which 
I may choose.42 Again, ceteris paribus, happiness increases with power. 
Initially, Sen seemed to favour ‘basic capability equality’ as the goal of 
egalitarian justice.43 For his part, Bentham rejected the notion of equality 
of power as a goal of policy, arguing that it was incompatible with organ-
ized political life.44 Sen’s increasing focus on capability as against func-
tioning, on opportunity as against achievement, is intended to capture 
the conviction that ‘the good life is inter alia a life of freedom’.45 As Rosen 
has done much to establish, Bentham was sensitive to the importance of 
liberty to human lives. Here, a single reason will be noted, namely the 
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pain of being deterred by threat of punishment from doing whatever it 
might be I want to do: ‘The whole course of legislation, though a neces-
sary evil, is still an evil: the legislator can not stir, but what he does is felt 
in the shape of hardship and coercion somewhere.’46
The third of Bentham’s conditions, inclination, fits less easily with 
the terminology of capabilities. Inclination is will or desire. My desires 
do not coincide exactly with my capabilities, since there are activities 
or functionings that I might easily undertake but do not wish to, and 
others that I might very much wish to undertake but cannot. Bentham 
could hardly overlook inclination, since voluntary action definitionally 
involves exercise of will. In this connection, Sen advances another criti-
cism, namely that utilitarianism shares (indeed, was largely respon sible 
for) the assumption of modern economics that rational behaviour is 
self-interested. For Bentham, the goal of the prudentially rational agent 
is to maximize his/her net balance of pleasure over pain. Insofar as homo 
oeconomicus is a self-interested utility maximizer, Bentham would recog-
nize his own characterization of typical human motivation. However, he 
did not assume that all motivation was egoistic. He recognized that sym-
pathy for others, understood as desire for their well-being, could provide 
a motive for action, insisting only that since the pleasure I derive from 
awareness of their well-being is mine, the desire to promote that well-be-
ing is motivated by the prospect of a pleasure that is likewise mine.47
Sen rejects any notion of rationality which, by explaining sympa-
thy in reference to the effect of others’ well-being on my own, makes 
the operation of sympathy compatible with self-interest.48 He concedes 
that ‘the effect of “other-regarding” concerns on one’s well-being has to 
operate through some feature of the person’s own being’,49 but insists 
that to limit evaluation of advantage to assessment of the level of indi-
viduals’ well-being is to miss much that is of value. In particular, it is 
to overlook the difference between well-being and agency, the latter of 
which encompasses all goals adopted by an individual, and extends well 
beyond her well-being understood as a positive net balance of pleasure 
over pain.50 This is a serious indictment, to which a possible Benthamic 
response, deploying the subordinate end of security, will be considered 
in Section III.
Sen joins many critics who have noted that not all human actions 
aim directly at happiness: some are done out of duty, some for other 
goals, some without any thought for the consequences. Bentham him-
self recognized many actions as the unreflective product of habit, or a 
desire to follow the herd, or not to think too hard,51 but such actions are 
hardly products of rational reflection. In responding directly, Bentham 
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might argue that the analysis finishes too quickly. If I am motivated by 
the desire to ‘do the right thing’ though the heavens fall, he might ask 
how I would feel if I acted otherwise, and hypothesize that I would feel 
pain, and that it is in order to avoid this sensation that I so act. He also 
recognized that, especially when an action did not impact directly on the 
well-being of an individual or on those close to him/her, that individ-
ual’s share in the universal interest could motivate actions from ‘public 
spirit’. Insofar as public spirit and individual interest pulled in the same 
direction, actions often arose ‘from a little of the one and a little of the 
other put together’.52 Finally, he discussed cases of heroic self-sacrifice, 
in which individuals subjected themselves to great pain or death in order 
to benefit others.53 In such cases, he would have to argue that the pains 
such individuals would feel in consequence of not making the sacrifice 
would be worse than death, but he would also doubtless point out that 
such cases were extraordinarily rare.54
II.ii Conversion factors: circumstances influencing 
sensibility
The exercise of many of Sen’s capabilities – that is, many of his func-
tionings – are mediated by ‘conversion factors’ that occupy the space 
between consumption of resources and experience of sensations.55 Sen’s 
critique of ‘equality of resources’ rests on the latter’s incapacity to take 
account of such factors, but Bentham’s utilitarianism appears immune to 
this criticism. Bentham categorized conversion factors as ‘circumstances 
influencing sensibility’.56 Almost every adducible fact about individuals 
is capable of acting as such a circumstance. Bentham listed 32 of them, 
ranging from internal physical or mental states, such as health, know-
ledge and bent of inclination, to external but still personal factors, such 
as connections in the way of sympathy and antipathy and pecuniary 
circumstances, to very broad factors like climate and form of govern-
ment.57 If, through the influence of these circumstances, people differ in 
their capacities for deriving well-being, how should moral theories take 
account of the variations?
On one hand, insofar as circumstances influencing sensibility alter 
the value of sensations, an accurate calculation of that value must take 
them into account. On the other, not only can no general rule take cog-
nizance of all differences in individual sensibility, but the legislator is 
in no position to garner the data necessary to reveal those differences. 
Bentham begins with a presumption of equality in sensibility, itself 
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derived from lack of particular knowledge: ‘Of individuals it is clear that 
the legislator can know nothing: concerning those points of conduct 
which depend upon the particular circumstances of each individual … he 
can determine nothing to advantage.’58 Bentham’s legislator commences 
by setting conversion factors aside altogether, and presuming that indi-
viduals have an equal capacity for happiness.59 However, he envisaged 
that some circumstances which ‘apply indiscriminately’ to discrete cat-
egories of persons could be ‘directly and pretty fully provided for by the 
legislator’.60 His list of such circumstances included bodily imperfection, 
insanity, sex, rank, climate, lineage, religion and age.
In regard to other circumstances, which admitted ‘an infinite vari-
ety of degrees’, the legislator was at a stand. However, Bentham con-
trasted the generic knowledge available to the legislator with the detailed 
familiarity with the circumstances influencing particular sensibilities 
achievable by the judge, who was given responsibility for fine-tuning the 
application of the penal-code according to circumstances that:
cannot be fully provided for by the legislator; but, as … the degree 
in which they take place is capable of being measured, provision 
may be made for them by the judge, or other executive magistrate, to 
whom the several individuals that happened to be concerned may be 
made known.61
It is tempting to assume that public officials, or ‘executive magistrates’, 
in a position, like the judge, to acquire knowledge of individual circum-
stances, might be equally obliged to make provision for the impact of 
such circumstances in applying public policy.
III. The subordinate ends of legislation and capabilities
For Rosen, Bentham’s pursuit of utility was largely indirect.62 The leg-
islator achieves the maximum of happiness, the ‘paramount end’, by 
directly pursuing instead four subordinate ends – subsistence, security, 
abundance and equality: ‘The superior end consists in the maximum of 
all four put together.’63 The achievement of discrete subordinate ends 
might be traded off, but only against the greater achievement of the 
others: ‘No sacrifice to be made of any one but in subserviency to some 
other of the four.’64
In contrast to Bentham’s theory of punishment – which concerns 
partly the direct infliction of the real entities (pains) and partly their 
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indirect infliction through the proxy of financial penalties – his discus-
sion of distributive justice focuses on the distribution of fictitious enti-
ties, that is, rights and obligations.65 In terms of the distinction between 
welfare and resources, the latter discussion is entirely resourcist, in that 
the rights in question are rights to things or services, or, in short, to prop-
erty, while rights and obligations are also fictitious proxies for real sen-
sations.66 As Bentham noted, three of his subordinate ends – subsistence, 
abundance and equality – ‘are conversant with the same matter; to wit, 
the matter of wealth’,67 that is resources: ‘all these subject-matters are, 
with reference to the individual in question, distinct from him, and exte-
rior to him’. The fourth end, security, deals partly with similar subject 
matter, but also includes the individual’s body (the site of experience of 
pain and pleasure), reputation and condition in life.68
When Nussbaum describes the task of politics as ‘distributing the 
conditions for a good life’,69 she is echoing Bentham’s description of 
the task of the civil law. The coincidence is not accidental, insofar as 
Bentham’s subordinate ends constitute his enumeration of objective 
human interests. In Postema’s words, the subordinate ends ‘are the uni-
versal goods each member needs whatever her (other) interests are’.70 
Despite his subjectivist epistemology, Bentham believes that human 
beings share universal interests. Although human tastes are idiosyn-
cratic, ‘the feelings of men are sufficiently regular to become the object of 
a science or an art’.71
There are similarities between Nussbaum’s use of a substantive con-
ception of human nature to ground a list of objectively valuable capa-
bilities, and Bentham’s list of subordinate ends. Bentham might endorse 
Nussbaum’s defence of ‘essentialism’, and the effort ‘to begin by consid-
ering certain perfectly general conditions of human life that appear to 
be common to all human societies’.72 Of course, the general condition 
crucial for Bentham was the capacity to experience pain and pleasure. 
Although Nussbaum dismisses ‘a life organized around the activity of 
sense-perception’ as ‘merely animal’,73 not only did she recognize in an 
early article that ‘the aversion to pain as a fundamental evil is a primi-
tive … unlearned part of being a human animal’, but included ‘being able 
to avoid unnecessary and nonbeneficial pain and to have pleasurable 
experiences’ in her list of ‘Basic Human Functional Capabilities’, though 
it disappears in later versions.74
Bentham’s subordinate ends, however, constitute neither ‘a thick 
vague theory of the good’,75 nor even a ‘thin theory of the good’,76 but 
rather, perhaps, a thin theory of the bad. Rosen consistently under-
lines the negative nature of the legislator’s task: ‘To have security is to 
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be free from something, for instance invasion, illness, or interference.’77 
For Bentham, ‘The care of providing for his enjoyments ought to be left 
almost entirely to each individual; the principal function of government 
being to protect him from sufferings.’78 Similarly, in describing the max-
imum happiness under the perfection of laws, Bentham asked: ‘To what 
will the happiness arising from all this amount? It may be described as 
the absence of a certain quantity of evil. It will arise from the absence of a 
part of the different evils to which human nature is subject.’79
Such an approach opens a line of response to the criticism that utili-
tarianism’s commitment to direct maximization of happiness comes at 
the cost of a disregard for individual entitlements. Bentham’s security 
might loosely be described as liberty under law. A charge made by com-
mentators on Adam Smith is that Benthamite utilitarianism’s error lies in 
its positive pursuit of the maximum happiness, as contrasted with Smith’s 
‘negative utilitarianism’.80 In fact, Bentham and Smith entirely agree on 
the primarily negative task of law: to protect each against depredation 
by our fellows. For Bentham, offences against individuals involve dam-
age to their person, property, reputation or condition in life – that is, to 
their security. Government protects individuals ‘by creating rights which 
it confers upon individuals: rights of personal security; rights of protec-
tion for honour; rights of property; rights of receiving assistance in case 
of need’.81
Thanks to Rosen, Kelly and Dube,82 it is no longer plausible to assert 
that Bentham lacks appreciation of the value to human lives (and human 
happiness) of liberty. Bentham would agree with Sen that the ability to 
walk the streets without fear of being mugged was a good thing, and fur-
ther that ‘we are looking for effective power’, rather than direct control 
over the prevention of mugging.83 He might object to Sen’s description 
of the benefit in terms of ‘our freedom being well served’, since it is the 
coercive restraint of the mugger’s freedom that serves our security. Rosen 
provided a magisterial analysis of Bentham’s understanding of liberty, 
and of his argument that erecting political systems on the basis of a prin-
ciple of liberty was an incoherent enterprise, since liberty – that is, the 
absence of coercion – and government – that is, coercion – are mutually 
exclusive concepts.84
Sen objects to utilitarianism for its disregard of agency: ‘A person’s 
“agency freedom” refers to what a person is free to do and achieve in 
pursuit of whatever goals or values he or she regards as important.’85 The 
poverty of the exclusive utilitarian focus on welfare is allegedly revealed 
in its failure to enquire after the capability of individuals to pursue any-
thing beyond their own well-being.86 Since other goals and values matter, 
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‘neither justice, nor political or moral evaluation, can be concerned only 
with the overall opportunities and advantages of individuals in a soci-
ety’.87 For Bentham, well-being is indeed the sole ultimate end of action. 
However, the primarily negative focus of the legislator’s task accommo-
dates agency goals and values as central elements of individual security, 
provided only that their pursuit does not violate the security of others. 
If my agency goals do involve threatening that security, my agency free-
dom will rightly be restrained by coercive law. In short, for Bentham, a 
considerable degree of ‘agency freedom’ is a central element of well-be-
ing. Given the importance that he ascribed to security in all its manifesta-
tions, the Rawlsian liberties of person, expression and association would 
be guaranteed by Bentham’s codes, as would freedom of the press, a nec-
essary condition of security against misrule.
Rosen argues that security is by far the most important subordi-
nate end,88 and Bentham himself often says similar things.89 Sometimes, 
however, he accords this accolade to subsistence.90 These two primary 
subordinate ends both encompass many different functionings. Thus, 
subsistence refers not simply to the functioning of being well-nourished 
(where ‘well’ means ‘sufficient to maintain health’),91 but also – at a mini-
mum – to those of being well-housed and well-clothed. For Bentham, the 
brute fact is that most of humanity will spend their lives in a condition 
not far elevated above subsistence level:
Impossibility of raising the wages of ordinary labour beyond mere 
subsistence. The state of the poorest is an acquisition in comparison 
of the savage state, which is the natural state. Equality is procured: 
1. By raising up. 2. By pulling down. 1. Raising the bulk higher than 
they are is impossible. 2. Pulling down others is mischievous.92
Most of us will therefore never, in Aristotelian terms, be liberated from 
the kingdom of necessity. The better news for the legislator is that if s/he 
provides a conditional guarantee of subsistence to all, s/he will have bro-
ken the back of the task, because the most fruitful sources of pleasure – 
the pleasures of eating, drinking, sex and rest, and the vicarious pleasure 
of knowing those we love are enjoying such pleasures – are enjoyed by 
all whose subsistence is secure.93 Further, notwithstanding the fact that 
wealth is an all-purpose tool for acquiring instruments of pleasure, once 
subsistence is secured, wealth itself is characterized by rapidly diminish-
ing marginal utility.94
The third subordinate end, abundance, consists in the social surplus 
existing after the demands of subsistence have been satisfied. Although 
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Bentham cautions against mistaking wealth for happiness,95 abundance 
qualifies as a subordinate end by virtue of its status as the source of funds 
for the institutions necessary to maintaining security on the one hand, 
and those necessary to maintaining the conditional assurance of subsist-
ence on the other: ‘the manufactories of luxury are offices of insurance 
against want’.96
The final subordinate end, equality, enters Bentham’s theory in at 
least two ways. The first concerns the implications for the distribution of 
any good of diminishing marginal utility, which indicate that, ceteris par-
ibus, an equal distribution will maximize happiness. The second involves 
what Postema calls Bentham’s ‘individualist conception’ of happiness. The 
feelings of human beings matter because they are felt by people attempt-
ing to live their lives: ‘If these experiences are abstracted from the mean-
ing they have within the lives of individual human beings they lose utterly 
their moral significance.’97 From the legislator’s perspective, to paraphrase 
Dworkin, human lives matter, and matter equally.98 It is true that both 
abundance and equality are, for Bentham, outranked in direct competition 
with either subsistence or security. Both, however, are properly under-
stood as ends of legislation. Without abundance, there are no resources to 
meet either the demands of security or to offer security of subsistence for 
more than the shortest periods. Without an explicit recognition of equal-
ity of claim to consideration in public policy, what follows? Not only the 
likelihood of significant social conflict and consequent unhappiness, but 
the closure of the only route to generalization of moral claims. No claim to 
systematic priority for my happiness over that of others can be generalized, 
but a claim to equal priority can be. With Rosen, ‘the only interests that 
can be maximized for everyone are those that everyone shares’, hence the 
‘greatest happiness in politics and legislation effectively means the maxi-
mization of equal security to all members of society’.99
IV. Bentham and adaptation
For both Sen and Nussbaum, one major weakness of utilitarianism 
involves the way in which subjective assessments of happiness are influ-
enced (perhaps even determined) by existing social expectations of the 
sorts of lives appropriate to particular subgroups of the population:
Desires and satisfactions are highly malleable. … The poor and 
deprived frequently adjust their expectations and aspirations to 
the low level of life they have known; thus their failure to express 
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dissatisfaction can often be a sign that they really do have enough. 
This is all the more true when the deprivations in question include 
deprivation of education and other information about alternative 
ways of life.100
The limited opportunities available in many countries to women make 
it prudentially rational for them to cut their cloth in accordance with 
those limits, avoiding the pain of disappointment by adopting a sort of 
self-denying ordinance. Accepting reports of contentment from such 
groups is endorsing the perpetuation of injustice, but utilitarianism ‘is 
bound by its very commitments to an uncritical validation of the sta-
tus quo’,101 especially since consciousness-raising measures intended 
to facilitate demands for change will necessarily lead to an increase in 
dissatisfaction:
People who … become aware of the variety of human societies and 
lose the isolation of … their ‘encapsulated’ condition frequently feel 
pain: both the pain of a new dissatisfaction with current arrange-
ments and the pain of reflection itself. If one is committed to measur-
ing development in terms of utility … one will be bound to judge that 
self-understanding is inimical to development, in such cases.102
Now, Bentham was perfectly aware of the effects of lived experience 
and social referents on aspiration. In his poor law writings, he distin-
guished the category ‘Past prosperity hands’ and, in recognition of their 
habituation to comparative luxury, sought to lighten their load in the 
workhouse.103 Elsewhere, he appealed to the influence of relative depri-
vation in limiting the aspirations of the poor, thereby reducing the pains 
they might feel in comparing their life chances with those of the rich. To 
those at the bottom of the scale, its summit was too remote to be rele-
vant to their prospects: ‘So far from making these comparisons, they do 
not dream of them; they are not tormented with impossibilities.’104
Since pleasure and pain are sensations, we are each the authority 
on our own perception of them. Bentham makes the adaptation point in 
reverse in his discussion of slavery: ‘It is absurd to reason as to the happi-
ness of men, otherwise than with a reference to their own desires and feel-
ings. It is absurd to seek to prove by calculation, that a man ought to be 
happy when he finds himself miserable.’105 In relation to Nussbaum’s argu-
ment that measures to change self-perceptions of disadvantaged groups 
will increase their pain, Bentham would admit the likelihood, and agree 
that such pains, in and of themselves, count against justification of the 
 ‘THE F IRST ARTICLE TO LOOK TO IS  POWER’  131
measures, as would the pains – felt by those favoured by current ortho-
doxies  – likely to ensue from a post-consciousness-raising demand for 
reform. Pain, regardless of prejudicial origin, is pain, and as such is rele-
vant to utilitarian calculation.
However, two different (and not necessarily consistent) responses 
might be made. First, insofar as the Rosen−Kelly interpretation is cor-
rect, since Bentham is interested in distributing equally the conditions 
of happy lives (without prejudicing security), the pains reflected in a 
decrease in satisfaction levels are themselves strictly irrelevant. Further, 
if Bentham is interested in the conditions of interest-formation, as well 
as those of interest-pursuit, there may well be a case for taking educa-
tive measures to combat the self-limitation of aspiration, by increasing 
knowledge, thus reducing both ‘false-consciousness’ and ‘unconscious-
ness’, and thereby increasing power and changing inclinations.
Alternatively, if the legislator is committed to direct utility calcula-
tions, it is nevertheless incorrect to assert that s/he ‘will be bound’ there-
fore to eschew efforts to change attitudes, since, as Bentham might say, 
the calculation remains incomplete. If consciousness-raising measures 
have costs, they also have benefits – increased knowledge and self-con-
fidence, and, in time, increased happiness.106 As ever, the correct choice 
depends upon the net balance of probable pains and pleasures conse-
quent upon the choice, or, with Bentham: ‘The clear utility of the law 
will be as its abstract utility, deduction made of the dissatisfaction and 
other inconvenience occasioned by it.’107 Now, some of Bentham’s exam-
ples of variations from abstract utility that might be viewed as ‘indiffer-
ent’ – as having no net effect on happiness – are rebarbative.108 As argued 
elsewhere, given his seeming endorsement of cultural practices that, for 
men’s convenience, severely curtailed the options of women, just what it 
takes to render any practice clearly mischievous is less than clear.109 The 
point, however, is that it is wrong to conclude that Bentham must uncrit-
ically accept prevailing opinion, regardless of content. It was always a 
matter of doing the sum, and setting the benefits of a policy against the 
costs, including those of a collision with prevailing beliefs.
Where the costs of challenging adaptive preferences are high, the 
balance of utilities might forbid reform.110 However, in ‘Place and Time’, 
Bentham concluded that if popular opinion was unremittingly hostile to 
a reform that promised a clear gain in human well-being, the legislator 
must override it: ‘The welfare of all must not be sacrificed to the obstinacy 
of a few; nor the happiness of ages to the quiet of the day.’111 After all, as 
Bentham noted, the dissatisfaction consequent upon change was likely to 
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be temporary, the benefit permanent. For a legislator adopting any more 
than the shortest time horizon, the benefits had every chance of exceed-
ing the costs.
It is not the case that, for Bentham, all preferences or judgements 
of value are equally worthy of respect: ‘what matters it whether a prac-
tice be originally prevalent, or at this time prevalent, when by consider-
ations drawn from the influence of it on human feelings it can be shewn 
to be proper, indifferent or improper?’112 He notes that, ‘Every nation is 
liable to have its prejudices and its caprices, which it is the business of the 
legislator to look out for, to study, and to cure.’113 If the legislator believes 
that prevailing beliefs are mistaken, s/he has no ultimate recourse but 
to appeal to evidence. In so doing, Bentham himself recommends a cau-
tious approach, avoiding, if possible, head-on attacks on prejudice.114 
Prejudicial judgements, judgements made without evidence, are exposed 
by examination of their rationale. As Bentham noted, in admitting that 
the pain suffered by homophobes at the thought of pleasure derived from 
consensual homosexual sex acts was ‘unquestionably to be placed to the 
account of the mischief of the offence, and this is one reason for the pun-
ishing of it’, such pain might be ‘assuaged and reduced to such a meas-
ure as to be no longer painful only in bringing to view the considerations 
which shew it to be ill-grounded’.115
Since Sen concedes that individual valuations depend partly on 
social valuations, implementation of the capability approach will also 
be ‘culture-dependent, especially in the weighting of different capabili-
ties’.116 As Sumner notes, the subjectivity of cultural judgements threat-
ens to hoist the approach on an adaptation petard of its own making.117 
Sen’s resolution involves appeal to collective discussion, and collective 
political judgement. Such collective evaluation involves deliberative 
exchange of reasons in an avowedly pluralistic democratic public sphere, 
informed by plural bases of information, and modelled on Smith’s 
impartial spectator.118 Bentham would dissent from neither the demand 
for reasoned assessment, nor its location in the free exchange of opin-
ions in a democracy. Without endorsing the indictment that the cap-
ability approach legitimizes sacrificing individual preferences to socially 
imposed values,119 sympathetic commentators question the methods for 
making public judgements.120 While the early Bentham assumed that the 
motivation of political power-holders was appropriately utilitarian, the 
later radical democrat Bentham explicitly viewed the interest of the gov-
erning few as diametrically opposed to that of the governed many,121 and 
spent a decade designing an institutional blueprint capable of resolving 
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this conflict, central to which were institutions by which ‘minimal stand-
ards of representation’ and thereby ‘public reasoning and democracy’ 
might be guaranteed.122
In part, Sen’s hostility to utilitarianism is traceable to his own moral 
pluralism.123 Of course, Bentham would view the admission of value 
 pluralism as destructive of objectivity in morals, as the upshot of an unre-
flective intuitionism he called the principle of sympathy and antipathy. 
While all human experience was inescapably subjective, Bentham’s claim 
was that the principle of utility, through its connection with the real enti-
ties of pleasure and pain, offers an objective criterion for the evaluation 
of moral claims. Moral engagement on any other basis was reducible 
to the bare statement of subjective preference.124 It might be argued in 
response that moral pluralism does not of itself rule out consensus on, 
for instance, the idea that unnecessary pain is a significant harm, and 
that harm should be avoided wherever consistent with whatever balanc-
ing of plural values constitutes doing the right thing in particular cases. 
Bentham might repeat that moral pluralism cannot provide consistent, 
empirically accessible and objective decision-making criteria, but, as 
Crisp notes in a sympathetic and nuanced discussion, utilitarianism itself 
is hardly free from ad hoc judgements in calculating incommensurable 
variables, and it remains open to the pluralist ‘to appeal to the necessity 
for judgement in any reasonable form of theoretical ethics’.125
Value pluralist or not, Sen commits himself to a limited form of 
objectivity in moral evaluation. He praises Smith’s device of the impartial 
spectator for widening moral horizons by bringing reasoned assessment 
to bear on unreflective, parochial preferences. One example to which 
Sen appeals is Smith’s condemnation of the role of custom in legitimiz-
ing infanticide in ancient Greece.126 For Smith, such practices ‘shock the 
plainest principles of right and wrongʼ, and could be explained only 
by the barbarity of the times. Smith dismissed philosophical defences 
of infanticide as ‘far-fetched considerations of public utilityʼ, and con-
cluded, ‘When custom can give sanction to so dreadful a violation of 
humanity, we may well imagine that there is scarce any particular prac-
tice so gross which it cannot authorize.’127 Bentham would dissent from 
the idea that infanticide was necessarily a heinous crime, and defended 
it, particularly in circumstances of population pressure, and specifically 
on the part of unmarried mothers faced with forfeiture of reputation 
and consequent destruction of future happiness. His utilitarian ration-
ale contrasted the probable consequences to the mother of attempting to 
rear a child alone with the absence of expectation on the infant’s part or 
alarm on the part of other infants.128 For present purposes, the crux is not 
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the moral status of neonates, but the way in which Sen’s example of the 
impartial spectator perspective as the corrector of localism’s errors seems 
peculiarly ill-chosen, since the ‘enlightened’ attitude endorsed by Smith 
and Sen is itself open to criticism for its parochialism. As Singer notes, 
infanticide has been a relatively common and accepted practice across 
cultures and across history: ‘from a cross-cultural perspective it is our 
tradition  … that is unusual in its official morality about infanticide’.129 
Bentham would recognize the utility of cross-cultural comparisons in 
extending our moral horizons, but might argue that Smith’s impartial 
spectator, unless informed by the principle of utility, was likely to issue 
the wrong prescriptions.
Sen seeks a middle route between ‘the Charybdis of [objectiv-
ist] overrigidity’ and the ‘Scylla of subjectivist variability’.130 Although 
Bentham’s epistemology was subjectivist, he too sought an objective 
basis for a moral discourse conducted on the basis of empirically veri-
fiable assertions about the experience of pain or pleasure by sentient 
beings. Like Sen and Nussbaum, he recognized choice as a constitutive 
element of well-being, and would baulk only at ascribing intrinsic value 
to anything but pleasure. Like Sen and Nussbaum, Bentham was com-
mitted to widespread publicity of both public policy and its rationale. 
Sen’s reliance on public evaluation of capabilities provides some defence 
against the charge that his approach is one more variant of sympathy 
and antipathy, a bare statement of approbation coupled with a demand 
that others’ attitudes should accord with our own, and that where they 
do not, coercive public power should ensure that their behaviours at 
least do so accord. Bentham too sought to subject the exercise of pub-
lic power to continuous reflective assessment by public opinion. For 
Sen, ‘reasoned valuation’ insures the capability agenda against hijack 
by oppressive social consensus. Bentham might counter that only dis-
cussion conducted in terms of the real entities of pleasure and pain 
can offer an objective basis for rational consensus, and that, thanks to 
human idiosyncrasy, any conceivable functioning might be vital to the 
life plan of particular individuals. He might argue that the subordinate 
ends of legislation, on the one hand, and their foundation in human feel-
ings on the other, offer a simpler, more universal formula for capturing 
the essential building blocks of human welfare (or, more accurately, 
essential ramparts against human ill-fare). A final hope, the fulfilment 
of which would make Fred Rosen very happy, is that contemporary phil-
osophers might be prompted to return to the sources of classical utili-
tarianism (and to Bentham in particular), and that engagement with 
those sources in context might not only confound some preconceptions 
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but deliver additional insights. Crisp notes that while utilitarianism and 
‘reflective non-egoistic pluralism’ seem alike incapable of refuting the 
other, ‘it is not entirely vain to hope that, if we understood ourselves and 
our history much better, there would be greater agreement in ethics, nor 
for the utilitarian to believe that there would be greater convergence on 
utilitarianism itself’.131
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Jeremy Bentham and President 
Roosevelt’s Four Freedoms
Manuel Escamilla-Castillo
I
In this paper1 I want to examine and compare what seem, on the face of it 
at least, to be two very different doctrines: that enunciated by Presi dent 
Franklin D. Roosevelt in his State of the Union Address given in 1941; 
and that contained in Jeremy Bentham’s discussion of natural rights in 
his Nonsense on Stilts, written in 1791 in response to the French Decla-
ration of the Rights of Man (1789). Roosevelt’s speech has come to be 
known as the Speech of the Four Freedoms. Despite the pressures of the 
times, it looked forward to the future and set out what it took to be the 
primary objectives of the new world order that would follow the suc-
cessful ending of the Second World War. One outcome of the speech was 
the post-war concern to place human rights at the heart of the interna-
tional order. Bentham’s reflections were also responding to an event at 
the start of some 25 years of European (and often wider) warfare and 
they too looked to establish some fundamental principles for the nature 
of government in the eventual new order. Whereas Roosevelt empha-
sized freedom and rights, Bentham placed the emphasis on happiness 
and ‘securities against misrule’ and, rather than looking for the protec-
tion of rights and freedoms antecedent to government, saw the concern 
of government to pursue the secondary principles or subordinate ends 
of civil law – subsistence, abundance, equality and security – through 
which happiness would be attained. Nevertheless, as I shall argue, their 
two positions are actually closely related – not least in being influenced 
by the Founding Fathers’ recognition of the centrality of the pursuit of 
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happiness – and their comparison underlines the continuing relevance 
of Bentham’s thought, and of his understanding of happiness, to discus-
sions of the proper ends of government in the modern world.
On 6 January 1941, President Franklin D. Roosevelt fulfilled the 
constitutional requirement to deliver the State of the Union Address, a 
particularly solemn and significant moment in the political year. That 
speech came to be known as the Speech of the Four Freedoms. He began 
by referring to the international situation, a situation so extremely diffi-
cult that in his opinion he was justified in using the address to set forth 
the problems of the world and to identify solutions for them. The con-
stitutional mandate for information refers to the problems of the United 
States, not to the problems of the world. But in 1941, faced with the 
efforts of many to adhere to the traditional isolationist position of the 
United States,2 he insisted that it was undeniable that the main problem 
of the Union was the world war currently being waged. For that reason, 
the speech was dedicated to the analysis of the international situation. 
Roosevelt was in a special position. The United States was preparing itself 
to assume the role of one of the great world powers, of which there would 
be only two by the end of the war. Roosevelt was aware of this, and aware 
also that it gave him enormous responsibility. It turned him into a world 
sovereign, a ‘Legislator of the world’, to use an established expression.
The Second World War (hereafter WWII) represents, in certain 
 relevant respects, a continuation of the First World War (hereafter WWI). 
Of course, there were new major issues, of which the rise of totalitari-
anism was the most important. But, inasmuch as WWII was a continua-
tion of WWI, with both wars seeking to solve national growth problems 
through imperial expansion, to that extent, Roosevelt recognized that 
WWII could be ended and peace achieved only with a new world order in 
which empires no longer existed.
This scenario of the historical redundancy of a dominant political 
model was not new to Roosevelt. On a national scale and, of course, 
without the bloodthirsty inhumanity of WWI, the Great Depression 
that began in 1929 also required a search for new models of social and 
economic organization. The New Deal was Roosevelt’s response to that 
national and world anguish. It does not matter now whether the response 
was right or not in terms of economic efficiency or effectiveness of rights 
and freedoms.3 What remains important, for the purposes of this paper, 
is the consistency of New Deal policy with the proposals set out in the 
Four Freedoms Speech. That speech was Roosevelt’s response to a world 
that had reached, with WWII, a maximum degree of the disruption that 
had been anticipated by the Great Depression: ‘In the future days which 
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we seek to make sure, we look forward to a world founded upon four 
essential human freedoms.’4
‘The first [of the Four Freedoms] is freedom of speech and expression 
[…]’.5 For Roosevelt, a modern political order could no longer be estab-
lished on any basis other than the freedom of the person to form inde-
pendently an image of the world and to publicly express that image. Many 
fundamental questions are involved here: the sovereignty of the individual 
conscience, the appeal to the opinion of the enlightened public, a commit-
ment to the pursuit and development of objective truth and to the expres-
sion of views that lies at the heart of democracy itself, and so on. That 
freedom, as against the idea of  mere tolerance that preceded it, builds a 
deeper commitment, indeed a transcendent foundation, into the very core 
of the new world view: ‘[t]he Second is freedom of every person to wor-
ship God in his own way […]’.6 These first two freedoms are considered 
as encompassing the content of the First Amendment of the United States 
Constitution: ‘Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom 
of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, 
and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.’
Apart from the greater breadth of the First Amendment, a further 
difference between it and Roosevelt’s text is that it speaks of ‘freedoms’: 
that is to say, recourse is had to the concept of freedoms of the English 
tradition, as Edmund Burke theorized.7 Old English liberties, according 
to Burke, are something that we detect a posteriori in the evolution of 
laws and political institutions, and not as a priori fundamentals of the 
political order. Burke notes that:
Government is not made in virtue of natural rights, which may and 
do exist in total independence of it; and exist in much greater clear-
ness, and in a much greater degree of abstract perfection: but their 
abstract perfection is their practical defect. By having a right to 
every thing they want every thing. Government is a contrivance of 
human wisdom to provide for human wants. Men have a right that 
these wants should be provided for by this wisdom.8
Another important difference between the approach of the Speech and 
that of the First Amendment is that the Constitution sets out the limits 
of the government in its different branches (‘Congress shall make no 
law … ’); it does not enumerate the rights that define the government. 
The difference between the points of view in these two texts is remark-
able. The Speech lists freedoms that were to structure the world political 
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order; the First Amendment, on the other hand, supplementing the Con-
stitution, specifies restrictions on government action. In fact, the Con-
stitution of the United States, in essence, is a list of the tasks that can be 
undertaken in the country’s governance. The idea behind this approach 
was very popular at the time of the adoption of the Constitution and fea-
tured heavily in the debate between supporters of and opponents to the 
inclusion of a Bill of Rights in it. Those who proposed excluding a state-
ment of rights thought that making a list of rights meant limiting them; 
for them, citizens have all the rights, not only those that a list would con-
tain even at its widest. Government, on the other hand, in all its branches, 
would have only those possibilities of action expressly authorized by the 
Constitution, as exceptions to the general principle of omnicompetence 
of citizens.9
Despite these differences, President Roosevelt’s first two freedoms 
expressed the essential content of the First Amendment by insisting that 
a central part of the idea of  freedom, perhaps the most important part, 
is religious freedom and freedom of expression. The other two freedoms 
he lists present a different set of problems. They are freedom from fear 
and freedom from want. From the theoretical point of view, the main 
difficulty of these two freedoms is precisely that their definition as liber-
ties clearly exceeds the traditional negative definition of freedom, which 
characterizes it as an absence of coercion and situates it in the relational 
sphere: I am free as long as no one else hinders my capacity for action. 
It is important to clarify whether President Roosevelt’s Four Freedoms 
really refer to freedom or if Roosevelt was using the prestige and the pop-
ular acceptance of the word ‘freedom’ to introduce political objectives 
other than freedom – or perhaps even contrary to it. This would be the 
case if the use of the word ‘freedom’ by Roosevelt in ‘freedom from fear’ 
and ‘freedom from want’ could be said to be what have been called the 
rhetorical (or poetic) uses of freedom – usage that links freedom, which 
is a moral notion, to the physical realm. It is a use of the term that is 
connected with the idea, which Isaiah Berlin subsequently developed, 
of ‘positive liberty’. According to this idea, the achievement of freedom 
depends not just on others not acting to restrain human behaviour (neg-
ative liberty), but requires that they contribute with their own actions 
to the personal achievements of those who claim freedom. Proponents 
of negative liberty hold that many of the confusions of political theory 
in relation to freedom derive from this essentially improper use of lan-
guage. In fact, it is a matter of introducing the idea of  freedom into the 
field of an antonym, necessity, to which Edmund Burke refers in the 
passage quoted above. Thus, if Roosevelt’s last two freedoms are to be 
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understood in terms of Berlin’s notion of positive freedom, we would 
have to conclude that the president had introduced himself into a land 
very different from that of freedom. This is most clearly so in the case of 
freedom from want, since this refers to the satisfaction of basic needs. In 
the case of freedom from fear, the question is more complex, as we shall 
see in relation to Bentham’s theory.
Another interpretation might be to understand these last two free-
doms in terms of the capabilities approach of Amartya Sen. Effectively, 
Sen develops another sense of freedom, building on what John Rawls 
calls ‘primary goods’, by speaking of freedom as capacity. This refines 
the concept of positive freedom: ‘Capability is, thus, a set of vectors of 
functioning, reflecting the person’s freedom to lead one type of life or 
another.’10 Sen thus places himself within the limits of the concept of 
freedom. He himself admits as much by including his discussion of free-
dom as a capacity within a work dedicated to the discussion on equality. 
Moreover, Sen explicitly refers to the second pair of freedoms identified 
by Roosevelt: ‘Freedom from want, which, translated into world terms, 
means economic understandings which will secure to every nation a 
healthy peacetime life for its inhabitants’;11 freedom from fear, ‘which, 
translated into world terms, means a world-wide reduction of armaments 
to such a point and in such a thorough fashion that no nation will be in a 
position to commit an act of physical aggression against any neighbor’.12 
If these two freedoms are understood, as Sen proposes, as distinct dimen-
sions of freedom, then Roosevelt’s proposal would be coherent and could 
not be interpreted as an attempt to introduce political objectives unre-
lated to the logic of rights under the pretext of defending freedom.
Understanding freedom as a capability allows us to redirect the idea 
of  positive freedom in a way that is not contrary to that of negative free-
dom. This means that when Roosevelt speaks of Four Freedoms, he is not 
making a mistake (as would be the case if we accepted that his last two 
freedoms leave the real sphere of freedom to enter into that of necessity), 
but he continues to talk about freedom in its proper sense. Moreover, 
understanding freedom as capability allows us not to be confined to the 
merely negative aspect of freedom, while avoiding the self-contradiction 
that occurs when freedom is extended to include necessity. Sen seeks to 
escape from the old opposition between formal and material freedom 
by claiming the material bases that he considers indispensable for the 
deployment of capabilities as components of freedom. In conclusion, if 
Sen’s proposal is accepted, we should conclude that Roosevelt was talk-
ing all the time just about freedom, not about freedom and necessity.
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Roosevelt’s explanations of these last two freedoms can be summed 
up in the value and purpose of a healthy peace, in the case of freedom 
from want, and in a peace in its original sense of the absence of war, in 
freedom from fear. The Address is thus situated on a clearly rhetorical 
ground, which was necessitated by the two major crises facing the presi-
dency of Roosevelt, the Great Depression and WWII. Sen states:
[This] language is not aberrant here. It fits into a broad general con-
cept of freedom, rather than having to be seen as invoking some 
peculiarly remote idea of freedom.
That is, Roosevelt is talking about freedom:
Freedom as a value demands that certain things be considered seri-
ously for that reason (whether or not it is valued for any other rea-
son as well). The notion of freedom as effective power to achieve 
what one would choose is an important part of the general idea of 
freedom.13
There is a third way of understanding freedom that is different from the 
two we have just considered, negative freedom and positive freedom. 
We can find this in Wilhelm von Humboldt’s theory, especially in The 
Sphere and Duties of Government, which conceptualizes modern freedom 
as a manifestation and, at the same time, an expression of individual-
ity, which means that freedom must lead to diversity and to variety in 
its forms.14 That diversity is positive. Nothing is more beautiful than the 
multiplicity of existence produced by the joint action of freedom and 
individuality. The multiplicity of existence constitutes the fullness of the 
human being, which is the person’s vocation. It is the enthusiastic exal-
tation of individual freedom characteristic of romanticism, which Hum-
boldt already anticipates:
The true end of Man (…), is the highest and most harmonious 
development of his powers to a complete and consistent whole. 
Freedom is the grand and indispensable condition which the pos-
sibility of such a development presupposes; but there is besides 
another essential, – intimately connected with freedom, it is true – 
a variety of situations. Even the most free and self-reliant of men is 
thwarted and hindered in his development by uniformity of posi-
tion. But as it is evident, on the one hand, that such a diversity is a 
constant result of freedom, and on the other, that there is a species 
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of oppression which, without imposing restrictions on man himself, 
gives a peculiar impress of its own to surrounding circumstances; 
these two conditions, of freedom and variety of situation, may be 
regarded, in a certain sense, as one and the same.15
One might think that this development of the powers of the human being 
to which Humboldt refers is an idea close to the capacities of which 
Amartya Sen speaks. But there is a very notable difference – in Hum-
boldt’s insistence that the development of human power is possible only 
on the condition that state intervention in this field is reduced as much 
as possible. For Humboldt, state intervention could take place only at the 
expense of a huge, uniform impoverishment of the human:
(…) whatever kind of obstacles the state proposes to remove – in 
the name of social justice and equality of opportunity – interven-
tion would always be unacceptable because, far from creating bet-
ter conditions so that all individuals can make use of their freedom 
of choice, such a state in fact lowers for everybody the possibilities 
of a self-chosen, self-created life (…).
The dominant reason why the state is not to be entrusted with 
the task of creating conditions of fairness for all, is a strong dislike 
of all attempts to put general principles into practice by political and 
administrative means. And this aversion is characteristic of a liberal 
disposition for which diversity is the corollary of individual liberty.16
According to Humboldt’s approach, then, freedom is the starting point 
of modern society, because it is integral to the very existence of the indi-
vidual human subject, and is also the sine qua non requirement for the 
full development of human possibilities and potential, and that will lead 
to the multiplicity of human ways of living, in the same way that the 
free expansion of life has led to the variety of plant and animal species. 
Variety is wealth; uniformity is impoverishment. Public action, being 
unavoidably uniform, frustrates the humanizing action of freedom. The 
versions of freedom proposed by Berlin and Sen, while plausible, provide 
a slide of meaning towards a version of freedom that calls for state inter-
vention, with coercive action that enforces social cooperation, instead of 
letting this cooperation be produced spontaneously, through voluntary 
agreements.
Humboldt returns us to the original meaning of freedom and allows 
us to understand why the freedom of religious beliefs and the manifes-
tation of those beliefs through worship is valuable. Freedom is valuable 
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because it allows variety. Variety, in turn, is valuable because it is the only 
way to approach the truth, a truth that will show itself in that variety or, 
at least, that will separate us from error. Berlin and Sen’s proposals on 
freedom, by broadening their scope, permit Roosevelt’s Four Freedoms to 
be considered homogeneous. But they are not. To the extent that the first 
two freedoms of President Roosevelt do not rely on state intervention to 
produce the freedom of individuals, they are also a coherent expression 
of Humboldt’s vision of freedom as a condition and incentive of individ-
ual self-development.17 Something different, however, happens with the 
last two freedoms of President Roosevelt, who thinks of them as correct 
expressions of freedom.
Roosevelt, faced with the two serious crises that shaped his man-
date, was trying to find a way towards the establishment of a lasting 
world order. He speaks of the fact that these freedoms constitute human 
rights (‘Freedom means the supremacy of human rights everywhere’) 
and he insists every time that the Four Freedoms are explained that they 
were to be in force ‘anywhere in the world’.18 Certainly, this recurring 
expression seeks a rhetorical effect, but it also affirms that isolationism 
was no longer possible in the world.
The durability and universality of the Four Freedoms became 
apparent when, in his State of the Union Address of 11 January 1944, 
Roosevelt announced a Second Bill of Rights.19 According to the presi-
dent, the Bill of Rights had dealt only with ‘political rights’, which guar-
anteed life and liberty, but the text of the Declaration of Independence, 
passed in 1776, further stated that the purpose of governments (which 
was the only thing that would keep them in power against the right of the 
people to change or abolish them otherwise) was the guarantee of these 
rights to life and freedom, and also to one more thing:
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that  all men are created 
equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain 
un alienable Rights, that among these are  Life, Liberty and the 
Pursuit of Happiness.
The history of happiness as a political objective goes back to the Pla-
tonic (or Socratic) concept of eudaemonia, and already in Aristotle this 
is presented not only as linked to the inner world (virtue and wisdom), 
but also to the possession of goods, whether immaterial (friendship) or 
material (wealth). In the context of the Declaration of Independence, the 
immediate antecedents of this idea are those natural rights enumerated 
by John Locke: life, liberty and goods. The pursuit of happiness would 
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replace property in the Lockean trio. All of this enables the notion of 
the ‘pursuit of happiness’ to be included (it is not a right to happiness, 
which would be something more definite). Moreover, that objective gives 
a material basis for the ends of government, as President Roosevelt does 
when he concretizes the objectives that the government must guarantee 
for the fulfilment of its duty to allow the pursuit of happiness in useful 
and remunerated work; a sufficient profit, also in the case of farmers; a 
free market, without unfair competition or monopolies; decent housing; 
the right to medical assistance and health; adequate social security, and 
good education.20
The foundation for the rights set out in the Second Bill of Rights 
proposed in Roosevelt’s 1944 speech is that the pursuit of happiness 
must be equal. And the scriptural authority for that can be found in the 
Declaration of Independence, which insisted that ‘all men are created 
equal’, and claimed the right to life, liberty and ‘the right to “Pursuit of 
Happiness”’.
By 1944, the United States was already fully involved in the two 
great arenas of WWII, the Euro-African and the Pacific, and it represented 
the only world leadership that could rival the Soviet Union. This global 
role was to be strengthened through India being granted independence 
from the British Empire and the subsequent decolonization, first in the 
Muslim countries of North Africa and the Middle East, and later in the 
rest of Africa and Asia. With the Four Freedoms Speech and the subse-
quent Atlantic Charter, in which Roosevelt and British premier Winston 
Churchill agreed that the principles set out there would be the founda-
tion of post-war world order, the Second Bill of Rights was also destined 
to have a planetary reach.
F. D. Roosevelt did not live to see the promised land of victory over 
the Axis, but his objectives for world peace were embodied in a series 
of institutions and norms, such as the institution of the United Nations, 
and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (hereafter UDHR). The 
draft of this Declaration, which was approved by United Nations General 
Assembly Resolution 217 A (III) on 10 December 1948, was written by an 
international committee in which the French René Cassin and American 
Eleanor Roosevelt, widow of the president, played a leading role.21 
They ensured that the formal and material features of the Universal 
Declaration would reflect the rights contained in the Declaration of 
Independence, the Constitution and the Bill of Rights, as well as in the 
French model of the Declaration of Rights of Man and the Citizen. Two 
further decisive components were the Four Freedoms and the conse-
quent proposal of a Second Bill of Rights. Thus, while articles 1 to 21 
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of UDHR develop the content of the First Bill of Rights, those from 22 
to 29 do so with the second. In this way, the Preamble to the Universal 
Declaration proclaims the aspiration to ‘the advent of a world in which 
human beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and belief and freedom from 
fear and want’.22 The influence of this vision of two Bills of Rights would 
then be transferred to the two Covenants approved by the United Nations 
in 1966, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 
and the  International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (ICESCR). The Preamble to the ICESCR states: ‘Recognizing that, 
in accordance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the ideal 
of free human beings enjoying freedom from fear and want can only be 
achieved if conditions are created whereby everyone may enjoy his eco-
nomic, social and cultural rights, as well as his civil and political rights’.23 
The whole development of human rights, both at the level of inter-
national treaties and that of the constitutions of democratic countries, 
has subsequently followed this dual structure.
The traditional interpretation of this dual structure of human rights 
sees it as a reflection of the partition of the world after WWII into a Western 
and a communist bloc. But we may also understand the inter national 
development of human rights following WWII as intended to consolidate 
the social-democratic political-economic model as a distinctive product 
of American liberalism, though on the basis of other  previous theoreti-
cal and practical developments.24 F. A. Hayek was already able to argue 
in The Road to Serfdom, written in the Cambridge exile of the London 
School of Economics during WWII, that the rule of social-democracy 
was undisputed in Western political practice, dedicating his book ‘To the 
socialists of all parties’.25
II
One of the hallmarks of Jeremy Bentham’s theory was his hostility to the 
notion of natural rights, which is what human rights were called in his 
time. He was against not only the idea itself, but equally the practical 
application that was made of it in the two great revolutionary moments 
of the eighteenth century, the American and the French revolutions. The 
basis of Bentham’s hostility to the idea of natural rights was that they 
are grounded on a ‘fantastic’ or ‘capricious’ principle, the principle of 
 sympathy and antipathy, which is the principle most opposed to utili-
tarianism.26 The two other reasons why Bentham thought natural rights 
unacceptable were that they are ‘anarchical fallacies’ and ‘nonsense upon 
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stilts’.27 They are anarchical fallacies because they are lies elaborated for 
the purpose of deceiving; where that deceit produces, in addition, an 
anarchic effect. They are lies because, for Bentham, they only become 
rights when they are embodied in law.28 ‘Natural’ rights, i.e. rights that 
would exist in nature, outside the law or before it, could not be such 
rights; hence the lie. Such lies as natural rights engender anarchy in 
society by seeming to make the validity of legal rules dependent on their 
conformity with these prior propositions. In extreme positions, as with 
the American and French revolutions, they can lead to the overthrow of 
government and to civil war. They are ‘nonsense upon stilts’ because they 
are fictional entities that are placed on a pedestal, so that everyone looks 
at them in amazement without wondering if there is any solid under-
pinning: ‘Natural rights is simple nonsense: natural and imprescriptible 
rights, rhetorical nonsense, nonsense upon stilts.’29 Bentham’s criticism 
of the idea of natural rights marks the beginning of their decline in the 
field of law and politics. During the rest of the nineteenth century and 
the first half of the twentieth century, the idea of natural rights disap-
pears from political and legal theory and practice until they were revived, 
under the name of ‘human rights’, in the Universal Declaration of 1948.30
When Bentham developed his constitutional theory, in the 
Constitutional Code, he proposed replacing ‘natural rights’ with the 
expression ‘securities against misrule’, guarantees against bad govern-
ment.31 If we were to apply Bentham’s proposals to the Four Freedoms, 
they would be considered not, as President Roosevelt saw them, as a 
prior matter in respect of legislative action, but rather as the telos or 
consequence of that action. They would be a device implemented in the 
laws, and a result directed to prevent rulers from abusing their power by 
betraying the interests of the governed, interests that would be indirectly 
confirmed and protected by the content of those guarantees. Legislation 
would concern itself not with antecedent liberties or rights, which rulers 
must approve or that policies should promote, but with setting responsi-
bilities, and imposing penalties in their case; and this, ex post facto, which 
is the normal way in which the law acts, as an instrument of political 
action that is orientated to freedom. From another point of view, using 
the concept of securities instead of the concept of freedoms, we have an 
indisputable concrete reference, rather than appealing to metaphysical 
notions (nature, reason), or to historical conceptions of metaphysical 
notions (nature of things), or to other contentious notions. Written, fixed 
and empirically verifiable texts are the sole basis for people’s claims. In 
fact, over time, Bentham relaxed the initial rigidity of his stance and 
admitted the usefulness of a solemn political statement of objectives, 
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although he continued to insist that this should be expressed in guaran-
tees rather than by rights. On the occasion of his attempt to promulgate 
the Constitution he had drafted for Tripoli, he even proposed that the 
Pasha address the people by stating that the Prophet Muhammad had in 
an apparition ordered him to carry out his political reforms.32
Bentham’s critique of natural rights was central to his theory, but to 
capture the difference between Bentham’s and Roosevelt’s proposals, it is 
more useful to focus on the development by the former of what he called 
secondary principles, or the subordinate ends of the civil law. As we have 
seen, Bentham’s political-legal proposal is based not on principles or 
rights but on ends or teleology. The ruler is not to guarantee rights, but 
to achieve certain goals. We are thus brought into the field of what Burke 
had called ‘needs’. The justification of the institution of the government 
of some people over others is, from this point of view, that it is necessary 
to satisfy human needs. For Bentham, the ruler and the law (which is 
the instrument and at the same time the creator of the ruler), if they are 
to be as they should be, must satisfy the needs of citizens (or subjects, 
as the case may be), enabling them to achieve happiness. Taking into 
account the variety of human aspirations, one must understand ‘happi-
ness’ in an abstract, broad sense. For that very reason, the Declaration of 
Independence does not speak of the attainment of happiness, but of the 
pursuit of happiness. The question, then, is of what the ruler should do 
for the happiness of citizens.
For Bentham, he must act by means of law: by means of criminal 
law, to prevent or reduce violations of citizens’ rights; by civil law, so that 
citizens get the goods to which they aspire (satisfy their needs). The main 
purpose of civil law, in this way, is happiness. The guide to happiness 
is found in the four secondary ends: subsistence, abundance, equality, 
security.33
Bentham's secondary principles are set out in this way because, 
according to him, that is the logical order. The first duty of a government 
is to assure the existence of the essential goods for the life of the people, 
for one can hardly be happy without the very means of mere subsistence: 
food, shelter, clothing, etc. People are happier if they are not limited to 
having just what is strictly necessary, but instead have such goods in 
abundance and variety. By applying the principle of decreasing marginal 
utility, an optimal level of happiness is achieved, once the abundance of 
material goods is obtained, provided that these goods are distributed in 
conditions of equality among the population. Finally, when all this was 
achieved, Bentham thought that people would be happier if they could 
possess and dispose of all of those goods with security.
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Although that is the logical order of secondary principles, accord-
ing to Bentham, he thinks that it is necessary to take into account – for 
the ordering of these principles, in addition to logical-formal consid-
erations  – other factors of a pragmatic nature: mainly, what the ruler 
should do to achieve those ends. The collection and supply of the neces-
sary goods to ensure the subsistence of the population (not to mention 
abundance) depends on the effort of the people in their production. Only 
by striving as much as possible to assure people of the enjoyment of the 
product of their efforts is there a way to obtain what is necessary and con-
venient for life. The Hobbesian background of Bentham’s theory arises 
powerfully in this theme.
For Bentham, freedom and security are deeply and reciprocally 
involved. You are free only to the extent that the fear of being extorted 
by anyone stronger than you is absent. Where there is no security, there 
is no freedom, only the law of the strongest. Even a tyrant is preferable 
to misrule. In a situation of anarchy, everybody is subjected to a max-
imal despotism, more fearsome than any tyranny. In fact, government 
is necessarily exercised by restricting freedom. To speak of ‘freedom’ as 
the end of government is to use misleading language. It is better to make 
clear that the end of government and law is security, rather than free-
dom. Freedom for Bentham is nothing more than a ‘branch’ of security, a 
goal subordinated to it.
Security acts both in the political sphere, in a broad sense, by the 
elimination of violence, and also in the specifically legal meaning of the 
guaranty of expectations. Bentham talks of the frustration of expecta-
tions as a great evil that would subtract from any act all the good that 
is expected from it. Moreover, a frustrated rational expectation would 
mean not only the loss of the expected good but would bring the added 
harm of a frustrated hope. He speaks in this sense of the ‘disappoint-
ment-preventing principle’. In legal theory, this set of considerations 
traditionally receives the denomination of ‘legal certainty’. In Bentham's 
theory, it is the second great set of reasons that supports the thesis of the 
understanding of freedom as well-understood security.
It should be remembered that this security encompassing freedom 
occupies the last place in Bentham’s logical ordering of what he calls sec-
ondary principles to the primary principle of the greatest happiness. It 
is Bentham himself who clarifies that, if pragmatic considerations were 
taken into account, this order of priority must be altered so as to obtain the 
end of the greatest happiness. Without security, the production of goods 
in such a quantity as to ensure subsistence could not be expected, let alone 
abundance, thus security becomes the first of the secondary principles:
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Security was associated with having enough subsistence for the 
present and future and was even associated with equality in so far 
as a more equal society was also more likely to respect the rules of 
property and protect individuals from harm. But security was par-
ticularly related to law and to that law that protected the individual’s 
person and property from attack by others and by government itself. 
The enforcement of the law via the courts achieved the former and 
a system of representative democracy (based on the secret ballot, 
frequent elections, and numerous checks on the abuse of power) 
provided security against the latter.34
The other secondary principles – subsistence, abundance and  equality – 
should be considered exactly in this order and insofar as they do not 
interfere with the achievement of security; otherwise, inconsistency 
would be the result: subsistence or equality must be obtained without 
sacrificing security, because this is the unique basis of them. In any event, 
in no circumstances should these secondary purposes be understood as 
rights other than legal rights; not even as moral rights:
But why did Bentham still deny from this perspective that a moral 
right to security could exist? He did so because society cannot rec-
oncile disparate claims to various rights from the point of view of 
the individual. The whole point of the utility principle is to provide 
an external standard with which individual claims can be recon-
ciled. Absolute claims to rights prevent this very reconciliation.35
III
Few things might seem so opposed as President Roosevelt’s Four Free-
doms and Bentham’s secondary principles. But, after careful consider-
ation, there are numerous coincidences that must be emphasized. The 
starting point in both is a reflection on the reciprocal entailment of free-
dom and security. In the case of Bentham, general, indeterminate free-
dom is a branch of security; in that of Roosevelt, the essential freedom 
is freedom of religion and freedom of expression, corresponding with 
the American tradition. Bentham and Roosevelt both warn that equal-
ity in the pursuit of happiness could not be guaranteed even if, as Toc-
queville pointed out, equality is a central value in democratic society.36 As 
a means to happiness (perhaps as happiness itself), Roosevelt’s ‘freedom’ 
from fear and necessity and Bentham’s security that allows subsistence 
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and abundance are essentially the same. Finally, both are trying to define 
the lines of action to be followed by rulers around the world.
Talking now of differences, we must point out the conceptual and 
logical rigour of Bentham contrasted with the imprecision and rhetoric 
of Roosevelt’s use of the term ‘freedoms’, as already mentioned, which 
makes it difficult to know precisely where he is situated and the conse-
quences of achieving or failing the objectives. Are these rights moral, 
political or legal? Above all, are the Four Freedoms principles or starting 
points for political action where non-compliance would cancel the legit-
imacy of the process? In the case of Bentham’s principles, in spite of the 
name, these are aims and objectives that must be calculated by the effect-
iveness of the measures adopted, without leaving sharp disqualifications 
except in extreme cases. It is an appeal to rationality, to complex analy-
sis, to pondering. In the case of the Four Freedoms, the speech is strict, 
without chiaroscuro. It is true that the times of the Great Depression and, 
later, of WWII, were enormously difficult. But the times in which Jeremy 
Bentham lived were also not easy, although there was a clear horizon and 
confidence in progress. Still, in 1944, or in 1948, when the UDHR was 
approved, the future was uncertain.
The great difference between the two interventions is undoubt-
edly the recipe to remedy the shortcomings and to meet people’s needs. 
The remedy is wealth, of course. The question is where that wealth 
comes from and how it can be increased and made more available. For 
Roosevelt, and the social-democratic tendency he advocated, there were 
two major phases about wealth to take into account, phases that are 
mutually independent: their production and distribution. Both require 
governing decisions on the part of authority. And that is what Roosevelt 
did; he established a centralized political direction of the economy, of 
production and of distribution of wealth. It seemed to be the best idea at 
a time of serious crisis. But it was an emergency solution, which soon ran 
out. The formula that was put to work to reverse the Great Depression 
was running low when the even more serious crisis of war fuelled a new 
start-up of the productive energies of the United States and also of many 
countries not directly involved in the conflict. Before this last answer to 
the crisis was exhausted, the peace model was advocated, although it 
would reveal itself as a precarious peace.
For peace, Bentham's proposal seems to be better adapted: if we 
think that everyone is the best judge of his/her own interests and that the 
production of wealth is not watertight with respect to distribution, then 
freedom and security mark the secure path to wealth and to the remedy 
for necessity.
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In the post-WWII world, we have been encumbered with a political 
rhetoric about rights and freedom that is rarely capable of addressing the 
ordering of priorities and the distribution of aid and support in regions 
less wealthy than the West. But in thinking about those priorities, and in 
taking seriously the obstacles that exist to the realization of happiness 
in the world, we might find Bentham a more useful tool, even if we fly 
under the flag of the rhetoric of human rights formulated as ambiguously 
as Roosevelt did.
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James Mill on Happiness
Antis Loizides
James Mill (1773–1836) was the father of John Stuart Mill (1806–1873) 
and close collaborator of Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832). He was respon-
sible for the education of the former and the propagation of the philoso-
phy of the latter. These two sets of facts account for most of the interest in 
the elder Mill’s works. They are also widely taken to sum up most of what 
is interesting in them. The truth of the first statement is undeniable; but, 
as I hope to show in this chapter, the truth of the second does not have to 
be. Typical as introducing an essay on Mill with reference to his son and 
Bentham may be, I argue that the elder Mill’s conception of happiness 
was not typically Benthamic.
It is well known that, for James Mill, all the elements of happiness 
can be reduced to the simple sensations of pleasure and pain. Such a 
conception of happiness situates him squarely in the modern Epicurean 
tradition. Yet, on a number of occasions, he seemed to make a different 
kind of claim: that happiness involves the pursuit of what one ‘deliber-
ately approves’. Did he mean it when he pointed out that ideas of (future) 
pleasures – desires – ‘are to be subjected to the sceptre of reason’? The 
view that a pleasure must be approved by reason – ‘as a scene of trial’ – 
was Stoic, not Epicurean. In this chapter, I argue that the tension between 
such hetero geneous elements is more apparent than real: for Mill, the 
happy life is one in the service of the common good. To substantiate 
this claim, I bring to the fore the underlying conception of happiness in 
his arguments in the debates on the education of the poor in the 1810s 
and parliamentary reform in the 1820s. During these two decades, Mill 
clearly developed a Benthamic argument for social, educational and 
political reform. Taking the cue from his classical interests, I try to show 
that he threw something distinctive into the mix. James Mill was more 
than just Jeremy Bentham’s lieutenant and John Stuart Mill’s father.
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James Mill on happiness is a challenging subject – for a number of 
reasons. He was the author of The History of British India (1817), Elements 
of Political Economy (1821), Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind 
(1829) and Fragment on Mackintosh (1835). Between 1806 and 1836, he 
wrote more than 150 articles in various periodicals and contributed a 
dozen essays to the Supplement to the Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Editions of 
the Encyclopaedia Britannica (1824). Prior to those, he made countless 
contributions to the Literary Journal and St. James’s Chronicle, on both 
of which he served as editor between 1802 and 1806, as well as editing 
and translating an award-winning French essay in 1805. Never did he 
write an essay on what makes for a happy life, alas. Moreover, those who 
are familiar with his son’s Autobiography (1873) may recall John Stuart’s 
remark that his father had ‘scarcely any belief in pleasure’. Still, as the 
younger Mill noted, though his father’s personal outlook was rather 
Cynic and Stoic, ‘[h]is standard of morals was Epicurean, inasmuch as it 
was utilitarian’.1 Curious as it may be, this synthesis of philosophic ele-
ments does justice to his life-long interest in the classics, nonetheless.
Should one decide to look past John Stuart’s indictment of his 
father’s educational regimen and the famous critique of James Mill’s 
utilitarian logic and politics by Thomas Babington Macaulay (1800-
1859), there is still much need for reconstruction in attempting to 
extract a notion of happiness from the elder Mill’s works. Mill’s books, 
articles and essays were written for different purposes and under widely 
different circumstances. Not only did he rely on his journalistic activi-
ties, especially between 1802 and 1819, for his livelihood, but Mill was 
engaged in a number of debates throughout his career: writing on edu-
cation, for example, he took the side of Joseph Lancaster over Andrew 
Bell; writing on India, he fought hard against the Orientalists; discuss-
ing good government, he wrote against both Tories and Whigs; he wrote 
on the side of associationist psychology, not ‘innate-principle metaphys-
ics’;2 and he wrote a long, vitriolic book defending Hobbes, Bentham and 
himself against the common-sense philosophy of James Mackintosh.
A question thus immediately presents itself: since a selection of the 
sources for the reconstruction is inevitable, what principle should guide 
it? The methodologically sound thing to do would be to focus on the 
debates themselves. It is reasonable to wonder whether there is a point 
in trying to bring statements on happiness together uttered with differ-
ent aims in mind. The customary response to such concerns is simply to 
ignore them: Mill’s contributions to all of the aforementioned debates 
are traditionally read through Bentham. As the story goes, Mill parroted 
Bentham, with the addition of a deductive, rationalistic, dogmatic and, 
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simply, too serious frame of mind. Viewing Mill as merely the militant 
Benthamite, Leslie Stephen (1900) and Élie Halévy (1904) argued 
that there was an underlying unity in Mill’s diverse aims: to propagate 
Benthamite utilitarianism. Mill stopped short of anything original and 
advanced little, if at all, beyond Bentham. This estimate has been proved 
double-edged: if we can make sense of Mill’s chaotic writing by postu-
lating a relentless resolve to preach Bentham’s gospel, why bother with 
him at all? Why not go directly to the master himself? Accordingly, only a 
handful of scholars have seriously studied James Mill’s works.
How does one go about addressing these issues? First, paying 
close attention to Mill’s background, Terence Ball and Robert Fenn have 
dealt with the caricature of Mill as Bentham’s mouthpiece decisively.3 
Any reconstruction and any interpretation of Mill’s thought must begin 
with his Scottish education, particularly his extraordinary classical 
training. His Commonplace Books showcase an extensive ancient Greek 
and Roman reading.4 Philosophers, orators, poets and historians such 
as Plato, Aristotle, Isocrates, Demosthenes, Herodotus, Thucydides, 
Xenophon and Diogenes Laërtius, as well as Cicero, Seneca, Quintilian, 
Tacitus, Livy, Pliny and Virgil, parade through the massive manuscript 
material.5 Plato’s Socrates appears in these pages more frequently than 
William Paley, or David Hume and Adam Smith. Plato’s and Aristotle’s 
works, combined, appear as frequently as Jeremy Bentham’s.
Second, most of Mill’s utterances on happiness had two related 
aspects: personal cultivation and public usefulness. Both his numerous 
contributions on education – either to the Lancaster–Bell controversy 
(see below) or the debate on the philosophical (and psychological) foun-
dation of education – and his essays arguing for parliamentary reform 
deserve full treatment; here I try to sketch a conception of happiness per-
vading these two sets of writings. In short, Mill argued that education 
was good to the extent that it associated the ‘grand purposes’ of life with 
pleasure; education produced those feelings, thoughts and actions that 
enabled a person to pursue her/his own happiness and the happiness of 
others. According to Mill, true public spirit, that is, ‘a habitual and gen-
erous concern for the good of mankind’, is the ‘finest and rarest of all the 
fruits of cultivation’.6 A cultivated person, as much as a civilized society, 
Mill believed, acts to promote social happiness.
Third, for Mill, all of the elements of happiness can be reduced to 
the simple sensations of pleasure and pain. This well-known ‘humble’ 
sense of happiness situates Mill squarely in the Epicurean tradition – a 
tradition that, according to Frederick Rosen (2003), included David 
Hume, Adam Smith and Jeremy Bentham, among others. However, as I 
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aim to show, the fuller picture is more complicated than that. According 
to Mill: (a) happiness consisted in pleasure and the absence of pain; (b) 
intellectual pleasures had much higher value than corporeal pleasures; 
(c) desires – roughly, for Mill, ideas of (future) pleasures – were ‘to be 
subjected to the sceptre of reason’; (d) happiness involved the pursuit of 
what one ‘deliberately approves’; and (e) one’s happiness involved the 
pursuit of others’ happiness. The Epicurean pedigree of Mill’s conception 
is called into question when we try to make sense of the fourth claim – 
happiness as the pursuit of what one ‘deliberately approves’ – in light of 
the third claim – ideas of pleasure are ‘to be subjected to the sceptre of 
reason’. The view that an idea of a pleasure must be first approved by 
reason was Stoic in origin. But there is a second complication for Mill’s 
conception of happiness when one understands claim (e) to mean a life 
of reason, activity and sacrifice, if need may be, in service of the greater 
good – a position more akin to a particular brand of Stoicism than the 
standard view of Epicureanism.
Here, I try to show that the contradiction that a mélange of such 
heterogeneous ideas might suggest, as regards the role of reason, desire 
and pleasure in Mill’s theory, is more apparent than real. First, I present 
Mill’s exposure to the classical tradition in the late eighteenth century, 
especially its relation to the vita activa. Second, I turn to the constituents 
of individual happiness as suggested in his educational tracts; and third, 
I focus on the constituents of social happiness as suggested in his parlia-
mentary reform tracts. In Mill’s works, the principle of utility becomes 
the keystone of the arch, keeping one’s duties in proper order, leading 
one to pursue the higher rather than the lower good.
I
It is no secret that James Mill loved the classics. In his obituary of Mill 
in The Morning Chronicle in June 1836, John Black recorded that he had 
heard Mill ‘speak with great warmth of the impression which the writ-
ings of Plato made on his youth’; leading him to ‘regulate his conduct 
strictly according to an elevated ethical standard’.7 Mill’s fascination 
with the classics began at Montrose Academy in the 1780s; it remained 
strong throughout his life. He must have raised some eyebrows at the 
university library when, as a second-year divinity student, he added Plato 
to an already unusual reading list. Unsurprisingly in 1818, prior to his 
employment at the East India Company, Mill contemplated putting him-
self up for the Greek Chair at Glasgow.8 But there is no clearer testimony 
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of what Mill thought about the worth of classics than the education of 
John  Stuart Mill.
In his Autobiography, the younger Mill testified of his father’s debt 
to Plato for his ‘mental culture’. For John Stuart, both he and his father 
were Plato’s students ‘cast in the mould of his dialectics’.9 According to 
James Mill, Socrates never asserted an opinion himself, but always strove 
to reveal the limitations of popular beliefs. Mill, as with many others, 
accepted Cicero’s verdict that Socrates ‘brought philosophy down from 
heaven to earth’, with the discovery of the rules and motives of good 
conduct contributing more than anything to ‘advancement in life’. Mill 
seemed to believe that it was only through Plato’s method that the rules 
and motives of good conduct could be discovered: Plato’s dialectics 
deconstructed traditional modes of thinking and allowed philosophical 
enquiries by supposing nothing in advance. Plato’s ingenious and elo-
quent dialogues, according to Mill, were most appropriate for ‘sharpen-
ing’ the ‘ingenuity of youth’ and ‘engendering’ ‘the love of science and of 
virtue’. Such an attitude towards Plato was filtered through Cicero, who 
was an authority ‘sufficient to confirm [Mill’s] opinion respecting the 
writings of Plato’. Mill’s acceptance of Cicero as an Academic led to a pro-
jection of that scepticism to Plato’s dialogues; as Mill denied the possi-
bility of Platonic dogmatism, the dialectic method itself was Plato’s most 
valuable contribution. This reading of Plato’s dialogues, which proved to 
be quite influential on John Stuart Mill,10 was not standard. James Mill’s 
veneration for Cicero, in contrast, was.
Alexander Bain speculated that Mill remained six or seven years at 
Montrose Academy; his unusually long training at one of the few gram-
mar schools in Scotland probably amazed his professors at the University 
of Edinburgh – he went in already an accomplished classical scholar. For 
example, his Professor of Greek, Andrew Dalzel, and his Professor of 
Logic, James Finlayson, recommended Mill as a tutor to various aristo-
cratic families.11 But from all that time in Edinburgh, Mill held dear the 
memory of Dugald Stewart’s lectures:
[…] for all the years I remained about Edinburgh, I used, as often 
as I possibly could, to steal into his class to hear a lecture, which 
always was a high treat. I have heard Pitt and Fox deliver some of 
their most admired speeches, but I never heard anything nearly so 
eloquent as some of the lectures of Mr. Stewart. I never heard any-
thing like so fine a speaker. The taste for the studies which have 
formed my favourite pursuits, and which will be so to the end of my 
life, I owe to Mr. Stewart.12
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Mill’s classical background would prove especially relevant. Stewart’s 
lectures, according to Stewart himself, ‘were addressed to young men 
fresh from the study of the learned languages’; for this reason, he:
attempted often to strengthen and adorn my argument with such 
passages from Cicero and other ancients as left the deepest impres-
sion on my own memory, and which I therefore conceived to be 
most likely to awaken classical associations in the minds of my hear-
ers, favourable to the truths which I wished to inculcate.13
It thus seems important to pause and consider eighteenth-century 
 classical education, even if only briefly.
The 1831 report for the Royal Commission of Inquiry into the State of 
Universities of Scotland noted as a matter of regret that students engaged 
but superficially with the classics at the universities.14 That was a charge, 
however, that did not apply to late-eighteenth-century Edinburgh; its 
most esteemed professors pressed that antiquity had much to offer: 
Adam Ferguson and Dugald Stewart as Professors of Moral Philosophy, 
Hugh Blair as Professor of Rhetoric, and Andrew Dalzel as Professor of 
Greek. For them, classical philosophical, literary and historical works as 
well as the lives and ideas of seminal figures provided valuable lessons 
and models of excellence to young scholars.
Beginning from the last, in Dalzel’s hands, ‘the Greek Chair in Edinburgh 
was elevated from being the mere schoolmaster’s rostrum to a living foun-
tain, whence flowed in abundant streams, not only accurate knowledge of 
the language of Greece, but enthusiasm for its study all over Scotland’.15 Like 
Dalzel, both Ferguson and Stewart shared the goal of ‘mould[ing] teenage 
boys into virtuous, polite, tolerably learned, self-confident, upstanding, 
patriotic young gentlemen’.16 Drawing inspiration from the ancients, these 
professors called their students to get to work for the betterment of society. 
Ferguson was praised, while still occupying the Chair, for ‘taking a route 
different from his contemporaries’; ‘direct[ing] philosophy to the heart’, 
Ferguson had ‘endeavoured to animate the coldness of modern times with 
the ardent spirit of antiquity; and, to a mercenary and luxurious age, has 
lifted up the voice which called the Greeks and Romans to virtue and glory’.17 
In his Principles of Moral and Political Science (1792)¸ which was to function 
as a textbook for his course, Ferguson even took a moment to respond to a 
charge of being partial to Stoics in some of the sections of that work and went 
on to list Lord Shaftesbury, Montesquieu and Hutcheson, among others, as 
admirers of Stoic philosophy, being ‘acquainted with its real spirit’.18 Stewart 
succeeded Ferguson in the Moral Philosophy Chair in 1785. It had taken him 
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no time at all to earn his students’ affection; thanks to Ferguson himself, 
Stewart had surpassed his teacher’s popularity among the students, while 
staying true to the spirit of Ferguson’s teaching method.19 Just like Dalzel, 
Ferguson and Stewart, Blair was trying to inspire his students into virtuous 
action with eloquence as an effective means to that purpose. In the last lec-
ture for his course on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres, Blair did not fail to offer 
important advice to his students:
I would thereof advice you to cultivate a taste for Virtue and 
Religion. This is a duty you owe to your friends, and I believe there 
is no one thing So favourable to the study of the liberal arts as the 
cultivation of a manly Spirit of Truth and piety, without this we can 
never relish the most refined beauty & pleasure the human Soul is 
capable of enjoying and Virtuous minds alone are capable of that 
tender Sensibility which is absolutely necessary for excelling in the 
fine arts, and especially for the Noble purposes of Life. It is only per-
sons of this temper of mind who can recommend religion & Virtue 
with Success to others, and the greatest applause an Orator can 
receive, is that the Speaker, discovers himself to be a person of a 
worthy mind and endowed with the Same dispositions with which 
he endeavours to inspire his hearers.20
Hence, the link between education, the cultivation of virtue and activity 
was as ubiquitous in the classical and rhetorical courses as it was in the 
moral philosophy course at Edinburgh. The classics served as a bridge 
between the diverse aims of these courses, and Cicero was the main 
source. According to Günter Gawlick, Cicero’s fame in the eighteenth 
century reached an astonishing peak: Enlightenment thinkers ‘admired 
the statesman, the orator and the philosopher in him to an extent which, 
to the twentieth century observer, seems largely unwarranted’.21
Mill shared this passion for the classics with many of his contemporar-
ies. And he kept returning to the classics throughout his life, adding to his 
Commonplace Books ‘admirable’, ‘remarkable’, ‘good’, quotations from Plato, 
Aristotle and Cicero, among others. Given the centrality of Cicero in  classical 
education, since his works deal extensively with all ancient philosophical 
schools, Mill’s readers would immediately identify the classical pedigree of 
his statements on happiness and on public duty. As George Nadel pointed 
out, scholars at times view ‘as new and revolutionary certain ideas put for-
ward by men like Bayle and Hume which, in fact, were merely paraphrases 
or quotations from the classics, drearily familiar to any educated person liv-
ing between the Renaissance and the nineteenth century’.22
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There are many examples of Mill drawing from classical sources 
to express familiar utilitarian ideas in his manuscript notes. For exam-
ple, for Mill, the principle of utility was ‘founded by Plato’, ‘the philos-
opher of the most brilliant imagination’, as outlined in three dialogues: 
Protagoras, Meno and Republic. In Protagoras, both interlocutors agreed 
that pleasures (and pains) need to be weighed and compared against 
their short-term and long-term consequences, including attributes such 
as intensity and quantity. However, such a calculation was not enough, 
Protagoras and Socrates agreed, as a person needs knowledge, or correct 
opinion, about the consequences of any given choice; that was the art of 
measurement – combining calculation with knowledge. As people never 
knowingly choose the lesser instead of the greater good, possessing this 
art is the key to a good life, Socrates argued.23 Plato’s Republic moved the 
discussion from the individual to society. While Mill identified utilitar-
ian thinking in passages in which calculation and reason appeared as the 
most important functions of the soul, he also pointed out that, for Plato, 
justice can make the state happy by uniting interests: the end to be sought 
was the happiness of all, not the happiness of just one social rank.24
In his copy of Cicero’s Opera Omnia (Leiden, 1642), Mill marked the 
passage of Cicero’s On Duties (3.11) where Socrates cursed those who 
first separated utility (utilitas) from justice (honestum). Likewise, Mill 
took note of Cicero’s Letters to Atticus (8.11) on the task of the statesman 
as defined in On the Commonwealth (Bk 5):
this guide of the commonwealth aims at the blessedness of the life 
of his citizens, that they should be solid in their resources, rich in 
property, well endowed with glory, honorable in virtue. I want him 
to be the person to perfect this task, which is the greatest and best 
among mankind.25
Moreover, Mill cited Cicero’s Letters to Quintus (1.24):
that those who govern others must gauge their every act by this 
one test – the greatest possible happiness of the governed […]. And 
indeed it is the duty not only of one who governs allies and citizens, 
but also of one who governs slaves and dumb animals, to be himself 
a slave to the interests and well-being of those he governs.26
Given the emphasis on rational calculation, the pursuit of virtue and the 
promotion of social well-being, it does not come as a surprise that, even 
though Mill welcomed John Mason Good’s English edition of Lucretius 
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On the Nature of Things (1805), he scolded the translator for adopting 
the ethics of Epicurus:
What shall we say of a philosophy which accounted it the chief hap-
piness of a being born to activity, and who can procure no happiness 
either to himself or to others but by action, to pass his life in com-
plete indolence, to be wholly void of care, and to slumber away his 
existence in profound ease and repose?27
Importantly, Mill’s verdict echoed Cicero’s view on Epicurean μή 
πολιτεύεσθαι (Letters to Atticus, 14.20, and On the Laws I.39). Since human 
beings are ‘born to activity’, there was no question more important than 
how to guide action. And that was primarily a question of education.
II
James Mill’s publication record on education begins around 1806,28 but 
his active engagement with public education is usually dated right after 
he commenced his association with Jeremy Bentham and Francis Place 
(1771–1854), that is, around 1808. Mill was involved in three different 
educational projects – an involvement that lasted until the early 1830s: 
primary education on monitorial educational principles (mainly for the 
poor); secondary education, that is, trying to establish a chrestomathic 
school in Bentham’s garden (which, to Bentham’s relief, was never imple-
mented);29 and higher education, the founding of the University of Lon-
don. Of all three projects, only the last came to fruition.30
Mill’s writings on education culminated in the 1819 essay 
‘Education’ for the Supplement to the Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Editions of 
the Encyclopaedia Britannica (1824). The very first sentence defined the 
end of education as clearly as possible: ‘to render the individual, as much 
as possible, an instrument of happiness, first to himself, and next to other 
beings’. However, Mill – unexpectedly – shrunk from the task of defining 
happiness. In Section III, he acknowledged that the definition of happi-
ness was of the highest importance for education, but he seemed to be 
content focusing on the means rather than the end. He outlined a ‘hum-
ble’, that is, experiential, and a ‘higher’, that is, transcendental, sense of 
happiness – the first being reduced in the simple sensations of pleasure 
and pain; the second drawing from a realm outside human sense-expe-
rience, cognizable only to the mind. Even though his analysis through-
out the essay on education drew from the first ‘school’ of philosophers 
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(Hobbes, Locke, Hume, Condillac, Helvétius, Hartley, Bentham, etc.), he 
chose simply to wrap up the discussion on the constituents of happiness 
as not yet conclusive and highly controversial.
The reason for Mill’s argumentative strategy was clear, even if 
indirectly so. In the 1810s, Mill was engaged in a bitter dispute between 
the proponents of Lancaster’s and Bell’s systems as applied in the edu-
cation of the poor – the former established schools more or less on sec-
ular principles, the latter on religious principles; the former featured 
members of a number of religious denominations in its ranks, the latter 
were members of the Church of England. All would agree that the best 
means of rendering the individual ‘an instrument of happiness’ involved 
inculcating the cardinal virtues – intelligence, temperance, justice and 
benevolence (‘Education’, Section II) – even if they disagreed on what 
‘happiness’ consisted in. Not long before, Mill had argued that ‘the moral 
duties […] are the very bond of society; the foundation of all the hap-
piness which human beings can enjoy; and on that account so deeply 
rooted in the affections of mankind, that any doctrine subversive of them 
would, together with its author, be sure of their detestation’.31
The public address to launch the West London Lancasterian 
Association, delivered on 2 August 1813, put together by James Mill, 
Francis Place and Edward Wakefield, offers the best summary of Mill’s 
own views on education: ‘[i]n whatever degree happiness depends upon 
good conduct, and in whatever degree good conduct depends upon good 
understanding and good habits, in that same degree do happiness and 
good conduct depend upon training or education’.32 Around the same 
time, Mill pointed out that ‘of all the circumstances which affect the hap-
piness, the beauty, and order, and well-being of society, by far the most 
important’ was character.33 Education was indeed the key to ‘the greatest 
happiness of the greatest number’.34
In July 1812, writing in Eclectic Review, Mill noted that ‘the property 
of knowledge [is] to elevate and refine our nature, – to enable a man 
to find satisfaction in his own bosom, – and, not only to produce a taste 
for intellectual delights, but to destroy the keen relish for gratifications 
purely sensual’.35 A month earlier, in the previous number of the same 
journal, Mill made a similar claim:
the pursuit of wisdom must mix itself with the pursuit of pleas-
ure; the happiness of others must occupy the wish and prompt the 
endeavour, as well as the gratification or aggrandizement of self; 
the mind must be accustomed to consider this world not as a place 
of rest for the indulgence of irregular desire, but as a scene of trial 
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where, by many conflicts and encounters, these desires are to be 
subjected to the sceptre of reason. The spiritual, in short, must take 
place of the sensual, and the infinite predominant over the finite.36
In Edinburgh Review, in 1813, Mill repeated that ‘inward happiness 
[…] results from a mind lifted somewhat above the objects of mere ani-
mal pursuit, – qualified in some degree for the task of reflection, – and 
open to the innumerable delights which it brings’.37 In the same year, he 
repeated that ‘a perception of intellectual and moral objects’ introduces 
one to ‘other causes of pleasure than merely sensual’. The ‘elevation of 
the people’ was quite important in their pursuit of happiness – elevation 
‘above ignorance, above swinishness, above prostitute servility, above 
oppression, above delusion religious or political, above grovelling vice, 
above subjection to the irrational passions’; and the way to achieve it was 
through education. Mill could not have been clearer than in 1836: ‘It is 
well-known how small is the value of all the merely corporeal pleasures, 
when taken nakedly by themselves, and without the addition of anything 
mental.’38
The problem in Mill’s conception of happiness is not the qualitative 
difference between pleasures. He ultimately resolved the issue as a ques-
tion of quantity – ‘the infinite’ ought to be predominant over ‘the finite’. 
The problem arises at the intersection of reason, desire and pleasure. 
What did Mill mean when he claimed that irregular desires ‘are to be sub-
jected to the sceptre of reason’? Does reason have priority or does pleas-
ure have priority in guiding conduct? His 1819 essay on education only 
slightly improves the picture. Education, Mill argued, ought to furnish:
A perfect command […] over a man’s appetites and desires; the 
power of restraining them whenever they lead in a hurtful direc-
tion; that possession of himself which insures his judgment against 
the illusions of the passions, and enables him to pursue constantly 
what he deliberately approves, is indispensably requisite to ena-
ble him to produce the greatest possible quantity of happiness. 
(‘Education’, II.3)
In 1813, Mill explained the same phenomenon in different words, rele-
gating reason to an instrumental, though still important, role:
Every man is guided by the pursuit of his own interest; and, in the 
way which he himself approves, endeavours to provide for the 
supply of his wants. The intelligence which may guide men in this 
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process, alters nothing in its necessity. It only renders the quantity 
of their happiness greater, and that of their misery less.39
It seems that Mill’s references to ‘the sceptre of reason’ and the process 
of deliberation have to do with the way in which one pursues her/his 
interests. In 1819, Mill was explicitly drawing on the ‘temperance of the 
ancient philosophers’ and intelligence, ‘the strength which overcomes 
the misguiding propensities’ as regards the best possible means to par-
ticular ends (the result of intelligence – knowledge and sagacity), as the 
constituents of individual happiness (‘Education’, II.3–4).
As we saw, by the late eighteenth century, there was already an 
established practice in place of drawing on Cicero in teaching moral phil-
osophy; Cicero’s ‘modified Stoicism’, Gloria Vivenza points out, became 
‘almost conventional’.40 Cicero claimed that for the Stoics, everybody by 
nature pursues those things that s/he thinks to be good and avoids their 
opposites – when something that has the appearance of a good is pre-
sented to us, we naturally move to obtain it (Tusculan Disputations, 4.12). 
This means action; whether one will act to obtain something good or to 
avoid something bad depends on opinion and judgement (4.14). Once we 
assent to their being predicated either as good or bad, we act. But there is 
a right way and a wrong way to go about pursuing what presents itself as 
good, that is, the sage and the fool react differently to what seems good. 
For the wise person, desire is regular and consistent, that is, in accord-
ance with reason; for the fool, it is irregular and unbridled, that is, in 
opposition to reason. The fool assents rashly to those impressions of the 
good or, in Zeno’s terminology, the imprint – τύπωσις – on the soul (4.12, 
13, 15, 80). Hence, one may be wrong in what s/he comes to consider 
good either due to intemperance or simply because of ignorance – false 
information, ineffective comparison, flawed evaluation. It was temper-
ance – self-control – that appeased the desires, making them obey right 
reason, as Cicero puts it, that is, maintaining the well-weighted judge-
ments of the mind (4.22). Only sages never err in their judgement, since 
any wish for any object they might have is in accordance with reason 
(4.12). In Academica (I.42), Cicero noted that Zeno excluded from virtue 
and wisdom all error, rashness, ignorance, opinion, supposition – that is, 
everything foreign to stable and consistent assent. For the Stoics, virtue 
is right reason, Cicero reported; emotions distract, disrupt and disturb 
the mind; thus, emotions threatened the life of thought and tranquillity 
(Tus. Dis. 4.34). When something is presented to our senses, either with 
the appearance of a good or having already been predicated by others 
 JAMES MILL ON HAPPINESS 173
as good, it is still in the power of the individual to evaluate and choose 
whether to act on it (4.65, 76).
Mill’s argument corresponded a great deal with Cicero’s sketch 
of the Stoic theory of emotions. For, Mill, happiness depends upon the 
actions of individuals, and the actions of individuals depend upon their 
feelings and thoughts. Education must be structured upon the ‘know-
ledge of the sequences which take place in the human feelings or thought’ 
and aim ‘to make certain feelings or thoughts take place instead of others’ 
(‘Education’, I.19). The kinds of mental succession, upon which educa-
tion works, make ‘all the difference between the extreme of madness and 
of wickedness, and the greatest attainable heights of wisdom and vir-
tue’.41 Since a person’s bent of mind was revealed in the sequences of its 
ideas, the object of education was ‘to provide for the constant production 
of certain sequences, rather than others’, either through habit or through 
association with ideas of pleasure or pain (‘Education’, I.29).
The question for Mill’s (and Cicero’s) moral agents, then, turned 
into an epistemological one: how do they know a true good from a false 
good? According to Mill, given that ‘our opinions are the fathers of our 
actions’ and given that ‘the actions of men are governed by their wills, 
and their wills by their desires’, and ‘their desires are directed to pleasure 
and relief from pain’,42 it was vital for individuals not to take the opinions 
of others upon trust or let others choose opinions for them about what it 
is in their interest to pursue.43 It was thus quite an important educational 
end to create habits of examining the evidence that grounds opinions – a 
habit that begins, Mill maintained, with self-examination.44 The reason 
for this was the danger arising from the possibility of those who ‘con-
trol’ education attempting to form habits or associations that would not 
enable individuals to pursue their own happiness or, similarly, leading to 
them forming habits or associations that would enable individuals only 
to pursue what others think their happiness consists in.45 Just as govern-
ment has the power to do ‘good’ through education, Mill argued, it also 
has the power to do ‘evil’. Expectedly, Mill concluded that in order for 
social and political education not to create ‘habits of servility and toler-
ation of arbitrary power’, it needs to be ‘joined to another inestimable 
blessing’: the liberty of the press. Uncensored public discussion, for Mill, 
had the Socratic function of developing an ability to form one’s own own 
estimate of things.46
The ‘business of a good education’, according to James Mill, ‘is 
to make the associations [of pleasure and pain] and the values [of the 
act] correspond’ – that is, inclucating the cardinal virtues expands the 
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associations of narrow interests to include social interests. Education 
must impart love for the ends of virtue, so that people can care enough 
to sacrifice ‘part of the self which the good of our species requires’.47 The 
crucial distinction in Mill’s conception of happiness, and the one that best 
accounts for the relation between reason, desire and pleasure, was not 
that of mental/sensual pleasures but that of self-regarding/other-regard-
ing interests. To this question, we now turn.
III
Notwithstanding the ostensible Benthamite language as regards the sim-
ple elements of happiness – that is, the sensations of pleasure and pain – 
Mill’s conception of happiness is beginning to appear more distinctively 
his own. Mill’s views in his final years were no different from when he took 
his first steps on the London scene. Writing in 1805, he argued that ‘the 
business of all men who wish to benefit their species is to cultivate their 
reason not to listen to their passions, or temper, but to acquire a steady 
and perfect habit of consulting their reason solely, in a case in which it 
alone can give proper advice’.48 As we saw, the cultivation of knowledge 
and sagacity as well as temperance and fortitude ‘appear to be sufficient 
for the happiness of the individual himself’. Similarly, justice – abstaining 
from doing harm – and generosity – doing positive good – suffice for the 
happiness of the community (‘Education’, II.4–5).
In an early unpublished piece of writing, Mill had already suggested a 
rule of thumb ‘for fixing the gradation of pleasures, in point of respectabil-
ity’. Nobler pleasures deserved more esteem; but the suggested rule went 
further than the simple distinction between the pleasures of the mind and 
the pleasures of the body: ‘May we not reckon that the most important 
pleasure, by the want of which man would suffer the most?’49 According to 
Mill, since human beings would suffer most without society, those actions 
that promote the well-being of society are the most noble and those that 
hinder the well-being of society the most vicious. The first deserve our 
approbation; the second our disapprobation. In his magnum opus, Mill 
argued that, at a higher state of civilization, ‘the mind of man is susceptible 
of pleasure from the approbation, pain from the disapprobation, of his fel-
low-creatures’, which makes human beings ‘capable of restraint’.50
In a series of essays in the 1820s, beginning with ‘Government’ 
(1820) in the Supplement and culminating in ‘Ballot’ (1830) in Westmin-
ster Review, Mill expanded on the above idea via pushing an agenda of 
parliamentary reform. According to Mill, ‘men, generally taken, will not 
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only prefer their own interests to those of other men, but when they can, 
will sacrifice the interests of other men to their own’.51 Good government 
ensures the greatest sum of the scanty materials of happiness to the mem-
bers of the community. This is achieved by preventing any group of indi-
viduals from making any other member weaker than that group, to have 
less than one’s share of pleasures from one’s own labour. However, since 
government involves transferring to a number of individuals enough 
power for the protection of all, by the above law of human nature, the 
same danger that exists outside the political community persists within 
the political community. Therefore, the community needs to prevent 
those who hold government power from abusing it.  Protective measures 
included extensive suffrage in combination with frequent elections that 
would identify the interests of the community with the power-holders – 
social happiness depended upon that identification of interests.52 The 
identification had to include the whole community:
When men are combined into an acting body, and have a kind of 
principle of unity bestowed upon them, it is universally recognized, 
that the interest of the body is the ruling principle of action. Their 
sympathies are with one another, not with those exterior parties 
whose interests come in competition with theirs. And as for virtue, 
in their case, who knows not, that in most minds, virtue consists 
in doing good to those with whom we sympathize? If there is any 
class of sensitive creatures, totally removed from our sympathies, 
we little regard the effects which our actions may have upon them.53
A review of James Mill’s writings on good government throughout his 
authorial career suggests that he did not consider the identity of inter-
ests through representation the sole condition of good government. Even 
though he referred to other conditions – education, publicity, the ‘fear 
of resistance’ – the foundation of his argument in ‘Government’ and the 
many essays that followed was the state of interests.54
The question then to consider is how to escape ‘self-love’. Even 
though we now move away from Mill’s reform tracts, these ideas were 
embedded in them. In 1814, Mill had identified the reason for the selfish 
propensities in individuals, namely a bad education:
Under the coarse and unskilful tuition of rude and ignorant ages the 
dissocial passions are little subject to restraint; the selfish passions 
are allowed to operate freely and expand themselves; and no pains 
are employed to cultivate and to strengthen those principles of the 
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mind by which we derive pleasure and pain from the happiness and 
misery of our fellow men. The youth under such a discipline, grows 
up into a man, having little regard for any other feelings than his 
own; occupied abundantly with the desire of his own happiness, but 
seldom troubling himself about the fate of others; little disposed to 
put himself to any inconvenience for promoting their happiness, or 
to make any sacrifice for alleviating their misery.55
In Analysis, Mill traced how human beings form attachments of friend-
ship, kindness and compassion to others, beginning from family, party, 
country and mankind. Such relationships evince ‘a principle of unity’ 
as we saw, in which the members of a family, party, country and even 
mankind share in the causes of pleasure and pain – for example, if the 
well-being of their child does not form the primary concern in a family, it 
cannot be properly called a ‘family’.56
The psychological principle involved in relationships was no different 
from that in other cases: the association of ideas. According to Mill, an asso-
ciation cluster is made up by numerous associations; what makes it a cluster, 
however, is that the feelings involved (sensations, thoughts, volitions) are 
so intimately blended ‘that they no longer appear many, but one feeling’.57 
Often, however, in such indissoluble associations, the idea of the end drops 
out of sight, and the individual fixes on the means themselves. For Mill:
Wealth, Power and Dignity afford perhaps the most remarkable of 
all examples of that extraordinary case of association, where the 
means to an end, means valuable to us solely on account of their 
end, not only engross more of our attention than the end itself, but 
actually supplant it in our affections.58
For example, it is ‘a vulgar observation, with respect to money’, Mill 
pointed out, ‘that, though useful only for obtaining pleasure, or saving 
from pain, it is often employed for neither purpose, but hugged as a good 
in itself’. ‘Persons have been found’, for another example, ‘the one of 
whom could not endure to live without the other.’59
We have already seen how Mill’s educational theory, with direct 
bearing on individual happiness, expanded on familiar ideas from 
Cicero: individuals need to pause, consider and approve the course of 
action that was prompted by ideas of future pleasure (originating in 
one’s own views of what is good or originating in what others denote as 
good). The preceding discussion, I think, allows us to view the emphasis 
on the identification of interests in Mill’s reform tracts in a different light. 
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We began with Mill’s view that actions which promote the well-being 
of society are the most noble. We then moved to consider that while we 
deliberate on how to act in a given situation, we need to take under con-
sideration how our actions affect ‘the fate of others’. But we also saw that 
only when there is a ‘principle of unity’ with (some) others can we share 
in their pleasure and pain. We form some distinctive group of individuals 
when our actions tend to promote the good of the group. Noble as these 
actions may be, the most noble are those in which no class of ‘sensitive 
creatures [is] totally removed from our sympathies’.
The cosmopolital ramifications of Mill’s conception of happiness 
were obvious. And, once again, Mill’s debt to Cicero manifests itself. As 
we saw, in his copy of Cicero’s Opera Omnia, Mill marked a passage in 
Cicero’s On Duties:
[…] And so, we have heard, Socrates used to pronounce a curse 
upon those who first drew a conceptual distinction between things 
naturally inseparable. With this doctrine the Stoics are in agree-
ment in so far as they maintain that if anything is morally right, it 
is expedient, and if anything is not morally right, it is not expedient 
(Off. 3.11).60
In the third book of On Duties, Cicero brings honestum and utilitas 
together in a simple rule of conduct (3.19): ‘This, then, ought to be the 
chief end of all men, to make the interest of each individual and of the 
whole body politic identical. For, if the individual appropriates to selfish 
ends what should be devoted to the common good, all human fellow-
ship will be destroyed’ (3.20). When people fail to recognize that they 
‘are bound to their fellow-citizens’ by mutual obligations, social ties and 
common interests, ‘the whole structure of civil society’ falls apart (3.28). 
Of course, this did not mean that we are ‘required to sacrifice our own 
interests and surrender to others what we need for ourselves, but each 
one should consider his own interests, as far as he may without injury to 
his neighbour’s’ (3.42). The ‘good man’, Cicero went on, ‘will always per-
form his duty, promoting the general interests of human society’ (3.31). 
The honestum, moral goodness, is what deserves most praise and all 
 honour, even when no one praises or honours it (1.14).
The new element into the mix is thus not so new after all: virtue. 
According to Mill:
With the idea of our own acts of virtue, there are naturally associated 
the ideas of all the immense advantages we derive from the virtuous 
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acts of our Fellow-creatures. When this association is formed in due 
strength, which it is the main business of a good education to effect, 
the motive of virtue becomes paramount in the human breast.61
But this is another example of indissoluble association; once the asso-
ciated cluster becomes a single feeling, the attention moves away 
from the actual end, that is, pleasure (via praise or individual bene-
fit); hence, Mill pointed out, the ‘Praise, which we are never to hear, 
which will be diffused only when we are dead, and from which no 
actual effects can ever accrue to us, is often an object of intense affec-
tion, and acts as one of the most powerful motives in our nature.’62 
In the process of correcting Adam Smith’s account of praiseworthi-
ness, Mill argued that praise and blame ‘are the great instruments we 
possess for ensuring moral acts on the part of our Fellow-creatures’. 
But we tend to deprive them of ‘their useful tendency’, by erroneously 
bestowing them, and thus ‘we do what in us lies to lessen the quantity 
of Virtue, and thence of Felicity, in the world’.63
We are now in a position to fully unpack Mill’s meaning. Any 
pursuit of ends is as a matter of suitably making appropriate associ-
ations of ideas. Via the example of writing, Mill argued that the end 
or ends of a discourse cannot be achieved without a proper combina-
tion of its many subordinate ideas: ‘[i]f every thing in the discourse 
tends to the accomplishment of the end, the Discourse is said to be 
coherent, appropriate, consistent’. Mill argued that living requires a 
similar ordering of ideas – some people actually manage to exhibit 
such ‘steady direction of their actions, through the course of their 
lives, to some general end, or ends’. Happiness is said to predomi-
nate and control ‘the associations in every part of the process’ – as the 
‘grand suggesting principle’ and the ‘grand selecting principle’, it sug-
gests which trains of ideas are connected with happiness and selects 
which particular ideas can operate as causes to its attainment. This 
was what it meant to the elder Mill to have control over one’s own 
ideas and actions. Such a steady pursuit of happiness becomes noble 
and commendable when the principle of utility keeps one’s duties in 
the ‘proper order’ and leads one to pursue the higher rather than the 
lower good.64 The higher good is the common good:
When the grand sources of felicity are formed into the leading and 
governing Ideas, each in its due and relative strength, Education 
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has then performed its most perfect work; and thus the individual 
becomes, to the greatest degree, the source of utility to others, and 
of happiness to himself.65
In his marginalia to Francis Hutcheson’s A System of Moral Philosophy 
(1755), Mill noted that ‘[h]uman nature [is] not made up solely of 
desires, and propensities, which it is to obey indiscriminately. It has a 
principle of selection. That principle its ultimate end. An ultimate end is 
a thing felt, not reasoned about.’66
IV
In April 1854, John Stuart Mill scribbled down in his journal that no 
longer was it necessary ‘to sink altogether earthly happiness as a pursuit’. 
No puritanism, no asceticism was necessary: ‘an earthly life’, the younger 
Mill added, ‘both pleasant and innocent can be had by many and might 
by all’. Instead, ‘[w]hat is now wanted is the creed of Epicurus warmed 
by the additional element of an enthusiastic love of the general good’.67 In 
this chapter, I have tried to show that this was exactly the way James Mill 
thought about happiness. On the one hand, deliberately approving what 
presents itself to us as a good was more about being able to question, 
examine and take control of the choice of action itself rather than simply 
being able to do what seems most expedient or pleasant to us, from the 
testimony either of our own experience or of others. On the other hand, 
acquiring the disposition to act virtuously means that the extrinsic worth 
of virtue, for instance, security and the reciprociation of benefits, has 
dropped out of sight. For the elder Mill, life in the service of the common 
good is simply the best kind of life. And that’s unsurprisingly familiar.68
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Bentham, Mill, Stoicism and Higher 
Pleasures
Jonathan Riley
I. Epicureans, Stoics and classical utilitarians
I am delighted and honoured to contribute to this volume in celebration 
of my friend and colleague Frederick Rosen. Fred and I share an interest 
in classical hedonistic utilitarianism and its relations to ancient Greek 
philosophy. But whereas he tends to argue that Jeremy Bentham largely 
anticipates John Stuart Mill’s utilitarianism – with the caveat that Mill 
tries to integrate elements of Stoicism with the Epicurean tradition 
that is a predominant influence on both of them – I claim that Mill’s 
utilitar ianism is a truly novel doctrine that goes beyond Bentham’s but 
does not involve any commitment to Stoicism. Unlike Bentham, Mill 
conceives of pleasure as a family of higher and lower kinds of feelings 
that are incommensurable with one another in the sense that a higher 
pleasure has a superior intrinsic quality of tone as pleasure, regardless 
of quantity.
I can think of no better way to show my gratitude and respect than 
to offer a critique of Fred’s interpretation of Bentham and Mill with 
respect to two main points. On the one hand, I will argue against his view 
that Bentham’s account of different sorts and qualities of pleasures shows 
that Bentham no less than Mill accepts that pleasures may be incommen-
surable. On the other hand, I will also challenge his reading of the char-
acter of Mill’s hedonistic account of the virtues, which does not involve 
an embrace of elements of Stoicism. In combination, these two lines of 
criticism should help to clarify the deeper issue about how to interpret 
the differences between Bentham and Mill.
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Rosen argues that Bentham and Mill belong within the Epicurean 
tradition because, like the Epicureans, they insist that the ultimate 
human good is happiness in the sense of pleasure and exemption from 
pain.1 They share the Epicureans’ commitment to hedonism, even if the 
utilitarians are concerned with promoting collective happiness whereas 
the Epicureans focus on the promotion of personal happiness.2
However, unlike Bentham, Rosen claims, Mill modified or quali-
fied his hedonism by combining Epicureanism with elements of Stoicism 
within his version of utilitarianism. Whereas Bentham dismissed the 
Stoics as ascetics who were opposed to the greatest happiness principle, 
Mill distinguished between the Stoics and ascetics: the Stoics, unlike the 
ascetics, who said that ‘pain is a good, and pleasure an evil’, said only 
that ‘pain is no evil, and pleasure no good’.3 As a result, Rosen says, ‘Mill 
tended to treat the Stoics more sympathetically than those he often 
referred to as “Puritans” or “ascetics”’.4 In particular, when he wrote in 
Utilitarianism that it was better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a pig or 
a fool satisfied, Mill’s ‘agenda … was to prise elements of Stoicism away 
from Puritanism and link them to the Epicurean tradition’.5
According to Rosen, by linking elements of Stoicism with 
Epicureanism, Mill made room for an ethics of personal sacrifice within 
utilitarianism and at the same time mounted a powerful attack against 
Thomas Carlyle’s ‘new form of Puritanism’, according to which human 
beings had no right to happiness and ought to renounce it as an unworthy 
goal:
By taking elements of Stoic thought into his approach … Mill could 
juxtapose a new kind of utilitarian hero who embraced sacrifice but, 
unlike Carlyle, did not renounce happiness. The utilitarian hero (or 
martyr) could sacrifice his or her own happiness to serve the happi-
ness of others, and Mill considered such a sacrifice to constitute the 
highest virtue.6
For Rosen, it seems, Mill’s main purpose when he asserted that it was 
better to be Socrates dissatisfied was to set the stage for his rejection of 
‘Carlyle’s belief that men lived and could live well without happiness’.7
While Rosen is certainly right that Mill firmly rejected Carlyle’s 
 asceticism and love of German metaphysical idealism,8 it is not clear how a 
turn to Stoicism is supposed to help us to understand Mill’s claim that it is 
better to be Socrates dissatisfied or his claim that hedonistic  utilitarianism 
can consistently accommodate the sacrifice of personal happiness. 
Bentham is correct that the Stoic maxim that ‘pain is no evil, and pleasure 
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no good’ is incompatible with Epicureanism as well as with hedonistic 
utilitarianism. Indeed, when Mill distinguishes between the Stoics and 
religious ascetics, he is doing so as part of his general defence of Bentham 
from William Whewell’s charges that Bentham makes absurd assertions 
about morality. According to Mill, Bentham is right to regard ascetics and 
Stoics as opponents of hedonism and hedonistic utilitarianism.9
Rosen apparently believes that Mill’s claim can be justified ‘in a 
straight-forward manner’ by using aspects of Stoicism to extend the 
Epicurean view that prudent egoists can find greater personal happiness 
than fools can:
Even though happiness, derived from the higher pleasures, might 
leave the individual subject to acute suffering, and the intelligent 
person might need more to make him- or herself happy, [Mill] 
invoked Stoic themes, such as a love of liberty, independence, and a 
sense of dignity, to give greater force to his view that it was better to 
be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied.10
But how does this explain that Socrates experiences greater happiness 
than a fool, especially in light of the admission that Socrates is exposed 
to more acute pains than the fool is? Socrates is said to be dissatisfied, 
that is, discontented, which seems to imply that he is unhappy, at least 
without further explanation. If pleasure is a homogeneous feeling across 
its various sources, as Bentham and the Epicureans assume, it is undeni-
able that the dissatisfied Socrates may experience a smaller amount of 
pleasure and security from pain than the satisfied fool does. Moreover, 
if it is maintained nonetheless that it is better to be Socrates dissatisfied, 
the term ‘better’ must be justified in terms of some value other than hap-
piness in the sense of pleasure and immunity from pain. In short, the turn 
to Stoicism seems to imply that Mill abandons hedonism, as his critics so 
often complain.
I will argue against Rosen that Mill never accepts the Stoic maxim 
that ‘pain is no evil, and pleasure no good’ and that he does not rely on it 
to construct his unusual version of hedonistic utilitarianism. In Section 
II, I maintain that, although neither Bentham nor Mill makes self-inter-
est constitutive of virtue, Bentham’s preoccupation with self-interest as 
a motive leads him to concentrate on the need for external sanctions to 
make selfish people do right whereas Mill emphasizes that cultivated 
people also develop higher moral motives that drive them to willingly do 
right and to pursue ideal ends for their own sake. For Mill, while Bentham 
acknowledges that one person can sympathize with another, he fails to 
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recognize the power of a disinterested conscience to override self-in-
terest in cases of conflict. In Section III, I claim that Bentham’s talk of 
quantities and qualities of pleasure does not anticipate Mill’s doctrine of 
higher pleasures. For Bentham, pleasant feelings are homogeneous and 
vary only in terms of quantity: the idea of higher kinds of pleasant feel-
ings superior in quality to other kinds is foreign to his thought. In Section 
IV, I suggest how Mill uses higher pleasures to justify his claim that it 
is better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a pig or fool satisfied. Section 
V concludes with arguments that higher moral pleasures can motivate 
cultivated people to voluntarily sacrifice self-interest to fulfil their moral 
duties, and that higher aesthetic pleasures can motivate heroic individu-
als to willingly go beyond duty by sacrificing even their own lives to pro-
mote greater happiness for others.
II. Between Bentham and Mill
It might be questioned whether Bentham saw the need for any distinc-
tion between rational self-interest and moral virtue since, if we accept 
Sidgwick’s reading, Bentham believes that a person’s self-interest, prop-
erly calculated, always coincides with the community’s greatest total 
happiness:
in the Deontology … it is distinctly assumed that, in actual human 
life as empirically known, the conduct most conducive to general 
happiness always coincides with that which conduces most to the 
happiness of the agent; and that ‘vice may be defined as a miscalcu-
lation of chances’ from a purely mundane point of view.11
Mill rejects such a reading of Bentham, on the grounds that the Deontol-
ogy was cobbled together by John Bowring from Bentham’s unpublished 
manuscripts and gives a distorted picture of Bentham’s utilitarian theory 
of morality.12
Mill insists that, for Bentham, self-interest is not constitutive of 
morality or the test of virtue. Rather, Bentham accepts that morality 
involves an impartial concern for the good of the community (everybody 
to count for one, nobody for more than one). For him, the test of virtue is 
promotion of general happiness. As Rosen puts it:
Bentham depicts the ‘partisan’ of the principle [of utility] not as one 
who calculates his pleasures and pains from self-interest, but one 
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whose ‘approbation or disapprobation … is determined by, and pro-
portioned to the tendency which he conceives it to have to augment 
or to diminish the happiness of the community’.13
But while Bentham does not reduce virtue to self-interest, it seems 
 accurate to say that, for him, self-interest is a predominant motive. True, 
he also recognizes sympathy for others as a motive. But he ‘felt the inad-
equacy of [it], except in certain limited cases, as a security for virtuous 
action’.14 Bentham understood that personal affection is liable to involve 
antipathy towards third parties and operate to their harm, Mill says, and 
thus needs to be regulated. In other words, Bentham typically conceives 
of sympathy as what Mill calls ‘sympathetic selfishness’, in the sense that 
self-interested people sympathize only with certain others such as family 
and friends whom they associate with their own interests.15 Such peo-
ple do not sympathize impartially with their fellow sentient creatures, 
as a highly cultivated moral agent does. Bentham also understood that 
‘general philanthropy, considered as a motive influencing mankind in 
general’ is ‘the very weakest and most unsteady of all feelings’.16 ‘There 
remained, as a motive by which mankind are influenced, and by which 
they may be guided to their good, only personal interest.’17 In short, for 
Bentham, conduct is governed in the main by ‘the different modifications 
of self-interest, and the passions commonly classed as selfish’.18
Given his preoccupation with self-interest as a motive, Bentham 
argues that external sanctions must be deliberately employed by govern-
ment officials and other agents to bring an individual’s self-interest into 
harmony with the utility principle. As he says: ‘[W]hatsoever evil it is 
possible for man to do for the advancement of his own personal and pri-
vate interest … at the expense of the public interest – that evil sooner or 
later, he will do, unless by some means or other … he be prevented from 
doing it’.19 External sanctions cannot always be effectively employed, 
however, and Bentham does not assume that rational egoists will choose 
virtuous actions in the absence of such sanctions.
Bentham’s focus on self-interest as a motive and on the need for 
external sanctions to channel and redirect self-interest for the public 
good is central to his version of hedonistic utilitarianism. He classifies 
external sanctions as physical, political, popular or moral, and religious. 
When he speaks of naked physical sanctions, he is referring to physical 
sensations of pleasure and pain that are caused in us by natural forces, 
unaided by the efforts of other people or by the supernatural interven-
tions of gods. These physical or bodily feelings are external in two related 
senses: they apparently originate in various external natural objects and 
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events, and they are conveyed to our consciousness by the nervous sys-
tem, independently of our will and other higher mental faculties. Such 
elementary feelings of pleasure and pain are alone what can ultimately 
make individuals do something, whether they wish to or not: ‘there is 
nothing by which a man can ultimately be made to do [something], but 
either pain or pleasure’.20 They are ‘sovereign masters’ imposed on us by 
nature.21
The other three sanctions he identifies are parasitic on the physical 
sanctions:
Of these four sanctions the physical is altogether … the ground-
work of the political and moral [or popular]: so is it also of the reli-
gious, in as far as the latter bears relation to the present life [here 
on earth]. It is included in each of the other three … In a word, 
the powers of nature may operate of themselves; but neither the 
magistrate, nor men at large, can operate, nor is God in the case in 
question supposed to operate, but through the powers of nature.22
The political, popular and religious sanctions are external sanctions 
employed by other agents as instruments or incentives to make predom-
inantly self-interested individuals do what is just and right as opposed to 
what is selfish and immoral. Bentham typically conceives of these exter-
nal sanctions in terms of punishments rather than rewards because he 
believes (like the Epicureans and Mill, among many others) that sensa-
tions of pain are more acute than sensations of pleasure. But he does not 
assume that these incentives can invariably work to make selfish indi-
viduals take the same virtuous actions as would be taken voluntarily by 
cultivated moral agents.
Mill objects that Bentham ‘overlooks … the moral part of man’s 
nature, in the strict sense of the term – the desire of perfection, or the 
feeling of an approving or of an accusing conscience’:
Man is never recognised by him as a being capable of pursuing 
spiritual perfection as an end; of desiring, for its own sake, the con-
formity of his own character to his standard of excellence, without 
hope of good or fear of evil from other source than his own inward 
consciousness … Nothing is more curious than the absence of rec-
ognition in any of his writings of the existence of conscience, as a 
thing distinct from philanthropy, from affection for God or man, and 
from self-interest in this world or in the next … If we find the words 
‘Conscience’, ‘Principle’, ‘Moral Rectitude’, ‘Moral Duty’, in his Table 
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of the Springs of Action, it is among the synonymes [sic] of the ‘love 
of reputation’; with an intimation as to the two former phrases, that 
they are also sometimes synonymous with the religious motive, or 
the motive of sympathy. The feeling of moral approbation or disap-
probation properly so called, either towards ourselves or our fel-
low-creatures, he seems unaware of the existence of.23
Not only does he overlook the moral desire to do right for its own sake 
and associated internal sanctions of guilt and remorse, Mill claims, ‘he 
but faintly recognises, as a fact in human nature, the pursuit of any other 
ideal end for its own sake … . [N]o conclusions are ever founded’ on the 
‘sense of honour, and personal dignity – that feeling of personal exalta-
tion and degradation which acts independently of other people’s opin-
ion, or even in defiance of it’, for example, or ‘on the love of beauty, the 
passion of the artist’.24
In Mill’s judgement, Bentham works with a simplistic conception of 
human nature that exaggerates the place of selfish motives to the neglect 
of ‘deeper feelings’:25
If he thought at all of any of the deeper feelings of human nature, it 
was but as idiosyncracies of taste, with which the moralist no more 
than the legislator had any concern, further than to prohibit such 
as were mischievous among the actions to which they might chance 
to lead. To say either that man should, or that he should not, take 
pleasure in one thing, displeasure in another, appeared to him as 
much an act of despotism in the moralist as in the political ruler.26
As a result, Bentham’s version of utilitarianism is a narrow and impov-
erished doctrine. In contrast, Mill aims to take account of higher moral 
and aesthetic feelings of pleasure that can motivate virtuous people to 
voluntarily sacrifice their own interests and even their lives to promote 
the collective happiness, without any need for others to employ exter-
nal sanctions to make them take such sacrifices. In other words, he never 
rejects hedonistic utilitarianism. Instead, he objects to Bentham’s pre-
occupation with self-interest and neglect of higher moral and aesthetic 
motives. He seeks to enlarge utilitarianism so that it duly recognizes 
the importance of the higher pleasant feelings while retaining whatever 
is valuable in Bentham’s philosophy with its focus on self-interest and 
external sanctions.
Bentham and Mill can both endorse the Epicurean claim that a 
wise egoist will be happier than a fool. A prudent person can find greater 
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personal happiness by sacrificing his/her own immediate pleasures for 
the sake of greater personal pleasures in the future. Such a person might 
also prefer a life of relative isolation and tranquillity, if the Epicureans 
are correct to think that others are likely to cause that person more acute 
pains than pleasures. But their acceptance of these points does not com-
mit the utilitarians to a belief that a wise egoist will voluntarily sacrifice 
his/her own pleasure so as to promote the pleasures or mitigate the pains 
of other people.
Some may argue roughly in the spirit of Epicureanism that wise 
egoists will consent to adopt social rules of justice and right that protect 
their own shared vital interests, rules including laws and customs that 
will be enforced by the wise against any fools who are inclined to cause 
wrongful harm to others. The social code of rules is for the mutual advan-
tage of the wise, it may be said, and well-designed external sanctions 
employed by them can force imprudent egoists to fulfil their moral duties 
to others out of fear of social punishment, including legal penalties and 
public humiliation and stigma.
But at least three related objections cast severe doubt on this argu-
ment. First, rational egoists, and not only fools, have incentives to break 
the rules and will take immoral and illegal actions when they believe they 
can do so without detection by others. Second, rational public officials 
must be compensated to employ external sanctions to prevent or punish 
wrongdoing, but egoistic taxpayers are unlikely to pay the required total 
compensation, in which case the sanctions will not be effectively imple-
mented. Third, external sanctions cannot be effectively employed to 
deter wrongdoing in some situations anyway – for example, confidential 
private engagements: they cannot always make up for the selfish agent’s 
lack of a strong conscience or lack of disinterested desire to do right for 
its own sake.
Bentham’s narrow utilitarianism is vulnerable to these objections. 
In light of Mill’s considered complaint that higher moral and aesthetic 
motives play no effective role in it, Bentham’s doctrine is unable to over-
come this vulnerability by relying on internal sanctions of guilt and 
dishonour that, when sufficiently powerful, motivate an individual to 
choose virtuous actions without any need for others to employ external 
sanctions. In contrast, Mill insists that there are higher kinds of pleasant 
feelings that are properties of the moral and aesthetic sentiments. His 
enlarged utilitarianism makes room for cultivated individuals who, after 
developing their capacities to appreciate the higher pleasures, conscien-
tiously fulfil their moral duties to others whenever possible, even when 
doing so is contrary to their selfish interests. The threat of self-inflicted 
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guilt and shame caused by frustration of their moral desire to do right 
for its own sake prevents them from acting on their selfish desires. These 
cultivated individuals may even freely take praiseworthy supereroga-
tory actions that they have no moral duty to take, sacrificing their own 
lives and property for the sake of others. A lofty aesthetic ideal of per-
sonal honour, the disappointment of which is intolerable to them, might 
prompt them to take such heroic actions.
The moral desire to always fulfil one’s duties to one’s fellow crea-
tures and the aesthetic desire to take admirable supererogatory actions 
on their behalf are both inexplicable by hedonists if self-interest is a 
predominant motive such that a wise individual will refuse to do these 
things in the absence of external sanctions imposed by others. Hedonists 
cannot maintain that external sanctions are always effective in enforcing 
moral duties. Nor can they argue that external sanctions are legitimately 
employed to force any individual to take admirable supererogatory 
actions that may severely harm or even kill that person. By emphasizing 
that the individual can become competently acquainted with the higher 
pleasures, Mill aims to show that an enlarged hedonistic utilitarianism 
can accommodate voluntary sacrifices of selfish interests. His utilitarian 
doctrine endorses even extreme supererogatory sacrifices by virtuous 
heroes or saints who willingly give up their own lives to promote greater 
happiness for others.
III. Higher pleasures
Bentham apparently conceives of pleasure as a homogeneous positive feel-
ing that varies only in quantity, and of pain as a negative homogeneous 
feeling that must be deducted from pleasure. In his view, pleasure can be 
understood to include relief from pain since adding to a sum total of pleas-
ures ‘comes to the same thing’ as diminishing a sum total of pains.27 As 
pointed out earlier, he focuses attention on physical sensations of pleasure 
and pain, and urges that these physical sanctions ought to be deployed in 
political, popular and religious sanctions designed to make selfish people 
comply to some extent (necessarily imperfect) with reasonable social rules 
of justice and right. Given that the physical sensations of pleasure and pain 
are typically experienced as ingredients of mental pleasures and pains, and 
given that pleasure can be taken to include security from pain, he is preoc-
cupied with one kind of mental pleasures – namely, selfish pleasures that 
the individual believes (perhaps mistakenly) are expedient in terms of his/
her own interests. It is a sound inference that the intrinsic nature or tone 
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of these selfish pleasant feelings is similar across individuals, even though 
different people may get their pleasure from different objects and events 
and also experience different amounts of it from any particular object or 
event.28 People who are competently acquainted with these selfish pleas-
ures agree that the feelings comprise a single selfish kind. Any competent 
individual who has, or once had, a predominantly selfish character recog-
nizes that the feelings feel alike to him/her and infers that the same is true 
for other competent people.
Sidgwick, Moore and virtually everyone in their trail have argued 
that hedonism cannot dispense with the assumption that pleasure, 
including relief from pain, is a homogeneous feeling. Rosen does not dis-
pute this received view. Rather, he emphasizes that Bentham, like Hume, 
subscribed to ‘the Epicurean doctrine of the unity of pleasure’, according 
to which one pleasant feeling feels like any other apart from quantity:
[Hume] never paused to consider different kinds of pleasure and 
pain. If utility pleased, the pleasure it provided was like any other 
pleasure. Bentham would fully agree. The various categories 
depicted in IPML led to no conclusions regarding some pleasures 
being superior to any others.29
As Rosen points out, the unity of pleasant feelings doctrine is compatible 
with the fact that different sources of this feeling, such as the activities of 
contemplation and of eating, can produce different amounts of it: ‘this is 
not to deny that one might obtain greater pleasure from contemplation 
than from eating (from the satisfactions of Socrates as opposed to those 
of a pig [or fool]’.30
Nevertheless, Rosen also challenges the received view, in particu-
lar, with respect to what may be called its decisiveness. In his opinion, 
Bentham’s hedonism involves different kinds of pleasures that have 
incommensurable qualities so that they cannot be added into a sum total. 
He emphasizes that Bentham sees a feedback between quality and quan-
tity that makes it difficult if not impossible to disentangle them when 
measuring pleasure and pain. To support his interpretation, he argues 
that when ‘Bentham listed fourteen kinds of pleasure and twelve kinds of 
pain, he was referring to different qualities of pleasure and pain, which 
he had delineated on the basis of careful observation and deduction’.31 As 
he elaborates the point:
Hence the pleasures of memory or expectation were different from 
the pleasures of skill and pleasures of power. For Bentham one 
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could not say that the possession of various skills generated more 
or less pleasure than the possession of power, as they referred to 
different kinds of pleasures which were not commensurable …32
Different kinds of pleasures apparently involve different qualities that 
are non-comparable, where the differences are rooted in the different 
sources of the pleasures. Distinct sources such as memory and posses-
sion of skills result in different kinds and qualities of pleasures. Perhaps 
multiple pleasures of the same kind and quality can be summed, Rosen 
seems to believe, but different kinds and qualities of pleasures cannot be 
summed because they are incommensurable.
However, as Rosen recognizes when discussing the doctrine of the 
unity of pleasant feelings, Bentham is not denying that the feeling of pleas-
ure itself is homogeneous, though it arises from different sources. He is not 
saying that the pleasant feelings arising from one source are intrinsically 
more valuable as pleasure than the pleasant feelings arising from another. 
For Bentham, pleasant feelings are homogeneous feelings  – more spe-
cifically, positive self-interested feelings whose intrinsic tone is the same 
across various sources. What he calls different kinds of pleasures are differ-
ent manifestations of this homogeneous selfish pleasant feeling, whoever 
feels it and whatever objects or events are its sources.33
Rosen also argues in support of his reading that ‘when Bentham 
listed seven “elements” or “dimensions” of value (intensity, duration, 
certainty, propinquity, fecundity, purity and extent), he might have 
been referring to quantitative assessment, but the elements or dimen-
sions comprise different qualities of measurement concerning pleasure 
and pain’.34 He suggests that Bentham does not mean to imply that all of 
these qualitative dimensions of quantitative measurement can be added 
together to give a single sum total of pleasure or pain: ‘It would be difficult 
to weigh up the intensity and purity of a pleasure in one sum, though not 
impossible to suggest that one pleasure was more intense than another 
or purer [than another, in the sense that the one was mixed up with less 
pain than the other]’.35 But this is incompatible with what Bentham actu-
ally says in the fourth chapter of IPML, despite Rosen’s attempts to divert 
attention by stressing the incommensurabilities, the limitations of quan-
titative measurement, and Bentham’s failure to ‘provide any mathemat-
ical formula’ to clarify how to ‘“sum up” first pleasures and then pains’.36
According to Bentham, the value or quantity of a pleasure or pain 
per se is measured by considering the four dimensions of intensity, dura-
tion, certainty and propinquity. These four dimensions ‘are to be con-
sidered in estimating a pleasure or a pain considered each of them by 
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itself’.37 In other words: ‘To a person considered by himself, the value of a 
pleasure or pain considered by itself, will be greater or less, according to 
the four [dimensions].’38
Contrary to Rosen, these four ‘qualitative’ dimensions of quantity 
can be estimated and then put into a formula to calculate a single total 
quantity or value of pleasure or pain. Let x be the intensity of a homoge-
neous pleasant feeling P, estimated in terms of a cardinal scale of units 
of the feeling per period of time, with a larger number of units corre-
sponding to a more intense or stronger feeling; let y be the duration of 
P measured in terms of periods of time, say, minutes; w be the certainty 
of P measured in terms of the probability (on a scale of zero to one) of 
experiencing it; and z be the propinquity of P measured in terms of a 
discount rate that varies (on a scale of zero to one) depending on how 
near or distant the pleasant experience is expected to occur.39 Assuming 
for convenience that intensity is constant over the duration of P, we have:
V(P) = Q(P) = xywz (P)
where V(P) is the value of P, Q(P) is the total quantity of P, and xywz is 
the product of the four dimensions of quantity. An analogous formula 
applies to pain.
Bentham tells us that the remaining three dimensions of quantity 
come into play only in the hedonistic evaluation of actions or events: 
‘They are in strictness to be deemed properties only of the act, or other 
event, by which such pleasure or pain has been produced; and accord-
ingly only to be taken into the account of the tendency of such act or 
such event.’40 Fecundity and purity must be taken into account even if 
the action is a ‘self-regarding’ action that affects only the agent. To meas-
ure fecundity, the likelihood that the pleasure or pain that is directly and 
immediately produced by the action will be followed by other pleasures 
or pains respectively must be estimated. To measure purity, the likeli-
hood that the pleasure or pain first produced by the action will not be 
followed by pains or pleasures respectively must be estimated. The total 
value of the pains can then be deducted from the total value of pleasures 
so as to estimate the tendency of the action to yield net pleasure or net 
pain to the agent as the case may be. For Bentham, it seems, competent 
agents should be free to judge whether they should take a self-regarding 
action and to decide which of their possible self-regarding actions is best 
for promoting their own interests.
Extent (in addition to fecundity and purity) must be taken into 
account if the action, whether by a private individual or by a government 
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agent, is a social or ‘extra-regarding’ action that affects some number of 
other people by causing them, or those (including non-human sentient 
creatures) with whom they sympathize, to experience physical sensa-
tions of pleasure or pain. Bentham prescribes that such actions should 
be selected so as to promote the greatest possible degree of general hap-
piness.41 Although I cannot argue the point here, he seems to recom-
mend that democratic majorities or their representatives should have the 
authority to estimate the relevant sum totals of pleasures and pains for 
the community, and to take whatever social actions (including enacting 
laws, issuing judicial orders and so forth) are deemed best by them to 
promote the total collective pleasure net of total collective pain in light 
of the fact that multiple self-interested people are jointly affected by the 
measures.42 Notice that an action considered to be the best of all feasible 
social actions for the community can in some situations be an action that 
produces net collective pain or unhappiness: there is no possible alterna-
tive action that results in net collective pleasure.
The upshot is that Bentham does not recognize higher kinds of 
pleasant feelings that are intrinsically superior as pleasure to lower 
kinds, regardless of quantity. For him, pleasant feelings, including relief 
from pain, are homogeneous across their sources such that equal quan-
tities of pleasure are always of equal value. While it can vary in quan-
tity, the quantity of this homogeneous pleasant feeling experienced by 
any individual from any source can be calculated by considering the four 
‘qualitative’ dimensions of quantity as he recommends. The hedonistic 
tendency of any action or event can also be estimated by considering the 
remaining three dimensions of quantity as well.43
In contrast, Mill does recognize higher kinds of pleasant feelings 
that are superior in quality as pleasure to lower kinds of pleasant feelings. 
This is not the place to discuss in detail his doctrine of higher pleasures.44 
But he makes clear that by superiority in quality he means unlimited or 
infinite superiority: a higher kind of pleasant feeling is intrinsically more 
valuable as pleasure than a lower kind, irrespective of quantity. The test 
of quality in this sense is the judgement of most if not all people who are 
competently acquainted with both kinds of pleasures. Such people have 
cultivated the higher mental faculties required to experience the higher 
kind. Since human nature is capable of experiencing only finite amounts 
of any kind of pleasure, the lower pleasure, however large in quantity, can 
never be equal in value to the higher pleasure, however small in quantity.
The crucial point for our present purposes is that, for Mill, moral 
and aesthetic kinds of pleasures are superior in quality to selfish and base 
kinds. People whose characters are predominantly selfish and miserable 
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are not competent judges of these higher kinds of pleasures. Rather, 
competent judges of their quality must have developed moral and 
noble characters in which the higher mental faculties are cultivated and 
strengthened through habitual exercise. For most if not all of these indi-
viduals, as opposed to the predominantly selfish, the intensity of moral 
and aesthetic pleasures is raised to such a pitch that they are superior in 
quality to competing kinds of pleasures.45
Mill suggests that the kind of pleasant feeling that is a property 
of the moral sentiments, of which the sentiment of justice is the most 
important and sets the tone for the others – such as the sentiment of 
charity or kindness – is superior in quality as pleasure to any competing 
kinds of pleasures.46 This higher moral kind of pleasure, a feeling of secu-
rity, grows up around the idea of justice understood as a system of equal 
rights and duties distributed and sanctioned by a fundamental social 
code. The code and the political system that facilitate its construction 
and enforcement are the only source of this pleasant feeling of security. 
Security, he says, depends on the continuous ‘active play’ of the insti-
tutional ‘machinery’ of justice.47 Most, if not all, individuals who have 
cultivated their higher faculties will feel that this moral kind of pleasure 
is superior in quality to any competing selfish kinds, Mill argues. Such 
highly developed moral agents are competently acquainted with both 
kinds since the development of a moral character involves progressing 
beyond the selfish characters typical of uncultivated humans in civil soci-
eties. For most of these committed moral agents, the pleasant feelings of 
security are ‘so much more intense than those concerned in any of the 
more common cases of utility, that the difference in degree (as is often 
the case in psychology) becomes a real difference in kind’.48 The claim we 
have on others to cooperate ‘in making safe for us the very groundwork 
of our existence’ assumes for these people a virtually sacred importance: 
‘The claim assumes that character of absoluteness, that apparent infinity, 
and incommensurability with all other considerations, which constitute 
the distinction between the feeling of right and wrong and that of ordi-
nary expediency and inexpediency.’49
A key implication is the absolute importance of reasonable social 
codes of justice within Mill’s extraordinary hedonistic utilitarianism. In 
my view, his utilitarianism is concerned only to aggregate over individu-
als’ various preferences that rank alternative rules which are the possible 
sources of security. An optimal social code of equal rights and duties is 
gradually constructed and enforced by suitably competent participants in 
a democratic decision process. Individuals are free from coercion to pursue 
any kinds of pleasures (besides security) so long as they act in accordance 
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with their recognized rights and duties as the code is established under this 
process. For general security to be maximized, equal rights and duties of a 
specific content must be extended impartially to all competent adult mem-
bers of society and not only to some smaller peer group within society.50
In principle, the construction of an optimal social code of justice 
requires that participants in the democratic decision process should have 
developed their higher mental faculties. These include their capacities 
to sympathize impartially with other people and even with other species 
of animals, to construct and obey reasonable social rules of justice and 
morality designed to protect any human or other sentient creature from 
suffering harms that ought to be considered wrongs, to direct resentment 
and punishment against those who intentionally, knowingly, recklessly 
or negligently break the rules, and so on. But civil societies cannot wait 
for this social development process to be completed before establishing a 
social code of justice, even though any code selected in the meantime is 
virtually certain to be non-optimal. Mill, unlike Bentham, argues that as 
long as many if not most people remain predominantly selfish, the demo-
cratic decision process must include a liberal system of counter-majoritar-
ian checks and balances designed to discourage the majority oppression 
of minorities and to inject more expertise into majority decisions.51
Another key feature of Mill’s doctrine as interpreted follows from 
the fact that individuals are free to act in pursuit of any kinds of pleasures 
as long as they act in accord with their recognized rights and duties under 
the established code of justice. In particular, if genuine aesthetic pleasure 
does not compete with the moral pleasure of security and is even superior 
in quality to it, virtuous utilitarian martyrs are free to sacrifice their own 
lives to avoid the kind of aesthetic suffering that they expect to feel, and 
cannot tolerate, if they do not promote the general happiness by saving 
innocent others from severe harm, including death at the hands of third 
parties or natural forces. Most of us may be incapable of such supererog-
atory actions, and yet we can appreciate their beauty and sublimity.52
IV. Socrates dissatisfied
To appreciate how the claim that it is better to be Socrates dissatisfied 
can be compatible with hedonism, it is essential to take seriously Mill’s 
argument that there are higher pleasures whose quality or intrinsic tone 
is superior to that of lower pleasures, regardless of quantity, and that 
people who are competently acquainted with both kinds of pleasures rec-
ognize this qualitative difference and prefer the higher pleasure, ‘even 
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though knowing it to be attended with a greater amount of discontent’.53 
The argument has no logical connection to Stoicism. Nor can Stoicism 
per se justify Mill’s further claims: namely, that a noble individual who 
appreciates and seeks the higher pleasures will always fulfil his/her 
moral duties when it is feasible to do so; and that such a person may also 
take admirable supererogatory actions to promote the greater happiness 
of others even at the expense of his/her own life. Again, these further 
claims depend on Mill’s argument that there are heterogeneous kinds of 
pleasant feelings such that higher kinds are superior in quality to lower 
kinds, regardless of amount. Mill never embraces the Stoic principle that 
‘pain is no evil, and pleasure no good’.
This is not to say that the elements of Stoicism identified by Rosen 
exerted no influence whatsoever on Mill’s thinking. As a hedonist, how-
ever, Mill must provide a hedonistic argument to explain why an individ-
ual who is ultimately motivated by pleasure is moved by ‘Stoic themes, 
such as a love of liberty, independence, and a sense of dignity’.54 The req-
uisite hedonistic argument is supplied by the higher pleasures doctrine.
V. Voluntary personal sacrifices
If cultivated individuals who are competently acquainted with selfish 
pleasures as well as with the pleasant feelings that are properties of the 
moral sentiments always prefer in cases of conflict the moral pleasures, 
regardless of quantity, then hedonism supports the claim that such peo-
ple will always fulfil their moral duties whenever feasible, even when 
doing so is contrary to self-interest. Such individuals have developed a 
powerful will to do right, with disinterested demands always overriding 
any competing selfish desires. In other words, they have become moral 
agents with a powerful conscience. They may be said to have acquired 
a sense of moral dignity. For any such moral agent, the moral kind of 
pleasure always outweighs any amount of selfish discontent and incon-
venience that may result from fulfilling his/her duties to others. There is 
no suggestion that the selfish pains are not evils. But, for moral agents, 
the evils are always outweighed by the moral pleasure, including secur-
ity from moral pain afforded by doing one’s duty. In contrast, selfish 
individuals, who take immoral actions because they have not developed 
a powerful conscience that overrides their selfish desires in cases of 
conflict, know only one side of the question. They must cultivate their 
higher mental faculties before they can give a competent judgement as to 
whether moral pleasures are superior in quality to selfish ones.
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Now consider a possible hedonistic account of a noble person’s 
supererogatory choice to sacrifice his/her own life to promote the greater 
happiness of others. Such a person may take a higher aesthetic kind of 
pleasure, in no way incompatible with the moral pleasure of fulfilling 
his/her duties to others, in living up to a surpassing ideal of personal hon-
our and dignity that requires giving up his/her life when there is no other 
way to prevent innocents from losing their lives at the hands of third par-
ties or natural forces. This utilitarian saint makes the ultimate sacrifice so 
as to avoid the acute personal suffering that s/he knows would ruin his/
her life anyway, and would result from a failure to uphold his/her honour 
and dignity under these tragic conditions.
Notice that this hero’s voluntary sacrifice implies that his/her aes-
thetic pleasure, including exemption from suffering, exceeds any amount 
of competing pleasure that the person expects to feel in his/her remaining 
lifetime. Strictly speaking, s/he is not sacrificing his/her own happiness. 
Rather, the individual has a sublime idea of what personal happiness 
consists in. This person is so devoted to others as to be willing to give up 
his/her own life, although there is no duty to do so. Most of us, however, 
including committed moral agents as well as predominantly selfish ones, 
are likely to say that the person has sacrificed his/her personal happiness 
to promote the greater good of others.
Three further points may help to clarify this Millian hedonistic 
account of what motivates the cultivated individual to always voluntarily 
fulfil his/her moral duties and perhaps even to go beyond duty by sacri-
ficing his/her life to promote greater happiness for others. First, it cannot 
be argued consistently with hedonism that the individual is motivated 
by a sum total of collective happiness that neither s/he nor anyone else 
actually experiences or feels. To hold otherwise is just a way of circum-
venting hedonism.
Second, Mill explains how any competent individual who seeks 
pleasure can come through experience to desire virtue for its own sake. 
‘Happiness is not an abstract idea, but a concrete whole,’ he insists, and 
its concrete parts, such as fame, power, money and virtue, which are 
originally indifferent except as means to pleasure and exemption from 
pain, become desired for their own sake only once they are desired as a 
part of happiness:
And the utilitarian standard sanctions and approves their being so. 
Life would be a poor thing, very ill provided with sources of hap-
piness, if there were not this provision of nature, by which things 
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originally indifferent, but conducive to, or otherwise associated 
with, the satisfaction of our primitive desires [for food, shelter, sex, 
liberty, and so on], become in themselves sources of pleasure more 
valuable than the primitive pleasures, both in permanency, in the 
space of human existence that they are capable of covering, and 
even in intensity.55
Virtue is a very special ‘good of this description’, he emphasizes, in that 
it facilitates the attainment of many pleasures not only by ourselves but 
also by the other members of society, so that it can become strongly asso-
ciated with both personal happiness and general happiness. Utilitarian-
ism prescribes the cultivation of this association so as to generate a highly 
intense desire for virtue that will ‘surpass in strength all other desires’ in 
noble characters:
There was no original desire of [virtue], or motive to it, save its 
conduciveness to pleasure, and especially to protection from pain. 
But through the association thus formed, it may be felt as a good in 
itself … ; and with this difference between it and the love of money, 
of power, or of fame, that all of these may, and often do, render 
the individual noxious to the other members of the society to which 
he belongs, whereas there is nothing which makes him so much a 
blessing to them as the cultivation of the disinterested love of vir-
tue. And consequently, the utilitarian standard, while it tolerates 
and approves those other acquired desires, up to the point beyond 
which they would be more injurious to the general happiness than 
promotive of it, enjoins and requires the cultivation of the love of 
virtue up to the greatest strength possible, as being above all things 
important to the general happiness.56
The desire for moral virtue can and should be cultivated to a point where 
the moral kind of pleasure, including exemption from guilt and remorse, 
associated with fulfilling one’s duties to others whenever feasible, is felt 
as superior in quality to competing kinds, regardless of quantity. So too 
the desire for aesthetic virtue can permissibly be cultivated, consistent 
with moral duty, to a sublime point where an aesthetic kind of pleasure, 
including relief from dishonour and suffering, associated with taking 
supererogatory actions to promote greater happiness for others, is felt by 
utilitarian heroes or martyrs as superior in quality even to moral pleas-
ures alone.
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Mill makes it clear in the course of his hedonistic explanation of 
spontaneous virtue that he does not rely on the Stoic view that ‘pain is no 
evil, and pleasure no good’. As he emphasizes:
Those who desire virtue for its own sake, desire it either because 
the consciousness of it is a pleasure, or the consciousness of being 
without it is a pain, or for both reasons united; as in truth the pleas-
ure and pain seldom exist separately, but almost always together, 
the same person feeling pleasure in the degree of virtue attained, 
and pain in not having attained more. If one of these gave him no 
pleasure, and the other no pain, he would not love or desire virtue 
[for its own sake as a part of his happiness].57
Third, certain nuances are involved in Mill’s claim that his enlarged 
hedonistic utilitarianism makes room for martyrs who sacrifice even their 
lives to promote the greater happiness of others. For example, should a 
noble individual really sacrifice his/her life to save those of a large group 
of narrowly selfish individuals who are incapable of feeling guilt for vio-
lating others’ moral rights or of feeling gratitude for a supererogatory 
action that is likely to strike them as insane? If my reading is correct, 
it seems that Mill must concede that a person of noble character, who 
appreciates that moral and aesthetic pleasures are more desirable as 
pleasures than selfish pleasures, regardless of quantity, should not make 
such a sacrifice to promote the purely selfish happiness of others, regard-
less of how much aggregate selfish pleasure including relief from pain 
can be promoted by that sacrifice.
Much more needs to be said to elucidate Mill’s hedonistic concep-
tion of human happiness. He clearly prescribes that competent individ-
uals can and should cultivate their higher faculties so as to pursue a life 
comprised of higher moral and aesthetic pleasures: ‘According to the 
Greatest Happiness Principle,’ he says, ‘the ultimate end, with reference 
to and for the sake of which all other things are desirable (whether we 
are considering our own good or that of other people), is an existence 
exempt as far as possible from pain, and as rich as possible in enjoy-
ments, both in point of quantity and quality.’58 In other words, happiness 
approaches as nearly as possible what he calls in On Liberty a ‘Greek 
ideal’ of self-development, that is, a noble personal character or individ-
uality.59 Unfortunately, tragic situations can arise in which innocent indi-
viduals are confronted with grave harms from unjust people or natural 
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calamities. True, cultivated people voluntarily recognize their moral 
duties to provide reasonable help, but such duties do not demand that 
they sacrifice their own lives. Even so, Mill’s hedonism accommodates his 
claim that a saintly individual can freely take supererogatory actions by 
waiving his/her moral rights, including the right to life, to promote the 
happiness of others in these situations. But nobody, he admits, can legit-
imately be forced to take such sublime actions. The use of force would 
be immoral since it would violate the individual’s moral rights, which by 
assumption have not been waived. Given that there is not a moral duty to 
waive one’s rights to save others or safeguard their rights, does it follow 
that, for Mill, there is not a moral duty to maximize general happiness? 
Not necessarily, because people are not morally required to be saints, and 
the failure to take a sublime saintly action is not wrongful. People who 
fail to take such an action do not themselves inflict a moral kind of suffer-
ing on others, whereas forcing them to act does inflict the moral kind of 
pain on them, and inflicting even a bit of moral suffering can never be jus-
tified as a way to prevent any amount of non-moral pain, however large.
Other questions of interpretation surround Mill’s conception of 
happiness and its implications for whether he is properly regarded as 
some unusual form of act utilitarian. For example, similar questions arise 
in connection with his absolute ban on coercive interference with self- 
regarding conduct.60 But I cannot add here to these brief remarks relating 
to his idea of happiness and the form of his utilitarianism.
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Individualist and Totalizing Ethical 
Thinking in Mill’s Utilitarianism
John Charvet
I. Introductory remarks
This essay is a piece of ethical theorizing carried on through an exami-
nation of what Mill has to say about the relations of utility, equality and 
morality in his Utilitarianism. Since this approach to the study of Mill’s 
work is certainly not in the spirit of Professor Rosen’s important new 
study of Mill’s ideas and may appear to be expressly rejected by him, I 
begin with a few introductory remarks regarding my method.
In his new book, Professor Rosen says that for students of Mill’s 
thought to concentrate on his three major essays  –  On Liberty, Utilitarianism 
and Considerations – cannot by itself provide satisfactory accounts of the 
issues discussed by Mill in these works. This is because to do so ignores 
what Mill has to say in his System of Logic and his Principles of Economics 
on the ends and methods of the scientific study of human well-being.1 
Rosen claims that ‘we should be approaching On Liberty (and many of 
his other essays) as an attempt to explore the causal conditions … for the 
development of active character and the associated evolving possibilities 
for human flourishing in the widest possible sense’.2 Nevertheless, Rosen 
acknowledges that Mill is committed to the belief, arrived at through the 
exercise of the ‘art of life’, that, in Mill’s words quoted by Rosen, ‘the gen-
eral principle to which all rules of conduct ought to conform, and the test 
by which they should be tried, is that of conduciveness to the happiness 
of mankind … that the promotion of happiness is the ultimate principle of 
teleology’.3 So Rosen is not denying that for Mill the principle of utility is 
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the ultimate standard by which to judge human practices. His claim is that 
‘the content of happiness is not especially determinate – it is not a stand-
ard against which we can measure sets of relationships in detail – allowing 
us to make maximizing conclusion’.4 This is because happiness as the end 
is always open to further and deeper exploration, and the content of what 
best satisfies the end is evolving over time and according to changes in our 
understanding of it. In particular, the science of ethology, discussed in his 
System of Logic, is crucial for the production of the empirical evidence to 
support judgements that such and such social arrangements best satisfy 
the end. Furthermore, these judgements, according to Rosen’s Mill, will 
not be universal prescriptions but relative to time and place and national 
character.
I do not think that my method and assumptions in the following 
essay conflict with Rosen’s broad conclusions about the character and 
content of Mill’s work. It is common ground between us that Mill’s ethical 
thought has as its foundation the greatest happiness principle. Rosen’s 
contribution to an understanding of that principle is to show how flexible, 
relative and, consequently, indeterminate Mill envisaged its application 
to be. With regard to the deepening and evolving sense of the content of 
that principle, Mill’s essays On Liberty and Utilitarianism have much to 
say. They show how virtue and individuality can come to be understood 
as part of the final end of happiness and hence pursued for their own sake 
and not as a means to happiness. With regard to a substantive sense of 
equality in Utilitarianism, Mill’s claims are different. This sense of equal-
ity is, Mill believes, part of the very meaning of the greatest happiness 
principle. It is not a content that comes to be associated with happiness 
and then identified as part of the end. To understand the meaning and 
moral obligation of the greatest happiness principle is to recognize that 
this substantive equality is morally required.
One of my claims in the following essay is that the movement of 
Mill’s thought towards his conclusion as to the egalitarian meaning of 
the greatest happiness principle is confused and mistaken. This failure 
of Mill leaves the greatest happiness principle unprotected because it 
is unqualified, as a maximizing principle. Professor Rosen is, no doubt, 
right that the content of what is to be maximized is open to all of the 
qualifications he makes. However, my concern is primarily with the 
ethical status of a maximizing principle, such as the greatest happiness 
principle, rather more than with how its content is to be determined. I 
contrast maximizing, or what my title refers to as totalizing, principles 
with individualist ones. The latter do in fact introduce a strong equal-
ity principle in their foundations. That is why Mill’s attempt and failure 
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to attach such an egalitarian meaning to his foundational principle is of 
such interest to me. In the end, this essay is just a piece of ethical theoriz-
ing carried out with reference to Mill’s Utilitarianism. I do not think that 
what it attributes to Mill or what criticisms it makes of Mill are incompat-
ible with Professor Rosen’s much broader and deeper understanding of 
Mill’s thought. The essay makes no claims to characterize Mill’s thinking 
in general. It is concerned only with Mill’s attempt in Utilitarianism to 
analyse the meaning and justification of the utilitarian principle.
II. The meaning of the terms
By totalizing ethical thinking, I mean a conception of ethics that identi-
fies the ethical claims of an individual in terms of his/her contribution 
to a larger good such as the good of the nation, the workers, humanity, 
the actualization of reason or the general happiness. An example of such 
totalizing ethics is Hastings Rashdall’s view that the greater capacity for 
high culture of white men in the modern age may justify the sacrifice of 
the lower well-being of countless Chinese or Africans for the sake of the 
higher life of a much smaller number of white men (he was writing in 
1924). The good on this view is the maximization of well-being under-
stood in terms of quantity and quality of life. In this total, the higher life 
‘counts as intrinsically, in and for itself, more valuable than lower life’.5 
One reason why Mill avoided making such an ethically unsound, and 
now hugely politically incorrect, claim, despite sharing Rashdall’s views 
on higher and lower life, was because of his belief that everyone is cap-
able of participating in the higher life.6
By individualist ethical thinking, I mean a conception of ethics that 
holds that a just order of society must aim at promoting and protecting 
the fundamental interests of each individual. This formulation should 
not be interpreted as being limited to a description of liberal individualist 
ethics. It is perfectly compatible with illiberal and hierarchical concep-
tions of a just social order. The classic example of an illiberal but individ-
ualist ethics is Plato’s Republic. It satisfies my individualist ethical idea 
because Plato claims to show how his conception of a just society is in the 
best interests of each member of society. Its hierarchical order is the one 
best suited to enable each class of person to live a good life given their 
natural capacities. Rashdall rejects such a view. The higher life of white 
men may make no contribution to the life of the lower types. Indeed, it 
may require the sacrifice of the interests of the lower types so that the 
others may flourish.
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In my formulation of an individualist ethics, the ethical claims of 
individuals to have their fundamental interests respected in the social 
order does not oppose – at least potentially – the individual’s interests 
to the good of the whole. From an ethical point of view, the good of the 
whole is to be arrived at through the order that promotes and protects the 
fundamental interests of each member. To be plausible, such an ethics 
requires the belief that the whole will flourish best through its ethical for-
mation. In the Platonic tradition, this harmony between the interests of 
the individual members and the interests of the whole society is secured 
through its functionalist conception of the social order. The members of 
each class best secure their fundamental interests in the good life by ful-
filling a social function that is appropriate to them and through which the 
good of the whole is achieved.7 In the liberal individualist tradition based 
on the equal status in the social order of each member, the good of the 
whole is arrived at by securing to each person the means whereby all can 
take responsibility for their individual and collective lives and achieve a 
greater well-being than they would achieve under a paternalist, hierar-
chical order.
It should be noted that this formulation of a liberal individualist 
ethics cannot be based on a foundational principle such as the claim that 
individuals are ends in themselves and beings of absolute worth. Such 
a foundational principle is the contrary of the totalizing ethical idea. 
Whereas the latter annihilates the independent ethical status of the indi-
vidual, the ‘Kantian’ formula annihilates the independent ethical claims 
of the social whole.8 Obviously, any adequate ethics must align the two.
My conception of ethical individualism builds a kind of equality 
into the very idea of an ethical order. This is an equality of respect for 
the fundamental interests of each member of society. The argument in 
this paper is that Mill’s conception of utilitarianism is initially expressed 
in totalizing terms but that he seeks to avoid the unacceptable implica-
tions of the totalizing idea through two strategies. One is by claiming 
that the required equality is contained in the utilitarian idea itself or is 
the inevitable product of the advance of civilization; the second is by 
distinguishing the foundational principle of utility from secondary or 
derivative principles and motivations. Neither succeeds. The failure of 
the latter covers well-trodden ground. The failure of the former is more 
interesting. It shows that Mill recognizes that utilitarian ethics is accept-
able only if it incorporates the ethical individualist idea. But the two are 
not compatible.
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III. Mill’s attachment to the totalizing idea
Mill’s initial formulation of the principle of utility, or the greatest hap-
piness principle, is clearly totalizing in form. The principle is said to be 
the foundation of morals and holds that actions are ‘right in proportion 
as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the 
reverse of happiness’.9 This happiness is not the agent’s own happiness 
but the greatest amount of happiness altogether.10 In order to arrive at 
this total, the agent must be as strictly impartial between his/her own 
happiness and that of others as a disinterested and benevolent specta-
tor.11 If you are trying to maximize a total and you are required to be 
indifferent to the distribution of the elements of the total between dif-
ferent individuals, you will in effect be treating the different individuals 
as different parts of one composite individual. A pain to individual X will 
then count only as a pain in part X of the composite individual C and 
may be compensated for by a greater pleasure to individual Y.12 However, 
this interpretation supposes that the impartial spectator is required to 
be indifferent to the distribution of pains and pleasures between people. 
If each individual had a basic right to a certain amount of pleasure – for 
instance, an equal amount – the impartiality condition would have to 
take that distributive entitlement into account. But at this point there is 
no mention in Mill of such a basic right.
In the above supposition, the good of X – his/her freedom from 
pain – is being sacrificed for the sake of a greater pleasure accruing to Y 
and thus the achievement of a larger total surplus of pleasure over pain. 
That such a sacrifice is envisaged by Mill is made explicit in his discussion 
of the acceptability of self-sacrificial actions within the utilitarian phil-
osophy. The state of the world may be such that what a utilitarian agent 
had most reason to do would be to renounce happiness for her/himself in 
order to serve the happiness of others.13 This renunciation of happiness 
would be justified by the good consequences for others and its conform-
ity with the greatest happiness principle. The action would be the right 
one according to that principle. Indeed, Mill calls it an action of the high-
est virtue. Nevertheless, despite what he says later about virtuous moti-
vation, here he wants the utilitarian agent to sacrifice his/her happiness, 
not for the sake of virtue, but for the sake of the gains to others.
It is true that Mill considers such a state of the world to be a bad 
one and views the advance of civilization as eliminating the conditions 
in which self-sacrifice is required by the utilitarian principle. This might 
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suggest that Mill believes self-sacrifice to be bad over and above the 
reduction of happiness in the total sum; that it is bad in itself that any-
one should have to sacrifice his/her happiness for others. On a strictly 
totalizing account of the situation, the only deplorable aspect would be 
that a greater total net happiness could have been achieved by eliminat-
ing poverty and other causes of unhappiness. But if self-sacrifice were 
bad in itself within a happiness-based philosophy, it would have to be 
so because it would involve the sacrifice of something such as an indi-
vidual’s basic right to a certain level of happiness, and again there is no 
suggestion here of such a right.
Mill says that the advance of civilization involves a move towards 
social equality and the harmonization of interests. His account of this 
progress towards equality and harmony is part of his argument regarding 
the sufficiency of the utilitarian sanction. It is the claim that the feeling 
of duty, which can come to be associated with the idea of the general 
happiness, is capable of being sufficiently strong to motivate the mem-
bers of a society of utilitarians because of its connection with a powerful 
nat ural sentiment. These strong natural sentiments are the social feel-
ings of mankind – by which he means the desire to be in unity with one’s 
fellow creatures. Mill believes that the social state is so ‘natural, neces-
sary and habitual’ that the individual doesn’t normally think of her/him-
self as a separate entity but as a member of a social body. Only through 
an un usual effort of abstraction can a person think of her/himself as an 
independent individual.
Mill says that, except in the case of the relation between master and 
slave, the social state is impossible, other than on the basis of the con-
sultation of everyone’s interests. However, this formulation is compat-
ible with the totalizing interpretation of the utility principle. In order to 
arrive at the greatest happiness, everyone’s interests must be considered. 
But such consideration does not exclude the conclusion that, in order to 
achieve the greatest happiness, X’s interests in happiness must be sacri-
ficed for the sake of the greater benefit accruing to A, B and C.
Mill moves immediately from the requirement to consult every-
one’s interests to that of regarding them equally. His idea is that a soci-
ety of equals must require that the members’ interests be accorded equal 
consideration. While he recognizes that relations of inequality are to 
be found in most societies, he claims that in every society, everyone is 
obliged to live on terms of equality with some others (except for abso-
lute monarchs) and in every age some advance is made towards a state 
in which it will be impossible to live on any other terms with anyone. 
History or civilization is, thus, moving in the direction of bringing about a 
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society of equals. Unfortunately, this claim still doesn’t exclude the total-
izing interpretation. Everyone’s interest must be counted and an equal 
weight given to each. But in calculating which social arrangement will 
produce the greatest sum of net pleasures, the possibility of overriding 
some people’s interest in happiness for the sake of a greater gain in hap-
piness to others is still not excluded. I do not doubt that by a society of 
equals, Mill had in mind one in which the social status and the condition 
of the members were more or less equal and that the possibility of over-
riding them was of no significance. However, what I am taking issue with 
here is not what sort of society Mill was expecting and hoping to ensue 
through the progress of civilization, but the adequacy of his understand-
ing of the principle of utility as the ethical foundation of this progress. 
What I am claiming is that nothing he has said so far in explicating this 
principle effectively qualifies the totalizing interpretation of it.
Thus, although he says that, in this march towards equality, the 
developing sense of unity with one’s fellows will lead people to be ‘under 
a necessity of conceiving themselves as at least abstaining from all 
grosser injuries’ – which suggests their recognition of some basic rights 
of a negative character – yet his conclusion as to the nature of the end 
state of this process is a striking formulation of the totalizing ethical idea. 
He says that:
in an improving state of the human mind, the influences are con-
stantly on the increase, which tend to generate in each individual a 
feeling of unity with all the rest; which, if perfect, would make him 
never think of, or desire, any beneficial condition for himself, in the 
benefits of which they are not included.14
Normally, one would think that, given the diversity of things different 
people find pleasure in pursuing, a desirable state of the world would 
be one in which they have the freedom to cultivate their own interests 
without having to claim that all others must benefit from their activities. 
Usually, a person who enjoys watching football matches or performances 
of ballet does not think everyone else must also do so. A state of the world 
in which the contrary holds would amount to one in which each person 
saw her/himself as part of a larger composite person, such that a benefit 
to individual/part X would be a gain to the whole and so to the other 
individuals/parts because together they constitute a single ethical entity. 
Such is the attraction of the totalizing idea for Mill that he comes up with 
this formulation of an ideal future state of humanity even when he rec-
ognizes that the development of the appropriate feelings might ‘interfere 
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unduly with human freedom and individuality’.15 What, in my view, the 
member of a free society – in which individuals have rights to pursue 
their own interests, within definable limits, without regard to the conse-
quences for others – should be able to think is that my freedom is a good 
for me as part of a general scheme of freedom that is also a good for all of 
the other participants.
It is relevant to note here that Mill’s account of the progress of civi-
lization towards the harmonization of interests is historical and psycho-
logical in character. It aims to show that civilization is actually moving 
in the direction required by the operation of the utilitarian principle and 
that motivationally it is possible for human beings to be moved to action 
by it. The account is not at this point an exploration of the ethical idea of 
the principle of utility as the foundation of morals. Yet his account throws 
light on what he thinks is involved in that idea. He believes that the prin-
ciple of utility must incorporate, and that the movement of history is in 
the process of incorporating, an important notion of equality. But, so far 
he has not been able to formulate a conception of that equality that liber-
ates it from the totalizing interpretation.
IV. Mill’s account of the relation of equality and utility in 
chapter 5 of Utilitarianism
In this chapter, Mill is concerned to show that although the sentiment 
of justice is distinctive among the moral sentiments through its strength 
and closeness of association with the individual’s own well-being, these 
facts do not require us to think of justice as a principle independent of 
utility. Mill spends some time analysing the sentiment of justice because 
he thinks that therein lies the clue to the peculiar importance attached to 
the idea of justice as standard that leads thinkers to assert the claims of 
principles of justice over those of utility. The notion of justice is associated 
with a peculiarly strong natural sentiment, namely the natural feeling of 
retaliation or vengeance for harms done to us or to those with whom we 
identify our interests. But it is not clear that he needs this analysis. When 
he comes to distinguish the just from the expedient, he does not appeal 
to such a natural sentiment, but argues that justice is ‘a name for certain 
classes of moral rule, which concern the essentials of human well-being 
more nearly, and are therefore of more absolute obligation, than any 
other rules for the guidance of life’.16 These are rules that forbid human 
beings from hurting one another, including hurting them by wrongfully 
interfering with their freedom. They are, therefore, more vital to human 
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well-being than rules for the best management of ‘some department of 
human affairs’. Such rules are important not only because they prevent 
individuals from harming each other but because in so doing they consti-
tute ‘the main element in determining the whole of the social feelings of 
mankind’.17 They preserve the peace without which ‘everyone would see 
in everyone else an enemy, against whom he must be perpetually guard-
ing himself’.18 Furthermore, for the above reasons, they are the rules that 
human beings have the most interest in impressing on each other and in 
demanding each other’s compliance with them.
In effect, Mill is distinguishing the rules of justice from the rules of 
utility more generally on the grounds of their containing a far greater 
degree of utility for human beings than other rules. On this view, the prin-
ciple of utility justifies secondary rules, some of which we come to call 
rules of justice because of their peculiar importance for human well-be-
ing and the peculiar obligation we attach to their observance. This is one 
way in which one might seek to introduce an individualist ethical prin-
ciple into a utilitarian theory: in order to maximize human well-being, 
we need to ensure that everyone’s fundamental interests are protected 
and promoted. I will be considering the adequacy of such a strategy in 
the next section. In the rest of this section, I will examine a quite different 
strategy of Mill’s: his attempt to construe the principle of utility itself so 
as to include a strong principle of equality, not as a secondary rule, but in 
its very meaning.
He begins his account of the relation of equality and utility by treat-
ing equality as a corollary of the fundamental maxims of justice. Thus, ‘it 
is a duty to do to each according to his deserts, returning good for good 
as well as repressing evil by evil’, from which maxim he says that ‘it neces-
sarily follows that we should treat all equally well (when no higher duty 
forbids) who have deserved equally well of us, and that society should 
treat all equally well who have deserved equally well of it, that is, who 
have deserved equally well absolutely’. He claims that this formula is 
‘the highest abstract standard of social and distributive justice; towards 
which all institutions and the efforts of all virtuous citizens should be 
made in the utmost possible degree to converge’.19
How this formula of equality would work out in terms of my individ-
ualist ethical principle would depend on what one believes about people’s 
fundamental deserts. But in any case, since he has just denied that the 
standard of justice is independent of utility, this logical corollary of the 
maxims of justice would amount only to a corollary of ‘secondary or deriv-
ative doctrines’.20 Yet this suggestion is what he immediately denies. He 
says that ‘this great moral duty rests upon a still deeper foundation, being 
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a direct emanation from the first principle of morals’, that it ‘is involved 
in the very meaning of Utility, or the Greatest Happiness Principle’.21 His 
explanation of how this is so, however, is merely a reformulation of the 
totalizing interpretation of the principle of utility. ‘That principle is a 
mere form of words without rational signification, unless one person’s 
happiness supposed equal in degree (with the proper allowance made 
for kind), is counted for exactly as much as another’s’ and he goes on 
to quote Bentham’s well-known dictum regarding the principle of utility, 
‘everybody to count for one and nobody for more than one’.22
The note Mill supplies to his introduction of Bentham’s dictum, 
aimed at defending the principle of utility’s adequacy as a sufficient guide 
to right against Herbert Spencer, illuminates the totalizing aspect of the 
above formulas. He says that the principle of utility, rather than presup-
posing, as Spencer claims, that everybody has an equal right to happi-
ness, ‘may be more correctly described as supposing that equal amounts 
of happiness are equally desirable, whether felt by the same or different 
persons’. This, he says, is not a premise necessary to support the principle 
of utility but the very principle itself. It shows, he goes on, that ‘the truths 
of arithmetic are applicable to the valuation of happiness’.23 Recall that 
by a totalizing ethical principle, I mean one that identifies a person’s fun-
damental ethical claims in terms of his/her contribution to a total, such 
as the general happiness, and that this understanding of ethics allows 
an overriding of some people’s fundamental interests for the sake of a 
greater total. Such an overriding could be ethically acceptable only if, in 
calculating the total good, such as happiness, it doesn’t fundamentally 
matter whether a certain stream of happiness or unhappiness accrues to 
person X or person Y. From the point of view of maximizing the total, 
X and Y are interchangeable. They are merely aspects of the composite 
person who is, so to speak, the owner of the totality of the experiences of 
his/her parts.
However, it is obvious from what Mill immediately goes on to say 
about the implications of the equality formulas he has just expressed, 
that he has no idea that they do not protect an individual’s fundamental 
interest in happiness from being overridden in the above way. For after 
stating them, he continues thus:
the equal claim of everybody to happiness in the estimation of the 
moralist and of the legislator, involves an equal claim to all the 
means of happiness, except, insofar as the inevitable conditions of 
human life, and the general interest, in which that of every individ-
ual is included, set limits to the maxim.24
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Effectively, Mill is supposing that there is no difference between the claim 
that equal amounts of happiness are equally desirable and the claim that 
everybody has an equal right to happiness and the means to happiness. 
He cannot see that the first is not essentially a claim about the rights of 
separate individuals but about streams of happiness wherever they may 
occur, while the second is essentially a claim that there are separate indi-
viduals and that each such individual has as much right to happiness as 
anyone else. It would seem to follow that if the equal distribution of hap-
piness and the means to happiness had the effect of lowering the total 
amount of net happiness, nevertheless this reduction would be ethically 
right. In this case, Mill would be affirming an individualist ethical prin-
ciple as contained in the very meaning of the principle of utility.
It might be argued that Mill’s affirmation of an equal right to hap-
piness and the means to happiness does not mean the same as having 
a right to equal happiness and equal means. All it involves is the claim 
that everyone equally has a right to some happiness but not necessarily 
an equal happiness. However, given that Mill immediately qualifies this 
equal right by allowing for justifying inequalities, it is obvious that his 
baseline equality is a substantive right to equal happiness from which 
departures may be justified.
Such departures are justified if they are required by the inevitable 
conditions of human life and the general interest. I take this qualification 
to involve the idea that, since some kind of political and legal order is 
necessary for the peaceful association from which everybody benefits, 
the inequalities that arise from such developments may be justified. The 
general interest, he says, includes everybody’s interest. This could be 
given a totalizing interpretation: everybody’s interest in their happiness 
is included in the calculation of the maximizing total. But in the imme-
diate context of his affirmation of a basic equal right, the individualist 
understanding of the general interest seems more appropriate. On that 
view, the inequalities would be justified only if everybody gains.
My claim in this section is that Mill has come round to the idea that 
the principle of utility can and should be expressed in terms of an indi-
vidualist ethics that guarantees to each person an equal right to have 
their fundamental interest in their happiness promoted and protected in 
the social order. My claim is also that Mill is mistaken in thinking that 
an unqualified greatest happiness principle is identical to the individu-
alist principle. The former attaches no fundamental ethical significance 
to the distinction between persons; the latter makes that distinction the 
foundation of any satisfactory ethics. Does Mill’s confusion on this point 
really matter? Can’t we just say that Mill clearly approves of a social 
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order constructed on individualist ethical lines and dismiss his tendency 
to accept totalizing formulations of the greatest happiness principle? It 
depends what we are interested in. If our concern is with the foundations 
of ethics, then Mill’s confusions are clearly important.
V. Mill’s appeals to secondary or derivative principles
Mill introduces the idea of secondary, derivative or subordinate ethical 
considerations at various points in his argument. They are designed to 
mitigate an interpretation of the greatest happiness principle that its 
critics seek to pin on its advocates. This is the totalizing interpretation. 
However, if Mill thought he had shown how the utility principle included 
in its very meaning the fundamentals of his ethical opponents’ views, 
there would have been no need for him to seek to develop these indir-
ect strategies. Such indirect strategies presuppose the correctness of the 
totalizing interpretation in the first instance and then seek to show how 
challenges to its supposed consequences can be defeated. This is another 
aspect of Mill’s confusion on the foundations of ethics. In my discussion 
of these strategies, however, I shall ignore Mill’s attempts to render them 
pointless, which I have covered in the previous section, and take them 
seriously as ways of avoiding the implications of a totalizing ethics.
His first move, however, is against critics of the utilitarian idea who 
think it involves too demanding an ethics. Mill represents them as claim-
ing that utilitarianism requires ethical agents always to act from a motive 
of promoting the general interests of society. If the standard of right and 
wrong for an ethical agent is the effect of acts on the general happiness, 
then it is not an unnatural interpretation of that idea to believe that it 
requires such agents to be motivated to promote the general happiness. 
Whether one thinks that this interpretation should be rebutted because 
it mistakenly demands too exacting an ethical motivation of human 
beings or because it would lead them to pursue arrangements that are 
morally unacceptable, the reason for the objection is the same on both 
views: utili tarianism requires ethical agents always to be motivated by 
the desire to promote the greatest happiness.
Mill’s rebuttal of this interpretation of the utilitarian ethic consists 
in distinguishing between utilitarianism as providing the standard of 
morality and as determining the best rules of action from the motive of 
agents in following the rules laid down by the standard.25 Clearly, some-
one has to be directly motivated by the maximizing utilitarian idea on 
this view in order for the best rules of action to be designed. But, once the 
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rules are in place, the ordinary member of society need be motivated only 
by respect for the rules. The moral rules may thus satisfy in one way or 
another the claims of each individual to have his/her fundamental inter-
ests recognized in accordance with the ethical individualist idea and the 
ordinary human being may be motivated to comply with the rules solely 
from respect for such claims and without regard to the consequences of 
their particular acts. It is not very clear from Mill’s account of this distinc-
tion whether the difference between totalizing utilitarian thinking and 
the motivations of common-sense morality is one that arises in each per-
son at different times or involves a distinction between classes of person. 
Bernard Williams attributed the latter view to Sidgwick and pilloried it 
as the Government House morality of British colonial administrators.26 R. 
M. Hare calls the two types of ethical thinking archangelic and proletar-
ian and thinks that each person can and should at different and appropri-
ate times engage in each.27 The standard reasons why such utilitarians as 
Hare think that we should, for the most part, operate as proletarians in 
our moral thinking is that making a success of the archangelic standpoint 
requires less imperfect information about the consequences of particu-
lar acts than human beings normally possess and less morally weak and 
self-interested agents than human beings usually are.
There is clearly much to be said for some such distinction. Even 
ethical individualists usually recognize that, in some extreme circum-
stances, it may be necessary to act contrary to our ordinary moral obli-
gations and lie, steal or kill the innocent in order to avoid a much greater 
evil. However, the difference, at this point, between the archangelic utili-
tarian and the ethical individualist is that the former is knowingly act-
ing in accordance with his/her understanding of the most fundamental 
ethical principle while the ethical individualist knows that s/he is acting 
contrary to his/her fundamental ethical beliefs. The utilitarian archan-
gel remains the ideal moral agent from a utilitarian perspective. But this 
is far from being the case for the ethical individualist. This claim needs 
explaining, which I will do in my final section. In the rest of this section 
I shall show, very briefly, that the other indirect strategies to which Mill 
appeals raise the same issue.
In Chapter 4 of Utilitarianism, in which Mill offers a proof of the 
greatest happiness principle, he begins by allowing that people desire 
other things as ends besides happiness.28 For instance, some people desire 
virtue or money for their own sake. Such things are not naturally ends, 
however. They are means to happiness in the first instance. Nevertheless, 
Mill claims that it is good that virtue should come to be desired for its 
own sake. Indeed, he says that:
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the mind is not in a right state, not in a state conformable to Utility, 
not in the state most conducive to the general happiness, unless it 
does love virtue … as a thing desirable in itself, even though, in 
the individual instance, it should not produce other desirable con-
sequences which it tends to produce, and on account of which it is 
held to be virtue.29
This passage strongly suggests that the endorsement of virtue as an end 
to be pursued for its own sake is an indirect strategy for maximizing util-
ity. However, in accordance with his psychological hedonism, Mill holds 
that one cannot desire something as an end unless one comes to associate 
one’s own happiness with the present enjoyment of that thing and one’s 
unhappiness with its absence. Virtue, or whatever one comes to desire as 
an end, becomes part of how one understands happiness. So, one doesn’t 
desire it as distinct from happiness. This line of argument suggests that 
desiring virtue for its own sake is not a means to maximizing utility but an 
essential part of the final end. Hence, it is not an indirect strategy. How-
ever, virtue for its own sake as part of happiness is only one’s own happi-
ness, not the general happiness, and virtue in this sense (common-sense 
morality) may come into conflict with what is required for the general 
happiness. At this point, the utilitarian ethical thinker should, if possible, 
adopt the archangelic standpoint, which conflicts with, yet necessarily 
trumps from a utilitarian perspective, the standpoint of virtue. It is true, 
as we have seen above, that Mill believes the progress of civilization will 
lead to a greater and greater alignment by each person of his/her happi-
ness with the happiness of everyone else, but that very idea is the product 
of a totalizing imagination and is in itself absurdly unrealistic.
The upshot of this discussion of the status of virtue for Mill in the 
promotion of the greatest happiness is that it really only makes sense as 
an indirect strategy and that this strategy preserves the primacy of the 
archangelic ethical agent. In the final chapter of Utilitarianism, in which 
Mill discusses the relation of the rules of justice to the principle of utility, 
this primacy of the totalizing perspective of the archangel over the indir-
ect strategy is quite explicit. The rules of justice, as we have seen, are the 
most important secondary principles for the achievement of the great-
est happiness. They concern ‘the essentials of human well-being more 
nearly … than any other rules for the guidance of life’. However, the dic-
tates of justice are many and conflicting and there is much difference of 
opinion among individuals in the same society and between societies as 
to how these conflicts should be ordered. ‘From these confusions,’ Mill 
says, ‘there is no other mode of extrication than the utilitarian.’30 In other 
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words, we have to call in the archangel to resolve these disputes by pro-
viding a totalizing perspective on them.
VI. Some concluding thoughts on the relation between 
the individualist principle and the greatest happiness 
principle (PU)
The usual criticism of indirect utilitarianism is that its strategy requires 
individuals to be motivated for the most part by non-utilitarian consider-
ations: they should respect the rules of common-sense morality without 
regard to the consequences. Yet, at the same time they must hold them-
selves ready to adopt the totalizing perspective of the unqualified utili-
tarian agent. If this means that the ethical agent must be moved to act by 
both anti-utilitarian and pro-utilitarian commitments at the same time, 
then this is not a possible moral psychology. It is, of course, possible for an 
agent to follow rules from a utilitarian inspiration that if generally adopted 
would be likely to produce the greatest utility while overriding the rules 
when the principle of utility demands it. In that case, a certain amount of 
rule-following is incorporated into the judgements of the totalizing utili-
tarian agent. Rule and act utilitarianism become extensionally equivalent 
and the ethical motivations of the agent will be utilitarian throughout.
However, rather than follow that line of argument any further, I 
shall return to the point raised in the previous section: even the anti-utili-
tarian ethical individualist will need to recognize that on occasion it may 
be necessary to lie, to seize people’s property or kill the innocent in order 
to avoid a greater evil. But the ethical individualist knows that such acts 
violate his/her ethical principles and need some special explanation and 
justification, while the utilitarian agent should be able to see them as part 
of normal ethical commitment. In what follows I shall sketch a way of 
understanding the ethical individualist position that throws a different 
light on the relation between the ethical principles and general utility. 
It is fundamental to this approach to see the principles as governing the 
choice of a basic structure of social institutions under which a collection 
of people commit themselves to associate, or in other words to interact 
in pursuit of their interests. Recall that in essence the ethical individu-
alist position is the commitment to associate on terms that protect and 
promote the fundamental interests of each associate. This excludes only 
such totalizing proposals as Rashdall’s willingness to sacrifice the hap-
piness of untold numbers of Africans and Chinese for the higher life of 
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a much smaller number of white men. It doesn’t exclude the hierarchi-
cal, paternalistic and inegalitarian arrangements proposed by Plato and 
countless others.
Why are Rashdall’s proposals unacceptable but not Plato’s? Those 
whose happiness will be sacrificed to promote the well-being of some 
others under Rashdall’s scheme are perfectly capable of understanding 
what is being proposed and can see that there is nothing in it for them, 
whereas under Plato’s idea of a just republic, everyone is supposed to be 
the best off that they could be (except, possibly, the philosophers). But 
this answer presupposes a fundamental individualism. The basic unit to 
which an ethical scheme is accountable or has to be justified is the human 
individual. On Rashdall’s view, it is some collective or abstract identity. 
So, it is justifiable to the individual losers if every individual’s correct 
identity, including that of the losers, is a vehicle for this greater being. No 
human individual is properly understood as an end in itself but only as 
the means through which this higher life is actualized.
However, even on my Rawlsian suggestion as to how we should 
think of possible ethical principles – namely as the terms of association 
for individuals – a collectivity is presupposed. The individuals thinking 
about the terms on which they should associate cannot, of course, be 
sensibly understood as independent persons living in a state of nature 
outside society but must be conceived of as members already of an ongo-
ing society who are reflecting on the ethical adequacy of their existing 
arrangements. They must already be committed to pursuing their indi-
vidual goods in association as members of the same society bound by the 
same rules and institutions in order to pursue such an enquiry. In other 
words, they do not just have an individual identity whose good they are 
seeking but must also possess a collective identity as members of the soci-
ety in question, whose (common) good is to be realized through the eth-
ical principles that will protect and promote the fundamental interests of 
each associate. However, the difference between a totalizing conception 
of the relation between individual and collective good and an individu-
alist one is that under the latter there must be some description of the 
individual’s good as an inherently separate entity and the ethical prin-
ciples must protect and promote this good, whereas under the former the 
good of the individual consists just in the extent to which s/he serves as a 
vehicle for the good of the collective entity.
On my individualist account, the ethical principles that protect indi-
viduals’ interests are the terms of association through which the common 
good of members of the society is achieved. Yet this relation between 
individual and common good applies only under normal circumstances. 
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The existence of the society and hence its having an identity and a good 
as an independent entity is presupposed by the ethical enquiry of its 
members. It is not created by the result of that enquiry. Under abnormal 
circumstances, the two can come apart. The good of individual members 
as ethically defined and their good as members of an independent entity 
whose primary concern must be its own continuous survival may come 
into conflict. Under the latter circumstances, totalizing considerations 
become relevant. The individual’s good will be that of a vehicle for the 
continued existence of society and that person may sacrifice his/her life 
for it. In this account of the relation between totalizing and individualist 
ethical concerns, the good of the whole is a contextual presupposition of 
the enquiry into individualist ethical principles. It must also serve as a 
limit on how individualist principles are to be understood and applied. 
They can’t be such as to undermine the viability of the society as a separ-
ate entity. Yet the good of the whole does not determine the content of 
the individualist principles. These must be arrived at through a consid-
eration of the fundamental interests of individuals as separate entities, 
which involves an entirely independent commitment to pursue the com-
mon good through principles that are justifiable to each person in terms 
of those interests.
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Mill and Democracy: Taking William 
Buckley Seriously
Alan Ryan
I am obliged to confess I should sooner live in a society governed 
by the first two thousand names in the Boston telephone directory 
than in a society governed by the two thousand faculty members of 
Harvard University.1
(William Buckley, 1963)
Introduction
It is a real pleasure to have the chance to write an essay for Fred Rosen, 
although it is a pleasure not unmixed with some apprehension. What fol-
lows is an essay in the most literal sense, a trial balloon, intended to give 
the reader ideas to chew on rather than taken on trust and swallowed 
without reflection. There is a narrow line between inventiveness and a 
wholesale disregard for textual constraints and historical accuracy. Pro-
fessor Rosen has always been firmly on the right side in this respect. It 
is enough to gesture to the Bentham edition to make the point. Nor has 
imagination been sacrificed to accuracy; his recent book on J. S. Mill, for 
instance, is full of original insights, especially into Mill’s fraught relation-
ship with Auguste Comte. So, I hope that he and I are as one in thinking, 
as Mill did, that on all great subjects there is more to be said, and in think-
ing, as Mill did not, that his demands on the electorate were unrealistic, 
but not absurd.
John Stuart Mill’s discussions of democracy display several ten-
sions; the one that fuels what follows is the contrast between his enthusi-
asm for the Athenians of the fifth century BCE and his dislike of those he 
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called ‘political men’.2 Pericles notoriously claimed that those who pro-
fessed indifference to public affairs had no place in Athens; apolitical men 
were very bad citizens.3 What follows asks whether the constitutional 
arrangements of Athenian democracy might be a viable ideal for the 
modern world. I contrast a political conception of democracy as rule by 
the people taken as literally as possible with a social, moral and, in a broad 
sense, cultural conception of democracy as the character of a society, giv-
ing every member of a society equal access to the means of a fulfilled 
existence. Unsurprisingly, this second conception is likely to attend to 
schools, workplaces and cultural institutions rather than the ballot box. I 
end by saying a few fairly sharp things about the politics necessary to sus-
tain this social and cultural conception of a democratic society, but very 
few. I am too doubtful of the prospects of radical political movements in 
the advanced industrial economies to have anything robust to say.
The central topics I tackle are the possibility of democracy without 
elections, what a political world without professional politicians might 
be like, what dangers it would face, whether it would not be too difficult 
to make it work, and whether it would not replace unaccountable profes-
sional politicians doing the bidding of special interests with unaccount-
able bureaucrats either themselves doing the bidding of special interests 
or acting as Platonic guardians in the manner of the civil servants of the 
East India Company, as described by Mill: providing government of the 
people and for the people, but not at any price government by the people. 
I do not tackle the currently much-discussed subject of collective action – 
the sense in which a collective actor called ‘the people’ can be said to 
act – because I do not see far into it. I should add that my debts should 
be obvious; besides Thucydides at one end of the story and Dewey at the 
other, they begin with Plato, continue with Polybius and Machiavelli, take 
in Rousseau, Constant, Tocqueville and Mill, and end more recently and 
more locally with Joseph Schumpeter, Robert Dahl, Henry Richardson, 
David Estlund, Larry Bartels and Martin Gilens.
My unsurprising claim is that what we call ‘liberal democracy’ is not 
(political) democracy, although it is liberal, and is more importantly and 
more genuinely liberal (in the old-fashioned sense of the term encapsu-
lated in the American and British Bill of Rights) than ‘democratic’. The 
extensive range of human rights that liberal democracies accord their cit-
izens is essential to their leading a decent and secure existence and enjoy-
ing the expansive educational, occupational and social opportunities that 
lead people to call them ‘social’ democracies in a non-Marxist sense; the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) provides a useful cata-
logue of such rights,4 and (unlike the amendments that make up the US 
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Bill of Rights) they are explicitly understood, not simply as prohibitions on 
legislative action, but as requirements on governments committed to cre-
ating a democratic society. They rule out the arbitrary denial of the vote to 
anyone, protect political free speech, and prohibit the expulsion of one’s 
own citizens; they demand of ‘public authorities’ that they take positive 
steps to secure equal opportunity, protect family life, and a good deal else.5 
They do not give the demos the power exercised by the Athenian assembly, 
but establish a framework for a liberal society, and for a socially egalitarian 
one in some respects, if not a democratic polity strictly (or narrowly) speak-
ing. Exactly what range of such legally acknowledged rights is definitive of 
a liberal regime, and how they should be construed by national and inter-
national courts (such as the European Court of Human Rights), is a large 
issue on which I do not here take sides. One topical question that divides 
liberal theorists and exercises governments in different countries, for 
instance, is whether legislation banning hate speech is, or is not, consist-
ent with a liberal view of free speech rights. Like Germany, France makes 
Holocaust denial a crime,6 and French courts have extended that protec-
tion to the Armenian genocide of the First World War.7 Conversely, the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has held that strict laws against 
abortion do not violate human rights, and fall within a state’s legitimate 
sphere of cultural choice.8 Some democratic features of such societies (in 
the conventional political sense), such as periodic free elections, are essen-
tial to the preservation of their liberal character, though much is owed to 
the convictions of the elites who de facto manage those societies’ affairs, as 
well as to the behaviour of the judiciary.9 The Convention promotes democ-
racy, but was not democratically devised or enacted. British civil servants 
drafted much of the ECHR; the document was never put to a referendum, 
many of its provisions are unpopular with politicians, the public and the 
press (as is their interpretation by British courts and the ECtHR), and it’s 
doubtful whether a majority of the British electorate would favour the 
Convention’s prohibition of capital punishment even today. This is hardly 
surprising; nineteenth-century liberals fearful of the effects of extending 
the franchise to the lower classes thought ‘the masses’ were by nature illib-
eral, prone to moral panic and given to violence; this was a commonplace 
of late nineteenth-century sociology. Many upper-class Americans at the 
end of the nineteenth century thought universal (adult male) suffrage had 
been a mistake, though one it was now impossible to reverse, and Ortega 
y Gasset’s Revolt of the Masses shows how such anxieties were exacerbated 
by the rise of European fascism in the 1920s. So, rule by the people and the 
civil liberties protected by the ECHR are in some tension as well as mutu-
ally supportive.
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As to the political regime under which the inhabitants of liberal 
democracies live, nobody will change their verbal habits because of 
anything I say, but liberal democracies are properly speaking: extensive 
popular mixed republics, with secure human rights, a tendency to oligar-
chical, plutocratic and populist distortions, to popular disaffection and 
apathy, and the corruption of the common people by bread and circuses. 
Both in the almost universal post-1945 parliamentary form and the all 
but unique American form, they are what writers in an older tradition 
would have seen as government by elective aristocracy.10 They are a 
version of the mixed regime, part democratic and part oligarchical, on 
which the Roman Republic prided itself, a system praised by Polybius, 
Cicero, Machiavelli, Rousseau and innumerable others; the label of ‘an 
extensive republic’11 is Madison’s, but contra Madison, who thought that 
extending the suffrage to persons other than property-holders amounted 
to the rise of democracy, the process instituted a different form of mixed 
republic: what Weber and Schumpeter described as ‘rule by professional 
politicians’.12 This may or may not be the best of all possible political 
worlds; I think it may well be, not for Panglossian reasons, but because 
the possibility of instituting anything very different is so slim. My empha-
sis falls on possible. The non-Kojèvian version of the ‘end of history’13 the-
sis defended by Francis Fukuyama in the early 1990s encapsulates that 
downbeat thought. The system is certainly susceptible to improvement, 
and in need of it everywhere, but it is vastly better than incompetent the-
ocracies, Stalinist or fascist dictatorships, the kleptocracies that disfig-
ure much of Africa and Central Asia, and the failed states found in many 
parts of the world. I am not going to ask whether the British, French, 
Canadian or American political systems are working well or badly; my 
question is what democracy in the picky sense – equalizing the polit-
ical power of all citizens – would look like if we instituted it, what we 
would have to do to make it work, and whether we would like it. Since 
the most obvious feature of the changes about which I am speculating is 
the absence of professional politicians, I say something in passing, some 
of it mildly disobliging, about what professional politicians do and what 
expertise they possess; and I offer a view of the legislative process that is 
at odds with contemporary practice and the intuitive understanding of 
legislation possessed by most of the citizenry. The largest lacuna in what 
follows is the absence of a full account of the executive; I have conflicting 
thoughts about the topic, but no settled position. I am not at all clear how 
a ‘citizens’ jury’ model of legislative democracy would best be instituted, 
and how committees of the legislature would interact with administra-
tive and policymaking committees of the executive. That is a real gap 
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in my argument. In the modern world, though not in 1787, we inevit-
ably live in an executive-centred administrative state and need to think 
how to make it efficient and forward-looking. This thought explains my 
anxiety that democracy might be a cover for (a good-natured and pub-
lic-spirited) mandarin tyranny. It is a real issue for someone whose affec-
tion for Jefferson and his ideas about ward republics does not extend to 
Jefferson’s dislike of ‘a very energetic government’.14
I. Forms of democracy
My main prop is the contrast between a political conception of democ-
racy – that the power to make and enforce binding decisions on all mem-
bers of the society should be shared equally among those affected – and 
a social conception, which holds that we are all members of a commu-
nity with rich intellectual, cultural and spiritual resources that should 
be available to everyone without distinction of race, class, gender, creed 
or national origin. Both focus on equality, the first on equality of power, 
the second on equality of access to the cultural goods of modern soci-
ety. There are other familiar distinctions on which I rely: direct versus 
representative, which overlaps with ancient versus modern conceptions 
(Madison and Jefferson thought representation was the modern discov-
ery that rendered even the greatest of ancient writers only ‘prefatory’ 
to the moderns, while Rousseau detested the idea of representation as 
essentially feudal),15 amateur legislators versus professional politicians, 
mass conceptions versus elite conceptions, and an emphasis on class (or 
sectional) conflict over the distribution of economic advantage as the 
essence of politics. The last is my starting point; it answers the question 
of what democratic politics is about. In taking it for granted that non-vio-
lent class warfare is and ought to be the essence of modern politics, I am 
at odds with Dewey, who should have thought this, but was undermined 
by his own communitarianism and by a contrast, too readily taken for 
granted, between Europe and the United States. This was not conserva-
tism; Dewey died at the age of 92, and voted for a winning presidential 
candidate only twice – in 1916 when he voted for Wilson and in 1948 
when he voted for Truman; he otherwise voted for Debs, La Follette and 
Norman Thomas, and he said that Roosevelt’s New Deal was just a bit 
of ‘messing around’.16 When I say that non-violent class warfare is what 
modern politics usually is and always should be about, I mean that sect-
arian and highly ideological politics are not susceptible to easy compro-
mise and sometimes not to any,17 but that non-violent class warfare is. 
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It amounts to using the political system to redress the inequalities and 
unfairnesses of the world into which children are born willy-nilly, to 
insure the citizenry at large against the insecurities and anxieties that 
the economic system and everyday life will predictably generate, and 
to settle arguments about who pays how much of the bill for these pro-
tections. In the ordinary course of events, the well off, well connected, 
well informed and intelligent will always secure a greater share of the 
good things that society creates than dispassionate justice would award 
them a priori, and they will endeavour to ensure that their friends and 
families hang on to what they hold. Reinhold Niebuhr claimed that all 
ruling classes overpaid themselves by at least a third;18 I have no idea 
what the basis of the calculation might have been, but the general idea 
is plainly right, even if the calculation understates the extent to which 
the elite overcharges the rest of us. James Scott holds a similar but more 
jaundiced view: liberal democracies are run for the benefit of the best-off 
20 per cent, and the political ‘trick’ that the 20 per cent and their help-
ers have to pull off is to persuade the next 35 per cent that they have 
more to fear from those below them than from those above.19 For read-
ers of Seymour Lipset’s Political Man, this is the seamy side of the story 
about the wonders of the ‘diamond-shaped’20 distribution of income and 
wealth, and its effect on political stability, a thought that Lipset happily 
(and rightly) admits to having borrowed from Aristotle; Aristotle was not 
in the business of advocating democracy, but Seymour Martin Lipset was.
Class warfare, as it is understood here, is the process whereby the 
less advantaged use the political system to offset the economic advantages 
of the better off and exact a fair price for their acquiescence in the status 
quo, or, as appears to be more common at present, the process whereby 
the better off use the political system to reinforce their advantages. Being 
well off and well connected is not the only form of advantage; being well 
organized on any basis – ethnic, religious, occupational, with regard to an 
irrational enthusiasm for guns – is the crucial asset. Being well off and 
well connected covers the costs of organization without anyone noticing; 
those with fewer resources need to do much more self-conscious organiz-
ing. The fact that organization is crucial means that another facet of dem-
ocratic politics is, or should be, the defence of the unorganized many, and 
the public interest, against the well-organized few, and sectional interests. 
This is all very familiar from Mancur Olson’s work21 of many years ago, 
and is an aspect of Rousseau’s discussion of the various fractional gen-
eral wills to be found in any society.22 If politics is an unseemly struggle 
about interests rather than a high-toned debate about principles, non-vi-
olent class warfare over the size of a group’s share of the social cake is 
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the route to stable compromises on distributive issues. Done properly, 
distributive politics is safe and lends itself to rational outcomes, while 
ideological politics is dangerous and unpredictable. Ideological politics 
may occasionally be inescapable, and the line between the two kinds of 
politics can obviously be blurred in all sorts of ways; indeed, if you are 
a member of the Weber admiration society, you will be quick to observe 
that some underlying ideological commitments must be in place if the 
constitutional rules that permit distributive politics to flourish are to be 
accepted; and you may go on to point out that in a Führerdemokratie, one 
thing the leader must do is articulate those commitments in a compelling 
fashion. None of this do I deny.
II. Three questions
So, the question is whether we do, can or want to practise democracy 
strictly speaking: which is to say to operate a political system in which 
everyone has an equal share of the power to decide on the rules that gov-
ern all the members of the political society in which they live, and an equal 
share in supervising their implementation. I ignore one way of achieving 
this, suggested years ago by Robert Paul Wolff and others. The Wolff ver-
sion turns legislation into an instant plebiscite; the citizenry has a set-top 
box on their television sets, with three buttons for yes, no, abstain, and 
when legislation is to be voted on, they vote for one of the three options.23 
Rousseau’s version required a yearly vote, but not on particular issues: 
does the general will endorse the existing constitution and approve the 
continuance in office of the present government? In the United States, 
the general will would probably return a 98 per cent yes to the first ques-
tion and 60 per cent no to the second, and more than that if we think of 
Congress as a body of ‘elective aristocrats’ of the sort Rousseau imagined 
as the best practicable government. The problems of plebiscitary democ-
racy are well known, and the attractions of plebiscites to Napoleon III, 
Mussolini and Hitler, as well as the manipulation of referenda in states 
such as California, suggest the difficulties of achieving political equal-
ity by that route; more bleakly, Cold War liberals like Isaiah Berlin and 
Jacob Talmon thought that the equality of political power achieved in a 
plebiscitary democracy would be such that everyone except the dictator 
in charge has none.24 He will ask the questions, make it clear what the 
answer is, and we will press the right button for fear of the secret police. 
Saddam Hussein could get 99 per cent support from 99 per cent of the 
population, as could Joseph Stalin.
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Anyone who asks my three questions (whether we do, can or want 
to practise democracy) can be expected to say no to at least one of them. 
I answer them as follows: we don’t, we could, but it might not be worth 
the effort. If we confine the question to political systems, my answer is 
that so-called liberal democracies do not practise democracy, are not 
designed to practise democracy, and that the United States was set up as 
something other than a democracy when more democratic options were 
available. The British system was never conceived as a democracy, actual 
or incipient; it aimed at ‘representative and responsible government’, and 
the nineteenth- and twentieth-century expansion of suffrage was a mat-
ter, in Gladstone’s phrase, of bringing the previously excluded ‘within the 
pale of the constitution’;25 this meant allowing lower-class men to get the 
vote as and when it seemed safe to allow them to have it. The long exclu-
sion and eventual inclusion of women is another story, not to be tack-
led here. The extension of suffrage26 to working men after 1867 was not 
particularly grudging; advocates of a wider suffrage believed that unless 
the working class sent members to parliament, even the best-inten-
tioned administration would lack the knowledge needed to implement 
its benign intentions. The constitution was not democratic, but liberal; 
its essence was the rule of law, not political equality. Liberal democracies 
permit the representation of interests and allow for the rejection of our 
rulers through the ballot, but they do not aim at the equalization of the 
power to decide outcomes and the rules determining outcomes. If we go 
on to ask whether we could practise democracy, the answer is that we 
could. The usual view that what Jefferson called ‘true democracy’ in dis-
tinction to ‘representative democracy’27 is impossible in countries as large 
as the United States is false. We could institute genuine democracy, but 
it would be hard work and require changes in our intellectual and polit-
ical habits. It might also be a terrible disappointment, because we might 
find that in order to achieve a coherent system, we had handed ourselves 
over to an oligarchy of experts, or had been bamboozled by competing 
demagogues. Small-scale experiments with the institutions that real 
democracy might involve would not be impossible, and have been tried; 
my anxiety is that scaling them up to a national level might not be worth 
the effort. When I say ‘not worth the effort’, I mean that unless we attach 
overwhelming value to the achievement of political equality itself, much 
of what we might hope political equality to yield could be had within the 
existing framework, and the almost vanishingly small (but equal) chance 
to determine national policy and supervise its implementation (which is 
the real pinch of the argument from size) hardly seems worth hankering 
after. This is not an endorsement of Benjamin Constant’s criticism of the 
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liberty of the ancients,28 which focused on the way most ancient repub-
lics crushed individuality; what it says is that the amount of ‘ancient lib-
erty’ each person would get – their ‘share of the sovereignty’ – would be 
too small to be worth taking seriously. I think that is right, although it 
does not bite on proposals that could be implemented at a local level, 
nor on proposals to submit national policy to appropriately constructed 
randomly selected panels afforced by expert advisers, rather than elected 
politicians, which would have other merits besides equalizing the power 
to decide.
We should therefore think about William Buckley and the Boston 
phone book. Looked at in a different light, the replacement of an elected 
Congress or House of Commons with a legislature chosen by an appro-
priately constructed lottery would have benefits of a different kind from 
the bare equalization of power. Before embarking on an explanation of 
that, I repeat that the political system we do have is a respectable form of 
government in its uncorrupted form, and its longevity would have been 
admired by many writers on how to build a successful republic, beginning 
with Aristotle – though not Plato – and continuing via Polybius, Cicero, 
Marsilio of Padua, Machiavelli, Harrington, Sidney and Montesquieu, 
and even Rousseau. Madison might have been surprised to find how long 
his creation had lasted, but depressed to discover how much better a par-
liamentary republic works than the republic he actually created, ham-
strung as it is by the separation of executive from legislature. The British 
affection for parliamentary sovereignty goes too far, but the sovereignty 
of parliament has its virtues, in enabling decisive government and poten-
tially, though not so much in practice, in aiding accountability. 
Finally, I turn very briefly to the third interpretation of the ques-
tion, in effect asking the obvious question: ‘If there is an understanding 
of democracy that does not focus narrowly on political arrangements, 
what is it, do we want social or cultural or whatever we should call it 
democracy, and how does it connect with our political arrangements nar-
rowly considered?’ The answer is, of course there is, it is what Tocqueville 
admired and Dewey praised as America’s contribution to the modern 
world, we do – or should – want it, and knowing what sort of politics best 
sustain it is not easy, let alone what the prospects are for that politics. But 
if ‘real’ democracy is too demanding, enthusiasts for democracy should 
think about the distance between it and what we do have because the 
extent of political inequality raises urgent questions about how we can 
hold the wielders of power accountable within the existing framework.
Democracy, politically speaking, means what it says: the rule of 
the demos, the common people, the people that Aristotle called ‘the 
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poor many’. Anything that gets in the way of the common people exer-
cising power is a dilution of the democratic principle, whether that 
dilution is a good or a bad thing. This view is the polar opposite of 
Dworkin’s in Freedom’s Law, and of his view of the connections between 
liberalism and democracy in his long-ago essay on ‘Liberalism’ in Public 
and Private Morality.29 I do not deny that there are liberal arguments 
for democracy – along the lines of arguing that since we are born free 
and equal, we can only be governed by our own consents, which is the 
line taken in Freedom’s Law.30 My take is different; it is interest-based, 
not rights-based and not focused on when one person or group of per-
sons has the right to coerce others into acting in one way rather than 
another; it thinks in terms of redressing imbalances between the lower 
and upper classes and between well-organized sectional interests and 
the indefinite ‘public’ at large. We are used to distinguishing between 
democracy and majority tyranny and saying that the latter ‘can’t really 
be’ democracy, because we don’t approve of it but we do approve of 
democracy. Hobbes took the line I follow here; he claimed that tyranny 
is but monarchy misliked;31 I side with the tradition which held that a 
tyrannical democracy is not a contradiction in terms. Extra-legal vio-
lence and expropriation are tyranny, while the exercise of legal author-
ity according to the local rules is, by and large, not – although we might 
think the local rules are themselves tyrannical. Socrates’s execution for 
blasphemy was not a case of majority tyranny, though the Athenian law 
was illiberal, superstitious and a disgrace to the city. The Athenians 
were, as Pericles told them, multiperson tyrants vis-à-vis their tribu-
tary states, but not vis-à-vis themselves.32 The unconstrained version 
of democracy says simply that the ordinary people rule. They may pass 
whatever laws seem good to them, make whatever executive decisions 
seem good to them, and enforce the laws as they see fit, so long as they 
do it in proper form; this is the sovereignty of the people rather than 
the sovereignty of parliament.33 If they have any sense, they will impose 
restraints on themselves to avoid civil war, to avoid self-destructively 
impulsive policymaking, and protect civil rights. Northern Ireland 
should be kept in mind, as well as the aftermath of the Arab Spring. 
Athenian democracy was not in the modern sense liberal; it could be 
relaxed and unpunitive, but it was not so on principle, and not because 
it thought individuals had a right to go their own way in any particular 
area. And in the sphere on which modern liberalism is grounded, reli-
gious liberty, their principled view was that anyone who undermined 
the civic cult endangered the polis.34
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III. Classical and modern democracy
We should pause for some demography, since size is the usual argument 
against invoking the classical idea of democracy as a standard for mod-
ern politics, and one I have conceded if the argument is about ‘a share of 
the sovereignty’. Athens, where democracy was practised and gained an 
alarming reputation in the eyes of respectable opinion, was the largest 
Greek city-state. It had at its most prosperous around 300,000 inhabit-
ants; some 200,000 were native-born, and free, the others were slaves 
and foreigners. Perhaps a quarter lived in the city. Women, children, 
slaves, foreigners and the poorest free males were ineligible to take 
part in politics. The consensus is that, at a maximum, Athens may have 
enrolled 30,000 to 40,000 citizens as eligible to speak and vote in the 
assembly. Even so, the assembly might be attended by up to 8,000 adult 
citizen men, entitled to vote in person on just about anything. What we 
talk about was invented a very long time ago – conventionally in 508 
BCE – for a small city (by our standards). Just which elements of what 
they invented make sense in a country of 300 million is a question with 
no simple answer, but we have committed ourselves to believing in some-
thing for which they provided the label.
Why did they create, defend and die for this political system? There 
are two reasons. Democracy expressed the thought that every citizen was 
the equal of every other citizen so far as the entitlement to exercise power 
was concerned. This wasn’t economic equality – Athenian leaders were 
notably upper class – and nobody thought that all Athenians were equally 
intelligent, let alone equally brave or far-sighted. They were exceedingly 
competitive, not given to modesty, and alarmingly willing to do down 
anyone else for the sake of their own advantage. Socrates’s interlocutors, 
Thrasymachus, Callicles and Polus, make that clear enough.35 But they 
wanted to secure political equality, and to a striking extent they did. In 
part, this was achieved by opening the assembly to most of the free adult 
male population, in part by rotating office at very frequent intervals, and 
in part by confining the use of election to a small number of positions, 
using lotteries for the rest. We still do the latter for picking juries, which 
formed a substantial part of Athenian public life. The second reason, 
which animates a good deal of these procedures, was self-defence: many 
thought with good reason that the well born and well connected were 
likely to reduce the poor to servitude; and in the alternative that if the 
well born and well connected squabbled among themselves, there’d be 
civil war and then tyranny. The effect of spreading the holding of office 
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very widely was that almost anyone who wanted to might find himself 
chairing the assembly once or twice in his lifetime, or serving on an 
important legal case. And decisions had consequences: if you were one 
of the thetes and voted for war in the assembly, you’d find yourself going 
home to get the cushion you sat on when rowing a trireme. This didn’t 
have the chastening effect that one might hope.
Now consider ourselves. We certainly have some beliefs in common 
with the Athenians. One is the belief in accountability; another is the 
wish not to be tyrannized over by the well born and well connected. It is 
hard to know whether they or we take economic exploitation the more 
seriously. A lower class with the instincts of ancient Athenians would per-
haps be sceptical about the way in which members of Congress make so 
much money in spite of professing to be ordinary folk just like their elec-
tors. Athenians seemed to accept the prominent role of the better born 
without complaint, but it’s hard to believe they would not have noticed 
that in the past 30 years the median wage has stagnated while the best-
off 1 per cent have seen their incomes triple. But we are not committed 
to isegoria.36 As Max Weber said, what we call democracy is rule by pro-
fessional politicians, not an aristocracy of birth, but certainly a self-re-
producing oligarchy, and in practice a plutocracy.37 It is not a central aim 
of the system we operate that each person has an equal share of political 
power; the existence of professional politicians is inconsistent with it. In 
the United States, though less so in Britain and in much of Europe – with 
the exception of Switzerland and, even more so, (tiny) Liechtenstein – 
there is a closer approximation to political equality locally; but the con-
trast between being cajoled into serving on a school board or the local 
sewer committee and deciding whether to risk everything on war with 
Sparta remains important. A lot of people serve on some sort of public 
body in a lifetime, but the proportion of the adult male population that 
does so is nonetheless very small – while the proportion of the female 
population that does so is also small, but infinitely higher than in Athens.
So, we have a popular republic with what Polybius and others called 
a ‘mixed constitution’.38 Crafted for a large country, not a small city-state, 
it is an extensive republic. A mixed republic is in intention neither a 
democracy, nor an aristocracy, nor a monarchy, but contains elements of 
all three in the hope that we can get the decisiveness of one-man rule, the 
wisdom of an aristocracy, and the common sense and immunity to cor-
ruption of the ordinary person. The historical example on which all writ-
ers drew was the Roman Republic – not the empire ruled by whatever 
autocrat the Praetorian Guard installed, but the republic that had evicted 
the Tarquins, overcome the conflicts between patricians and plebeians, 
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and achieved a balance that lasted until rich men raised private armies. 
This is not the place to explore the substantial gap between the oligar-
chical realities of Roman political life and the rhetorical gloss placed on 
them by later writers. But one way in which reminding ourselves that we 
live in a modified Roman republic may have some therapeutic value is to 
recall the ways in which that sort of regime runs into trouble. The Roman 
system was intended to promote consensus by making it difficult for any 
of the holders of power to act independently of the others. The obvious 
danger of such a system is that it will simply grind to a halt if everyone 
digs their heels in. Another is that it depended on a clientelist ethos. We, 
of course, are opposed to clientelism – but practise it in our own way. It 
may not be the degeneration of a democracy that we should fear, but the 
degeneration of a mixed republic.
Madison’s republic was designedly more anti-democratic than what 
we have today, and indeed than it became by around 1830. But it was 
always a popular republic to a degree that Rome never was; Rome con-
fined the holding of public office to members of the equestrian and sen-
atorial classes, and had an elaborate cursus honorum that ensured ‘new 
men’ took a long time to reach high office. It reinforced the oligarchical 
character of the republic by organizing the voting process that confirmed 
legislation and elected officials in such a way that each ‘century’ voted 
as a bloc, which meant that the upper classes whose centuries contained 
fewer members than those of the less well off had far more voting power 
than the lower classes; and votes were taken with the upper classes vot-
ing first and the process stopping as soon as a majority was reached – thus 
avoiding the question of how firm a majority had been secured. From the 
outset, the American version placed few restrictions – other than sex, 
race and initially property – in the way of holding public office; Madison 
lost his fear of the majority tyranny the poor would practise if they had 
easy access to the ballot box or too firm a grip on Congress, but it is worth 
remembering that devices such as the electoral college and the indir-
ect election of senators were intended to achieve ‘Roman’ results – the 
election of upper-class candidates – in the absence of a cursus honorum. 
Tocqueville’s comments on the contrast between the members of the 
Senate and the members of the House suggest it was working in 1832.39 
Changes since the Founders set up the system have moved it in what 
everyone would describe as a democratic direction, but which I will con-
tinue to call a ‘popular’ direction. In other respects, the Romans and we 
run a more ‘open’ system than the Athenians. The Athenians insisted that 
citizens were the offspring of two citizen parents, but we have abandoned 
ethnicity, gender and race as barriers to public office and, unless we want 
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to run for president, the obstacle of one’s birthplace can be overcome by 
a few years of residence and the cooperation of the INS (the Immigration 
and Naturalization Service). The Romans were like us in being ethnically 
open as the Athenians were not.
Nonetheless, what we have is not democracy because it does not 
equalize political power – in the sense that it does not equalize the chance 
of holding public office or making and supervising the implementation of 
important decisions. A self-selected class of persons holds most offices 
and most seats in Congress. Could anything be done to alter this? The 
answer is yes, but when people see the answer they flinch. The legisla-
tive branch should be selected by lottery; the administrative machinery 
should be selected by competitive tests of an appropriate kind, and pro-
motion within the administrative mechanism should be by merit; I am 
inclined to think that the head of the executive should be elected by the 
legislative body and be subject to dismissal by it, but by a super-majority. 
It is not clear to me what sort of cabinet s/he would need, but plainly a 
system of heads appointed by the chief executive and themselves sup-
ported by a cabinet would be an obvious choice. William Buckley said 
he’d rather be governed by the first 2,000 people from the Boston phone 
book than the faculty of Harvard; he should have gone further. He should 
have said we’d do better with a pool of legislators drawn from the entire 
population than with the House and Senate as currently constituted. I 
take the United States for ease of illustration, but the argument holds in 
any modern state, certainly the United Kingdom. The United States has, 
as the old saying had it, the finest legislature that money can buy, and 
even in countries that are much more restrictive of political expenditures 
than the United States, access to substantial financial resources is neces-
sary for election, and after election the opportunities for making large 
amounts of money are numerous. One virtue of choosing your legislators 
by lottery is that they can’t be bought – ahead of time; with rapid turn-
over and ferocious policing, you can prevent them being bought at all. 
But we aren’t thinking about how good, bad or indifferent a randomly 
selected legislature of 535 persons would be, but whether this equalizes 
power.
It doesn’t do what is manifestly impossible, namely stick all 180 
million adult Americans in an assembly on the Pnyx and let them vote 
on everything and anything. In that sense, it offers the citizen less than 
the set-top box proposal. It gives everyone an equal, but very, very small, 
chance of serving – which is why republics such as Renaissance Florence 
used lotteries40 for such purposes. Most people’s reactions to the idea 
are sceptical, sometimes because they think a random selection of the 
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population would throw up a collection of oddballs; others because they 
fear ordinary folk wouldn’t know all sorts of things that they suppose 
politicians do know. The first can be dealt with by some pretty minimal 
constraints on how you draw your sample. The second exaggerates the 
competence of politicians. Most politicians know very little about almost 
everything they vote on. I have taught enough of them to know that this 
is not because they are stupid or ill-educated. The reason is that nobody is 
an expert on more than a couple of areas, and almost all of us are wholly 
dependent on others in almost all areas of human knowledge; this is one 
way in which Schumpeter’s broad-brush division between the ignorant 
mass and the informed elite is misleading. What professional politicians 
do is act as intermediaries between citizens and government: they act 
as social workers to the poor when they need help dealing with social 
services, and as lobbyists for the better off when businesses and profes-
sions (and retired persons) need political favours.41 They seem to per-
form it very efficiently. Martin Gilens has done some interesting research 
which shows that on several hundred issues where the preferences of 
the public can be ascertained, the outcomes followed the preferences 
of the most affluent; only when the preferences of poor and middle-in-
come Americans coincided with the preferences of the most affluent did 
the outcome follow their preferences.42 Larry Bartels’s work showed the 
same thing.43 The explanation is too obvious to belabour it.
I take for granted that the random sample would have to be prop-
erly taken; all opinion polling rests on the assumption that we know how 
to take a properly representative sample. The question is what it is to do. 
A random sample of the population could be a perfectly effective legis-
lature if we rethink the way legislation works. Remember that the field 
where we allow the ordinary person selected at random to make vital 
decisions is when we call them for jury service. A defendant in a criminal 
trial depends on the good sense of a dozen persons chosen at random 
to keep him/her out of jail or save his/her life, and in a civil case to save 
him/her from bankruptcy, or whatever. The jury’s effectiveness depends 
on the probity and hard work of the prosecuting and defending counsel; 
that is where expertise and knowledge are important (and where the less 
well off lose out). But the jury’s task is to decide, either on the balance 
of probabilities or beyond reasonable doubt, which story they have been 
told is true or closer to the truth. The analogy, if you made the bold leap 
to choose your legislators by lot, is not hard to perceive. The legislature 
would need to be presented with legislative proposals and a story about 
their likely effects, and then make up its collective mind on whether it 
should or should not believe what it heard. It seems overwhelmingly 
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likely that they would behave as all such bodies always have and break up 
into committees for detailed discussion, reporting back to ‘the committee 
of the whole’ for a final vote; and they would need a good deal of cleri-
cal and administrative support to do it effectively. The Athenians under-
stood this; draftsmen wrote their legislation (though they also seem to 
have drafted in the assembly itself) and they ensured that speakers pro 
and contra were heard. Just as juries need not be experts, but are utterly 
dependent on them, so it is with legislatures. The place where expertise 
is needed is in making policy and drafting legislation. One reason why 
legislation so often disappoints those who initially wanted it is that by 
the time politicians, lobbyists and staffers have finished with the drafting 
process, the result is as unfit for inspection as Bismarck said the process 
of its creation was. The role of legislators under any system ought to be 
to decide what they want from a law and then to approve or disapprove 
what they are offered, as Mill argued. Under a system where the legisla-
ture was selected by lot, that would be especially obvious.
There is a lot more to be said about the institutional arrangements 
that would be needed to formulate public policy and implement it, but 
there is a long history of well-organized republics in which these devices 
worked for a substantial period of time. There are many possibilities. The 
most important thing about any institutional design along these lines is 
that a modern version would be very dependent on a really good civil 
service with a strong esprit de corps – which might make one fear that 
having got rid of one professional political class we would have created 
another, and that instead of having our politicians bought and sold out 
in the open, we’d have our bureaucrats corrupted on the quiet. One 
really valuable outcome, however, is that in abandoning representative 
government of one kind – the one that depends on electing representa-
tives from geographical districts – we would have created another kind 
of representativeness – one where the legislature would be a repre-
sentative cross-section of the population. That would be worth having. 
Introducing elements of it even within the present political and economic 
system would be well worth doing.
I should point to two obvious problems with choosing our congress 
by lot. The first is that those selected might not wish to serve. Those of us 
who are addicted to politics would surely enjoy having even one five-hun-
dredth of the power to determine legislation for the entire country. Most 
sensible people would regard spending three years as randomly selected 
members of the legislature as an interference with everyday life. They 
already dislike the fairly minimal interruption to their lives imposed by 
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jury service; how would they react to the much greater interruption that 
this would involve? Even in Athens, attendance at the assembly was heav-
ily slanted towards the better off. The answer must be to pay them very 
well. The second obvious problem is corruption. There would be no vast 
expenditure on elections if there were no elections, but it defies belief to 
think that special interests would not seek ways to bribe the legislators. If 
we elected the executive – or if the legislature did it in the classical fashion 
– we’d run the risk of corruption at that point. One remedy in the old litera-
ture was rapid rotation in office, but aside from the problem of an inexperi-
enced executive making every possible mistake and demitting office just as 
s/he had begun to get the hang of things, one can always bribe people with 
the promise of a job or a share in some lucrative deal in future; it needn’t 
be, and usually isn’t, anything so vulgar as cash in a brown paper bag.
Conclusion
So, we could institute real democracy – that is, the equalization of power 
over the whole nation – but it might be very hard work, it might end up 
leaving power in a different set of unaccountable hands, and it presup-
poses a population more interested in politics and policymaking than the 
population seems to be. Yet, less than 50 years after Madison set out to 
avoid creating a democracy, Tocqueville’s best-seller was called Democ-
racy in America. It is true that J. S. Mill said that the book was really a 
study of equality not democracy,44 but that was a lone quibble; even 
though I’m on Mill’s side on the issue, that’s only two lone voices. Given 
that I don’t expect to remodel the political vocabulary of the rest of the 
world, it may be more fruitful, if less interesting, to ask, ‘What is democ-
racy in this sense?’ What politics might sustain it?
Tocqueville called it ‘equality of condition’. Partly it is political: 
there are no qualifications of wealth, birth, lineage, to run for office. The 
rest is social. It is all immensely familiar. Whether Americans are still as 
self-reliant as they think is a matter for debate; the sturdy yeoman farmer 
is less visible than the agricultural corporation growing subsidies. Still, in 
terms of the American self-image, self-reliance is central. The converse is 
that neither the paternalist social welfare state nor the premodern state, 
with its urge for policing the morals of the citizenry, holds many attrac-
tions. There is a commitment to social mobility, however, honoured in 
the breach; ambition is thought to be a virtue in anyone, no matter how 
humble their origins. My station and its duties is not an American ideal, 
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which is why there are next to no genuine conservatives in America, no 
matter what they call themselves. Mrs Alexander’s ‘All Things Bright and 
Beautiful’ sticks in American throats when it comes to the lines: ‘The rich 
man in his castle/ The poor man at his gate,/ God made them high and 
lowly,/ And ordered their estate.’45 This is another way of reminding us 
of the old cliché that the United States is a non-feudal country, or rather 
that it had no feudal past, and has no feudal remnants to get in the way of 
the ideal of ‘the career open to talent’.
The question to which Mill did not pay enough attention is this: 
what kind of politics is essential to the preservation of democracy in 
its social sense? I think that almost any version of my Athenian model 
would be more likely to achieve it than what we have.46 In the absence of 
a ‘back to Pericles’ groundswell, the alternative is that those whose inter-
ests would otherwise be overlooked have to use the political machinery 
we do have – well described by Schumpeter and other theorists of elite 
competition – to put the fear of God into the professional politicians who 
form the ‘elite’. It may, of course, be a lost cause; all the survey evidence 
suggests that it is. In which case, we shall have to make the best of plutoc-
racy, and a regime built on panem et circenses – bread and circuses for the 
Romans, but fast food, celebrity culture, sports TV and mass distraction 
for us. There have been, and in many places there are, very much worse 
regimes than that. But we shouldn’t delude ourselves that it amounts to 
democracy, either political or social.
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18. Reinhold Niebuhr, Moral Man and Immoral Society: A Study in Ethics and Politics (New York: 
Scribner, 1937).
19. James C. Scott, Two Cheers for Anarchism: Six Easy Pieces on Autonomy, Dignity, and Meaningful 
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1963), 50.
21. Mancur Olson, ‘Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development’, American Political Science Review 
87/3 (September 1993): 567–76.
22. Rousseau, The Social Contract, II, 3, 4, 60.
23. Robert P. Wolff, In Defense of Anarchism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970).
24. Jacob Talmon, The Origins of Totalitarian Democracy (London: Secker & Warburg, 1952) and 
Isaiah Berlin, ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’ (1958), in Four Essays on Liberty (Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 1969).
25. ‘I venture to say that every man who is not presumably incapacitated by some consideration of per-
sonal unfitness or of political danger is morally entitled to come within the pale of the Constitution.’ 
Speech in the House of Commons (11 May 1864). https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/
commons/1864/may/11/second-reading#column_324 (accessed 28 February 2019).
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John Stuart Mill and the Jewish 
Question: Broadening the Utilitarian 
Maximand
Samuel Hollander
I. Introduction
Edward Alexander in his The State of the Jews: A Critical Appraisal (2012) 
asserts that ‘John Stuart Mill was neither anti-Semite nor philo-Semite, 
but a tertium quid foreshadowing a political type of more immediacy to 
my subject than the two Arnolds themselves’.1 By the two Arnolds he 
meant Thomas, Headmaster of Rugby School, who explained to a corres-
pondent in 1834 that he ‘must petition against the Jew Bill’2 because it is 
based on ‘that low Jacobinical notion of citizenship, that a man acquires 
a right to it by the accident of his being littered inter quatuor maria [on 
the nation’s soil]3 or because he pays taxes’;4 and Thomas’s son, Matthew, 
‘a (relatively) straightforward philosemite, just as his father had been an 
unqualified antisemite’.5 And by the contention that Mill ‘foreshadowed 
a certain political type’ Alexander intends modern-day Israel’s ‘ideolog-
ical enemies … [who] have long done battle with that straw man they 
call “Zionists who want to silence all criticism of Israel”, mythical crea-
tures nobody has ever been able to identify … ’.6 A reviewer of the book 
observes fairly regarding the ‘critical appraisal’ of the subtitle that ‘Alex-
ander’s animus is directed exclusively against the disparagement of Israel 
issuing from anti-Semites and liberal Diaspora dupes’.7
To approach Alexander’s perception of John Stuart Mill as a surro-
gate for modern-day critics of Israel – by which I intend Israeli policy, gov-
ernmental or civil – requires distinguishing between the facts of the case 
relating to discrimination against the non-Jewish minority, and desirable 
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policy or principles of good governance. For there are those who rec-
ognize the justice of the principle of non-discrimination and insist that 
actual Israeli policy lives up to that principle (or at least tries to do so), as 
well as those who adopt the same principle but believe that Israeli policy 
systematically contravenes it – and does so even as a matter of princi-
ple.8 What though of Mill? Could honest critics find comfort in his stance 
regarding the principle of equality? Alexander, notwithstanding the for-
mal contrast he draws between Mill and Arnold senior – his assertion that 
Mill was ‘neither anti-Semite nor philo-Semite’ – evidently does perceive 
him as prey to anti-Jewish prejudice, whatever label we might choose to 
apply, so that his writings could be put to the service of disingenuous 
critics including Jews of the ‘self-hating’ variety. By implication, honest 
critics who (rightly or wrongly) perceive Israeli policy to be discrimina-
tory, or who are concerned by indications that suggest a weakening of 
the principle of equality embodied in the Declaration of Independence, 
could scarcely find in him a source of inspiration, for he would be seen as 
simply hypocritical in his own day when purporting to champion minor-
ity rights while in fact biased against Jews.
The evidence I shall bring leaves no doubt that honest critics 
may rest assured that they are following in Mill’s footsteps. Certainly, 
Mill expressed himself critically regarding the Old Testament, and in 
Section  II  I consider his historical evaluation of ethical standards with 
particular reference to his representation of the document as ‘prim-
itive’. This critical view is, however, shown to be heavily qualified in 
two respects: full-hearted appreciation of the contribution made by the 
core Mosaic texts to monotheism and, yet more significantly, a remark-
ably positive perspective on the Prophets. The overall view of historical 
Judaism is thereby transformed.
My historical overview then proceeds (Section III) to Mill’s major 
qualifications to the notion of ethical progress achieved by Christianity. 
His criticisms were evenly distributed. But as for social reform more spe-
cifically, I show that his animus is directed not against Judaism but pri-
marily against Christianity for its lack of social content, including ‘duty 
to the State’, thereby falling short of the morality even ‘of the best Pagan 
nations’. Mill’s condemnation of the poisonous form of religious preju-
dice surrounding the Crucifixion is also relevant.
Mill’s stance on the Jewish Question in practice was in any event 
wholly divorced from his perspective on the Old Testament. Prima facie 
evidence for this assertion is provided by his accord with the ‘compati-
bility of Judaism with a sterling English character’, as one contemporary 
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put it, as we shall see. In Section IV, I demonstrate the meaningfulness 
of this accord by reference to Mill’s support for the removal of Jewish 
political disabilities, revealing that Jewish citizens were to be included, 
like any other minority, within the utilitarian ‘greatest happiness’ maxi-
mand. Similar applications were made to the issues of public education 
and Sabbatarian legislation, the latter providing a defence of Saturday 
as the day of rest for Jews on the grounds of their religious obligation – a 
defence, incidentally, not applied to the Christian observance of Sunday, 
for which Mill found no religious justification.
II. Mill on Judaism and ethical progress
I call attention first to a private communication by J. S. Mill of 9 Septem-
ber 1842 affirming his accord with F. D. Maurice’s ‘Moral and Metaphys-
ical Philosophy’ (1840), but expecting Maurice to be somewhat taken 
aback: ‘I agree to a much greater extent than you would perhaps suppose, 
in your view, even of the historical position of the Jews’.9 I shall cite one 
characteristic passage from Maurice that Mill might have had in mind:
A habit of looking rather at the negative than at the positive parts 
of the Jewish system, its provisions rather than its principles, has 
prevailed to a great extent among our divines and biblical critics. 
The vague phrases that it was intended to provide against idolatry, 
and for the recognition of the Divine Unity, have hindered students 
from steadily examining these [Mosaic] institutions, and con-
sidering what information they give us respecting the grounds of 
national and social life. Our conviction is, that there can be no clear 
understanding of the principles of political order, as they existed in 
Greece and Rome, and as they do exist in modern Europe, until the 
constitution of this Divine commonwealth is meditated upon in an 
honest and humble spirit.10
Mill then went on to admit having once entertained ‘crude notions’ 
regarding the Jews, ‘many’ of which he had abandoned on encountering 
Joseph Salvador’s L’Histoire des Institutions de Moϊse et du Peuple Hébreu 
(1828): ‘I believe I was cured of many of my crude notions about them by 
the writings of Salvador, a Jew by race and by national feeling, a French-
man by birth, and a rationalist of the school of [H. E. G.] Paulus … ’.11 
We note a proviso that Salvador’s account was ‘somewhat ludicrous in 
its adaptation of Moses to a Voltairian public and in its attempts to prove 
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that the Jews were Constitutional Liberals and utilitarians’. Nevertheless, 
it was ‘so full of strong facts and even arguments that it made a great 
impression on me when I read it a year or two ago’ (1998). Earlier the 
same year, Mill had written to Gustave d’Eichthal that although Salva-
dor’s book had been too much affected by contemporary French events, 
it had transformed his perceptions:
[I]t has … thrown much new light upon history & has made me 
think in a manner I never expected to do of the Hebrew people 
& polity, mais cela se ressent horriblement des quinze dernières 
années de la restauration – I could hardly help laughing at the man-
ner in which he strains everything to recommend poor Moses to the 
Constitutional Opposition & to shew that the Jews were Liberals, 
political economists & Utilitarians, and that they had properly 
speaking no religion, or next to none, & were altogether à la hau-
teur de l’époque, worthy sons of the 18th century.12
I know of no other indication by Mill himself of his earlier ‘crude’ views 
than that mentioned in the letter of September 1842, but we must take 
him at his word, including the admission that he had entertained such 
views until the encounter with Salvador in 1840 or 1841.13 As for a res-
idue of prejudice implied in the disavowal, I am inclined to believe that 
Mill’s confession in this regard should not be read literally since one does 
not normally admit to retaining ‘crude notions’. Nevertheless, several of 
his objections to the Old Testament as a ‘primitive’ document, even after 
reading Salvador, do lack balance, while an evident unawareness of cen-
turies – rather, millennia – of rabbinical interpretation constitutes to my 
mind a serious weakness. To the extent that Mill did retain a biased view in 
the historical context, I find that his ability to approach the contemporary 
Jewish question sympathetically – documented later in this paper – to be 
all the more impressive.
Let me be more specific. In 1835 Mill opined that the ‘guidance in 
the details of ethics’ or a ‘code of morals’ provided by Judaism was but 
‘local and temporary’ rather than universally applicable;14 and in later 
correspondence he strikingly lamented:
How can morality be anything but the chaos it now is, when the 
ideas of right & wrong, just & unjust, must be wrenched into accord-
ance either with the notions of a tribe of barbarians in a corner of 
Syria three thousand years ago, or with what is called the order of 
Providence.15
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On Liberty refers to the ethical doctrine of the Bible as ‘a system elaborate 
indeed, but in many respects barbarous, and indeed only for a barbarous 
people.’16 Utilitarianism refers to ‘the idée mère, the primitive element, in 
the formation of justice’, namely:
conformity to law [which], constituted the entire idea among the 
Hebrews, up to the birth of Christianity; as might be expected in the 
case of a people whose laws attempted to embrace all subjects on 
which precepts were required, and who believed those laws to be a 
direct emanation from the Supreme Being.17
Mill goes on to argue that the Greeks and Romans were more advanced 
by opening the door for law reform. For they ‘knew that their laws had 
been made originally, and still continued to be made, by men’, and so:
were not afraid to admit that those men might make bad laws; might 
do, by law, the same things, and from the same motives, which, if 
done by individuals without the sanction of law, would be called 
unjust. And hence the sentiment of injustice came to be attached, 
not to all violations of law, but only to violations of such laws as 
ought to exist, including such as ought to exist but do not; and to 
laws themselves, if supposed to be contrary to what ought to be law.
What particularly troubled Mill regarding the Hebrew law was the lex 
talionis or law of retaliation:
when the legitimacy of inflicting punishment is admitted, how many 
conflicting conceptions of justice come to light in discussing the proper 
apportionment of punishment to offences. No rule on this subject rec-
ommends itself so strongly to the primitive and spontaneous sentiment 
of justice, as the lex talionis, an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth. 
Though this principle of the Jewish and of the Mahomedan law has 
been generally abandoned in Europe as a practical maxim, there is, I 
suspect, in most minds, a secret hankering after it.18
Mill was apparently largely unaware of the ethical rulings in the Old Tes-
tament of undoubted universal and permanent relevance encapsulated 
by the seven Noahide commandments enjoined upon all mankind, but in 
fact extending much further to encompass, for example, fair treatment 
of ‘aliens’ – an injunction against the return to their masters of escaped 
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slaves – animal welfare and public hygiene.19 As for the lex talionis, Mill 
bases himself on a literal reading of the Biblical text, ignoring rabbinical 
interpretation that runs in terms of monetary compensation for injury, 
although admittedly it is no easy matter to discern whether the Rabbis 
intended to soften the harshness of the original or whether they believed 
that monetary compensation was the actual intention of the lawgiver. 
More generally, Mill ignored entirely the fact that social utility was a 
prime consideration governing the rabbinical contribution to practical 
Jewish law.20
When Mill does recognize aspects of the broader picture, it is some-
times in a manner so ungracious as to suggest prejudice, and to that 
extent Alexander has reason to object. I refer to a note regarding the com-
mandment ‘to love one another’ (as found in John), where Mill reminds 
readers that this is ‘[n]ot, however, a new commandment. In justice to the 
great Hebrew lawgiver, it should always be remembered that the precept, 
to love thy neighbour as thyself, already existed in the Pentateuch; and 
very surprising it is to find it there’.21 Similarly ungenerous is his declara-
tion that ‘[t]he Stoics were, I believe, the first (except so far as the Jewish 
law constitutes an exception) who taught as a part of morality that men 
were bound by moral obligations to their slaves’.22 Why the qualification? 
As for the Jewish law restricting proprietary rights to land, it is hardly the 
Hebrew lawgiver’s fault that ‘in the historical times of the Jewish state 
this rule may have been successfully evaded’.23
Mill himself, we recall, had affirmed in 1842 that he had abandoned 
‘many’ – not all – of his admitted biases regarding the Jews upon encoun-
tering Joseph Salvador, so perhaps we should not be surprised to encoun-
ter residual instances of prejudice. But we must be cautious, for the fact 
is that Mill also expressed, simultaneously, fulsome appreciation for the 
advance of humanity by the ancient Hebrews. Thus, the reflection that 
their perceiving law as emanating from the Supreme Being and accord-
ingly as necessarily ‘just’, which precluded any notion of ‘the progress of 
mankind’, did not prevent Mill from applauding their contribution to 
monotheism as such:
We have no wish to dispute the matter with those who believe 
that Monotheism was the primitive religion, transmitted to our 
race from its first parents in uninterrupted tradition. By their own 
acknowledgment, the tradition was lost by all the nations of the world 
except a small and peculiar people, in whom it was miraculously kept 
alive.24
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And while regretting the failure of the Hebrews to remain faithful to the 
principle,25 Mill acknowledged that such lapses could be understood as 
reflecting the real mental difficulties impeding its adoption.
But beyond all this, an admiration for the Hebrew Prophets consti-
tutes a veritable transformation of the view taken of early Judaism if not 
of the Old Testament. Here Joseph Salvador again plays a part, as is clear 
from Mill’s letter to Gustave d’Eichthal of 10 January 1842, referred to 
earlier: ‘He is quite right … in saying that the liberty of prophesying was 
equivalent in the Jewish polity to the liberty of the press & the point is a 
new & striking one.’26 But Mill insists against Salvador on the specifically 
religious component, complaining that:
it really is not necessary to tell us that the prophets did not pretend 
to be, nor were supposed to be, specially credited from God, that all 
the expressions implying them to be such are a mere façon de par-
ler, meaning only that they were very clever fellows, & to fortify this 
by philological arguments from the usages & phrases of the Hebrew 
tongue.
It would have been preferable:
to say at once that all persons of genius, inspired persons in the 
modern sense, poets & persons of imagination & eloquence who 
had great & wonderful powers not derived from teaching, were 
believed to derive these powers straight from God & were in con-
sequence of that religious belief, permitted from religious motives to 
exercise that right of free speech & free censure of powerful persons, 
which certainly would not in that age have been conceded to any 
one who spoke merely as from himself.27
Some 20 years later, Mill confirmed his dismissal of the predictive powers 
of the still greatly admired Prophets, when those powers are perceived 
to be supernatural, while again emphasizing the essential role played by 
religious belief in assuring confidence in the prophetic message.28
Going even further than the correspondence are passages from 
Considerations on Representative Government (1861), where the very 
character of the Jewish religion is central to the argument. Here, the 
Prophetic literature is portrayed as a revolutionary breakaway from 
the Old Testament, and the Jews – along with the Greeks – as ‘the 
starting-point and main propelling agency of modern cultivation’.29 
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The context is a contrast between the ancient Chinese and Egyptians, 
viewed as unable to progress ‘for want of mental liberty and individu-
ality’ and ‘a comparatively insignificant Oriental people – the Jews … 
Their religion … enabled persons of genius and a high religious tone 
to be regarded and to regard themselves as inspired from heaven, [giv-
ing] existence to an inestimably precious unorganized institution – the 
Order (if it may be so termed) of Prophets’ alongside the monarchy and 
priesthood, an ‘antagonism of influences’ – a balance of power – which 
is ‘the only real security for continued progress. Religion consequently 
was not there, what it has been in so many other places – a consecration 
of all that was once established, and a barrier against further progress’. 
But Salvador, Mill affirmed, did not go far enough. Though valid, his 
identification of the Prophets with the modern freedom of the press did 
not convey:
an adequate conception of the part fulfilled in national and uni-
versal history by this great element of Jewish life; by means of 
which, the canon of inspiration never being complete, the person 
most eminent in genius and moral feeling could not only denounce 
and reprobate, with the direct authority of the Almighty, whatever 
appeared to them deserving of such treatment, but could give forth 
better and higher interpretations of the national religion, which 
thenceforth became part of the religion.
A divorce of the Prophets from the earlier Biblical works is a main theme, 
and a more enthusiastic accolade for the Jewish contribution to civiliza-
tion it is difficult to imagine:
Accordingly, whoever can divest himself of the habit of reading the 
Bible as if it was one book, which until lately was equally inveter-
ate in Christians and in unbelievers, sees with admiration the vast 
interval between the morality and religion of the Pentateuch, or 
even of the historical books (the unmistakable work of the Hebrew 
Conservatives of the sacerdotal order), and the morality and reli-
gion of the Prophecies: a distance as wide as between these last 
and the Gospels. Conditions more favourable to progress could not 
easily exist: accordingly, the Jews, instead of being stationary like 
other Asiatics, were, next to the Greeks, the most progressive peo-
ple of antiquity, and, jointly with them, have been the starting-point 
and main propelling agency of modern cultivation.30
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True, the allusion to a sharp break in ethical progress between the Proph-
ets and the Gospels implies that the Prophets did not go far enough. Yet, 
as we shall now see, in a range of informal and formal contexts dating 
from 1835 onwards – On Liberty included – Mill questioned whether the 
Gospels indeed purveyed a peculiarly Christian morality.
III. Mill on Christian ethics
In the course of a defence of the utility doctrine in 1835 against criti-
cisms by Adam Sedgwick (1835), Mill points to Sedgwick’s opposing a 
‘moral sense’ to an alleged ‘indefiniteness of a morality founded on util-
ity’, assuming by the contrast ‘his moral-sense man [to be] provided with 
all the guidance which can be derived from a revelation from heaven – 
intending New Testament revelation – and his “utilitarian” destitute of 
any such help’.31 Revelation, Mill insisted, was in principle also open to 
the utilitarian ‘to assist or rectify our judgments of utility’. But the entire 
formulation, Mill explains, in an argument distinguishing Christianity 
from Judaism and other religions, was in fact faulty since there were no 
specifically Christian guidelines to practical ethics:
Christianity does not deliver a code of morals, any more than a code of 
laws. Its practical morality is altogether indefinite, and was meant 
to be so …. Christianity, on the contrary, influences our actions only 
[1867: influences the conduct] by shaping the character itself: it 
aims at so elevating and purifying the desires, that there shall be no 
hindrance to the fulfilment of our duties when recognized; but of 
what our duties are, at least with regard to outward acts, it says very 
little but what all moralists [1867: moralists in general] have said 
[emphasis added].
And in the absence of peculiarly Christian guidelines to practical ethics, 
‘we must perforce resort to that “foresight of consequences”, of the diffi-
culties of which the Professor has so formidable an idea’.
In the System of Logic (1843), Judaism is famously perceived as 
merely a stage in human development in a sequence entailing polythe-
ism, Judaism, Christianity, Protestantism and ‘the critical philosophy of 
modern Europe and its positive science’, with each stage perceived as ‘a 
primary agent in making society what it was at each successive period’.32 
For all that, we yet find reaffirmed in On Liberty – as in 1835 – a denial 
of anything like ‘a complete doctrine’ of Christian morals, with the New 
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Testament amounting to a sort of wishful-thinking seeking unsuccess-
fully to go beyond Old Testament morality – it is in this context that we 
have encountered the representation of the Old Testament as a ‘barba-
rous’ production – and in the case of St Paul, accommodating Greek and 
Roman doctrine including slavery:
[B]efore pronouncing what Christian morality is or is not, it would 
be desirable to decide what is meant by Christian morality. If it 
means the morality of the New Testament, I wonder that any one 
who derives his knowledge of this from the book itself, can suppose 
that it was announced, or intended, as a complete doctrine of mor-
als. The Gospel always refers to a pre-existing morality, and con-
fines its precepts to the particulars in which that morality was to be 
corrected, or superseded by a wider and a higher; expressing itself, 
moreover, in terms most general, often impossible to be interpreted 
literally, and possessing rather the impressiveness of poetry or elo-
quence than the precision of legislation. To extract from it a body of 
ethical doctrine, has never been possible without eking it out from 
the Old Testament, that is, from a system elaborate enough indeed, 
but in many respects barbarous, and intended only for a barbarous 
people. St. Paul, a declared enemy to this Judaical mode of inter-
preting the doctrine and filling up the scheme of his Master, equally 
assumes a pre-existing morality, namely that of the Greeks and 
Romans; and his advice to Christians is in a great measure a system 
of accommodation to that; even to the extent of giving an apparent 
sanction to slavery.33
What follows in On Liberty certainly undermines the representation in 
Auguste Comte of Christianity as ‘the highest form of Monotheism’ (see 
endnote 32), and indeed negates any notion of ethical progress over the 
centuries up until Mill’s day:
Christian morality (so called) has all the characters of a reaction; 
it is, in great part, a protest against Paganism. Its ideal is negative 
rather than positive; passive rather than active; Innocence rather 
than Nobleness; Abstinence from Evil, rather than energetic Pursuit 
of Good: in its precepts (as has been well said) ‘thou shalt not’ pre-
dominates unduly over ‘thou shalt’.34
But there is, in addition, Mill’s own vision of a good society reflected 
in the charge that Christianity encouraged self-interest at the cost of 
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social concern, its standard of ethics amounting to no more than ‘passive 
obedience’:
It holds out the hope of heaven and the threat of hell, as the 
appointed and appropriate motives to a virtuous life: in this falling 
far below the best of the ancients, and doing what lies in it to give 
human morality an essentially selfish character, by disconnecting 
each man’s feelings of duty from the interests of his fellow-crea-
tures, except so far as a self-interested inducement is offered to him 
for consulting them. It is essentially a doctrine of passive obedience; 
it inculcates submission to all authorities found established …. And 
while, in the morality of the best Pagan nations, duty to the State 
holds even a disproportionate place, infringing on the just liberty of 
the individual; in purely Christian ethics, that grand department of 
duty is scarcely noticed or acknowledged.35
These charges against Christianity correspond, be it noted, to those 
directed at the ‘Old School’ of political economy, namely opposition to 
social reform on the grounds of the sanctity of the laissez faire principle, 
and – citing Cliffe Leslie – of ‘pleasing the powers that be, by lending the 
sanction of “science” to all established institutions and customs, unless, 
indeed, customs of the poor’.36
On Liberty carries yet further the denial of anything amounting to a 
peculiarly Christian contribution to the idea of public spirit:
What little recognition the idea of obligation to the public obtains 
in modern morality, is derived from Greek and Roman sources, not 
from Christian; as, even in the morality of private life, whatever 
exists of magnanimity, high mindedness, personal dignity, even 
the sense of honour, is derived from the purely human, not the reli-
gious part of our education, and never could have grown out of a 
standard of ethics in which the only worth, professedly recognised, 
is that of obedience.37
In conclusion, Mill declared:
It can do truth no service to blink the fact, known to all who have 
the most ordinary acquaintance with literary history, that a large 
portion of the noblest and most valuable moral teaching has been 
the work, not only of men who did not know, but of men who knew 
and rejected, the Christian faith.38
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This orientation, it must be said, is itself qualified, although without 
changing the general picture. Thus, in ‘Utility of Religion’, Mill:
grant[ed] that some of the precepts of Christ as exhibited in the 
Gospels – rising far above the Paulism which is the foundation of ordi-
nary Christianity – carry some kinds of moral goodness to a greater 
height than had ever been attained before, though much even of what 
is supposed to be peculiar to them is equaled in the Meditations of 
Marcus [Aurelius] Antoninus, which we have no ground for believing 
to have been in any way indebted to Christianity.39
A final matter contributing to our understanding of Mill’s perspective 
on Christianity especially in relation to the Jews is his reading of the 
Crucifixion. Thus, On Liberty mitigates the moral responsibility of those 
responsible for the ‘judicial iniquity’.40 Mill pleaded for a judgement tak-
ing proper account of time and place:
The high-priest who rent his garments when the words were pro-
nounced, which, according to all the ideas of his country, consti-
tuted the blackest guilt, was in all probability quite as sincere in 
his horror and indignation, as the generality of respectable and 
pious men now are in the religious and moral sentiments they pro-
fess; and most of those who now shudder at his conduct, if they 
had lived in his time, and been born Jews, would have acted pre-
cisely as he did.41
IV. Contemporary issues
i. Parliamentary reform
I now turn from Mill’s perspective on the historical development of 
ethical standards to contemporary policy, starting with parliamentary 
reform. In ‘Notes on the Newspapers’ for the Monthly Repository of 17 
June 1834, Mill designated as a ‘Parliamentary Monstrosity’ the stance 
adopted in the House of Lords by Edward Grey (Bishop of Hereford and 
brother of the Prime Minister) in rejecting an Edinburgh petition for the 
removal of Jewish Civil Disabilities.42 The Socinians43 – tolerated by the 
legislature – Grey held ‘in utter abhorrence’, but at least they believed 
Jesus to be the Messiah, ‘while the Jews affirmed the Lord Jesus Christ to 
be an imposter’. Mill protested strongly:
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Protect us from such Christianity! If this be the figure under which 
Christianity is to continue to be exhibited by its recognized teach-
ers, there needs no prophet to predict, that, as the religion of the 
people of this country, it will not last two more generations. The 
religion which men shall ever again reverence, and shape their 
lives by, will be, Dr. Grey may depend on it, another kind of reli-
gion than this.
In this protest we have an early affirmation that there were no valid reli-
gious grounds for maintaining the political disabilities imposed on mem-
bers of the Jewish faith.
In further comments in the Monthly Repository (12 August 1834), 
Mill denounced the rejection by the House of Lords of the Jewish 
Emancipation Bill, and now extended his criticisms to the rejection of 
two further proposals from the lower House: a Bill ‘to Remove Certain 
Disabilities Which Prevent Some Classes of His Majesty’s Subjects from 
Resorting to the Universities’ – which of course included Jewish subjects 
– and a Bill ‘to Abolish the Irish Tithe’.44 Mill’s case regarding the first two 
is made out on the grounds of the principle of ‘civil equality and religious 
liberty’, in line with the June article, although he had no illusions about 
the potential effectiveness of the first two rejected bills. It is unclear 
whether by his assertion that the ‘Jew Bill’ or the ‘Universities’ Admission 
Bill’, if carried, would have entailed not ‘one atom of practical good’, Mill 
intended the small number of those potentially affected or an estimate 
that very few would take advantage of liberalization, but it is clear that 
what mattered for him was the principle of ‘civil equality and religious 
liberty’, which does not turn on numbers.45
Mill’s firm support for the removal of Jewish political disabilities 
remained unqualified thereafter. In 1848 and again in 1849, Lord John 
Russell’s Jewish Disabilities Bill designed to admit Jews to parliament 
was turned back by the House of Lords. Writing to Harriet Taylor, Mill 
protested:
Do you notice that Russell in bringing forward his Jew Bill, although 
he is actually abolishing the old oaths & framing new, still has the 
meanness to reinsert the words ‘on the true faith of a Christian’ for 
all persons except Jews, & justifies it by saying that the Constitution 
ought not avowedly to admit unbelievers into Parliament.46
This is evidently not a remark hostile to the release of Jews from an 
oath impeding their entry into the legislature, but rather a protest at the 
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refusal to extend the release to all and sundry. The matter was elaborated 
anonymously in an article of 26 March 1849 for the Daily News – entitled 
‘The Attempt to Exclude Unbelievers from Parliament’ – summarized by 
Mill as declaring ‘without mincing the matter, that infidels are perfectly 
proper persons to be in parliament’.47 Mill assured Harriet – who had 
encouraged him to write an article on Russell’s Bill – that ‘I have carefully 
avoided anything disrespectful to Russell personally’, but this is uncon-
vincing, for the article effectively charges Russell with unprincipled polit-
ical calculation:
He is proposing to abolish the old oaths and to establish new, and 
in the oaths which he establishes he introduces de novo these very 
words, granting to Jews a special exemption from their use. He 
opens the door of parliament just wide enough to allow in one par-
ticular class of dissenters from Christianity to slip in, and closes it, 
as far as depends upon him, against all others.48
Not only religious sceptics would be excluded, Mill pointed out, but some 
three-quarters of the population of the Empire professing beliefs other 
than Christianity, radically restricting the pool of parliamentary talent.49 
But Mill could not bring himself to believe that Russell actually intended to 
exclude those formally affected. His true purpose, Mill deduces, was not to 
exclude sceptics and other non-Christians, but to attract voters to his party 
by allowing into the Commons Lionel de Rothschild, who was returned as 
Liberal candidate in 1847 for the City of London but unable to take his seat 
because of the required oath ‘on the true faith of a Christian’.50 As in 1834, 
practical effectiveness was secondary to mankind’s improvement: ‘[Rus-
sell] has yet to learn that a legislature which either introduces or confirms 
a bad principle does more harm than is compensated by twenty good prac-
tical measures involving no principle: for it is by the principles contained in 
them that institutions educate the national mind’.51
Five years later, Mill reaffirmed his support for the removal of the 
restriction on Jews, and this notwithstanding his objection to the pro-
cedure adopted by the proposed legislation: ‘ … the writer of one of the 
leading articles in today’s Morning Post [14 March 1854] had evidently 
come hot from reading the Logic, & I am sorry to say did it no credit as a 
pupil for it was an article against the Jew bill’.52 As Mill’s editors explain, 
the objectionable article ‘ended with an attack on a writer in Fraser’s for 
attempting to prove the “compatibility of Judaism with a sterling English 
character”’. Mill’s insistence upon such compatibility has been suffi-
ciently demonstrated.53
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There is one qualification to be noted. Addressing the electors of 
Westminster on 2 November 1868, Mill played down the importance 
of the ‘admission of Jews to equal power with other people’ – finally 
achieved in legislation of 1858 and 1866 regarding the Commons and 
Lords respectively – and similarly ‘the abolition of the church rates’ 
achieved in 1868.54 But both cases he intended ‘comparatively unimpor-
tant’ relative to parliamentary reform itself – Disraeli’s great Reform Act 
had been passed the previous year – and by no means a positive denigra-
tion of the significance of the issues.
ii. Public education
Mill’s support for secular public education is based on the same consider-
ations of ‘civil equality and religious liberty’, cited above, as those for the 
removal of Jewish political disabilities:
To know the laws of the physical world, the properties of their 
own bodies and minds, the past history of their species, is as much 
a benefit to the Jew, the Musselman, the Deist, the Atheist, as to 
the orthodox churchman; and it is iniquitous to hold it from them. 
Education provided by the public must be education for all, and to 
be education for all it must be purely secular education.55
As for public education limited to believers in New Testament doctrine:
The Jew and the unbeliever would be excluded from it though they 
would not the less be required to pay for it. I do not hear that their 
money is to be refused, that they are to be exempted from the school 
rate. Religious exclusion and inequality are as odious when practised 
towards minorities as majorities [emphasis added].
In later correspondence, Mill consistently argued against clauses in the 
1870 Education Bill that he feared would ‘empower the State to estab-
lish schools on the denominational principle’.56 And in a public speech he 
strongly reaffirmed his opposition to Church of England teaching funded 
by the state: ‘The principle remains of teaching the religion of a part with 
funds raised by taxation from the whole; and a measure infected by this 
bad principle cannot be satisfactory to any but persons of the dominant 
creed, not to impartial persons of any creed.’57
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iii. Sabbatarian regulation
There is in fact one case where Mill justifies particular protection of Jew-
ish religious sensibilities. I have in mind his position in On Liberty regard-
ing Sabbatarian legislation, a category that might seem less important 
than voting rights and public education, but which strikingly confirms 
the absence of hostile bias on Mill’s part in practical application. Thus, 
the state should in its Sabbatarian legislation protect the sanctity of 
Saturday for Jews, whereas any other day might be selected as a day of 
rest for non-Jews: ‘Without doubt, abstinence on one day in the week, 
so far as the exigencies of life permit, from the usual daily occupation, 
though in no respect religiously binding on any except Jews, is a highly 
beneficial custom … ’.58 Should Sunday – or any other day – be selected 
as the general day of rest there would necessarily be exceptions – such 
as workers in a variety of service industries including cultural activities, 
transportation and the like; but restrictions on Sunday amusements on 
purely religious grounds reflected ‘a determination not to tolerate others 
in doing what is permitted by their religion, because it is not permitted 
by the persecutor’s religion. It is a belief that God not only abominates 
the act of the misbeliever, but will not hold us guiltless if we leave him 
unmolested’. Mill’s rejection of a religious basis for Sunday observance, 
coupled with his defence of the Jewish Sabbath, is reiterated in election-
eering for the Westminster constituency on 8 July 1865: ‘his opinion was 
that the Sabbatical institution was an institution for the Jews only. The 
Christian Sunday appeared to him to be an institution of a quite different 
character’.59
V. Summary and conclusion: a current application
The notion that Mill was prejudiced against Judaism turns in large part 
on his observations regarding the historical progression of ethical stand-
ards. This progression we have shown was subject to major qualification. 
Thus, his declamations regarding ‘primitive’ Old Testament doctrine – 
based upon a partial familiarity with the text – are effectively outweighed 
by his admiration for the Prophetic institution represented as protecting 
freedom of critical expression against perceived injustices as essential 
to assure their correction to the benefit of the state. In any event, it is 
clear that several of his hostile remarks relating to religion are directed at 
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Christian rather than Jewish targets; indeed, in one case, a representation 
of the Old Testament as ‘primitive’ is expressed in the context of a criti-
cism of contemporary Christianity (see above). Certainly, charges of lack 
of social concern and endemic conservatism had profound consequences 
for the broadest range of contemporary social issues. Furthermore, Mill’s 
understanding of ancient Jewish history in no way deflected him from 
the principle of equality implying protection of Jewish civil rights in con-
temporary England on a par with those of other minorities. The abolition 
of Jewish political disabilities is a prime case in point, with Mill opposing 
John Russell’s exclusion of Jews from the Christian oath for entry into 
parliament only because it discriminated against other non-Christians 
including atheists and agnostics. The case for non-denominational public 
education is similarly based on the principles of ‘civil equality and reli-
gious liberty’. Particularly significant as evidence of a fearless objectivity 
is the argument for recognition of Saturday as the day of rest for Jews on 
specifically religious grounds (but not of Sunday for non-Jews). Here sat-
isfaction of the principle of ‘equality’ is seen as justifying in special cases 
a sort of positive discrimination.
Recall now, from the outset of this paper, Thomas Arnold’s crude lam-
basting in 1834 of ‘that low Jacobinical notion of citizenship, that a man 
acquires a right to it by the accident of his being littered inter quatuor maria 
or because he pays taxes’, a stance he directed against the Jewish minority 
of his day. It is precisely a Jacobinical notion of citizenship – a term corre-
sponding to ‘left-wing’ in today’s parlance – that Mill upheld and which he 
would doubtless apply today to the benefit of other minorities. Honest critics 
of specific policies adopted by the modern Jewish state (elaborated below) 
should therefore feel free to appeal to Mill in good conscience.
Now, ethical objections to discrimination are of course strength-
ened where inequality in the treatment of majorities by the minority is 
at issue; and Mill indeed appropriately extended his case. A concept of 
‘national morality’ is of the essence in his treatment of British colonial 
rule in Ireland and India.60
As for Ireland, Mill considered reducing unrest by improving the lot of 
the Irish, including a variety of land reforms, but he recognized a ‘desper-
ate form of dissatisfaction, which does not demand to be better governed, 
which asks us for no benefit, no redress of grievances, not even any repa-
ration of injuries, but simply to take ourselves off and rid the country of 
our presence’ – that is, a ‘revolt of mere nationality’.61 He himself could not 
have believed that the situation had quite reached that stage since he put 
much weight on institutional reform as a last resort to save the Union. Only 
in its absence would Britain be forced, and rightly so, to abandon Ireland:
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It is not consistent with self-respect, in a nation any more than an 
individual, to wait till it is compelled by uncontrollable circum-
stances to resign that which it cannot in conscience hold. Before 
allowing its government to involve it in another repetition of the 
attempt to maintain dominion over Ireland by brute force, the 
English nation ought to commune with its conscience, and solemnly 
reconsider its position. If England is unable to learn what has to be 
learnt, and unlearn what has to be unlearnt, in order to make her 
rule willingly acceptable by the Irish people … are we the power 
which, according to the general fitness of things and the rules of 
morality, ought to govern Ireland.62
As for India, the following extract from Considerations on Representative 
Government is written with an eye to the East India Company:
The government of a people by itself has a meaning, and a real-
ity; but such a thing as government of one people by another does 
not and cannot exist. One people may keep another as a warren or 
preserve for its own use, a place to make money in, a human cat-
tle-farm, to be worked for the profit of its own inhabitants. But if 
the good of the governed is the proper business of a government, it is 
utterly impossible that a people should directly attend to it. The 
utmost they can do is to give some of their best men a commission to 
look after it; to whom the opinion of their own country can neither 
be much of a guide in the performance of their duty, nor a compe-
tent judge of the mode in which it has been performed.63
I stress in particular the qualification that ‘if the good of the governed is 
the proper business of a government’ then the ‘government of one people 
by another does not and cannot exist’. For since 1967 Israel has exercised 
rule over a subject people making use of administrative, legal, police 
and military regulations, much of which was inherited from Mandatory 
times when Britain was the occupying power. In some respects, matters 
are worse than Mill would have feared. Public opinion in Israel apparently 
has no patience with Millian liberal principles, which is scarcely surpris-
ing since the attitudes of administrators, police, soldiers and settlers in the 
Territories naturally affect the perspectives of residents within the Green 
Line – in many, perhaps in most, cases these are in fact overlapping groups. 
But beyond this, Palestinians are allowed no access to independent com-
missioners divorced from Israeli public opinion of the sort Mill believed 
was provided by the East India Company concerned with Indian welfare.
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Now, Mill’s ‘Jacobinism’ is in fact expressed loud and clear in Israel’s 
Declaration of Independence, in the famous clause stating that the 
Jewish State ‘will ensure complete equality of social and political rights 
to all its inhabitants irrespective of religion, race or sex’.64 The now wide-
spread condemnation as ‘traitors’ to the Jewish State of critics concerned 
with perceived deviations from this principle amounts to rejection of the 
founding document. Indeed, the Nation-State Law passed in September 
2018 (and at the time of writing before the High Court) omits entirely 
mention of equal treatment of minorities and is thus conspicuously at 
odds with the Declaration of Independence. Worse still, the principle of 
non-discrimination is explicitly traced in that document to ‘the prophets 
of Israel’, so that if we accept Mill’s view of the prophetic institution as 
one establishing the right ‘to denounce and reprobate’ – under religious 
auspices into the bargain – it follows that those who would silence crit-
icism do so in the name of a sadly impoverished version of the Jewish 
faith. They bear an exceedingly heavy responsibility.
Notes
1. Edward Alexander, The State of the Jews: A Critical Appraisal (New Brunswick and London: 
Transaction Publishers, 2012), xiv.
2. Referring to the Jewish Emancipation Bill rejected by the House of Lords in 1833 and reintro-
duced unsuccessfully in 1834. The proposed legislation included the release of Jews elected to 
parliament from the obligation to take a Christian oath before taking their seats.
3. Literally: within the four seas. Arnold’s ultimate objective was to avoid an ‘indiscriminate 
mixture’ of races; see Arthur P. Stanley, The Life and Correspondence of Thomas Arnold, D.D., 
I (London: B. Fellowes, 1844), 378. He was willing, he explains to another correspondent, to 
let Jews ‘tax themselves in a Jewish House of Assembly, like a colony or like the clergy of old; 
but to confound the right of taxing oneself with the right of general legislation, is one of the 
Jacobinical confusions of later days, arising from those low Warburtonian notions of the ends 
of political society’ (377–8n). (Regarding Henry Warburton, Radical MP, see Mill’s favourable 
comment in the Examiner, 2 September 1832; John Stuart Mill [1832], ‘Recommendations of 
Candidates to Parliament’ [2 September 1832], in Newspaper Writings, Collected Works [here-
after, CW] [Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1986], XXIII, 507.)
4. Cited in Stanley, The Life and Correspondence of Thomas Arnold, D.D., 377.
5. Alexander, The State of the Jews, xiii–xiv.
6. Alexander, The State of the Jews, xiv.
7. Haim Chertok, ‘Review of Alexander’, Hadassah (August–September 2013): 69.
8. Much of my discussion identifies the principle of equality with non-discrimination against mi-
norities. The moral issue is of course exacerbated where the ‘colonialist’ treatment of majorities 
by the minority is entailed.
9. John Stuart Mill, The Later Letters 1849 to 1873, CW, XIV–XVII (1997).
10. Frederick D. Maurice (1840), ‘Moral and Metaphysical Philosophy’, in Encyclopaedia Metro-
politana, eds. E. Smedley et al. (London: Joseph Griffen, 1849), Vol. II, 545–674, 554. This 
positive view is carried further in analysis of the Prophetic Period; see John Stuart Mill (1849), 
‘The Attempt to Exclude Unbelievers from Parliament’ (26 March), in Newspaper Writings, CW, 
XXV, 560–7.
11. Mill, Later Letters, CW, XIV–XVII (1997–8).
12. John Stuart Mill, The Earlier Letters 1812 to 1848, CW, XII–XIII (1963), (10 January 1842), 
496.
 JOHN STUART MILL AND THE JEWISH QUESTION 265
13. For the importance of Salvador as an influence on Mill, particularly regarding the Prophetic 
literature, see Georgios Varouxakis, Liberty Abroad: J. S. Mill on International Relations (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 112.
14. John Stuart Mill (1835), ‘Sedgwick’s Discourse’, in Essays on Ethics, Religion and Society, CW, X 
(1985), 65.
15. Mill, Later Letters, 22 November 1850, CW, XIV–XVII, 53.
16. John Stuart Mill (1859), On Liberty, CW, XVIII (1977), 254–5.
17. John Stuart Mill (1861), Utilitarianism, in Essays on Ethics, Religion and Society, CW, X (1969), 
245.
18. Mill, Utilitarianism, 253.
19. Indeed, we have seen that Salvador’s account elicited mockery on Mill’s part.
20. Salvador, who alludes frequently to utilitarian considerations in discussing the Old Testament, 
does not consider rabbinical literature.
21. John Stuart Mill (1874), ‘Utility of Religion’, in Three Essays on Religion. Essays on Ethics, Reli-
gion and Society, CW, X (1969), 416 (written between 1850 and 1858); emphasis added.
22. John Stuart Mill (1869), The Subjection of Women. In Essays on Equality, Law, and Education, 
CW, XXI (1984), 266.
23. John Stuart Mill (1879), Chapters on Socialism. In Essays on Economics and Society, CW, V 
(1967), 751.
24. John Stuart Mill (1865), Auguste Comte and Positivism. In Essays on Ethics, Religion and Society, 
CW, X (1969), 274; emphasis added.
25. See also Mill, ‘Utility of Religion’, 412, 421, on the tendency of the Hebrews to lapse from their 
worship.
26. Mill, Earlier Letters, 496.
27. Mill, Earlier Letters, 496–7; emphasis added.
28. Mill, Later Letters, to Henry Chenevix (4 November 1863), 895–6.
29. John Stuart Mill (1861), Considerations on Representative Government, in Essays on Politics and 
Society, CW, XIX (1977), 397.
30. Mill, Considerations on Representative Government, 397.
31. Mill, ‘Sedgwick’s Discourse’, 65.
32. John Stuart Mill (1843), A System of Logic Ratiocinative and Inductive, CW, VII–VII (1974), 
927. The transition was a complex process, with Mill affirming subsequently that ‘[i]n what-
ever mode, natural or supernatural, we choose to account for the early Monotheism of the 
Hebrews, there can be no question that its reception by the Gentiles was only rendered pos-
sible by the slow preparation which the human mind had undergone from the philosophers’ 
(Mill, Comte and Positivism, 275). And there were reversals insofar as even ‘the highest form 
of Monotheism, Christianity’ had, up to Mill’s time, ‘giv[en] partial satisfaction to the mental 
dispositions that lead to Polytheism, by admitting into its theology the thoroughly polytheistic 
conception of a devil’ (274).
33. Mill, On Liberty, 254–5.
34. Mill, On Liberty, 255.
35. A silent objection to the ethical stance of William Paley might be intended here, at least if we 
follow Mill’s interpretation of Paley as provided in ‘Sedgwick’s Discourse’: ‘Paley not only rep-
resents the proposition that we ought to do good and not harm to mankind, as a mere corollary 
from the proposition that God wills their good, and not their harm – but represents the motive 
to virtue, and the motive which constitutes it virtue, as consisting solely in the hope of heaven 
and the fear of hell’ (see Mill, ‘Sedgwick’s Discourse’, 53–4). That God wills conduct directed 
at enhancing the general good, thereby furthering happiness, is a feature of Lockean ethical 
doctrine; but Locke’s ‘theological utilitarianism’ had its limits and did not extend to the second 
element of Mill’s reading of Paley.
36. John Stuart Mill (1870), ‘Leslie on the Land Question’, in Essays on Economics and Society, CW, 
V (1967), 671; see Samuel Hollander, John Stuart Mill: Political Economist (Singapore: World 
Scientific, 2015), 434–6.
37. Mill, On Liberty, 256. Mill here evaluates the Koran as superior to the New Testament in recog-
nizing competence as the criterion in selecting state officials, an index of social responsibility.
38. Mill, On Liberty, 257.
39. Mill, ‘Utility of Religion’, 416.
40. Mill, On Liberty, 235
41. Mill, On Liberty, 236.
266 HAPPINESS AND UTIL ITY
42. John Stuart Mill (1834), ‘Notes on the Newspapers’ (17 June), in Essays on England, Ireland, 
and the Empire, CW, VI (1982), 251.
43. A doctrine denying the divinity of Jesus, the Trinity, etc. and explaining sin and salvation 
 rationalistically.
44. John Stuart Mill (1834), ‘Notes on the Newspapers’ (12 August), CW, VI (1982), 276.
45. The important contribution to the Jewish relief campaign by Richard Whately, Archbishop of 
Dublin, to the Lords debate in 1833 and for two decades thereafter is spelled out in Tony Ham-
mond, ‘F. H. Goldsmid and Archbishop Whately of Dublin: Their Significance in the Emancipa-
tion Debate’, Jewish Historical Studies 35 (1996–1998): 153–66. Mill, to my knowledge, makes 
no mention of Whately in the present context.
46. Mill, Later Letters, 21 February 1849, 13.
47. Mill, Later Letters, 17 March 1849, 18.
48. Mill, ‘The Attempt to Exclude Unbelievers’, 1136.
49. Mill, ‘The Attempt to Exclude Unbelievers’, 1137.
50. Mill, ‘The Attempt to Exclude Unbelievers’, 1137–8. Mill is attributing to Russell a high expec-
tation that Rothschild would be chosen as MP by the London establishment. Rothschild was 
indeed elected in 1847, and on several occasions thereafter, but was unable to take his seat 
until the Jews Relief Act of 1858. Only in 1866 were Jews admitted to the House of Lords. 
On the 1847 election itself, see the account by Victor Gray, ‘New Light on the 1847 Election 
in the City of London’, https://www.rothschildarchive.org/materials/review_2010_2011_
new_light_on_the_1847_election_2.pdf (accessed 1 March 2019). For an overview of the civil 
rights of English Jews in general, see Henry S. Q. Henriques, ‘The Civil Rights of English Jews’, 
The Jewish Quarterly Review 18/1 (1905): 40–83.
51. Mill, ‘The Attempt to Exclude Unbelievers’, 1138.
52. Mill, Later Letters, 185.
53. Mill, Later Letters, 185n. On Jews as a moral threat, as perceived by Thomas Carlyle and his 
follower Charles Kingsley, see David Levy, How the Dismal Science Got Its Name: Classical Eco-
nomics and the Ur-Text of Racial Politics (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2001), 
73–6, 143, 149–52. By contrast, William Hazlitt in 1831 had argued posthumously against the 
notion of the Jew as ill-equipped by character to fulfil the conditions for full citizenship (see 
Hammond, ‘Goldsmid and Archbishop Whately of Dublin’, 157). Mill does not mention Hazlitt 
in our context.
54. John Stuart Mill (1868), ‘Westminster Election 1868’, in Public and Parliamentary Speeches, 
CW, XXVIII (1988), 337.
55. John Stuart Mill, ‘Secular Education’, written after 4 November 1850, paper not delivered, in 
Public and Parliamentary Speeches, CW, XXVIII, 4.
56. Mill, Later Letters, 28 February 1870, 1703.
57. John Stuart Mill (1870), ‘The Education Bill’, in Public and Parliamentary Speeches, CW, XXIX 
(1988), 382. On the general context, see Hollander, John Stuart Mill, 505–8. Regarding Mill’s 
opposition to an educational system in Ireland entirely controlled by the Catholic Church, see 
Bruce L. Kinzer, A. P. Robson and J. M. Robson, A Moralist in and out of Parliament: John Stuart 
Mill at Westminster. 1865–1868 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992), 156n.
58. Mill, On Liberty, 289.
59. John Stuart Mill (1865), ‘Westminster Election 1865’, in Public and Parliamentary Speeches, 
CW, XXVIII, 38.
60. The same concept is adopted by Ricardo in rejecting proposals to default on the national debt: 
‘With a view to wealth only, it might be equally or more desirable that [a debtor] should or 
should not pay it; but the claims of justice and good faith, a greater utility, are not to be com-
pelled to yield to those of a less … . A debt guaranteed by the nation, differs in no respect from 
the above transaction. Justice and good faith demand that the interest of the national debt 
should continue to be paid, and that those who have advanced their capitals for the general 
benefit, should not be required to forego their equitable claims, on the plea of expediency.’ See 
David Ricardo (1817), Principles of Political Economy, ed. P. Sraffa (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1951), 245–6.
61. John Stuart Mill (1868), England and Ireland, CW, VI (1982), 509–11.
62. Mill, England and Ireland, 519–20; emphasis added.
63. Mill, Considerations on Representative Government, 569; emphasis added.
64. ‘THE STATE OF ISRAEL will be open for Jewish immigration and for the Ingathering of the 
Exiles; it will foster the development of the country for the benefit of all its inhabitants; it will 
 JOHN STUART MILL AND THE JEWISH QUESTION 267
be based on freedom, justice and peace as envisaged by the prophets of Israel; it will ensure 
complete equality of social and political rights to all its inhabitants irrespective of religion, race 
or sex; it will guarantee freedom of religion, conscience, language, education and culture; it 
will safeguard the Holy Places of all religions; and it will be faithful to the principles of the 
Charter of the United Nations.’
Bibliography
Alexander, Edward. The State of the Jews: A Critical Appraisal. New Brunswick and London: Trans-
action Publishers, 2012.
Chertok, Haim. ‘Review of Alexander’, Hadassah (August–September, 2013): 69.
Gray, Victor. ‘New Light on the 1847 Election in the City of London’. https://www.rothschildar-
chive.org/materials/review_2010_2011_new_light_on_the_1847_election_2.pdf (accessed 
1 March 2019).
Hammond, Tony. ‘F. H. Goldsmid and Archbishop Whately of Dublin: Their Significance in the 
Emancipation Debate’, Jewish Historical Studies 35 (1996–1998): 153–66.
Henriques, Henry S. Q. ‘The Civil Rights of English Jews’, The Jewish Quarterly Review 18/1 (1905): 
40–83.
Hollander, Samuel. John Stuart Mill: Political Economist. Singapore: World Scientific, 2015.
Kinzer, Bruce L., Robson, A. P. and Robson, J. M. A Moralist in and out of Parliament: John Stuart 
Mill at Westminster. 1865–1868. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992.
Levy, David. How the Dismal Science Got Its Name: Classical Economics and the Ur-Text of Racial Poli-
tics. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2001.
Maurice, Frederick D. (1840). ‘Moral and Metaphysical Philosophy’. In Encyclopaedia Metropoli-
tana, edited by E. Smedley et al., Vol. II, 545–674. London: Joseph Griffen, 1849.
Mill, John Stuart (1849). ‘The Attempt to Exclude Unbelievers from Parliament’ (26 March). In News-
paper Writings. Collected Works [CW], XXV, 1135–8. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1986.
Mill, John Stuart (1865). Auguste Comte and Positivism. In Essays on Ethics, Religion and Society. 
CW, X, 261–368 (1969).
Mill, John Stuart (1879). Chapters on Socialism. In Essays on Economics and Society. CW, V, 703–53 
(1967).
Mill, John Stuart (1861). Considerations on Representative Government. In Essays on Politics and 
Society. CW, XIX, 371–577 (1977).
Mill, John Stuart. The Earlier Letters 1812 to 1848. CW, XII–XIII (1963).
Mill, John Stuart (1870). ‘The Education Bill’. In Public and Parliamentary Speeches. CW, XXIX, 
381–6 (1988).
Mill, John Stuart (1868). England and Ireland. CW, VI, 505–32 (1982).
Mill, John Stuart. The Later Letters 1849 to 1873. CW, XIV–XVII (1972).
Mill, John Stuart (1870). ‘Leslie on the Land Question’. In Essays on Economics and Society. CW, V, 
668–85 (1967).
Mill, John Stuart (1834). ‘Notes on the Newspapers’ (17 June). In Essays on England, Ireland, and 
the Empire. CW, VI, 251–4 (1982).
Mill, John Stuart (1834). ‘Notes on the Newspapers’ (12 August). CW, VI, 276–7 (1982).
Mill, John Stuart (1859). On Liberty. CW, XVIII, 213–310 (1977).
Mill, John Stuart (1848). Principles of Political Economy. CW, II–III (1965).
Mill, John Stuart (1832). ‘Recommendations of Candidates to Parliament’ (2 September 1832). In 
Newspaper Writings. CW, XXIII, 507–9.
Mill, John Stuart. ‘Secular Education’. Written after 4 November 1850, paper not delivered. In Pub-
lic and Parliamentary Speeches. CW, XXVIII, 3–5 (1988).
Mill, John Stuart (1835). ‘Sedgwick’s Discourse’. In Essays on Ethics, Religion and Society. CW, X, 
31–74 (1985).
Mill, John Stuart (1869). The Subjection of Women. In Essays on Equality, Law, and Education. CW, 
XXI, 259–340 (1984).
Mill, John Stuart (1843). A System of Logic Ratiocinative and Inductive. CW, VII–VII (1974).
Mill, John Stuart (1861). Utilitarianism. In Essays on Ethics, Religion and Society. CW, X, 203–59 
(1969).
268 HAPPINESS AND UTIL ITY
Mill, John Stuart (1874). ‘Utility of Religion’, Three Essays on Religion. In Essays on Ethics, Religion 
and Society (written between 1850 and 1858). CW, X, 369–489 (1969).
Mill, John Stuart (1865). ‘Westminster Election 1865 In Public and Parliamentary Speeches. CW, 
XXVIII, 31–40 (1988).
Mill, John Stuart (1868). ‘Westminster Election 1868’. In Public and Parliamentary Speeches. CW, 
XXVIII, 334–41 (1988).
Ricardo, David (1817). Principles of Political Economy . Edited by P. Sraffa. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1951.
Salvador, Joseph. Histoire des Institutions de Moϊse, et du Peuple Hébreu I. Paris: Ponthieu, 1828.
Stanley, Arthur P. The Life and Correspondence of Thomas Arnold, D.D., I. London: B. Fellowes, 1844.
Varouxakis, Georgios. Liberty Abroad: J. S. Mill on International Relations. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2013.
269
14
The Failure of Planned Happiness:  
The Rise and Fall of British Home 
Colonies
Barbara Arneil
In nineteenth-century Britain, many progressive thinkers of various 
political and religious stripes (socialist, liberal, Protestant, Quaker and 
humanist) proposed home colonies as a single solution to an enormous 
variety of social ‘problems’ (pauperism/idleness, mental disability or 
illness, alcoholism, juvenile delinquency and/or petty crime) that had 
beset a rapidly urbanizing and industrializing society. Home colonies 
in Britain – and more broadly domestic colonies in Europe1 – proposed 
and/or implemented by philanthropic individuals or organizations and 
states in nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Europe were located 
inside the borders of one’s own state (rather than overseas) in order to seg-
regate the ‘idle and/or irrational’ of society, engage them in agrarian 
labour on uncultivated soil and thus ultimately improve both themselves 
and the land on which they laboured. It was argued that such colonies 
would transform the marginalized of Britain and shift them from a life of 
misery, dependence and idleness into one characterized by productivity, 
independence and happiness.
One can identify three general categories of home colonies based 
on what they were called by their defenders and the populations to be 
transformed within them: 1. farm colonies for mentally ill and dis-
abled people;2 2. labour colonies for the idle poor and unemployed;3 
3.  utopian colonies for political, religious and racial minorities. The his-
torical existence of such colonies challenges the meaning of colonization 
and colonies found in both popular dictionaries and academic analysis, 
which, by definition, can exist only overseas as products of a foreign policy 
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of imperialism. While imperial colonies are certainly the most profound, 
extensive and longest-lasting kind of colonization as manifestations of 
imperial power exercised over foreign, often racialized, peoples and 
lands, in this chapter I show that colonies also existed within Europe for 
certain kinds of Europeans but that they were justified by a similar ide-
ology of colonialism as had first been used to justify overseas settler col-
onies. As such, home colonies in Britain were not the product of foreign 
policy but rather domestic social policy that used colonialism but turned 
inwards to solve the ‘problem’ of marginalized populations by virtue of 
their lack of reason or idleness at home. Many of those who proposed 
such colonies in Britain argued they would create happiness within 
these groups of fellow citizens who lived miserable lives on city streets. 
Home colonies require us to rethink, in interesting ways, the definition 
and scope of colonization as well as its relationship to happiness within 
Britain in the nineteenth century.
Colonialism, as an ideology, was characterized by three princi-
ples: segregation, improvement and – above all – agrarian labour. First 
deployed by John Locke in seventeenth-century America to justify the 
dispossession of indigenous land,4 these same principles were adopted by 
nineteenth- and twentieth-century European domestic colonialists but 
often married to either a utilitarian or consequentialist understanding 
of happiness. Thus, the argument was made, in both cases, that rather 
than conquer, constrain or punish the ‘idle’ poor or mentally disabled/ill 
(as current institutions such as asylums, workhouses or prisons did), the 
home colonialist argued that to segregate such populations from soci-
ety, cities and the bad habits of their environment, and engage them in 
agrarian labour on uncultivated soil, would both improve the individual 
(the ethical benefit) and create revenues through the sale of agricultural 
produce (the economic benefit). The former would lead to happiness and 
the latter would offset the growing costs to the state or philanthropist 
of maintaining such populations. Defenders of the colony model thus 
explicitly defended colonies against prisons, asylums, workhouses and/
or emigration as both creating better lives for those living within them 
and being less costly.
Thus, for the purposes of this volume, it is striking how often justifi-
cations for nineteenth-century labour or home colonies for the idle poor 
used happiness to describe the goal of the colony juxtaposed against the 
misery of both their current state of unemployment, alcoholism, corrup-
tion or criminality as well as the life they would face in alternative insti-
tutions such as prisons or workhouses or through emigration. Indeed, 
British home colonies were more often than not described in a highly 
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elevated, romantic and sometimes religious language of a ‘promised 
land’ of happiness through which the idle poor were ‘delivered’ from lives 
of abject misery and redeemed by working the soil in the fresh air of the 
bucolic countryside, leading them eventually to more virtuous, industri-
ous and happy lives. For British domestic colonialists, the key to produc-
ing happiness for the most marginalized and destitute of Britain was not 
only that the colony was built upon the three key colonial principles of 
segregation, improvement and agrarian labour, but that life within the 
colony followed very specific plans or blueprints. Thus, the colony rep-
resented planned happiness, meaning that everything from the kinds of 
buildings to be erected to how the buildings were placed in relation to 
each other, to the crops grown, to the daily schedule were provided in 
detailed plans by home colonialists.
Ultimately, it was argued, to achieve happiness for the idle poor, 
home colonies had to be implemented in accordance with these various 
detailed plans. The corollary point, often made explicitly by home coloni-
alists, was that if colonies were not created in accordance with the blue-
prints provided, misery would continue to reign. However, despite the 
promises made by British domestic colonialists in their written defences 
of specific kinds of home colonies that planned happiness for the poor 
could not fail, the historical reality across the board was quite the oppo-
site. Either colonies failed immediately and never got off the ground 
at all, or they collapsed quickly and spectacularly and/or deteriorated 
into places that were punitive and/or abusive. In other words, the home 
colony as the solution to poverty in nineteenth-century Britain was fol-
lowed almost universally and fairly rapidly by failure, as lofty notions of 
planned happiness in theory gave way to the profound failure of the col-
ony model in practice.
In this paper, therefore, I examine the rise and fall of home colo-
nies in Britain – the promise of happiness (the rise) based on both the 
prin ciples of colonialism as described above and in accordance with a 
detailed plan by various domestic colonialists in Britain, and the fail-
ure (the fall) to deliver in practice through three case studies of British 
domestic colonies and colonialists:
1. Utopian home colonies for the poor proposed by Robert Owen in 
Britain in 1840.
2. Labour colonies proposed and created in Lindfield, Sussex, by 
 William Allen in 1827.
3. Labour farm colonies proposed and created by the founder of the 
Salvation Army, William Booth, in Hadfield, Essex, in 1890.
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I. Robert Owen: Utopian home colonies
Utopian socialist Robert Owen defended home colonies as the best 
 vehicle for human happiness for the poor if they were properly planned 
and implemented. This fitted into his general philosophy that human 
misery and happiness depended very much on how society organized 
itself. In A New View of Society (1816), Owen states that three-quarters 
of the population of the British Islands (which included Ireland) are 
‘poor or working class’ and ‘unhappily situated’. This need not be the case 
because ‘any general character … may be given to any community [happy 
or miserable] … by the application of proper means’.5 Moreover, for the 
poor to experience happiness, a particular form of collective or socialist 
life needs to be planned since ‘individual happiness can be increased’ in 
proportion only to an ‘increase in happiness of all around him’.6 At the 
heart of Owen’s vision of colonies was the need to segregate the colony 
from the rest of society (in order to protect a collectivist economy) and 
engage the poor in cooperative farming.
In an essay entitled ‘A Development of the Principles and Plans on 
which to Establish Self-Supporting Home Colonies … .’, published under 
the auspices of the British Home Colonization Society, Owen targeted the 
very poor of England. He begins his essay by describing the ‘increase of 
poverty, destitution and crime’ among the working classes in Britain and 
Ireland before arguing that the key was to engineer the right environ-
ment to create happiness rather than misery. ‘Each of these individuals 
should be placed … within those external arrangements that will ensure 
the most happiness.’7 Happiness was thus the end and home colonies 
the means – properly planned and implemented. In the first substantive 
section entitled ‘General Arrangements of the Proposed Home Colonies’, 
Owen provides in written and pictorial form the specific layout of the col-
ony. Life in the home colony would be dominated by agrarian labour: ‘It 
is proposed … that agriculture should form the basis of all.’8
Thus, at the heart of the colony were four farms, using the typical 
idyllic and romantic language to describe the cultivation of ‘empty’ land 
in the countryside:
The Estate belonging to the Colony, laid out in Four Farms but hav-
ing the appearance of a Park, with its hills and dales, its wood and 
water … these farms will be cultivated, as far as population will 
admit, with the spade, and kept in the best order and the most pro-
ductive state. About the centre of each farm will be the requisite 
Agricultural buildings.9
 THE FAILURE OF PLANNED HAPPINESS 273
It is worth noting, because both William Allen and William Booth will 
make the same argument, that the simplest of tools – the spade – rather 
than ploughs or other kinds of sophisticated but less laborious tools 
should be used. The focus on simple technology such as the spade was 
common to English home colonialists and one finds it echoed in settler 
states like Canada, where the government also insisted indigenous peo-
ples be limited to the simplest of tools. Both kinds of spade-based coloni-
alism reflect a paternalistic approach to those deemed to be ‘backward’ 
and ‘idle’, a ‘romantic’ notion of being as close to the soil as possible and 
to the principle of industriousness by insisting upon the most laborious 
form of cultivation.
Owen argues for collective rather than private ownership of land:
It is proposed that each establishment of these Colonies shall, in 
the first instance, be the property of a joint-stock company; who … 
shall let the whole, upon lease, to a company of tenants; the lat-
ter having power gradually to fine down the rents, and ultimately to 
become the owners.10
Owen concludes his essay by arguing that the difference between what 
exists currently for the poor, in the way of parish relief, poorhouses and 
pauper emigration, and his proposed utopian colonies is happiness. ‘The 
difference between the two systems … with respect to the formation of 
human character, and the enjoyment of superior happiness, there can 
be no comparison.’11 Elsewhere, Owen also directly challenges those 
who argue pauper emigration is the answer in terms of both cost and 
outcomes. As president of the fourth congress of the ‘Association of All 
Classes of All Nations’, Owen states that if you compare the ‘advantages 
of superior home colonies with the disadvantages of individual emi-
gration into foreign climes you will, we are sure, find the difference far 
beyond your present means of estimation’.12
The 1841 essay in defence of home colonies provides detailed 
instructions as to the architecture of the colony, the buildings and spaces 
within it. Owen models his home colonies in Britain in part on Jan van 
den Bosch’s labour colonies in Holland. Albert Schrauwers observes that 
van den Bosch’s scheme:
bears striking similarities with [those of] Robert Owen, the English 
utopian socialist and correspondent of the Benevolent Society, 
who was proposing rural colonies for the poor in England at the 
same time. … Both men saw individual character as the product of 
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circumstances … however, the malleability of character meant that 
it could be improved through education and better conditions.13
But while Owen and van den Bosch agreed on some aspects of domestic 
colonialism (segregation, agrarian labour and improvement), they dif-
fered on religion and the free market. Owen as a secular socialist viewed 
his ‘home colonies’ as secularist alternatives to the capitalist system 
(collectively owned and cultivated by the members of the colony itself), 
whereas van den Bosch viewed his labour colonies as products of his 
Protestant faith that supported existing labour markets. In his article, 
National Industry in General and the Netherlands (1819), van den Bosch 
concludes that his colonies will not ‘distort markets in either labor or 
goods’ but support them by turning individuals into productive labourers 
and return them to the labour market.14
Despite his lofty claims for the home colony to solve poverty in 
Britain, Owen’s scheme failed due to a lack of support by British phi-
lanthropists. In response to his own question, ‘why did … Owenite 
institutions [home colonies] wither so quickly as compared with other 
philanthropic causes which crusaded successfully in the early nine-
teenth century [such as] Sunday schools, anti slavery and temperance?’, 
Harrison argues Owen’s reliance on happiness defended in humanitarian 
and secularist terms rather than religious redemption or salvation pro-
vides the answer:
Owen’s philanthropy was predominantly secular. It was antago-
nistic towards the religion of evangelical Christianity and the faith 
of political economy. Consequently, it found no favour with the 
dominant schools of philanthropy … Owenite philanthropy was … 
rooted in the humanistic values of the Enlightenment. Utility or 
the pursuit of happiness was its starting point, not the saving grace 
of Christ Jesus … the Owenites stood condemned as infidels and their 
philanthropy was therefore discountenanced.15
II. Quaker William Allen and home colonies
William Allen was a close ally of James Mill, and an associate of both Jer-
emy Bentham and Robert Owen. Indeed, it was Allen who ‘induced Ben-
tham to invest money in the New Lanark establishment. Owen, whose 
benevolent schemes had been hampered by his partners, bought them 
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out, the new capital being partly provided by Allen, Bentham, and oth-
ers’.16 Ultimately, Allen and Owen famously parted ways in 1828 as Owen 
resigned all connection to New Lanark. In the middle of this process of 
parting ways (in 1826), Allen wrote a treatise entitled Colonies at Home; 
or, The Means for Rendering the Industrious Labourer Independent of Parish 
Relief and for Providing the Poor Population of Ireland by the Cultivation of 
the Soil. This treatise, published 15 years before Robert Owen’s own trea-
tise on home colonies, also had a focus on the transformation of the ‘idle’ 
into the ‘industrious’ through the segregation of the poor into colonies, 
engagement in agrarian labour and proper planning.
Being a pauper and living in misery was constructed by society, 
according to Allen; if life for the poor were planned in a different way, 
their suffering could be alleviated. At the same time, revenues could be 
raised through the sale of agricultural produce. The first sentence thus 
reads:
On considering the circumstances of the poorest Classes of the 
population, during my travels in different Countries; I have been 
convinced that much of the misery which exists among the Poor, 
everywhere, might easily be obviated by a few judicious arrange-
ments; and particularly, by settling them down upon small portions 
of Land and teaching them to cultivate that Land in the most prof-
itable manner.17
Unlike Owen, Allen made the case for private allotments as opposed to 
collective ownership; but, like Owen, he was committed to ‘spade’ hus-
bandry because it is more laborious, brings the idle poor closer to the 
land and creates more revenues to offset the cost of maintaining this pop-
ulation: ‘It has been found, by actual experiment, that when pains are 
taken to dig land well with a spade more is produced’ than with a plough 
or other means. Allen also argued that home colonization is better and 
less costly than emigration: ‘Encouragement is given to emigration and 
this at considerable expense; while at the same time, the class of persons 
who are thus expatriated, is precisely that … we should the least wish 
to part with.’18 Thus, the economic benefits of home colonies, whether 
through spade husbandry or in comparison to external colonization, are 
emphasized.
The text provided a very detailed plan as to how home colonization 
should occur, with the supply of manure addressed, followed by what 
crops ought to be grown using a year-by-year crop rotation diagram. He 
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also provided a diagram for the cottages and how the rooms ought to be 
laid out in each and concluded the essay by making the case that home 
colonies, properly implemented in accordance with these detailed blue-
prints, would increase the happiness of the poor and society as a whole:
If those whom Divine Providence has intrusted with riches, would 
duly lay these things to heart, and avail themselves of the means 
put into their hands, they would in no very long time change the 
face of their Country. The moral of the great mass of the people 
would be improved, their happiness in consequence augmented, and 
the blessed effect of it would be felt through all the ramifications of 
Society.19
Thus, the happiness of the British poor requires the implementation of a 
proper and detailed plan within segregated colonies on uncultivated soil 
where members use spades and plant particular crops within a specific 
organizational layout.
In 1823, Allen implemented his domestic colonial arguments and 
set up an agricultural colony with small allotments in Lindfield, Sussex, 
following his blueprint to create a ‘rural colony’. In 1827, Allen wrote 
to Prince Alexander Galitzin of Russia to tell him that Linfield was the 
model for his Colonies at Home essay and sent him a copy of the essay for 
Tsar Nicholas I:
If thou shouldest judge it suitable, please to present the enclosed 
to Emperor Nicholas, with my very sincere respects. It is what his 
beloved brother wished me to send to him, when I had finished it. 
The title is ‘Colonies at Home’ and it contains those plans for pro-
moting the comfort and happiness of the agricultural poor, which I 
am now carrying out at Lindfield Sussex.20
Allen also described a periodical he began at Lindfield as ‘a repository for 
hints and suggestions calculated to promote the comfort and happiness 
of men’.21
One curious aspect of the Lindfield colony was that those living 
near it often referred to it as ‘America’, tying together in a very concrete 
and explicit way the settler colony of America with the home colony 
of Lindfield. In his 1884 biography of Allen, Fayle provides an account 
of a conversation he had with a young American he met on his way to 
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Lindfield. When the American asked Fayle his destination, he answered 
‘America’ and went on to explain:
[Lindfield] is the capital of America … [William Allen was] the 
George Washington of these parts, from whence he used to go and 
see what we have seen and soothe his mind with the beauty of 
Nature; from whence, also he could look down on his flourishing 
‘Colony’ … this new America – a land of promise to some genera-
tions, in its small way, as your big continent is to thousands of thou-
sands from the Old World at this day.22
Locke’s famous words ‘all the world was America’ take on a new mean-
ing here. The ‘settler colony’ of America and the home colony of Lind-
field – according to the ideology of domestic colonialism – serve the same 
purpose: ‘give the peasant a chance by working on his self-respect so as 
to render him independent of parish relief, by letting him have a little 
land upon fair terms and directing him in the cultivation of it’.23 Fayle 
concludes in the biography that ‘the founder [William Allen] had clearly 
called a New World into existence’ in Lindfield.24
Referring to Lindfield Colony as the ‘New World’ also speaks to the 
romantic language so often used by domestic colonialists of a promised 
land within which one could redeem oneself, and find happiness out 
of misery. Referring to Lindfield as America was not unique to Fayle or 
Allen. As Margaret Nicolle notes, ‘the Lindfield experiment was like a 
small America to the people of the area’,25 meaning a promised land of 
happiness and hope – a ‘new world’ in the midst of the old. Nicolle asks 
why a colony in Sussex might be called America to those living near it. 
Her answer is ‘Colonies were seen as a way for the poor to have a fresh 
opportunity in life.’
Allen thought Lindfield could be a model not only for Russia, as 
mentioned above, but also for Ireland, which became particularly impor-
tant to him during the Irish famine of the early 1820s:
By May [1822] reports of distress were already so alarming that 
a private relief committee was formed in London [of] Irish and 
English Quakers … When the [British and Irish Ladies committee] 
appealed to the ubiquitous William Allen for ideas, his response was 
to recommend the Irish communal villages be set up based on his 
model English community of Lindfield.26
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Allen’s plans for exporting his colony to other places such as Ireland 
and Russia had poor results. Nicolle observes that the Emperor in Rus-
sia tried experiments with little success and Irish correspondents told 
Allen it would be problematic to implement. As Irish novelist Maria 
Edgeworth wrote in a letter to Allen about his plans for home colonies 
in Ireland in 1827:
In attempting to carry them into execution in this country, there 
would be found obstacles of which you can form no estimate … 
Things impossible for you to foresee, perhaps impossible for your 
English imagination to conceive would happen … you will be cru-
elly disappointed not in promise, but in performance.27
Thus, Allen was ultimately ‘never able to raise the funds required’ to cre-
ate home colonies in Ireland.28
As for Lindfield itself, it too failed. As early as 1824, the pastor 
Sydney Smith wrote to Allen to express his grave doubts about the colony 
experiment: ‘I often see the best intended Schemes of the assistance of 
the poor ending in disappointment … Such schemes are often laid before 
the public in the first Honeymoon of the Experiment and nothing is told 
of their subsequent failure.’29 The key failure for most critics of the period 
according to Nicolle was the cost of the colony; more recently, historians 
have argued the model was flawed.30 Thus, William Allen’s own colony 
was a failure in practice in his lifetime.
III. William Booth, the Salvation Army and farm colonies 
for the submerged tenth
The most famous and influential domestic colonialist at the end of the 
nineteenth century in Britain was William Booth, founder of the Sal-
vation Army. Booth published a book, In Darkest England and the Way 
Out (1890), that laid out an ambitious colony scheme for Britain and 
beyond. While today the Salvation Army is known for its urban-based 
centres that provide food and shelter to the poor and homeless, Booth’s 
original plan saw these ‘city colonies’, as he called them, as mere con-
duits to the central feature of his plan: the domestic farm labour col-
ony. Booth begins his book by making a direct parallel between darkest 
Africa and the ‘submerged tenth’ or idle poor of ‘darkest England’, 
focusing on the shared role that idleness plays in the darkness encoun-
tered by ‘negroes’ in the ‘Equatorial forest’ and the poor in the streets of 
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London: ‘Just as in Darkest Africa … so with us, much of the misery of 
those whose lot we are considering arises from their own habits.’31 But 
‘for Darkest England, as for Darkest Africa, there is a light beyond’. It is 
this ‘light’ that will provide ‘a way out’ – the promise in the title of his 
book. Using the romantic language so often associated with the home 
colony as the path to happiness Booth notes:
I think I see my way out, a way by which these wretched ones may 
escape from the gloom of their miserable existence into a higher 
and happier life … Mr. Stanley never succumbed … every step for-
ward brought him nearer his destined goal, nearer to the light of 
the sun, the clear sky and the rolling uplands of the grazing land.32
Thus, for Booth, the external colony in Africa has its parallel in Eng-
land – in both cases those who are ‘backward’ and ‘idle’, living in misery 
and wretched conditions can find their way out to lightness and happi-
ness through colonization. The juxtaposition of the binaries of dark and 
light, misery and happiness, idleness or backwardness, and progress or 
improvement suffuses Booth’s book. At the heart of this process towards 
a happier life is agrarian labour and the farm colony in the countryside 
outside the city. Booth’s vision is a bucolic one – rolling hills upon which 
animals graze, wide open skies with fresh air and, above all, sunlight that 
conquers the dark.
Booth creates a tripartite colonial model: a) city colonies to gather 
the idle poor in urban centres who would be transported to: b) ‘farm col-
onies’ within England where they would be trained in agricultural skills 
and educated in order to improve their moral character: ‘Here [in the 
farm colony], the process of reformation of character would be carried 
forward … [and] including those forms of labour and that knowledge 
of agriculture’.33 Booth, like the other domestic colonialists described 
above, emphasizes the spade: ‘On arrival at the Farm they would [be] 
at once told off to work … in spade husbandry upon what is called the 
system of “intensive” agriculture’ that will yield ‘much greater results 
than when you merely scratch the surface with a plough’.34 ‘Intensive’ 
in this sentence clearly means ensuring the work is more laborious than 
with a plough or other implement less time-consuming and thus, for 
Booth, spade husbandry is defended in terms of the intensity of labour 
as well as the amounts of produce. After being properly trained at the 
domestic farm colony and transformed into agrarian labourers, mem-
bers of the colony were sent to farms in England or transported to: c) 
overseas colonies.
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In essence, Booth combines a domestic colonialism marked by a 
Christian ‘progressive’ view of idleness as a failure in one’s moral char-
acter with a ‘benevolent’ and ‘liberal’ view of improvement and creat-
ing ‘happiness’ for the poor themselves rather than simply punishing or 
constraining them. The overseas colony also introduces a form of settler 
colonialism through which the retrained and reformed English pauper 
could resettle in one of Britain’s colonies and thus help that settler state 
to build its nation further, often on indigenous land. As Booth developed 
and implemented his scheme in the 1890s, he believed he could solve 
poverty worldwide. For Booth, colonization was primarily a social policy 
to solve domestic problems rather than an imperial policy (although it 
has settler colonial implications).
But Booth argues that within the British colonies there were still 
‘millions of acres of useful land to be obtained almost for the asking, 
capable of supporting our surplus population … were it a thousand 
times greater’,35 echoing John Locke’s colonial references in the Two 
Treatises to land that could hold ‘a hundred thousand times as many’ if 
only labour were introduced to it. He also makes it clear, however, like 
the other domestic colonialists already discussed, that pauper emigra-
tion on its own is not the answer: ‘[Some say] emigration is the true spe-
cific. The waste lands of the world are crying aloud for the application of 
surplus labour’ but Booth emphasizes that ‘emigration is not the pana-
cea’, particularly if those sent to ‘settle’ overseas are not trained in agrar-
ian labour.36 Ultimately, he suggests an overseas colony owned by the 
Salvation Army itself: ‘we propose to secure a tract of land [overseas] … 
prepare it for settlement … settling it gradually with a prepared people 
[i.e. trained in agrarian labour] and so create a home for these destitute 
multitudes’ (58). Again, key to the success of emigration is training in 
spade husbandry. He asks facetiously, ‘Whom are you to emigrate? … 
These lads who never handled a spade?’37
Like Allen but unlike Owen, Booth argues that religious instruction 
as well as agricultural training is necessary since the latter transforms 
the idle person into an industrious one and the former transforms the 
corrupt mind and spirit into a moral one. Religious instruction increases 
the chance of happiness:
Habits of industry, sobriety and kindness with them would create 
a restfulness of spirit which goes far in the direction of happiness 
and if religion were added it would make the happiness complete … 
They would be far better circumstanced for happiness in this life 
and in the life to come than in their present liberty.38
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He concludes that once his plans are implemented in full, the whole 
of humanity will be lifted from misery into a happy place: ‘When this 
scheme is perfected and fairly at work, every meeting and every proces-
sion will be looked upon as an advertisement of the earthly as well as the 
heavenly conditions of happiness.’39
As with Owen and Allen, Booth is very specific about farm colonies 
and the detailed planning necessary to their success – the location of 
the farm colony, the proximity to a rail line, the configuration of the cot-
tages, the kind of instruction in both religion and agriculture, and so on. 
In other words, happiness for the poor can be achieved once again only 
through elaborately planned city and farm colonies within which the life 
of its members is carefully regulated and planned. Even the question of 
marriage ought to be overseen and planned: ‘while I have been busily 
occupied in working out my Scheme for … labour … why could not some-
thing like the same plan be adopted in relation to men who want wives 
and women who want husbands?’ He goes on to suggest there could be 
an agency that could help to suggest whom to marry and a month of 
‘matrimonial training’ for women to ensure life-long happiness: ‘A month 
spent before marriage in a training home of housewifery would conduce 
much more to the happiness of married life than the honeymoon which 
immediately follows it.’40 Thus, happiness requires planning in the pri-
vate and the public lives of the poor with a gendered emphasis on wives 
learning the skills of ‘housewifery’.
Booth’s domestic colonial scheme was widely disseminated: 
‘Darkest England was a great popular success, selling roughly 115,000 
copies within the first few months … In addition, Booth received strong 
support in the British press’41 and his ideas were promoted and imple-
mented by supporters in England, Scotland, America and Canada. 
He was challenged by conservatives in Britain who saw his scheme as 
socialist: ‘Booth lost credibility among conservatives when several of his 
strongest supporters – T. H. Huxley, Ben Tillet and the editors of Reynold’s 
Newspaper – argued that his system of colonies … promoted socialism in 
Britain.’42 One of his greatest critics was Herbert Spencer, to whom Booth 
responded about the popularity of his ideas among liberals in 1894: ‘I am 
not discouraged by anything Herbert Spencer may have said about such 
colonies … there is not a liberal in the present [British] government who 
is not in hearty sympathy with me.’43
Like Owen and Allen, Booth not only wrote about home colonies, 
but also tried to implement them. In 1891, he established a 3,200-acre 
farm labour colony at Hadleigh, Essex, along with five city colonies and 
18 labour bureaux in London, all designed to feed people into the farm 
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colony.44 In contrast to Owen’s scheme, the Hadleigh colony sought to 
train farmers who would become private property owners. As Brown says 
of the Hadleigh colony: ‘the aim was largely land reform … providing 
work for the unemployed but also … giving them the necessary train-
ing in agriculture to allow them to become small-holders’.45 Both the 
ethics (does the colony improve people and make them happier?) and 
economics of colonization (do they raise revenues in the short run for 
the care of the poor and/or turn the idle into productive citizens in the 
longer term?) were at the forefront of any discussion in the media about 
Booth’s scheme. Thus, the headline of an article in the Pall Mall Gazette, 
in 1892, reads, ‘Will the General’s Farm Colony “Pay”?’.46 As the author 
of this article argues, ‘The two points everybody is interested in are – Are 
the colonists better men … second, is the colony going to pay?’ Or to put 
it another way – is domestic colonization going to work in the very terms 
that Booth justified them, namely in being less costly to society and creat-
ing better, more industrious and happier people?
With the appropriate planning and training in a home colony, Booth 
argues the idle poor could leave ‘Darkest England’ and create happiness 
rooted in labour in an overseas colony:
The essence of my colony is the transfer of prepared persons from 
the overcrowded slums. These persons are not submerged but are 
in such circumstances that their poverty may lead them to be sub-
merged. Their habits may be changed so that they may help to form 
what I consider the glory of any country, an honest, hard-working 
peasantry, contented with plenty to eat, and have a happy, hallelujah 
time of it.47
In other words, the home colony will not only produce happiness within 
England but also, as these rehabilitated individuals are sent overseas, 
create happiness in settler colonies as well.
As with Owen and Allen, the promise, in theory, of a future full of 
happiness and hallelujahs was, in practice, the opposite. The only suc-
cessful aspect of Booth’s plans was the city colony that exists to this day. 
This was largely because his city colonies removed the unwanted beg-
gar or pauper from the city street and so became enormously popular 
with power brokers and governments in the larger cities of England, and 
eventually the world, as an immediate stop-gap measure for the home-
less poor. But the farm colony scheme was viewed as too socialist, too far-
fetched and/or too costly. Thus, the true heart of Booth’s scheme – the 
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farm colony – did not succeed, even though the first part of it was wildly 
successful. Moyles comments:
The financial response to Booth’s Darkest England scheme had been 
so overwhelming that, in a very short time, Salvation Army Rescue 
Homes, Industrial Homes, and City Shelters were familiar features 
of most major cities throughout the British-speaking world. The sec-
ond wing – the Farm Colony – had not met with the same success.48
To this day, we see the ‘city colony’ or Salvation Army shelters present in 
most cities throughout Britain and indeed the world.
Conclusion
All three of these domestic colonialists (Owen, Allen and Booth), it could 
be argued, had good intentions with respect to the poor of Britain as they 
sought to transform the lives of the idle poor from that of dependency 
and misery into self-sufficiency and happiness. And they all thought they 
had come up with the perfect solution to achieve this end in England, 
which could then be exported to the rest of the world – in the case of 
Owen to America, in the case of Allen to Ireland and Russia, and in the 
case of Booth to settler states within the British Empire. At the heart of 
their colonial schemes was the transformation of individual paupers, 
via segregation from society, education, training/engagement in agrar-
ian labour and improvement of land in order to create ethical benefits 
(self-sufficiency/happiness) and economic benefits (revenues for the 
philanthropist or state and increased value of the land). Colonization, in 
other words, originally and primarily a policy to serve British foreign and 
imperial policy goals in the seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth cen-
turies, was turned inwards by these thinkers and philanthropists (among 
others) in the middle of the nineteenth century in order to serve the 
domestic problem of the urban poor in England. And while the colony, 
according to its proponents, heralded in a brand new world where pov-
erty would be eradicated for good and the existing poor would be made 
industrious and happy, the reality in practice was the opposite. Rather 
than being the answer to the various social problems besetting Britain 
in the nineteenth century, the home colony became an abject failure in 
practice – not getting off the ground at all, lasting less than a decade and/
or being rife with abuse and conflict.
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While some, including the domestic colonialists themselves, argue 
this was because the scheme they devised in such detail was not prop-
erly implemented as specified in their various blueprints or plans, the 
reasons for the rapid failure of such institutions was much deeper than 
implementation and can be found in the ideology of colonialism itself. 
Some explanations advanced at the time – Owen’s colony was too social-
ist or not religious enough, Allen’s colony was too costly, Booth’s colonial 
scheme was too complex or socialist – provide us with some insights as 
to why societies or governments did not embrace colonies, but they do 
not explain why all of these different kinds of colonies failed and why 
so quickly. If we are to believe the argument that Owen’s colony failed 
because it was too socialist/utilitarian and not religious enough, it can-
not explain why Allen’s or Booth’s farm colonies failed: both explicitly 
embraced Christianity and, in Allen’s case, he created individual allot-
ments rather than collective ownership at Lindfield.
The rapid failure of all of these colonies lies neither in the incorrect 
implementation of the schemes (as their proponents argue) nor the limi-
tations of socialism, Quakerism or liberal Protestantism (as others argue), 
but in the ideology of colonialism itself – namely, the central claim that it 
is possible to engineer the happiness of the poor through detailed plans 
based on the principles of segregation and engagement in agrarian labour 
and spade husbandry. For domestic colonialists, ‘idleness’ was, by defini-
tion, understood as something produced within an individual’s character 
by his/her home environment. Change the environment, break habits, 
introduce labour and you transform idleness into industriousness and 
misery into happiness. The focus on changing individuals’ character and 
behaviour, even if it is more humane than it is punitive, fails to address 
larger structures and processes – urbanization and industrialization – that 
were instrumental to the problems of unemployment and poverty on the 
city streets of Britain. While Allen believed individual idleness and moral 
character were the source of misery and Owen concurred but added the 
structures of marriage, religious belief and private property, neither ana-
lysed the larger economic and social structures of industrialized capitalist 
society in the way that Marx and his followers or reform liberals did from 
the middle of the nineteenth century onwards, which meant creating 
societal/state structures to support the poor. Domestic colonialism failed 
therefore because its focus was entirely on changing individuals from 
within rather than addressing societal structures.
Beyond the failure to deal with the larger structural forces that gave 
rise to the urban poor, home colonialism was also flawed in how it con-
structed the solution to poverty. First, the idea that a very detailed plan 
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must be implemented in the exact manner specified by the domestic colo-
nialist on behalf of all people who are poor ignores both human diversity 
and agency. Such detailed blueprints failed to acknowledge the demo-
cratic impulse within any community to have their own blueprints, while 
the diversity of individual ideas and actions are stifled by a one-size-fits-
all top-down solution. Second, while the countryside location may be a 
healthier place for people to live rather than industrialized and crowded 
city streets, there is no inherent magical character to such locations as 
these colonialist thinkers assume – indeed it might increase a person’s 
sense of isolation, marginalization and unhappiness as they are removed 
from those organic links to family and friends. More often than not, the 
countryside as redemptive is taken as an article of faith by British home 
colonialists, but this commitment reveals more about their own romantic 
proclivities than anything else. If, rather than removing people from the 
city, the focus was on how to make the city a better place in which to live, 
particularly for the very poor and unemployed, their unhappiness, living 
their lives as part of a community, might be better addressed.
Third, the colonial principle of improvement is deeply problematic 
in and of itself because it requires philanthropists and superintendents 
to exercise power by seeking to change the poor from within. Defenders 
of the colony model thus believed individual happiness depended upon 
educating the poor to recognize faults in their own minds, bodies and 
habits in order to become something different. This core belief in an inter-
nal form of change provides fertile ground for the violation of mental or 
physical boundaries as the superintendent or staff of the colony seek to 
improve the individual. The principle of ‘segregation’ and the marginal-
ized nature of those living within the colony compound the problem of 
abuse as these segregated institutions were built beyond the oversight 
of society. Consequently, those who wanted to abuse their charges could 
do so with a sense of impunity. The colony then becomes a place within 
which the individual’s mind and body could be easily violated in the 
name of improvement, redemption or salvation in relative obscurity.
Thus, I hope to have shown how colonialism had a domestic face 
in Britain as well as a foreign and imperial face overseas; those who sup-
ported home colonies (unlike external colonies or empires) were often 
progressives (reform liberals and socialists) who believed their solution 
to poverty and pauperism was a more humane and less costly option that 
would improve rather than punish or constrain the poor and provide the 
basis for happiness. In seeking a solution via segregation and agrarian 
labour in the countryside to redeem souls and create productive and 
happy citizens using a highly elevated and romantic language, domestic 
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colonialists created not only false hope but also the conditions under 
which these same populations were isolated and often abused in the ser-
vice of improvement. It is not surprising, therefore, that these home colo-
nies failed quickly and spectacularly as the ideology producing them was 
inherently flawed – despite the good intentions of those defending them. 
Perhaps the rise and fall of the domestic colony as a model for happiness 
is best summed up in the pithy description that Jeremy Bentham once 
used to describe the ideas of Robert Owen more generally: they ‘begin in 
vapour and end in smoke’.
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Making Better Sense of Ideal 
Utilitarianism
David Weinstein
Introduction
In the ‘Preface’ to his 2013 Mill, Frederick Rosen writes, ‘I have tried to 
release Mill from numerous stale arguments and debates in an attempt 
to establish a more rounded view of his ideas as well as to capture the 
turmoil that surrounded his intellectual life.’1 Modern commentators 
have wrongheadedly manipulated and recast Mill ‘to go to the heart of 
key issues in recent moral and political philosophy from a Millian per-
spective’ at the cost of too often missing ‘the heart of Mill’s thought’.2 
They typically reconstruct Mill via the lens of our own analytical pre-
occupations and conceptual conundrums rather than keeping to Mill’s 
historical context of philosophical concerns. Instead of interpreting Mill, 
they appropriate him. And while appropriating Mill, or any historical 
philosophical figure for that matter, is often an excellent technique for 
thinking through our highly refined and technical disputes about the 
dimensions of consequentialism, theories of well-being and the like, it 
makes for poor intellectual history. We end up both recreating a Mill he 
would not recognize as well as fabricating a false chapter in the history of 
classical utilitarianism. We should do our best to avoid such bad habits in 
reading Mill because they corrupt whatever sense we try to make of his 
legacy as it was taken up by Sidgwick and his successors and critics from 
Moore through to the Oxford intuitionists and beyond.
While I am not sure that Rosen would put what is at stake in prop-
erly interpreting Mill as I have just put it, I do think that he would not 
object terribly to my spin on his intentions. As some readers may know, 
I have been riding the same hermeneutic hobby-horse that I have just 
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attributed to Rosen for quite some time. In my view, to appropriate past 
philosophical texts is simply doing English-speaking, analytical moral 
and political theory by other means, which risks, among other things, 
displacing, marginalizing and condensing much that came just before it.
In what follows, I would like to examine G. E. Moore and Hastings 
Rashdall’s versions of ideal utilitarianism through their respective 
responses to T. H. Green’s idealism and Henry Sidgwick’s classical utili-
tarianism.3 I will not claim that ideal utilitarianism should be understood 
as primarily a reaction to Green and Sidgwick, but I will insist that Moore 
and Rashdall cannot be interpreted properly unless we take more seri-
ously their criticisms and appropriation of Green and Sidgwick. Green 
and Sidgwick were on their minds as much as any predecessors were when 
Moore published Principia Ethica in 1903 and Rashdall published The 
Theory of Good and Evil in 1907. Green and Sidgwick dominated Moore 
and Rashdall’s intellectual context. They were shadows under which 
both laboured to at least soften or at best completely escape. Others, such 
as J. S. Mill, Herbert Spencer, F. H. Bradley and J. S. Mackenzie, figured 
prominently as points of departure as well as in Moore and Rashdall’s 
ideal utilitarianism. I will not eschew taking up Mill, Spencer, Bradley 
and Mackenzie, though I will do so more in passing.
I. Moore’s ‘hide-bound orthodoxy’
W. J. Mander has recently insisted that analytic ‘philosophy did not just 
magically replace the earlier Idealism, but rather developed alongside 
and in conscious opposition to it, and in this process Idealism shaped its 
successor; as truly as any parent shapes the child who rebels against it’.4 
Bertrand Russell and G. E. Moore thus committed hermeneutical patri-
cide in reconstructing idealism simplistically in order to overdramatize 
their own novelty. But Moore, for his part, oversimplified in my view not 
just idealists but other immediate predecessors such as Herbert Spencer, 
J. S. Mill and Henry Sidgwick. For Moore, Spencer, Mill and Sidgwick 
exemplified the errors of modern ‘naturalistic’ ethics while idealists, par-
ticularly T. H. Green, epitomized ‘metaphysical’ ethics at its worst.
Jennifer Welchman has similarly argued that Moore’s purported 
revolution in ethics was less abrupt and decisive than we now believe, 
not least because Moore’s contemporary readers, including his idealist 
critics, took issue with him in a much different way from that which we 
are now inclined to assume.5 Indeed, Bernard Bosanquet, for instance, 
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thought Principia Ethica neither especially original nor revolutionary, 
though he conceded that Moore was a gifted critic. But so far as he could 
determine, Moore ‘hampered himself with ideas no less dogmatic than 
those of the most hide-bound orthodoxy: and he is not yet therefore a 
critic in the true sense, a critic who can take the standpoint of that which 
he criticizes’ (my italics).6 In other words, Moore inaugurated nothing 
particularly new. He was not so much innovative as he was a provoca-
tive but nonetheless sloppy reader of those he appropriated to illustrate 
alternative versions of the naturalistic fallacy as a preliminary move to 
constructing his ideal utilitarian alternative. And if no historical prede-
cessors actually committed anything resembling the naturalistic fallacy, 
then the fallacy was a historical straw man, making Moore’s rejection of 
naturalistic and metaphysical ethics much less of a philosophical new 
beginning and more of an ongoing colloquy of shared suppositions and 
overlapping, substantive normative claims.7
II. Moore’s rejection of classical utilitarianism
Now, Moore seems to have been far more preoccupied with exposing 
how Spencer, Mill and Sidgwick went astray in committing the natur-
alistic fallacy than he was with showing up idealists such as Green. He 
devotes an entire chapter to condemning naturalistic ethics, which he 
regarded Spencer as exemplifying especially strikingly.8 Next follows a 
chapter disparaging Mill and then Sidgwick, though he regards Sidg-
wick far more favourably and for that reason I shall say something about 
his differences with Sidgwick here. Moreover, Moore’s assessment of 
Sidgwick should assist us in making sense of Moore’s dismissal of Green, 
too, because Sidgwick’s rivalry with Green is significantly revealing 
about both.9
Moore, like Sidgwick, was a utilitarian, though Sidgwick was a 
hedonist and Moore was not. Furthermore, both were non-naturalists 
and both deemed good unanalysable – or at least, Moore was convinced 
that Sidgwick deemed good unanalysable. Of all the hedonists:
Prof. Sidgwick alone has clearly recognized that by ‘good’ we do 
mean something unanalysable, and has alone been led thereby to 
emphasise the fact that, if Hedonism be true, its claims to be so 
must be rested solely on its self-evidence – that we must maintain 
‘Pleasure is the sole good’ to be a mere intuition.10
292 HAPPINESS AND UTIL ITY
Moore, then, praised Sidgwick’s commitment to intuitionism and seemed 
to think that his methodological commitment to intuitionism somehow 
also committed him to accepting that good was necessarily unanalysable 
or undefinable. But it is unclear if Sidgwick thought good unanalysable 
or, if he did, whether he regarded this fact as especially significant. Nor 
is it plain that Sidgwick was particularly preoccupied with good anyway. 
Rather, as others such as David Phillips have claimed, Sidgwick viewed 
ethics as being fundamentally about what we ought to do and not about 
goodness. As Sidgwick stipulates at the very outset of The Methods of Eth-
ics, ‘a “Method of Ethics” is explained to mean any rational procedure by 
which we determine what individual human beings “ought” – or what it 
is “right” for them – to do, or to seek to realise by voluntary action’.11
Now, notwithstanding Moore’s preference for Sidgwick over Mill and 
his contention that Sidgwick was no less consumed with the problem of 
good than he was, Moore deemed Sidgwick’s intuitionism a failure when 
all was said and done. And his account of its failure bears directly on his 
explanation of how metaphysical ethics purportedly fails as well as on his 
interpretation of the relationship between pleasure and good in metaphys-
ical ethics. For Moore, Sidgwick’s intuitionism goes wrong insofar as he 
holds intuitively that pleasure alone is good in itself. That is, Sidgwick errs 
in not appreciating that whatever goodness is, it is necessarily ‘something 
beyond the limits of human existence’. Furthermore, whatever this some-
thing is, we typically experience it as pleasurable, making our consciousness 
of pleasure, and not pleasure itself, so significant.12 Our consciousness of 
pleasure is not identical with, but instead attends to, good. Our conscious-
ness of pleasure merely marks goodness; therefore, the ‘most that can be 
said for it is that it does not seriously mislead in its practical conclusions, 
on the ground that, as an empirical fact, the method of acting which brings 
the most good on the whole does also bring the most pleasure’.13 Hence, it 
is unsurprising that hedonists typically ‘recommend a course of conduct 
which is very similar to that which I should recommend’.14 Nonetheless, 
‘in so far as their reason for holding these conclusions to be true is that 
“Pleasure alone is good as an end,” they are absolutely wrong: and it is with 
reasons that we are chiefly concerned in any scientific Ethics’.15
At best, then, the most we could say in defence of hedonism, espe-
cially its utilitarian variety, is that maximizing pleasure ‘was a matter of 
fact under actual conditions, generally accompanied by the greatest quan-
tity of other goods’, which would be a ‘strange coincidence’. Assuming this 
unexpected coincidence true, pleasure would thus serve a ‘good criterion’ 
of right action.16 But, as far as Moore is concerned, there is little reason to 
suppose this coincidence.17
 MAKING BETTER SENSE OF IDEAL UTIL ITARIANISM 293
III. Metaphysical ethics
Moore begins Chapter IV, ‘Metaphysical Ethics’, referring to unnamed 
Hegelian-influenced ‘modern writers’ who also followed the Stoics, Spi-
noza and Kant in deploying metaphysical propositions as the grounds for 
inferring ethical propositions. The only ‘modern’ metaphysical writers he 
eventually comes around to naming and discussing specifically are J. S. 
Mackenzie and Green.18 According to Moore, Mackenzie typifies those 
modern metaphysicians who hold that our supreme good is realizing our 
true selves. More importantly and erroneously:
They also imply, as I said, that this ethical proposition follows from 
some proposition which is metaphysical: that the question ‘What is 
real?’ has some logical bearing upon the question ‘What is good?’ … 
To hold that from any proposition asserting ‘Reality is of this nature’ 
we can infer, or obtain confirmation for, any proposition asserting 
‘This is good in itself’ is to commit the naturalistic fallacy … . It rests 
upon the failure to perceive that any truth which asserts ‘This is 
good in itself’ is quite unique in kind – that it cannot be reduced to 
any assertion about reality, and therefore must remain unaffected 
by any conclusions we may reach about the nature of reality … . 
If, for instance, we are told that the ideal consists in the realization 
of the ‘true self,’ the very words suggest that the act that the self in 
question is true is supposed to have some bearing on the fact that 
it is good.19
Much of the remainder of Chapter IV is devoted to disparaging Kant. But 
near the end of the chapter, Moore returns to criticizing metaphysical 
writers after Kant, who though ‘profess[ing] to base their Ethics on an 
investigation of will’ fail to prove that what is willed in a certain way is 
also good. These writers ‘make no attempt to shew that will is a criterion 
of goodness; and no stronger evidence could be given that they do not 
recognize that this, at most, is all it can be’.20 And even if we could show 
that willing in a certain way and goodness generally accompanied one 
another, it would remain ‘doubtful whether the inference from “gener-
ally” to “always” would be valid, and almost certain that this principle 
would be useless’.21
Green, however, is the sole example Moore gives of a post-Kan-
tian metaphysician who allegedly confuses willing in a certain way with 
goodness, which explains most probably why Mander thinks that Moore 
saw himself as ‘offering a replacement’ for Green’s Prolegomena to Ethics, 
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which, he adds, ‘would certainly not have been lost on Moore’s first 
readers’.22 Evidence for Green’s confusing willing in a certain way with 
goodness is found where we see him ‘explicitly stating that “the common 
characteristic of the good is that it [my italics] satisfies some desire”’. 
Furthermore, Green’s ‘conclusion may be ethical and may even be right, 
but he has not given us a single reason for believing them’. But the ‘thing 
which a scientific Ethics is required to shew, namely that certain things 
are really good, he has assumed to begin with, in assuming that things 
which are willed in a certain way are always good’ (my italics). Hence, the 
‘Prolegomena to Ethics is quite as far as Mr Spencer’s Data of Ethics, from 
making the smallest contribution to the solution of ethical problems’.23
Notice that Moore is not saying that Green confuses goodness with 
what (say, willing in a certain way) just happens to satisfy our desires, 
but that he confuses goodness with desire satisfaction itself. Good is that 
constituted by desires being satisfied. Desire satisfaction is the whole of 
goodness. Whenever and wherever goodness is going on, desires are, 
analytically speaking, being satisfied. Goodness is not an object but an 
experience. But how desire satisfaction and willing in a certain way are 
related is unclear. Surely they are not identical experiences nor synonyms 
for the very same experience. In any case, notwithstanding whether the 
experience of satisfying desires is willing in a certain way, Green, as I 
have argued elsewhere, does indeed maintain, at least on numerous occa-
sions, that happiness generally, if not always, accompanies good willing. 
But insofar as Green is claiming this, he is not analysing or defining good 
in Moore’s sense. Green is not confusing a non-natural property, namely 
goodness, with another natural property, namely desire satisfaction. 
Therefore, he is not a relevant example of Moore’s naturalistic fallacy. 
But he could be said to exemplify a complementary analytical error or fal-
lacy of reasoning. He could seem to be guilty of confusing often enough 
the experience of happiness with the experience of willing in a certain 
way. He might be charged with claiming that happiness always, as an 
empirical fact, accompanies good willing. But, as I have just suggested, 
I do not think he ever makes such a claim; rather, he merely insists that 
happiness normally tends to accompany good willing.
While Mander, rightly in my judgement, faults Russell and Moore 
for committing hermeneutical patricide by reconstructing idealists sim-
plistically and exaggerating the differences between them, he does much 
the same in misrepresenting idealism’s rejection of classical utilitarian-
ism. Classical utilitarianism wrought idealism no less than analytical 
philosophy was fashioned by idealism. Moore’s contrasting assessment 
of hedonism (Chapter II) and metaphysical ethics (Chapter III) in 
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Principia Ethica demonstrates this plainly, even though his account of 
Mill and Sidgwick on the one hand and his account of Mackenzie and 
Green on the other hand have much to be desired. Notwithstanding 
whether all four were more preoccupied with good or with ought, and 
notwithstanding whether they were what we now call consequentialists, 
all four tended to converge in recommending the same practical con-
duct. Though they may have given sufficiently distinct foundational 
reasons for the conduct they recommended, insofar as they understood 
good differently, happiness was hardly less crucial for idealists as it was 
for classical utilitarians. Indeed, they all held either that promoting hap-
piness meant promoting goodness or that happiness in some sense typi-
cally accompanies promoting goodness and was therefore an extremely 
useful substitute ‘criterion’ for guiding our normative practical deci-
sions. In finding what seemed to Moore to be the naturalistic fallacy in 
classical utilitarians and idealists alike, his Principia Ethica reminds us 
of just how much they constitute a historical continuum rather than the 
second being a dramatic break with the first.
IV. Hurka’s ‘school’
Hastings Rashdall dedicated his 1907 The Theory of Good and Evil ‘To the 
Memory of My Teachers Thomas Hill Green and Henry Sidgwick’, though 
he adds in the ‘Preface’ that neither of these:
great writers to whom I feel I owe most in the special department 
of Ethics – the late Professor Sidgwick, and the late Professor T. H. 
Green whose lectures and private classes I used to attend as an 
undergraduate – can well be regarded as having said the last word 
upon the subject by students of a generation later who have prof-
ited not merely by the criticism which each of them supplies upon 
the other, but by the general progress of Philosophy since the first 
appearance of Sidgwick’s Methods of Ethics (1874) and of Green’s 
Prolegomena to Ethics (1883).24
But why should we care who influenced Rashdall unless we first have 
reason to care about Rashdall, whose reputation has faded?
Thomas Hurka’s recent British Ethical Theorists from Sidgwick to 
Ewing as well as his 2011 collection, Underivative Duty, make a compel-
ling case for once again taking up Rashdall. Hurka considers Rashdall a 
key figure in an underappreciated ‘school’ of British moral philosophers 
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prominent from the 1870s to 1950s, which included not only more well-
known names such as Henry Sidgwick, G. E. Moore and W. D. Ross, but 
also J. M. E. McTaggart, H. A. Prichard, E. F. Carritt, C. D. Broad and 
A. C. Ewing.25 According to Hurka, this Sidgwick-to-Ewing school com-
bined meta-ethical non-naturalism with normative realism. That is, they 
insisted that ethics was autonomous and underivative whether from evo-
lutionary biology, psychology or metaphysics and that normative judge-
ments were universal and objective, as well as simply sui generis.26
V. Rashdall ‘in the middle’
Of course, insisting that despite their achievements, neither Green nor 
Sidgwick should be viewed as having said the ‘last word’ on ethics sug-
gests that Rashdall did not view each uncritically. Indeed, insofar as he 
tried to combine them, we should expect that he rejected elements of 
their respective moral theories. But what Rashdall rejected from Green 
himself rather than his followers, such as Mackenzie, is not easy to deter-
mine because, not unlike Moore, Rashdall frequently takes Mackenzie 
as better exemplifying and saying more lucidly what Green was trying 
to say.27 This naturally raises the question of whether anything Rashdall 
says for or against Green is truly an interpretation of him.
However much Rashdall conflates Green with Mackenzie, he says 
many of their criticisms of classical utilitarianism are uncompelling. 
For instance, Rashdall rejected Mackenzie’s claim (which he also says 
at one point Green purportedly agreed with and at another point dis-
agreed with) that pleasures cannot be summed and therefore a sum of 
pleasures cannot be a possible object of desire.28 Rashdall also repudi-
ates Mackenzie’s allegation that pleasures were incommensurable, 
therefore making it impossible to determine whether any option before 
us was cardinally superior to any other. According to Mackenzie on 
Rashdall’s account, because ‘numerical values cannot, with any mean-
ing, be assigned to two pleasures or sums of pleasure … there can never 
be any meaning in the assertion “this pleasure is twice as great as that”’.29 
Although Rashdall conceded that it is certainly difficult if not impossible 
to compare and rank pleasures cardinally, comparing and ranking them 
ordinally is hardly so demanding. We do it all the time. As Rashdall says, 
repeating McTaggart, ‘I feel no hesitation in affirming that the pleasure I 
get from a plate of turtle-soup is more than twice the pleasure I get from a 
plate of pea-soup.’ Like comparing the size of flocks of sheep, comparing 
pleasures is ‘none the less not quantitative because it is vague’.30
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As for Green’s further claim that maximizing pleasure was incoher-
ent because maximum pleasure cannot be enjoyed all at once and because 
it is always possible to desire more, Rashdall responds much as Sidgwick 
did in criticizing Green on this same account.31 Rashdall remarks, ‘To aim 
at a greatest possible sum of pleasures means to endeavor that as much 
pleasure should be got into a given time as possible and that the time 
which we are enjoying pleasure should be as long as possible.’32 And see 
where Rashdall says:
The possibility of desiring a sum of pleasures was denied by the late 
Prof. T. H. Green but it is difficult to see on what grounds except 
the obvious but irrelevant fact that pleasures cannot be enjoyed as 
a sum. Such arguments are surely based upon a mere verbal quib-
ble. You might as well deny that I can desire music because I can-
not take in a whole symphony simultaneously, while each separate 
note, taken by itself, would not be music at all. When I say that I 
desire a sum of pleasures, I mean of course that I desire to get as 
much pleasure as possible, i.e. to enjoy pleasure as intense and as 
long lasting as possible.33
Furthermore, Rashdall faults Green implicitly in the guise of criticizing 
Mackenzie explicitly for thinking moral self-realization is an any less 
problematic object of desire and duty. If ‘the “self-realization” which 
Prof. Mackenzie wants is not in time at all, how can it be an object of 
human effort?’ He adds, if ‘it is in time, would he not think a longer dura-
tion of it better than a shorter?’34
Moore is responsible for inventing non-hedonistic, ideal utilitarian-
ism more than any other philosopher. But Rashdall gave it its name and 
disseminated it and defended it more systematically. Moore then, no less 
than Green and Sidgwick, also motivated Rashdall’s moral thinking. The 
Theory of Good and Evil engages mostly the very same nineteenth-century 
philosophers as Moore does in Principia Ethica, namely Mill, Sidgwick, 
Spencer and idealists such as Green and Mackenzie. And in Is Conscience 
an Emotion? from 1914, Rashdall pays his debts to Moore, insisting that 
no one has rightly ‘done so much to emphasise the ultimate, unanalys-
able, sui generis character of value-judgement as Mr. G. E. Moore, of 
Trinity College, Cambridge’. In asserting that pleasure is good, you nec-
essarily mean ‘something more’ than that pleasure is pleasure and that 
whatever that something is, it ‘is not expressible in any language that does 
not contain the word “good” or some synonym of it’. Moore was abso-
lutely correct, insisting that good is simply ‘indefinable’.35 And following 
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Moore, he rejects hedonism, maintaining that he does ‘not think that the 
pleasure-pain side of conscious experience is the only element which we 
take into consideration in pronouncing on its value’. Clearly, ‘it is cer-
tainly one of the elements on which its value depends, and in the case of 
such elementary rules as we are considering, it is the only one that need 
be taken account of’ (my italics).36 Though Rashdall does not elaborate 
here, I take it that in conceding that when considering elementary moral 
rules, it is enough simply to keep in mind the pleasurable consequences 
of our actions. This concession is not without considerable practical sig-
nificance in establishing our fundamental moral obligations, in as much 
as it seems that Rashdall is conceding, not unlike Green, that classical 
utilitarianism can stand in most of the time as a proxy for determining 
right from wrong.
Rashdall’s differences with Moore were subtle but not unimpor-
tant. Some of them reveal just how much Rashdall owed to Sidgwick in 
trying to build on and go beyond Mill. In Chapter III of Volume I of The 
Theory of Good and Evil, devoted to Sidgwick and entitled ‘Rationalistic 
Utilitarianism’, Rashdall says that Sidgwick’s role in the ‘development of 
English Utilitarianism may be indicated by saying that he takes up the 
controversy at the point at which it had been left by Mill’. Sidgwick’s 
improvement of Mill was pivotal in the ‘dialectic which leads away 
from Utilitarianism towards what I may be excused for calling by antic-
ipation a higher and deeper Moral Philosophy’ (ostensibly Rashdall’s).37 
Presumably, Moore’s ideal utilitarianism constituted for Rashdall the 
next step in this dialectic coming between Sidgwick’s hedonistic distil-
lation of Mill and his own final, idealistic improvement. In other words, 
Sidgwick improved Mill by exposing how Mill was not consistently 
hedonistic in distinguishing between higher and lower pleasures. Moore 
then improved Sidgwick by proving why hedonistic utilitarianism was in 
any case flawed analytically. Rashdall then built on Moore’s anti-hedon-
ism by borrowing from Green among others.
For Rashdall, Sidgwick’s greatest innovation over Mill was his rec-
ognition of the justificatory value of moral common sense. According to 
Rashdall, ideal utilitarianism suitably improved best comports with com-
mon-sense morality, revealing specifically Sidgwick’s powerful method-
ological influence on him. Though Rashdall held contrary to Sidgwick 
that other values or states of affairs besides just pleasure contained 
goodness, Sidgwick nevertheless correctly appreciated the decisive rel-
evance of taking common sense seriously in justifying utilitarianism. So 
for Rashdall as for Sidgwick, our common-sense moral judgements help 
us discover moral truth insofar as philosophizing about the latter needs 
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to be more-or-less consistent with the former. For both, common sense is 
justificatory.
Rashdall also seems to follow Sidgwick, insisting that explana-
tions of the evolution of common-sense morals were nonetheless meta- 
ethically irrelevant. Just as the fact that our cognitive faculties developed 
out of more primitive ones has no bearing whatsoever on mathematical 
and scientific truth, the fact that our moral faculties also developed out 
of more primitive ones is wholly irrelevant to the existence and particu-
lars of moral truth. Thanks to Sidgwick and contrary to the exaggerated 
claims of Spencer, we may hope that the:
time will come when the present craze for extracting ethical theory 
from a study of the habits of Mollusca and crustacean will be seen 
to have been as much the passing fashion of an age of biological 
discovery as Locke’s speculation as the possibility of solving moral 
problems by the aid of Algebra was the passing aberration of a 
great intellect dazzled by the brilliant vista of possible achievement 
opened out to his generation by the mathematical discoveries of 
Newton.38
Or more generally, ‘No true account of what the moral consciousness 
actually is can possibly be vitiated by any true account of its genesis.’39
Now much like Sidgwick, Rashdall does not always keep truths 
about morality’s genesis distinct from claims about moral truth.40 More 
than once, he conflates origin with validity or at least he fudges the dis-
tinction between them. For instance, in The Theory of Good and Evil, he 
says ambiguously that ‘the evolutionary history of Morality does sup-
ply us with an additional caution against tampering with deeply-seated 
moral convictions’ (my italics).41 Spencer’s ‘doctrine, in so far as it has 
a sound physiological basis, can at most only slightly reinforce that pre-
sumption in favour of established Morality from which the sane Moralist 
from any school sets out’ (my italics).42 The ‘evolutionary history of Ethics 
may then supply us with some help – chiefly negative help – towards (as it 
were) purging our value-judgements of irrelevant matter due to the mere 
inheritance or tradition or prejudice and the like’ (my italics).43 And evo-
lutionary theory ‘has supplied us with an additional ground for a prima 
facie confidence in apparently intuitive moral beliefs, while at the same 
time it has enforced the necessity of asking whether such beliefs have or 
have not outlived their justification’ (first italics mine).44 Clearly, in sug-
gesting that established morality and its evolutionary history caution us 
against tampering with it by providing it with a prima facie presumption 
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and helping to ground it, Rashdall concedes that the historical origins of 
common sense are not without justificatory weight. Origins do indeed 
bear on validity after all.
Perhaps Rashdall’s (and Sidgwick’s similar) fudge on whether the 
history of our moral intuitions contributes to warranting them exposes 
a quandary faced by all versions of reflective equilibrium. If we dare not 
ignore our common-sense moral intuitions, however they have come 
about when we reason morally, then it would seem that the former are 
necessarily justificatory in some genuine albeit equivocal sense. So much 
for unalloyed non-naturalism.
VI. Pleasure, happiness and life as a whole
Rashdall’s ideal version of utilitarianism is most distinctive for attribut-
ing intrinsic value or goodness itself to a plurality of goods, or perhaps it 
would be better to say that he attributes intrinsic value to a plurality of 
virtues or states of affairs. Either way takes him beyond Moore. No doubt, 
too, either characterization helps make better sense of why Rashdall fol-
lowed Moore, insisting that good was unanalysable, although Rashdall 
sometimes seems to imply that good was not just unanalysable but also 
meaningless. Goods (and virtues) were conceptually meaningful, refer-
ring to something real, but not so the concept of ‘good’.
In The Theory of Good and Evil, Vol. I, Rashdall says that the moral-
ity of our actions is determined by their tendency to promote ‘many ends’ 
rather than one end. In some passages, he says these include two espe-
cially, namely ‘Morality and pleasure’. Elsewhere, he says rather vaguely 
that morality requires that we promote other goods, including ‘disposi-
tions, emotions, activities, states of consciousness which are valued for 
their own sakes and not merely as a means to some further good’.45 And 
wherever he shifts to the language of virtues instead of goods, he says 
that acting morally prescribes promoting the exercise of our ‘higher intel-
lectual and aesthetic faculties’ and controlling our ‘lower or more ani-
mal impulses’.46 The former includes particularly the aptitude for seeking 
truth and speaking truthfully. Volume II of The Theory of Good and Evil 
blends the language of goods and virtues:
Suffice it once more to remind the reader that, while I do regard 
pleasure as a good, I do not regard it as the good. It seems to me 
perfectly clear that the moral consciousness does pronounce some 
goods to be higher, or intrinsically more valuable than others; and 
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that at the head of these goods comes Virtue, while many other 
things – intellectual cultivation and intellectual activity, aesthetic 
cultivation, emotion of various kinds – are also good and of more 
intrinsic value than mere pleasure. It is true that pleasure is an ele-
ment in every state of consciousness to which we can assign ulti-
mate value.47
Now, in claiming that pleasure is an element accompanying every valu-
able state of consciousness, Rashdall implies that pleasure is the sole 
good that attends to every other good. The exercise of every virtue is 
always accompanied by the good of pleasure and, practically speaking, 
we should be thankful for that. Fortunately for us, pleasure just happens 
to supervene on all other goods. Wherever one or more other goods are 
going on, the good of pleasure is going on as well.
So pleasure marks the presence of other goods but not systemat-
ically because though pleasure is ‘an element in everything to which we 
attach value’, we ‘do not attach value to consciousness in proportion to 
its pleasantness’.48 Happiness, however, is a far better marker of the pres-
ence of other goods. It is the one good that best signifies the presence of 
other goods. Though happiness is not identical with the ‘end of life’, it 
is nevertheless ‘a most important’ element in true well-being. It is ‘a far 
more valuable kind of pleasure than any other, and far more inseparable 
than most other pleasures from the goods to which we ascribe the very 
highest value’ (my italics).49 Even though ‘men are not happy in propor-
tion to their goodness’, just as they do not experience pleasure in pro-
portion to their overall goodness, happiness fortuitously tracks overall 
goodness better than any other singular good.
Earlier, I suggested Rashdall seems to hold that classical utilitar-
ianism can stand in as a convenient method for determining our moral 
obligations. We can now see why. If pleasure typically marks the pres-
ence of other goods, then maximizing pleasure will also tend to maxi-
mize them. And if happiness marks their presence even better, then 
maximizing happiness can stand in yet more conveniently as a substitute 
tactic for determining moral rightness. But Moore, as we saw earlier, 
doubted whether pleasure was a useful, proxy ‘criterion’ of right action. 
It would therefore be a ‘strange coincidence’ if maximizing pleasure also 
happened to maximize good. Hence, we might expect that Moore would 
find Rashdall’s claims that classical utilitarianism could stand in for ideal 
utilitarianism problematic. And indeed, Moore faults Rashdall precisely 
on this score in an obscure review of The Theory of Good and Evil in the 
Hibbert Journal. There Moore writes that Rashdall thinks that actions 
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that ‘produce a maximum balance of pleasure might always also produce 
such other results as would give the total a maximum of intrinsic value’. 
Moore avers that Rashdall errs in assuming this coincidence. Indeed, as 
Moore remarks, Rashdall himself sometimes concedes as much insofar 
as he ‘appears to hold that cases do sometimes actually occur in which it 
is wrong to do an action whose total results are likely to contain a maxi-
mum balance of pleasure’. Rashdall, then, recognizes the implausibility 
of the ‘view that it always would be right, no matter what the consequences 
might be in other respects, to do any action which would produce a maxi-
mum of pleasure’.50
Notwithstanding how much Rashdall differed from Moore in terms 
of how closely pleasure as an element of goodness tracked overall good-
ness, Rashdall and Moore differed less about goodness itself. But for 
Rashdall, despite good being indefinable (perhaps because goodness by 
itself does not exist, making the concept nonsense), there was still such a 
thing as an ‘ideal end of life’, which does not consist of a bunch of higher 
and lower goods ‘piled together’ but rather is an interconnected ‘whole 
made up of distinguishable elements – a good made up of an hierarchy 
or ascending scale of goods’.51 This ‘ideal life or the good is an ultimate 
conception which does not admit of further definition, and the content 
of which we can only express by enumerating the various elements or 
aspects of it, and then explaining in what way they are to be combined’.52 
Good, then, may not be quite unanalysable after all. It’s just that we can-
not say much about it other than analysing individually and connecting 
hierarchically the separate goods constituting it. The more we try to get 
a hold of it conceptually, the more it slips away, but there really is some-
thing complex and very significant there.
Here we return to Green. Rashdall’s conception of an ideal life as 
whole, and the place of pleasure and happiness in it, is seminal for Green 
as well. Surely, Rashdall was a careful enough reader of Green not to 
miss just how importantly intertwined these notions were. (Recall, after 
all, that Rashdall dedicated The Theory of Good and Evil to Green and 
Sidgwick both.) As I have argued at length in Utilitarianism and the New 
Liberalism, Green was what we would label a non-hedonistic consequen-
tialist, for whom promoting self-realization, particularly our moral dispo-
sitions, was the criterion of moral rightness. And for Green, as previously 
noted, insofar as pleasure typically accompanies self-realizing activities, 
aiming at maximizing pleasure turns out to be a pretty good proxy for 
promoting self-realization. In other words, classical utilitarianism, espe-
cially Mill’s version, could be substituted in place of the kind of practical 
reasoning Green favoured.
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VII. Rightness
As I have been stressing, Rashdall was an ideal utilitarian like Moore and, 
if we follow Hurka, like McTaggart as well.53 Like them, he combined a 
consequentialist theory of right but with a pluralistic account of good. 
That is, he held that the morality of actions is determined solely by the 
goodness of the state of affairs produced and that the goodness of the 
latter consisted not just in the good of pleasure but in various other goods 
as well.54 As Rashdall declares: ‘According to this view (ideal utilitarian-
ism) actions are right or wrong according as they tend to produce for 
all mankind an ideal end or good, which includes, but is not limited to, 
pleasure.’55 And as he often insists, as we have already seen, the ‘ideal 
or good for man is not a number of goods lying side by side and having 
no relation to one another, but a particular kind of life in which various 
elements are harmoniously combined’.56
But unlike Moore, Rashdall was just as preoccupied with rightness 
as with goodness. In this regard, he looked back more to Sidgwick, who, 
as we saw earlier, was far more invested in determining what we ought 
to do than he was in defining or analysing good. Indeed, for Rashdall, 
rightness was fundamentally axiomatic.
Rashdall frequently refers to his consequentialist theory of right as 
the axiom of rational benevolence, which is to say that for him it is ‘a 
priori’ or ‘self-evident’. For a judgement to be self-evident a priori means 
that there is ‘an element of knowledge which cannot be explained as sen-
sation or any generalization from sensation’.57 Such a judgement is ‘as 
inexpugnable a notion of the human mind as the notion of quantity or 
cause or substance or the like … ’.58 Likewise, referencing Sidgwick, he 
insists that rational prudence and ‘equity or justice’ are also independ-
ent, self-evident normative axioms.59 Whereas rational benevolence 
and rational prudence prescribe how good is to be promoted, equity 
prescribes how it should be distributed. Obviously, insofar as Rashdall 
deems rational prudence and equity self-evident axioms in addition to 
rational benevolence, he opens his consequentialist theory of right to a 
host of problems that go beyond Sidgwick’s anxiety about the dualism 
of practical reasoning. Designating equity a third self-evident axiom of 
right adds another layer of complication, making his practical reasoning 
arguably no longer solely consequentialist.
Rashdall regards equity as an independent, normative axiom of 
great importance. His discussion of how we should understand this 
axiom is often confusing and is quite different from Sidgwick’s coun-
terpart conception of it. Rashdall begins his chapter on ‘Justice’ in the 
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first volume of The Theory of Good and Evil stipulating that we ‘want a 
principle to guide us as to the distribution of good among the various 
persons capable of enjoying it’. Bentham’s principle that ‘everyone is to 
count for one and nobody for more than one’ is not a bad starting point 
when somewhat modified as ‘Everybody’s good [is] to be treated as of 
equal value with the like good of every one else’.60 Rashdall next spends 
much of the chapter reformulating equity variously. For instance, he 
says that by equity, ‘what the individual is entitled to is simply equality 
of consideration’. And he also says, ‘The principle of equal consideration 
certainly requires us to aim at the greater equality of actual Well-being, 
but only on condition that the greater equality will not violate the equal 
right of each to enjoy as much good as it is possible for him to enjoy.’61 
Now, these formulations are palpably not identical. For instance, being 
equally considered does not necessarily entail that one’s good is indeed 
being treated with equal value. I may consider others equally by treating 
them equally badly without treating their good equally at all. Certainly, 
equal consideration does not entail that I promote ‘greater’ equality of 
‘actual’ well-being. Moreover, the ‘equal’ right to enjoy as much good as 
it is ‘possible’ to enjoy would seem remarkably over-demanding. Matters 
only get messier for Rashdall where he casts equity in terms of equal 
opportunity. For instance, citizens are owed the ‘opportunity for the fre-
est and most fruitful exercise’ of their ‘highest capacities – their exercise 
in such a way as shall be most favourable both to the goodness itself and 
to the pleasure which, under favourable circumstances, goodness brings 
with it’. They require ‘room for initiation, for selection, for choosing 
what to do or not to do … ’.62 And recalling Bosanquet, Rashdall observes 
that it is the ‘supreme condition of a truly moral system of property-dis-
tribution that it shall be the one most favourable to the cultivation and 
development of the highest individual characters’.63 Notice that here 
property should be distributed not according to what promotes every-
one’s highest capacities, but according to what promotes the capacities 
of those whose capacities happen to be the highest. So equal consider-
ation really prescribes ‘equality of treatment when capacities are equal, 
treatment in proportion to the intrinsic worth of the capacity when they 
are unequal’.64
Rashdall, then, conjoins a non-hedonistic or idealist theory of good 
with a compound, axiomatic theory of right. He combines what preoccu-
pied Moore with what earlier preoccupied Sidgwick. And he also looked 
back to Green. There is far more nuance to the story of ideal utilitarian-
ism than just Moore, his critics and his subsequent reformulated views 
about the naturalistic fallacy.65
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Finally, when we recall Mackenzie’s allegation noted previously that 
the only ‘real difference’ between Moore and his idealist adversaries such 
as Green and Bradley ‘seems to lie in his contention that Good cannot be 
defined’, we have all the more reason to insist that the story of ideal utili-
tarianism is far more knotty than the current received view would have it. 
If Mackenzie’s claim has even some merit, then Rashdall, as well as Moore, 
has more in common with idealists than we now assume, suggesting that 
ideal utilitarianism and idealism were hardly implacable antagonists.
Conclusion
For, beyond somewhat narrow limits, there seems no ground for 
determining what a philosopher actually thought except a judg-
ment of what is right to think. The other method put forward now, 
especially in Germany, as ‘history of development’ rests in the end 
on this. It is true that much light may be thrown on what a man 
thought by discovering what his predecessors thought; but our view 
of what they thought must again be determined largely by our view 
of what can be thought [my italics].
If he [Kant] had seen it [the contradiction between two prop-
ositions], he would have been forced to choose between them; and 
it belongs to the historian’s province to determine which he would 
have chosen, since that would depend upon what he thought to be 
the real significance of his system. And in this determination the 
historian must assume that Kant would have been influenced, to 
some extent, by the same arguments which appear conclusive to him. 
Failing this assumption, it would be impossible for him to declare 
what was the essential contention upon which the philosopher 
really means to insist [my italics].
G. E. Moore, ‘1898 Fellowship Dissertation’
When Moore revised his ‘1897 Fellowship Dissertation’ and resubmitted 
it a year later as his ‘1898 Fellowship Dissertation’, he added the above to 
the ‘Introduction’. Presumably he added the above, which was part of a 
supplementary clarification of his approach to reading past philosophical 
texts, in response to Edward Caird’s critical report on the earlier disser-
tation. Caird had disparaged Moore severely for conflating his own views 
with the views of those he criticized, such as Kant and Sidgwick. Moore, 
that is, failed utterly to interpret Kant and Sidgwick correctly, turning 
their thinking into what Moore held they should have thought. So, for 
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Moore, at least in 1898, when encountering an inconsistency in Kant, 
apply the following principle: Whenever we can imagine Kant approving 
our corrections to his arguments, we can conclude that this was what he 
actually thought.
When practising the history of philosophy, we should eschew argu-
ing with historical texts as if we were quarrelling with each other. Rosen’s 
scholarship is testimony to this principle. We would do best to avoid spec-
ulating how, for instance, Rashdall could respond to any number of our 
criticisms of him. We should not say what Robert Shaver says in defence 
of Rashdall for purportedly having violated ‘ought’ implies ‘can’, namely 
in ‘reply, Rashdall might say that he is relying on a sense of “ought” that 
does not imply “can”’ (my italics).66
As a first step, then, we should focus on how authors of these texts 
who were contemporaries argued with each other. Next, we should 
attend to how they argued, or appropriated, those who immediately 
preceded them, keeping in mind that they probably misread their prede-
cessors much like we misread them by arguing with them as if they were 
our contemporaries.
That is to say, when we read Moore, we should read the whole of 
Principia Ethica carefully and not just the opening chapter where Moore 
introduces and explains the naturalistic fallacy. We should at least also 
read the middle chapters where Moore engages Spencer, Mill, Sidgwick, 
Kant and Green in the guise of Mackenzie. We should then follow 
through by examining no less carefully the last two chapters, particularly 
where Moore defends his version of ideal utilitarianism. And we should, 
furthermore, read the ‘Preface to the Second Edition’ of Principia Ethica 
as well as Moore’s ‘1897 Fellowship Dissertation’ and ‘1898 Fellowship 
Dissertation’. We should read, despite its inferiority to Principia Ethica, 
Rashdall’s The Theory of Good and Evil and a bit of McTaggart to boot. 
Spencer, Mill, Sidgwick, Kant and idealists such as Green and Mackenzie 
were in Moore’s sights primarily when he wrote Principia Ethica. They 
constituted the context of his immediate philosophic discourse, and 
Rashdall’s too. Rashdall pretty much takes up the very same contem-
poraries and immediate predecessors as worthy of criticism. Likewise, 
Rashdall and McTaggart are crucial because they built on Moore in 
assembling what we have since come to characterize as ideal utilitarian-
ism. If we want to understand just Moore’s version of ideal utilitarianism, 
then we need to come to terms with Rashdall and McTaggart’s versions 
lest we conflate them all into one muddled mess of inheritance.
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I would further like to re-emphasize that because Rashdall dedicates 
The Theory of Good and Evil to both Green and Sidgwick and interprets 
himself as combining the best of both, we have all the more reason not 
to exaggerate the differences between classical utilitarianism and ideal-
ism, which it provoked in response.67 No doubt as well, and to repeat, we 
do best not to overdramatize the differences between idealism and ideal 
utilitarianism. I suspect that our contemporary predilection for drawing 
sharp analytical dichotomies drives some of this overdramatization – 
which is just another way of saying that analytical philosophers should 
tread more carefully whenever they engage in the history of philosophy.
But I would concede, as I surmise Rosen would as well, that how-
ever much idealists such as Green and Bradley and ideal utilitarians like 
Moore and Rashdall saw themselves as slaying their predecessors and 
however much we have subsequently bought into this melodramatic nar-
rative of their intentions, we should not forget to pay sufficient attention 
to the actual substance and effectiveness of their criticisms. We should 
no less avoid fetishizing authorial intentions than we should recklessly 
reconstruct texts out of context.
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Methods of Ethics in which Sidgwick discusses these three axioms. After endorsing Sidgwick’s 
axioms, Rashdall says, curiously, that these axioms of right are implied in the idea of good. In-
deed, they ‘both involve the same single analysable idea which can expressed in many ways but 
can never be defined … ’ (46). See 181–3, where Rashdall discusses rational benevolence and 
equity as axioms, again referencing Sidgwick. He claims that, among other things, perceiving 
benevolence and equity as axioms testifies to their ‘rational, objective character’.
60. Rashdall, The Theory of Good and Evil, Vol. I, 222.
61. Rashdall, The Theory of Good and Evil, Vol. I, 226, 234.
62. Rashdall, The Theory of Good and Evil, Vol. I, 258, 276.
63. Rashdall, The Theory of Good and Evil, Vol. I, 277.
64. See also Rashdall, The Theory of Good and Evil, Vol. I, 255, where he says that because the 
‘higher good is worth more than the lower good’, the ‘man who has more capacity for higher 
good should count for more than the man who has less’. Those who are more talented deserve 
more opportunities to cultivate their superior talents. Finally, whatever equal consideration 
amounts to, it does not mean equal freedom in Spencer’s sense either: ‘To my own mind the 
principle that “every man is free to do that which he wills, provided he infringes not the equal 
freedom of any other man” is as self-evidently absurd as to Herbert Spencer it as self-evidently 
true.’ Contrary to Spencer, the ‘idea that “compulsion” is avoided by the absence of State in-
terference is a delusion’. The ‘workman who is compelled to accept subsistence wages under 
penalty of starvation is just as much “compelled” or “interfered with” as if he were threatened 
with imprisonment by the State’. And a ‘labourer without Capital is about as free to appropri-
ate the value of his labour as a lame man without crutches is free to walk’ (391, 393). Again, as 
with Green, Sidgwick, Moore and many others of Hurka’s ‘school’, Spencer was very much on 
Rashdall’s mind.
65. G. E. Moore, Principia Ethica, ed. Thomas Baldwin (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1994).
66. Robert Shaver, ‘Prichard’s Arguments against Ideal Utilitarianism’, Utilitas, FirstView, 17. 
Though a fine account of Prichard’s often obtuse criticisms of ideal utilitarianism, Shaver’s 
essay offers several hypothetical ways of how Rashdall ‘might’ respond to criticisms Shaver 
raises. See 17–18. Shaver also speculates how Prichard ‘might’ respond to objections that ideal 
utilitarians might have made to his criticisms of Moore. See 10. Shaver notes, too, on 15 that 
it is ‘striking that the arguments I have considered in this section and the previous two – ar-
guments that dominate the debate now – get so little attention from later Prichard’. But why 
should we be all that surprised that Prichard missed arguments that now preoccupy us?
67. My Utilitarianism and the New Liberalism tried hard to demonstrate that the disparities be-
tween classical utilitarians such as Mill and Sidgwick on the one hand and idealists and new 
liberals like Green, Hobhouse, Ritchie and Hobson on the other have been overblown.
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